From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 18:18:48 +0000 (+0100) Subject: 3.18-stable patches X-Git-Tag: v3.18.96~40 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=c9a8d4bd622518122eb5c742133e31d6ed45d87f;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git 3.18-stable patches added patches: crypto-x86-twofish-3way-fix-rbp-usage.patch mm-vmscan-make-unregister_shrinker-no-op-if-register_shrinker-failed.patch net-avoid-skb_warn_bad_offload-on-is_err.patch netfilter-ipt_clusterip-fix-out-of-bounds-accesses-in-clusterip_tg_check.patch netfilter-on-sockopt-acquire-sock-lock-only-in-the-required-scope.patch netfilter-x_tables-avoid-out-of-bounds-reads-in-xt_request_find_-match-target.patch netfilter-x_tables-fix-int-overflow-in-xt_alloc_table_info.patch netfilter-xt_rateest-acquire-xt_rateest_mutex-for-hash-insert.patch provide-a-function-to-create-a-nul-terminated-string-from-unterminated-data.patch selinux-ensure-the-context-is-nul-terminated-in-security_context_to_sid_core.patch selinux-skip-bounded-transition-processing-if-the-policy-isn-t-loaded.patch staging-android-ion-add-__gfp_nowarn-for-system-contig-heap.patch xfrm-check-id-proto-in-validate_tmpl.patch --- diff --git a/queue-3.18/crypto-x86-twofish-3way-fix-rbp-usage.patch b/queue-3.18/crypto-x86-twofish-3way-fix-rbp-usage.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f8b333a831e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/crypto-x86-twofish-3way-fix-rbp-usage.patch @@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +From d8c7fe9f2a486a6e5f0d5229ca43807af5ab22c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Biggers +Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017 16:40:26 -0800 +Subject: crypto: x86/twofish-3way - Fix %rbp usage + +From: Eric Biggers + +commit d8c7fe9f2a486a6e5f0d5229ca43807af5ab22c6 upstream. + +Using %rbp as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and +breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. + +In twofish-3way, we can't simply replace %rbp with another register +because there are none available. Instead, we use the stack to hold the +values that %rbp, %r11, and %r12 were holding previously. Each of these +values represents the half of the output from the previous Feistel round +that is being passed on unchanged to the following round. They are only +used once per round, when they are exchanged with %rax, %rbx, and %rcx. + +As a result, we free up 3 registers (one per block) and can reassign +them so that %rbp is not used, and additionally %r14 and %r15 are not +used so they do not need to be saved/restored. + +There may be a small overhead caused by replacing 'xchg REG, REG' with +the needed sequence 'mov MEM, REG; mov REG, MEM; mov REG, REG' once per +round. But, counterintuitively, when I tested "ctr-twofish-3way" on a +Haswell processor, the new version was actually about 2% faster. +(Perhaps 'xchg' is not as well optimized as plain moves.) + +Reported-by: syzbot +Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers +Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf +Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + arch/x86/crypto/twofish-x86_64-asm_64-3way.S | 118 ++++++++++++++------------- + 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-x86_64-asm_64-3way.S ++++ b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-x86_64-asm_64-3way.S +@@ -55,29 +55,31 @@ + #define RAB1bl %bl + #define RAB2bl %cl + ++#define CD0 0x0(%rsp) ++#define CD1 0x8(%rsp) ++#define CD2 0x10(%rsp) ++ ++# used only before/after all rounds + #define RCD0 %r8 + #define RCD1 %r9 + #define RCD2 %r10 + +-#define RCD0d %r8d +-#define RCD1d %r9d +-#define RCD2d %r10d +- +-#define RX0 %rbp +-#define RX1 %r11 +-#define RX2 %r12 +- +-#define RX0d %ebp +-#define RX1d %r11d +-#define RX2d %r12d +- +-#define RY0 %r13 +-#define RY1 %r14 +-#define RY2 %r15 +- +-#define RY0d %r13d +-#define RY1d %r14d +-#define RY2d %r15d ++# used only during rounds ++#define RX0 %r8 ++#define RX1 %r9 ++#define RX2 %r10 ++ ++#define RX0d %r8d ++#define RX1d %r9d ++#define RX2d %r10d ++ ++#define RY0 %r11 ++#define RY1 %r12 ++#define RY2 %r13 ++ ++#define RY0d %r11d ++#define RY1d %r12d ++#define RY2d %r13d + + #define RT0 %rdx + #define RT1 %rsi +@@ -85,6 +87,8 @@ + #define RT0d %edx + #define RT1d %esi + ++#define RT1bl %sil ++ + #define do16bit_ror(rot, op1, op2, T0, T1, tmp1, tmp2, ab, dst) \ + movzbl ab ## bl, tmp2 ## d; \ + movzbl ab ## bh, tmp1 ## d; \ +@@ -92,6 +96,11 @@ + op1##l T0(CTX, tmp2, 4), dst ## d; \ + op2##l T1(CTX, tmp1, 4), dst ## d; + ++#define swap_ab_with_cd(ab, cd, tmp) \ ++ movq cd, tmp; \ ++ movq ab, cd; \ ++ movq tmp, ab; ++ + /* + * Combined G1 & G2 function. Reordered with help of rotates to have moves + * at begining. +@@ -110,15 +119,15 @@ + /* G1,2 && G2,2 */ \ + do16bit_ror(32, xor, xor, Tx2, Tx3, RT0, RT1, ab ## 0, x ## 0); \ + do16bit_ror(16, xor, xor, Ty3, Ty0, RT0, RT1, ab ## 0, y ## 0); \ +- xchgq cd ## 0, ab ## 0; \ ++ swap_ab_with_cd(ab ## 0, cd ## 0, RT0); \ + \ + do16bit_ror(32, xor, xor, Tx2, Tx3, RT0, RT1, ab ## 1, x ## 1); \ + do16bit_ror(16, xor, xor, Ty3, Ty0, RT0, RT1, ab ## 1, y ## 1); \ +- xchgq cd ## 1, ab ## 1; \ ++ swap_ab_with_cd(ab ## 1, cd ## 1, RT0); \ + \ + do16bit_ror(32, xor, xor, Tx2, Tx3, RT0, RT1, ab ## 2, x ## 2); \ + do16bit_ror(16, xor, xor, Ty3, Ty0, RT0, RT1, ab ## 2, y ## 2); \ +- xchgq cd ## 2, ab ## 2; ++ swap_ab_with_cd(ab ## 2, cd ## 2, RT0); + + #define enc_round_end(ab, x, y, n) \ + addl y ## d, x ## d; \ +@@ -168,6 +177,16 @@ + decrypt_round3(ba, dc, (n*2)+1); \ + decrypt_round3(ba, dc, (n*2)); + ++#define push_cd() \ ++ pushq RCD2; \ ++ pushq RCD1; \ ++ pushq RCD0; ++ ++#define pop_cd() \ ++ popq RCD0; \ ++ popq RCD1; \ ++ popq RCD2; ++ + #define inpack3(in, n, xy, m) \ + movq 4*(n)(in), xy ## 0; \ + xorq w+4*m(CTX), xy ## 0; \ +@@ -223,11 +242,8 @@ ENTRY(__twofish_enc_blk_3way) + * %rdx: src, RIO + * %rcx: bool, if true: xor output + */ +- pushq %r15; +- pushq %r14; + pushq %r13; + pushq %r12; +- pushq %rbp; + pushq %rbx; + + pushq %rcx; /* bool xor */ +@@ -235,40 +251,36 @@ ENTRY(__twofish_enc_blk_3way) + + inpack_enc3(); + +- encrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 0); +- encrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 