From: Sasha Levin Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2024 11:50:54 +0000 (-0400) Subject: Fixes for 5.4 X-Git-Tag: v6.1.107~68 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=d139bcce744bc5be29790211bde92b12a61a48cf;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git Fixes for 5.4 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- diff --git a/queue-5.4/bluetooth-hci_core-fix-le-quote-calculation.patch b/queue-5.4/bluetooth-hci_core-fix-le-quote-calculation.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f6d4c67b0e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/bluetooth-hci_core-fix-le-quote-calculation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +From a7451ea041d4572418cd16fd5114437ebbb6d32d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2024 11:22:08 -0400 +Subject: Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix LE quote calculation + +From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz + +[ Upstream commit 932021a11805b9da4bd6abf66fe233cccd59fe0e ] + +Function hci_sched_le needs to update the respective counter variable +inplace other the likes of hci_quote_sent would attempt to use the +possible outdated value of conn->{le_cnt,acl_cnt}. + +Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/915 +Fixes: 73d80deb7bdf ("Bluetooth: prioritizing data over HCI") +Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 19 +++++++------------ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +index b6243cb97e8ec..f1e8bda97c106 100644 +--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c ++++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +@@ -4245,19 +4245,19 @@ static void hci_sched_le(struct hci_dev *hdev) + { + struct hci_chan *chan; + struct sk_buff *skb; +- int quote, cnt, tmp; ++ int quote, *cnt, tmp; + + BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); + + if (!hci_conn_num(hdev, LE_LINK)) + return; + +- cnt = hdev->le_pkts ? hdev->le_cnt : hdev->acl_cnt; ++ cnt = hdev->le_pkts ? &hdev->le_cnt : &hdev->acl_cnt; + +- __check_timeout(hdev, cnt, LE_LINK); ++ __check_timeout(hdev, *cnt, LE_LINK); + +- tmp = cnt; +- while (cnt && (chan = hci_chan_sent(hdev, LE_LINK, "e))) { ++ tmp = *cnt; ++ while (*cnt && (chan = hci_chan_sent(hdev, LE_LINK, "e))) { + u32 priority = (skb_peek(&chan->data_q))->priority; + while (quote-- && (skb = skb_peek(&chan->data_q))) { + BT_DBG("chan %p skb %p len %d priority %u", chan, skb, +@@ -4272,18 +4272,13 @@ static void hci_sched_le(struct hci_dev *hdev) + hci_send_frame(hdev, skb); + hdev->le_last_tx = jiffies; + +- cnt--; ++ (*cnt)--; + chan->sent++; + chan->conn->sent++; + } + } + +- if (hdev->le_pkts) +- hdev->le_cnt = cnt; +- else +- hdev->acl_cnt = cnt; +- +- if (cnt != tmp) ++ if (*cnt != tmp) + hci_prio_recalculate(hdev, LE_LINK); + } + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/bluetooth-hci_core-fix-not-handling-link-timeouts-pr.patch b/queue-5.4/bluetooth-hci_core-fix-not-handling-link-timeouts-pr.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..fe88089447e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/bluetooth-hci_core-fix-not-handling-link-timeouts-pr.patch @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +From 26a1cb188edc9410baccc90df814b2dd1371e883 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2022 15:44:42 -0700 +Subject: Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix not handling link timeouts propertly + +From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz + +[ Upstream commit 116523c8fac05d1d26f748fee7919a4ec5df67ea ] + +Change that introduced the use of __check_timeout did not account for +link types properly, it always assumes ACL_LINK is used thus causing +hdev->acl_last_tx to be used even in case of LE_LINK and then again +uses ACL_LINK with hci_link_tx_to. + +To fix this __check_timeout now takes the link type as parameter and +then procedure to use the right last_tx based on the link type and pass +it to hci_link_tx_to. + +Fixes: 1b1d29e51499 ("Bluetooth: Make use of __check_timeout on hci_sched_le") +Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz +Tested-by: David Beinder +Stable-dep-of: 932021a11805 ("Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix LE quote calculation") +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +index 6caef575c628c..b6243cb97e8ec 100644 +--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c ++++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +@@ -4055,15 +4055,27 @@ static inline int __get_blocks(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) + return DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE, hdev->block_len); + } + +-static void __check_timeout(struct hci_dev *hdev, unsigned int cnt) ++static void __check_timeout(struct hci_dev *hdev, unsigned int cnt, u8 type) + { +- if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_UNCONFIGURED)) { +- /* ACL tx timeout must be longer than maximum +- * link supervision timeout (40.9 seconds) */ +- if (!cnt && time_after(jiffies, hdev->acl_last_tx + +- HCI_ACL_TX_TIMEOUT)) +- hci_link_tx_to(hdev, ACL_LINK); ++ unsigned long last_tx; ++ ++ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_UNCONFIGURED)) ++ return; ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case LE_LINK: ++ last_tx = hdev->le_last_tx; ++ break; ++ default: ++ last_tx = hdev->acl_last_tx; ++ break; + } ++ ++ /* tx timeout must be longer than maximum link supervision timeout ++ * (40.9 seconds) ++ */ ++ if (!cnt && time_after(jiffies, last_tx + HCI_ACL_TX_TIMEOUT)) ++ hci_link_tx_to(hdev, type); + } + + static void hci_sched_acl_pkt(struct hci_dev *hdev) +@@ -4073,7 +4085,7 @@ static void hci_sched_acl_pkt(struct hci_dev *hdev) + struct sk_buff *skb; + int quote; + +- __check_timeout(hdev, cnt); ++ __check_timeout(hdev, cnt, ACL_LINK); + + while (hdev->acl_cnt && + (chan = hci_chan_sent(hdev, ACL_LINK, "e))) { +@@ -4112,8 +4124,6 @@ static void hci_sched_acl_blk(struct hci_dev *hdev) + int quote; + u8 type; + +- __check_timeout(hdev, cnt); +- + BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); + + if (hdev->dev_type == HCI_AMP) +@@ -4121,6 +4131,8 @@ static void hci_sched_acl_blk(struct hci_dev *hdev) + else + type = ACL_LINK; + ++ __check_timeout(hdev, cnt, type); ++ + while (hdev->block_cnt > 0 && + (chan = hci_chan_sent(hdev, type, "e))) { + u32 priority = (skb_peek(&chan->data_q))->priority; +@@ -4242,7 +4254,7 @@ static void hci_sched_le(struct hci_dev *hdev) + + cnt = hdev->le_pkts ? hdev->le_cnt : hdev->acl_cnt; + +- __check_timeout(hdev, cnt); ++ __check_timeout(hdev, cnt, LE_LINK); + + tmp = cnt; + while (cnt && (chan = hci_chan_sent(hdev, LE_LINK, "e))) { +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/bluetooth-make-use-of-__check_timeout-on-hci_sched_l.patch b/queue-5.4/bluetooth-make-use-of-__check_timeout-on-hci_sched_l.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..048953f044f --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/bluetooth-make-use-of-__check_timeout-on-hci_sched_l.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From d5b21c11457cefc52404a638e22e9d41f469ce7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2020 13:02:18 -0800 +Subject: Bluetooth: Make use of __check_timeout on hci_sched_le + +From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz + +[ Upstream commit 1b1d29e5149990e44634b2e681de71effd463591 ] + +This reuse __check_timeout on hci_sched_le following the same logic +used hci_sched_acl. + +Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz +Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann +Stable-dep-of: 932021a11805 ("Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix LE quote calculation") +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 11 +++-------- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +index 71a7e42097cc0..6caef575c628c 100644 +--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c ++++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +@@ -4240,15 +4240,10 @@ static void hci_sched_le(struct hci_dev *hdev) + if (!hci_conn_num(hdev, LE_LINK)) + return; + +- if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_UNCONFIGURED)) { +- /* LE tx timeout must be longer than maximum +- * link supervision timeout (40.9 seconds) */ +- if (!hdev->le_cnt && hdev->le_pkts && +- time_after(jiffies, hdev->le_last_tx + HZ * 45)) +- hci_link_tx_to(hdev, LE_LINK); +- } +- + cnt = hdev->le_pkts ? hdev->le_cnt : hdev->acl_cnt; ++ ++ __check_timeout(hdev, cnt); ++ + tmp = cnt; + while (cnt && (chan = hci_chan_sent(hdev, LE_LINK, "e))) { + u32 priority = (skb_peek(&chan->data_q))->priority; +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/ipv6-prevent-uaf-in-ip6_send_skb.patch b/queue-5.4/ipv6-prevent-uaf-in-ip6_send_skb.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ebfffae29b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/ipv6-prevent-uaf-in-ip6_send_skb.patch @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +From 7abc155cc65839ff1ef143675e75c395bd0b9f90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 16:08:57 +0000 +Subject: ipv6: prevent UAF in ip6_send_skb() + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit faa389b2fbaaec7fd27a390b4896139f9da662e3 ] + +syzbot reported an UAF in ip6_send_skb() [1] + +After ip6_local_out() has returned, we no longer can safely +dereference rt, unless we hold rcu_read_lock(). + +A similar issue has been fixed in commit +a688caa34beb ("ipv6: take rcu lock in rawv6_send_hdrinc()") + +Another potential issue in ip6_finish_output2() is handled in a +separate patch. + +[1] + BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964 +Read of size 8 at addr ffff88806dde4858 by task syz.1.380/6530 + +CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6530 Comm: syz.1.380 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00306-gdf6cbc62cc9b #0 +Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024 +Call Trace: + + __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] + dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119 + print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] + print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 + kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 + ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964 + rawv6_push_pending_frames+0x75c/0x9e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:588 + rawv6_sendmsg+0x19c7/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:926 + sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] + __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745 + sock_write_iter+0x2dd/0x400 net/socket.c:1160 + do_iter_readv_writev+0x60a/0x890 + vfs_writev+0x37c/0xbb0 fs/read_write.c:971 + do_writev+0x1b1/0x350 fs/read_write.c:1018 + do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] + do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f +RIP: 0033:0x7f936bf79e79 +Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 +RSP: 002b:00007f936cd7f038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 +RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f936c115f80 RCX: 00007f936bf79e79 +RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004 +RBP: 00007f936bfe7916 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 +R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 +R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f936c115f80 R15: 00007fff2860a7a8 + + +Allocated by task 6530: + kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] + kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 + unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:312 [inline] + __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:338 + kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] + slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3988 [inline] + slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4037 [inline] + kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x135/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4044 + dst_alloc+0x12b/0x190 net/core/dst.c:89 + ip6_blackhole_route+0x59/0x340 net/ipv6/route.c:2670 + make_blackhole net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3120 [inline] + xfrm_lookup_route+0xd1/0x1c0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3313 + ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x13e/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1257 + rawv6_sendmsg+0x1283/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:898 + sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] + __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745 + ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597 + ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline] + __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2680 + do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] + do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f + +Freed by task 45: + kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] + kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 + kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579 + poison_slab_object+0xe0/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:240 + __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:256 + kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline] + slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2252 [inline] + slab_free mm/slub.c:4473 [inline] + kmem_cache_free+0x145/0x350 mm/slub.c:4548 + dst_destroy+0x2ac/0x460 net/core/dst.c:124 + rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2569 [inline] + rcu_core+0xafd/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2843 + handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554 + __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline] + invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline] + __irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x1c0 kernel/softirq.c:637 + irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:649 + instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 [inline] + sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 + asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702 + +Last potentially related work creation: + kasan_save_stack+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 + __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xac/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:541 + __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:3106 [inline] + call_rcu+0x167/0xa70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3210 + refdst_drop include/net/dst.h:263 [inline] + skb_dst_drop include/net/dst.h:275 [inline] + nf_ct_frag6_queue net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c:306 [inline] + nf_ct_frag6_gather+0xb9a/0x2080 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c:485 + ipv6_defrag+0x2c8/0x3c0 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c:67 + nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline] + nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x220 net/netfilter/core.c:626 + nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:269 [inline] + __ip6_local_out+0x6fa/0x800 net/ipv6/output_core.c:143 + ip6_local_out+0x26/0x70 net/ipv6/output_core.c:153 + ip6_send_skb+0x112/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1959 + rawv6_push_pending_frames+0x75c/0x9e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:588 + rawv6_sendmsg+0x19c7/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:926 + sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] + __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745 + sock_write_iter+0x2dd/0x400 net/socket.c:1160 + do_iter_readv_writev+0x60a/0x890 + +Fixes: 0625491493d9 ("ipv6: ip6_push_pending_frames() should increment IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS") +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Reported-by: syzbot +Reviewed-by: David Ahern +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820160859.3786976-2-edumazet@google.com +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +index c67d634dccd47..a34a562b0954d 100644 +--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +@@ -1882,6 +1882,7 @@ int ip6_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) + struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb); + int err; + ++ rcu_read_lock(); + err = ip6_local_out(net, skb->sk, skb); + if (err) { + if (err > 0) +@@ -1891,6 +1892,7 @@ int ip6_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) + IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS); + } + ++ rcu_read_unlock(); + return err; + } + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/kcm-serialise-kcm_sendmsg-for-the-same-socket.patch b/queue-5.4/kcm-serialise-kcm_sendmsg-for-the-same-socket.