1); +- encrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 2); +- encrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 3); +- encrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 4); +- encrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 5); +- encrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 6); +- encrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 7); ++ push_cd(); ++ encrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 0); ++ encrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 1); ++ encrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 2); ++ encrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 3); ++ encrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 4); ++ encrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 5); ++ encrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 6); ++ encrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 7); ++ pop_cd(); + + popq RIO; /* dst */ +- popq %rbp; /* bool xor */ ++ popq RT1; /* bool xor */ + +- testb %bpl, %bpl; ++ testb RT1bl, RT1bl; + jnz .L__enc_xor3; + + outunpack_enc3(mov); + + popq %rbx; +- popq %rbp; + popq %r12; + popq %r13; +- popq %r14; +- popq %r15; + ret; + + .L__enc_xor3: + outunpack_enc3(xor); + + popq %rbx; +- popq %rbp; + popq %r12; + popq %r13; +- popq %r14; +- popq %r15; + ret; + ENDPROC(__twofish_enc_blk_3way) + +@@ -278,35 +290,31 @@ ENTRY(twofish_dec_blk_3way) + * %rsi: dst + * %rdx: src, RIO + */ +- pushq %r15; +- pushq %r14; + pushq %r13; + pushq %r12; +- pushq %rbp; + pushq %rbx; + + pushq %rsi; /* dst */ + + inpack_dec3(); + +- decrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 7); +- decrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 6); +- decrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 5); +- decrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 4); +- decrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 3); +- decrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 2); +- decrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 1); +- decrypt_cycle3(RAB, RCD, 0); ++ push_cd(); ++ decrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 7); ++ decrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 6); ++ decrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 5); ++ decrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 4); ++ decrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 3); ++ decrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 2); ++ decrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 1); ++ decrypt_cycle3(RAB, CD, 0); ++ pop_cd(); + + popq RIO; /* dst */ + + outunpack_dec3(); + + popq %rbx; +- popq %rbp; + popq %r12; + popq %r13; +- popq %r14; +- popq %r15; + ret; + ENDPROC(twofish_dec_blk_3way) diff --git a/queue-3.18/mm-vmscan-make-unregister_shrinker-no-op-if-register_shrinker-failed.patch b/queue-3.18/mm-vmscan-make-unregister_shrinker-no-op-if-register_shrinker-failed.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a2a73863469 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/mm-vmscan-make-unregister_shrinker-no-op-if-register_shrinker-failed.patch @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +From bb422a738f6566f7439cd347d54e321e4fe92a9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tetsuo Handa +Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017 20:31:41 +0900 +Subject: mm,vmscan: Make unregister_shrinker() no-op if register_shrinker() failed. + +From: Tetsuo Handa + +commit bb422a738f6566f7439cd347d54e321e4fe92a9f upstream. + +Syzbot caught an oops at unregister_shrinker() because combination of +commit 1d3d4437eae1bb29 ("vmscan: per-node deferred work") and fault +injection made register_shrinker() fail and the caller of +register_shrinker() did not check for failure. + +---------- +[ 554.881422] FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. +[ 554.881422] name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 +[ 554.881438] CPU: 1 PID: 13231 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8+ #82 +[ 554.881443] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 +[ 554.881445] Call Trace: +[ 554.881459] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 +[ 554.881474] ? arch_local_irq_restore+0x53/0x53 +[ 554.881486] ? find_held_lock+0x35/0x1d0 +[ 554.881507] should_fail+0x8c0/0xa40 +[ 554.881522] ? fault_create_debugfs_attr+0x1f0/0x1f0 +[ 554.881537] ? check_noncircular+0x20/0x20 +[ 554.881546] ? find_next_zero_bit+0x2c/0x40 +[ 554.881560] ? ida_get_new_above+0x421/0x9d0 +[ 554.881577] ? find_held_lock+0x35/0x1d0 +[ 554.881594] ? __lock_is_held+0xb6/0x140 +[ 554.881628] ? check_same_owner+0x320/0x320 +[ 554.881634] ? lock_downgrade+0x990/0x990 +[ 554.881649] ? find_held_lock+0x35/0x1d0 +[ 554.881672] should_failslab+0xec/0x120 +[ 554.881684] __kmalloc+0x63/0x760 +[ 554.881692] ? lock_downgrade+0x990/0x990 +[ 554.881712] ? register_shrinker+0x10e/0x2d0 +[ 554.881721] ? trace_event_raw_event_module_request+0x320/0x320 +[ 554.881737] register_shrinker+0x10e/0x2d0 +[ 554.881747] ? prepare_kswapd_sleep+0x1f0/0x1f0 +[ 554.881755] ? _down_write_nest_lock+0x120/0x120 +[ 554.881765] ? memcpy+0x45/0x50 +[ 554.881785] sget_userns+0xbcd/0xe20 +(...snipped...) +[ 554.898693] kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled +[ 554.898724] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access +[ 554.898732] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN +[ 554.898737] Dumping ftrace buffer: +[ 554.898741] (ftrace buffer empty) +[ 554.898743] Modules linked in: +[ 554.898752] CPU: 1 PID: 13231 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8+ #82 +[ 554.898755] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 +[ 554.898760] task: ffff8801d1dbe5c0 task.stack: ffff8801c9e38000 +[ 554.898772] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x7e/0x150 +[ 554.898775] RSP: 0018:ffff8801c9e3f108 EFLAGS: 00010246 +[ 554.898780] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 +[ 554.898784] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8801c53c6f98 RDI: ffff8801c53c6fa0 +[ 554.898788] RBP: ffff8801c9e3f120 R08: 1ffff100393c7d55 R09: 0000000000000004 +[ 554.898791] R10: ffff8801c9e3ef70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 +[ 554.898795] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 1ffff100393c7e45 R15: ffff8801c53c6f98 +[ 554.898800] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801db300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 +[ 554.898804] CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 +[ 554.898807] CR2: 00000000dbc23000 CR3: 00000001c7269000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 +[ 554.898813] DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000020000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 +[ 554.898816] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 +[ 554.898818] Call Trace: +[ 554.898828] unregister_shrinker+0x79/0x300 +[ 554.898837] ? perf_trace_mm_vmscan_writepage+0x750/0x750 +[ 554.898844] ? down_write+0x87/0x120 +[ 554.898851] ? deactivate_super+0x139/0x1b0 +[ 554.898857] ? down_read+0x150/0x150 +[ 554.898864] ? check_same_owner+0x320/0x320 +[ 554.898875] deactivate_locked_super+0x64/0xd0 +[ 554.898883] deactivate_super+0x141/0x1b0 +---------- + +Since allowing register_shrinker() callers to call unregister_shrinker() +when register_shrinker() failed can simplify error recovery path, this +patch makes unregister_shrinker() no-op when register_shrinker() failed. +Also, reset shrinker->nr_deferred in case unregister_shrinker() was +by error called twice. + +Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa +Signed-off-by: Aliaksei Karaliou +Reported-by: syzbot +Cc: Glauber Costa +Cc: Al Viro +Signed-off-by: Al Viro +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + mm/vmscan.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +--- a/mm/vmscan.c ++++ b/mm/vmscan.c +@@ -220,10 +220,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_shrinker); + */ + void unregister_shrinker(struct shrinker *shrinker) + { ++ if (!shrinker->nr_deferred) ++ return; + down_write(&shrinker_rwsem); + list_del(&shrinker->list); + up_write(&shrinker_rwsem); + kfree(shrinker->nr_deferred); ++ shrinker->nr_deferred = NULL; + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_shrinker); + diff --git a/queue-3.18/net-avoid-skb_warn_bad_offload-on-is_err.patch b/queue-3.18/net-avoid-skb_warn_bad_offload-on-is_err.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b9353465cc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/net-avoid-skb_warn_bad_offload-on-is_err.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 8d74e9f88d65af8bb2e095aff506aa6eac755ada Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willem de Bruijn +Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 11:39:04 -0500 +Subject: net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload on IS_ERR + +From: Willem de Bruijn + +commit 8d74e9f88d65af8bb2e095aff506aa6eac755ada upstream. + +skb_warn_bad_offload warns when packets enter the GSO stack that +require skb_checksum_help or vice versa. Do not warn on arbitrary +bad packets. Packet sockets can craft many. Syzkaller was able to +demonstrate another one with eth_type games. + +In particular, suppress the warning when segmentation returns an +error, which is for reasons other than checksum offload. + +See also commit 36c92474498a ("net: WARN if skb_checksum_help() is +called on skb requiring segmentation") for context on this warning. + +Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + net/core/dev.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/net/core/dev.c ++++ b/net/core/dev.c +@@ -2478,7 +2478,7 @@ struct sk_buff *__skb_gso_segment(struct + + segs = skb_mac_gso_segment(skb, features); + +- if (unlikely(skb_needs_check(skb, tx_path))) ++ if (unlikely(skb_needs_check(skb, tx_path) && !IS_ERR(segs))) + skb_warn_bad_offload(skb); + + return segs; diff --git a/queue-3.18/netfilter-ipt_clusterip-fix-out-of-bounds-accesses-in-clusterip_tg_check.patch b/queue-3.18/netfilter-ipt_clusterip-fix-out-of-bounds-accesses-in-clusterip_tg_check.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c8fc646e5db --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/netfilter-ipt_clusterip-fix-out-of-bounds-accesses-in-clusterip_tg_check.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From 1a38956cce5eabd7b74f94bab70265e4df83165e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Vyukov +Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 15:21:34 +0100 +Subject: netfilter: ipt_CLUSTERIP: fix out-of-bounds accesses in clusterip_tg_check() + +From: Dmitry Vyukov + +commit 1a38956cce5eabd7b74f94bab70265e4df83165e upstream. + +Commit 136e92bbec0a switched local_nodes from an array to a bitmask +but did not add proper bounds checks. As the result +clusterip_config_init_nodelist() can both over-read +ipt_clusterip_tgt_info.local_nodes and over-write +clusterip_config.local_nodes. + +Add bounds checks for both. + +Fixes: 136e92bbec0a ("[NETFILTER] CLUSTERIP: use a bitmap to store node responsibility data") +Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov +Reported-by: syzbot +Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c +@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static int clusterip_tg_check(const stru + struct ipt_clusterip_tgt_info *cipinfo = par->targinfo; + const struct ipt_entry *e = par->entryinfo; + struct clusterip_config *config; +- int ret; ++ int ret, i; + + if (cipinfo->hash_mode != CLUSTERIP_HASHMODE_SIP && + cipinfo->hash_mode != CLUSTERIP_HASHMODE_SIP_SPT && +@@ -379,8 +379,18 @@ static int clusterip_tg_check(const stru + pr_info("Please specify destination IP\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } +- +- /* FIXME: further sanity checks */ ++ if (cipinfo->num_local_nodes > ARRAY_SIZE(cipinfo->local_nodes)) { ++ pr_info("bad num_local_nodes %u\n", cipinfo->num_local_nodes); ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } ++ for (i = 0; i < cipinfo->num_local_nodes; i++) { ++ if (cipinfo->local_nodes[i] - 1 >= ++ sizeof(config->local_nodes) * 8) { ++ pr_info("bad local_nodes[%d] %u\n", ++ i, cipinfo->local_nodes[i]); ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } ++ } + + config = clusterip_config_find_get(par->net, e->ip.dst.s_addr, 1); + if (!config) { diff --git a/queue-3.18/netfilter-on-sockopt-acquire-sock-lock-only-in-the-required-scope.patch b/queue-3.18/netfilter-on-sockopt-acquire-sock-lock-only-in-the-required-scope.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..dbf9ddfede9 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/netfilter-on-sockopt-acquire-sock-lock-only-in-the-required-scope.patch @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +From 3f34cfae1238848fd53f25e5c8fd59da57901f4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paolo Abeni +Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 19:01:40 +0100 +Subject: netfilter: on sockopt() acquire sock lock only in the required scope + +From: Paolo Abeni + +commit 3f34cfae1238848fd53f25e5c8fd59da57901f4b upstream. + +Syzbot reported several deadlocks in the netfilter area caused by +rtnl lock and socket lock being acquired with a different order on +different code paths, leading to backtraces like the following one: + +====================================================== +WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected +4.15.0-rc9+ #212 Not tainted +------------------------------------------------------ +syzkaller041579/3682 is trying to acquire lock: + (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}, at: [<000000008775e4dd>] lock_sock +include/net/sock.h:1463 [inline] + (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}, at: [<000000008775e4dd>] +do_ipv6_setsockopt.isra.8+0x3c5/0x39d0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:167 + +but task is already holding lock: + (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000004342eaa9>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 +net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 + +which lock already depends on the new lock. + +the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: + +-> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}: + __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] + __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 + mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 + rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 + register_netdevice_notifier+0xad/0x860 net/core/dev.c:1607 + tee_tg_check+0x1a0/0x280 net/netfilter/xt_TEE.c:106 + xt_check_target+0x22c/0x7d0 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:845 + check_target net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:538 [inline] + find_check_entry.isra.7+0x935/0xcf0 +net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:580 + translate_table+0xf52/0x1690 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:749 + do_replace net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1165 [inline] + do_ip6t_set_ctl+0x370/0x5f0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1691 + nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline] + nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115 + ipv6_setsockopt+0x115/0x150 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:928 + udpv6_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv6/udp.c:1422 + sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2978 + SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1849 [inline] + SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1828 + entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x29/0xa0 + +-> #0 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}: + lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3914 + lock_sock_nested+0xc2/0x110 net/core/sock.c:2780 + lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1463 [inline] + do_ipv6_setsockopt.isra.8+0x3c5/0x39d0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:167 + ipv6_setsockopt+0xd7/0x150 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:922 + udpv6_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv6/udp.c:1422 + sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2978 + SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1849 [inline] + SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1828 + entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x29/0xa0 + +other info that might help us debug this: + + Possible unsafe locking scenario: + + CPU0 CPU1 + ---- ---- + lock(rtnl_mutex); + lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6); + lock(rtnl_mutex); + lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6); + + *** DEADLOCK *** + +1 lock held by syzkaller041579/3682: + #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000004342eaa9>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 +net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 + +The problem, as Florian noted, is that nf_setsockopt() is always +called with the socket held, even if the lock itself is required only +for very tight scopes and only for some operation. + +This patch addresses the issues moving the lock_sock() call only +where really needed, namely in ipv*_getorigdst(), so that nf_setsockopt() +does not need anymore to acquire both locks. + +Fixes: 22265a5c3c10 ("netfilter: xt_TEE: resolve oif using netdevice notifiers") +Reported-by: syzbot+a4c2dc980ac1af699b36@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Suggested-by: Florian Westphal +Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni +Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 14 ++++---------- + net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c | 6 +++++- + net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 17 +++++------------ + net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv6.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ + 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +@@ -1090,11 +1090,8 @@ int ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int l + if (err == -ENOPROTOOPT && optname != IP_HDRINCL && + optname != IP_IPSEC_POLICY && + optname != IP_XFRM_POLICY && +- !ip_mroute_opt(optname)) { +- lock_sock(sk); ++ !ip_mroute_opt(optname)) + err = nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_INET, optname, optval, optlen); +- release_sock(sk); +- } + #endif + return err; + } +@@ -1119,12 +1116,9 @@ int compat_ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk + if (err == -ENOPROTOOPT && optname != IP_HDRINCL && + optname != IP_IPSEC_POLICY && + optname != IP_XFRM_POLICY && +- !ip_mroute_opt(optname)) { +- lock_sock(sk); +- err = compat_nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_INET, optname, +- optval, optlen); +- release_sock(sk); +- } ++ !ip_mroute_opt(optname)) ++ err = compat_nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_INET, optname, optval, ++ optlen); + #endif + return err; + } +--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c +@@ -269,15 +269,19 @@ getorigdst(struct sock *sk, int optval, + struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple; + + memset(&tuple, 0, sizeof(tuple)); ++ ++ lock_sock(sk); + tuple.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_rcv_saddr; + tuple.src.u.tcp.port = inet->inet_sport; + tuple.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr; + tuple.dst.u.tcp.port = inet->inet_dport; + tuple.src.l3num = PF_INET; + tuple.dst.protonum = sk->sk_protocol; ++ release_sock(sk); + + /* We only do TCP and SCTP at the moment: is there a better way? */ +- if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP && sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_SCTP) { ++ if (tuple.dst.protonum != IPPROTO_TCP && ++ tuple.dst.protonum != IPPROTO_SCTP) { + pr_debug("SO_ORIGINAL_DST: Not a TCP/SCTP socket\n"); + return -ENOPROTOOPT; + } +--- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c +@@ -875,12 +875,8 @@ int ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int + #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER + /* we need to exclude all possible ENOPROTOOPTs except default case */ + if (err == -ENOPROTOOPT && optname != IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY && +- optname != IPV6_XFRM_POLICY) { +- lock_sock(sk); +- err = nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_INET6, optname, optval, +- optlen); +- release_sock(sk); +- } ++ optname != IPV6_XFRM_POLICY) ++ err = nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_INET6, optname, optval, optlen); + #endif + return err; + } +@@ -910,12 +906,9 @@ int compat_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock * + #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER + /* we need to exclude all possible ENOPROTOOPTs except default case */ + if (err == -ENOPROTOOPT && optname != IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY && +- optname != IPV6_XFRM_POLICY) { +- lock_sock(sk); +- err = compat_nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_INET6, optname, +- optval, optlen); +- release_sock(sk); +- } ++ optname != IPV6_XFRM_POLICY) ++ err = compat_nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_INET6, optname, optval, ++ optlen); + #endif + return err; + } +--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv6.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv6.c +@@ -240,20 +240,27 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops ipv6_conntrack + static int + ipv6_getorigdst(struct sock *sk, int optval, void __user *user, int *len) + { +- const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); ++ struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple = { .src.l3num = NFPROTO_IPV6 }; + const struct ipv6_pinfo *inet6 = inet6_sk(sk); ++ const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); + const struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h; + struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; +- struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple = { .src.l3num = NFPROTO_IPV6 }; + struct nf_conn *ct; ++ __be32 flow_label; ++ int bound_dev_if; + ++ lock_sock(sk); + tuple.src.u3.in6 = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr; + tuple.src.u.tcp.port = inet->inet_sport; + tuple.dst.u3.in6 = sk->sk_v6_daddr; + tuple.dst.u.tcp.port = inet->inet_dport; + tuple.dst.protonum = sk->sk_protocol; ++ bound_dev_if = sk->sk_bound_dev_if; ++ flow_label = inet6->flow_label; ++ release_sock(sk); + +- if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP && sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_SCTP) ++ if (tuple.dst.protonum != IPPROTO_TCP && ++ tuple.dst.protonum != IPPROTO_SCTP) + return -ENOPROTOOPT; + + if (*len < 0 || (unsigned int) *len < sizeof(sin6)) +@@ -271,14 +278,13 @@ ipv6_getorigdst(struct sock *sk, int opt + + sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6.sin6_port = ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple.dst.u.tcp.port; +- sin6.sin6_flowinfo = inet6->flow_label & IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK; ++ sin6.sin6_flowinfo = flow_label & IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK; + memcpy(&sin6.sin6_addr, + &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple.dst.u3.in6, + sizeof(sin6.sin6_addr)); + + nf_ct_put(ct); +- sin6.sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6.sin6_addr, +- sk->sk_bound_dev_if); ++ sin6.sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6.sin6_addr, bound_dev_if); + return copy_to_user(user, &sin6, sizeof(sin6)) ? -EFAULT : 0; + } + diff --git a/queue-3.18/netfilter-x_tables-avoid-out-of-bounds-reads-in-xt_request_find_-match-target.patch b/queue-3.18/netfilter-x_tables-avoid-out-of-bounds-reads-in-xt_request_find_-match-target.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..01a99c12247 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/netfilter-x_tables-avoid-out-of-bounds-reads-in-xt_request_find_-match-target.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From da17c73b6eb74aad3c3c0654394635675b623b3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 17:16:09 -0800 +Subject: netfilter: x_tables: avoid out-of-bounds reads in xt_request_find_{match|target} + +From: Eric Dumazet + +commit da17c73b6eb74aad3c3c0654394635675b623b3e upstream. + +It looks like syzbot found its way into netfilter territory. + +Issue here is that @name comes from user space and might +not be null terminated. + +Out-of-bound reads happen, KASAN is not happy. + +v2 added similar fix for xt_request_find_target(), +as Florian advised. + +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Reported-by: syzbot +Acked-by: Florian Westphal +Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +--- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c ++++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c +@@ -209,6 +209,9 @@ xt_request_find_match(uint8_t nfproto, c + { + struct xt_match *match; + ++ if (strnlen(name, XT_EXTENSION_MAXNAMELEN) == XT_EXTENSION_MAXNAMELEN) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); ++ + match = xt_find_match(nfproto, name, revision); + if (IS_ERR(match)) { + request_module("%st_%s", xt_prefix[nfproto], name); +@@ -251,6 +254,9 @@ struct xt_target *xt_request_find_target + { + struct xt_target *target; + ++ if (strnlen(name, XT_EXTENSION_MAXNAMELEN) == XT_EXTENSION_MAXNAMELEN) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); ++ + target = xt_find_target(af, name, revision); + if (IS_ERR(target)) { + request_module("%st_%s", xt_prefix[af], name); diff --git a/queue-3.18/netfilter-x_tables-fix-int-overflow-in-xt_alloc_table_info.patch b/queue-3.18/netfilter-x_tables-fix-int-overflow-in-xt_alloc_table_info.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f07d526880d --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/netfilter-x_tables-fix-int-overflow-in-xt_alloc_table_info.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From 889c604fd0b5f6d3b8694ade229ee44124de1127 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Vyukov +Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2017 09:48:54 +0100 +Subject: netfilter: x_tables: fix int overflow in xt_alloc_table_info() + +From: Dmitry Vyukov + +commit 889c604fd0b5f6d3b8694ade229ee44124de1127 upstream. + +syzkaller triggered OOM kills by passing ipt_replace.size = -1 +to IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE. The root cause is that SMP_ALIGN() in +xt_alloc_table_info() causes int overflow and the size check passes +when it should not. SMP_ALIGN() is no longer needed leftover. + +Remove SMP_ALIGN() call in xt_alloc_table_info(). + +Reported-by: syzbot+4396883fa8c4f64e0175@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov +Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 4 +--- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c ++++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c +@@ -38,8 +38,6 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); + MODULE_AUTHOR("Harald Welte "); + MODULE_DESCRIPTION("{ip,ip6,arp,eb}_tables backend module"); + +-#define SMP_ALIGN(x) (((x) + SMP_CACHE_BYTES-1) & ~(SMP_CACHE_BYTES-1)) +- + struct compat_delta { + unsigned int offset; /* offset in kernel */ + int delta; /* delta in 32bit user land */ +@@ -951,7 +949,7 @@ struct xt_table_info *xt_alloc_table_inf + int cpu; + + /* Pedantry: prevent them from hitting BUG() in vmalloc.c --RR */ +- if ((SMP_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 2 > totalram_pages) ++ if ((size >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 2 > totalram_pages) + return NULL; + + newinfo = kzalloc(XT_TABLE_INFO_SZ, GFP_KERNEL); diff --git a/queue-3.18/netfilter-xt_rateest-acquire-xt_rateest_mutex-for-hash-insert.patch b/queue-3.18/netfilter-xt_rateest-acquire-xt_rateest_mutex-for-hash-insert.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3273a193049 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/netfilter-xt_rateest-acquire-xt_rateest_mutex-for-hash-insert.patch @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +From 7dc68e98757a8eccf8ca7a53a29b896f1eef1f76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Cong Wang +Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 14:41:45 -0800 +Subject: netfilter: xt_RATEEST: acquire xt_rateest_mutex for hash insert + +From: Cong Wang + +commit 7dc68e98757a8eccf8ca7a53a29b896f1eef1f76 upstream. + +rateest_hash is supposed to be protected by xt_rateest_mutex, +and, as suggested by Eric, lookup and insert should be atomic, +so we should acquire the xt_rateest_mutex once for both. + +So introduce a non-locking helper for internal use and keep the +locking one for external. + +Reported-by: +Fixes: 5859034d7eb8 ("[NETFILTER]: x_tables: add RATEEST target") +Signed-off-by: Cong Wang +Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal +Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet +Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c ++++ b/net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c +@@ -40,23 +40,31 @@ static void xt_rateest_hash_insert(struc + hlist_add_head(&est->list, &rateest_hash[h]); + } + +-struct xt_rateest *xt_rateest_lookup(const char *name) ++static struct xt_rateest *__xt_rateest_lookup(const char *name) + { + struct xt_rateest *est; + unsigned int h; + + h = xt_rateest_hash(name); +- mutex_lock(&xt_rateest_mutex); + hlist_for_each_entry(est, &rateest_hash[h], list) { + if (strcmp(est->name, name) == 0) { + est->refcnt++; +- mutex_unlock(&xt_rateest_mutex); + return est; + } + } +- mutex_unlock(&xt_rateest_mutex); ++ + return NULL; + } ++ ++struct xt_rateest *xt_rateest_lookup(const char *name) ++{ ++ struct xt_rateest *est; ++ ++ mutex_lock(&xt_rateest_mutex); ++ est = __xt_rateest_lookup(name); ++ mutex_unlock(&xt_rateest_mutex); ++ return est; ++} + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_rateest_lookup); + + void xt_rateest_put(struct xt_rateest *est) +@@ -104,8 +112,10 @@ static int xt_rateest_tg_checkentry(cons + rnd_inited = true; + } + +- est = xt_rateest_lookup(info->name); ++ mutex_lock(&xt_rateest_mutex); ++ est = __xt_rateest_lookup(info->name); + if (est) { ++ mutex_unlock(&xt_rateest_mutex); + /* + * If estimator parameters are specified, they must match the + * existing estimator. +@@ -143,11 +153,13 @@ static int xt_rateest_tg_checkentry(cons + + info->est = est; + xt_rateest_hash_insert(est); ++ mutex_unlock(&xt_rateest_mutex); + return 0; + + err2: + kfree(est); + err1: ++ mutex_unlock(&xt_rateest_mutex); + return ret; + } + diff --git a/queue-3.18/provide-a-function-to-create-a-nul-terminated-string-from-unterminated-data.patch b/queue-3.18/provide-a-function-to-create-a-nul-terminated-string-from-unterminated-data.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3198541d38f --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/provide-a-function-to-create-a-nul-terminated-string-from-unterminated-data.patch @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +From f35157417215ec138c920320c746fdb3e04ef1d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells +Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2017 17:25:02 +0100 +Subject: Provide a function to create a NUL-terminated string from unterminated data + +From: David Howells + +commit f35157417215ec138c920320c746fdb3e04ef1d5 upstream. + +Provide a function, kmemdup_nul(), that will create a NUL-terminated string +from an unterminated character array where the length is known in advance. + +This is better than kstrndup() in situations where we already know the +string length as the strnlen() in kstrndup() is superfluous. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells +Signed-off-by: Al Viro +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + include/linux/string.h | 1 + + mm/util.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+) + +--- a/include/linux/string.h ++++ b/include/linux/string.h +@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ void *memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, s + extern char *kstrdup(const char *s, gfp_t gfp); + extern char *kstrndup(const char *s, size_t len, gfp_t gfp); + extern void *kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp); ++extern char *kmemdup_nul(const char *s, size_t len, gfp_t gfp); + + extern char **argv_split(gfp_t gfp, const char *str, int *argcp); + extern void argv_free(char **argv); +--- a/mm/util.c ++++ b/mm/util.c +@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kstrdup); + * @s: the string to duplicate + * @max: read at most @max chars from @s + * @gfp: the GFP mask used in the kmalloc() call when allocating memory ++ * ++ * Note: Use kmemdup_nul() instead if the size is known exactly. + */ + char *kstrndup(const char *s, size_t max, gfp_t gfp) + { +@@ -80,6 +82,28 @@ void *kmemdup(const void *src, size_t le + EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmemdup); + + /** ++ * kmemdup_nul - Create a NUL-terminated string from unterminated data ++ * @s: The data to stringify ++ * @len: The size of the data ++ * @gfp: the GFP mask used in the kmalloc() call when allocating memory ++ */ ++char *kmemdup_nul(const char *s, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) ++{ ++ char *buf; ++ ++ if (!s) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ buf = kmalloc_track_caller(len + 1, gfp); ++ if (buf) { ++ memcpy(buf, s, len); ++ buf[len] = '\0'; ++ } ++ return buf; ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmemdup_nul); ++ ++/** + * memdup_user - duplicate memory region from user space + * + * @src: source address in user space diff --git a/queue-3.18/selinux-ensure-the-context-is-nul-terminated-in-security_context_to_sid_core.patch b/queue-3.18/selinux-ensure-the-context-is-nul-terminated-in-security_context_to_sid_core.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e3ca1beeff0 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/selinux-ensure-the-context-is-nul-terminated-in-security_context_to_sid_core.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +From ef28df55ac27e1e5cd122e19fa311d886d47a756 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paul Moore +Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 18:51:12 -0500 +Subject: selinux: ensure the context is NUL terminated in security_context_to_sid_core() + +From: Paul Moore + +commit ef28df55ac27e1e5cd122e19fa311d886d47a756 upstream. + +The syzbot/syzkaller automated tests found a problem in +security_context_to_sid_core() during early boot (before we load the +SELinux policy) where we could potentially feed context strings without +NUL terminators into the strcmp() function. + +We already guard against this during normal operation (after the SELinux +policy has been loaded) by making a copy of the context strings and +explicitly adding a NUL terminator to the end. The patch extends this +protection to the early boot case (no loaded policy) by moving the context +copy earlier in security_context_to_sid_core(). + +Reported-by: syzbot +Signed-off-by: Paul Moore +Reviewed-By: William Roberts +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 ++++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c ++++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c +@@ -1239,27 +1239,25 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core( + if (!scontext_len) + return -EINVAL; + ++ /* Copy the string to allow changes and ensure a NUL terminator */ ++ scontext2 = kmemdup_nul(scontext, scontext_len, gfp_flags); ++ if (!scontext2) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ + if (!ss_initialized) { + int i; + + for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) { +- if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) { ++ if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext2)) { + *sid = i; +- return 0; ++ goto out; + } + } + *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; +- return 0; ++ goto out; + } + *sid = SECSID_NULL; + +- /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */ +- scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags); +- if (!scontext2) +- return -ENOMEM; +- memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len); +- scontext2[scontext_len] = 0; +- + if (force) { + /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */ + rc = -ENOMEM; diff --git a/queue-3.18/selinux-skip-bounded-transition-processing-if-the-policy-isn-t-loaded.patch b/queue-3.18/selinux-skip-bounded-transition-processing-if-the-policy-isn-t-loaded.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..77f56ad9a2d --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/selinux-skip-bounded-transition-processing-if-the-policy-isn-t-loaded.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 4b14752ec4e0d87126e636384cf37c8dd9df157c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paul Moore +Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2017 17:17:43 -0500 +Subject: selinux: skip bounded transition processing if the policy isn't loaded + +From: Paul Moore + +commit 4b14752ec4e0d87126e636384cf37c8dd9df157c upstream. + +We can't do anything reasonable in security_bounded_transition() if we +don't have a policy loaded, and in fact we could run into problems +with some of the code inside expecting a policy. Fix these problems +like we do many others in security/selinux/ss/services.c by checking +to see if the policy is loaded (ss_initialized) and returning quickly +if it isn't. + +Reported-by: syzbot +Signed-off-by: Paul Moore +Acked-by: Stephen Smalley +Reviewed-by: James Morris +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c ++++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c +@@ -823,6 +823,9 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_ + int index; + int rc; + ++ if (!ss_initialized) ++ return 0; ++ + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + + rc = -EINVAL; diff --git a/queue-3.18/series b/queue-3.18/series index ca502ed5623..a691e3f8e28 100644 --- a/queue-3.18/series +++ b/queue-3.18/series @@ -15,3 +15,16 @@ btrfs-fix-crash-due-to-not-cleaning-up-tree-log-block-s-dirty-bits.patch alsa-seq-fix-racy-pool-initializations.patch arm-dts-s5pv210-add-interrupt-parent-for-ohci.patch media-r820t-fix-r820t_write_reg-for-kasan.patch +mm-vmscan-make-unregister_shrinker-no-op-if-register_shrinker-failed.patch +xfrm-check-id-proto-in-validate_tmpl.patch +selinux-skip-bounded-transition-processing-if-the-policy-isn-t-loaded.patch +crypto-x86-twofish-3way-fix-rbp-usage.patch +staging-android-ion-add-__gfp_nowarn-for-system-contig-heap.patch +netfilter-x_tables-fix-int-overflow-in-xt_alloc_table_info.patch +netfilter-x_tables-avoid-out-of-bounds-reads-in-xt_request_find_-match-target.patch +netfilter-ipt_clusterip-fix-out-of-bounds-accesses-in-clusterip_tg_check.patch +netfilter-on-sockopt-acquire-sock-lock-only-in-the-required-scope.patch +netfilter-xt_rateest-acquire-xt_rateest_mutex-for-hash-insert.patch +net-avoid-skb_warn_bad_offload-on-is_err.patch +provide-a-function-to-create-a-nul-terminated-string-from-unterminated-data.patch +selinux-ensure-the-context-is-nul-terminated-in-security_context_to_sid_core.patch diff --git a/queue-3.18/staging-android-ion-add-__gfp_nowarn-for-system-contig-heap.patch b/queue-3.18/staging-android-ion-add-__gfp_nowarn-for-system-contig-heap.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0cbb6eb6b56 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/staging-android-ion-add-__gfp_nowarn-for-system-contig-heap.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 0c75f10312a35b149b2cebb1832316b35c2337ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laura Abbott +Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 11:14:08 -0800 +Subject: staging: android: ion: Add __GFP_NOWARN for system contig heap + +From: Laura Abbott + +commit 0c75f10312a35b149b2cebb1832316b35c2337ca upstream. + +syzbot reported a warning from Ion: + + WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3485 at mm/page_alloc.c:3926 + + ... + __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x9fb/0xd80 mm/page_alloc.c:4252 + alloc_pages_current+0xb6/0x1e0 mm/mempolicy.c:2036 + alloc_pages include/linux/gfp.h:492 [inline] + ion_system_contig_heap_allocate+0x40/0x2c0 + drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_system_heap.c:374 + ion_buffer_create drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c:93 [inline] + ion_alloc+0x2c1/0x9e0 drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c:420 + ion_ioctl+0x26d/0x380 drivers/staging/android/ion/ion-ioctl.c:84 + vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] + do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 + SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] + SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 + +This is a warning about attempting to allocate order > MAX_ORDER. This +is coming from a userspace Ion allocation request. Since userspace is +free to request however much memory it wants (and the kernel is free to +deny its allocation), silence the allocation attempt with __GFP_NOWARN +in case it fails. + +Reported-by: syzbot+76e7efc4748495855a4d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Reported-by: syzbot +Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_system_heap.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_system_heap.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_system_heap.c +@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static int ion_system_contig_heap_alloca + if (align > (PAGE_SIZE << order)) + return -EINVAL; + +- page = alloc_pages(low_order_gfp_flags, order); ++ page = alloc_pages(low_order_gfp_flags | __GFP_NOWARN, order); + if (!page) + return -ENOMEM; + diff --git a/queue-3.18/xfrm-check-id-proto-in-validate_tmpl.patch b/queue-3.18/xfrm-check-id-proto-in-validate_tmpl.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..18a6a02fe0c --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/xfrm-check-id-proto-in-validate_tmpl.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From 6a53b7593233ab9e4f96873ebacc0f653a55c3e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Cong Wang +Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 11:15:16 -0800 +Subject: xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl() + +From: Cong Wang + +commit 6a53b7593233ab9e4f96873ebacc0f653a55c3e1 upstream. + +syzbot reported a kernel warning in xfrm_state_fini(), which +indicates that we have entries left in the list +net->xfrm.state_all whose proto is zero. And +xfrm_id_proto_match() doesn't consider them as a match with +IPSEC_PROTO_ANY in this case. + +Proto with value 0 is probably not a valid value, at least +verify_newsa_info() doesn't consider it valid either. + +This patch fixes it by checking the proto value in +validate_tmpl() and rejecting invalid ones, like what iproute2 +does in xfrm_xfrmproto_getbyname(). + +Reported-by: syzbot +Cc: Steffen Klassert +Cc: Herbert Xu +Signed-off-by: Cong Wang +Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) + +--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c ++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +@@ -1375,6 +1375,21 @@ static int validate_tmpl(int nr, struct + default: + return -EINVAL; + } ++ ++ switch (ut[i].id.proto) { ++ case IPPROTO_AH: ++ case IPPROTO_ESP: ++ case IPPROTO_COMP: ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) ++ case IPPROTO_ROUTING: ++ case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: ++#endif ++ case IPSEC_PROTO_ANY: ++ break; ++ default: ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } ++ + } + + return 0;