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f2bed6610b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/kcm-serialise-kcm_sendmsg-for-the-same-socket.patch @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +From 6c92f1781af4b537690a2360c90db4be07929335 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2024 15:04:37 -0700 +Subject: kcm: Serialise kcm_sendmsg() for the same socket. + +From: Kuniyuki Iwashima + +[ Upstream commit 807067bf014d4a3ae2cc55bd3de16f22a01eb580 ] + +syzkaller reported UAF in kcm_release(). [0] + +The scenario is + + 1. Thread A builds a skb with MSG_MORE and sets kcm->seq_skb. + + 2. Thread A resumes building skb from kcm->seq_skb but is blocked + by sk_stream_wait_memory() + + 3. Thread B calls sendmsg() concurrently, finishes building kcm->seq_skb + and puts the skb to the write queue + + 4. Thread A faces an error and finally frees skb that is already in the + write queue + + 5. kcm_release() does double-free the skb in the write queue + +When a thread is building a MSG_MORE skb, another thread must not touch it. + +Let's add a per-sk mutex and serialise kcm_sendmsg(). + +[0]: +BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2366 [inline] +BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:2385 [inline] +BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3175 [inline] +BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3181 [inline] +BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kcm_release+0x170/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1691 +Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000ced0fc80 by task syz-executor329/6167 + +CPU: 1 PID: 6167 Comm: syz-executor329 Tainted: G B 6.8.0-rc5-syzkaller-g9abbc24128bc #0 +Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 +Call trace: + dump_backtrace+0x1b8/0x1e4 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:291 + show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:298 + __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] + dump_stack_lvl+0xd0/0x124 lib/dump_stack.c:106 + print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] + print_report+0x178/0x518 mm/kasan/report.c:488 + kasan_report+0xd8/0x138 mm/kasan/report.c:601 + __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:381 + __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2366 [inline] + __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:2385 [inline] + __skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3175 [inline] + __skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3181 [inline] + kcm_release+0x170/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1691 + __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline] + sock_close+0xa4/0x1e8 net/socket.c:1421 + __fput+0x30c/0x738 fs/file_table.c:376 + ____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:404 + task_work_run+0x230/0x2e0 kernel/task_work.c:180 + exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline] + do_exit+0x618/0x1f64 kernel/exit.c:871 + do_group_exit+0x194/0x22c kernel/exit.c:1020 + get_signal+0x1500/0x15ec kernel/signal.c:2893 + do_signal+0x23c/0x3b44 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1249 + do_notify_resume+0x74/0x1f4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:148 + exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline] + exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline] + el0_svc+0xac/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:713 + el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730 + el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598 + +Allocated by task 6166: + kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] + kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68 + kasan_save_alloc_info+0x70/0x84 mm/kasan/generic.c:626 + unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:314 [inline] + __kasan_slab_alloc+0x74/0x8c mm/kasan/common.c:340 + kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] + slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3813 [inline] + slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline] + kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x204/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:3903 + __alloc_skb+0x19c/0x3d8 net/core/skbuff.c:641 + alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1296 [inline] + kcm_sendmsg+0x1d3c/0x2124 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:783 + sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] + __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] + sock_sendmsg+0x220/0x2c0 net/socket.c:768 + splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:889 + do_splice_from fs/splice.c:941 [inline] + direct_splice_actor+0xec/0x1d8 fs/splice.c:1164 + splice_direct_to_actor+0x438/0xa0c fs/splice.c:1108 + do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1207 [inline] + do_splice_direct+0x1e4/0x304 fs/splice.c:1233 + do_sendfile+0x460/0xb3c fs/read_write.c:1295 + __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1362 [inline] + __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1348 [inline] + __arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1348 + __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline] + invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51 + el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136 + do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155 + el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712 + el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730 + el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598 + +Freed by task 6167: + kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] + kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68 + kasan_save_free_info+0x5c/0x74 mm/kasan/generic.c:640 + poison_slab_object+0x124/0x18c mm/kasan/common.c:241 + __kasan_slab_free+0x3c/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:257 + kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline] + slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inline] + slab_free mm/slub.c:4299 [inline] + kmem_cache_free+0x15c/0x3d4 mm/slub.c:4363 + kfree_skbmem+0x10c/0x19c + __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1109 [inline] + kfree_skb_reason+0x240/0x6f4 net/core/skbuff.c:1144 + kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1244 [inline] + kcm_release+0x104/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1685 + __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline] + sock_close+0xa4/0x1e8 net/socket.c:1421 + __fput+0x30c/0x738 fs/file_table.c:376 + ____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:404 + task_work_run+0x230/0x2e0 kernel/task_work.c:180 + exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline] + do_exit+0x618/0x1f64 kernel/exit.c:871 + do_group_exit+0x194/0x22c kernel/exit.c:1020 + get_signal+0x1500/0x15ec kernel/signal.c:2893 + do_signal+0x23c/0x3b44 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1249 + do_notify_resume+0x74/0x1f4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:148 + exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline] + exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline] + el0_svc+0xac/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:713 + el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730 + el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598 + +The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000ced0fc80 + which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 240 +The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of + freed 240-byte region [ffff0000ced0fc80, ffff0000ced0fd70) + +The buggy address belongs to the physical page: +page:00000000d35f4ae4 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10ed0f +flags: 0x5ffc00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff) +page_type: 0xffffffff() +raw: 05ffc00000000800 ffff0000c1cbf640 fffffdffc3423100 dead000000000004 +raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 +page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected + +Memory state around the buggy address: + ffff0000ced0fb80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb + ffff0000ced0fc00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc +>ffff0000ced0fc80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb + ^ + ffff0000ced0fd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc + ffff0000ced0fd80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb + +Fixes: ab7ac4eb9832 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module") +Reported-by: syzbot+b72d86aa5df17ce74c60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b72d86aa5df17ce74c60 +Tested-by: syzbot+b72d86aa5df17ce74c60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima +Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240815220437.69511-1-kuniyu@amazon.com +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + include/net/kcm.h | 1 + + net/kcm/kcmsock.c | 4 ++++ + 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/include/net/kcm.h b/include/net/kcm.h +index 2d704f8f49059..8e8252e08a9ce 100644 +--- a/include/net/kcm.h ++++ b/include/net/kcm.h +@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ struct kcm_sock { + struct work_struct tx_work; + struct list_head wait_psock_list; + struct sk_buff *seq_skb; ++ struct mutex tx_mutex; + u32 tx_stopped : 1; + + /* Don't use bit fields here, these are set under different locks */ +diff --git a/net/kcm/kcmsock.c b/net/kcm/kcmsock.c +index 920b0ebf1cb80..50dceed77ba66 100644 +--- a/net/kcm/kcmsock.c ++++ b/net/kcm/kcmsock.c +@@ -913,6 +913,7 @@ static int kcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) + !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE) : !!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_EOR); + int err = -EPIPE; + ++ mutex_lock(&kcm->tx_mutex); + lock_sock(sk); + + /* Per tcp_sendmsg this should be in poll */ +@@ -1061,6 +1062,7 @@ static int kcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) + KCM_STATS_ADD(kcm->stats.tx_bytes, copied); + + release_sock(sk); ++ mutex_unlock(&kcm->tx_mutex); + return copied; + + out_error: +@@ -1086,6 +1088,7 @@ static int kcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) + sk->sk_write_space(sk); + + release_sock(sk); ++ mutex_unlock(&kcm->tx_mutex); + return err; + } + +@@ -1328,6 +1331,7 @@ static void init_kcm_sock(struct kcm_sock *kcm, struct kcm_mux *mux) + spin_unlock_bh(&mux->lock); + + INIT_WORK(&kcm->tx_work, kcm_tx_work); ++ mutex_init(&kcm->tx_mutex); + + spin_lock_bh(&mux->rx_lock); + kcm_rcv_ready(kcm); +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-fix-out-of-bound-access.patch b/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-fix-out-of-bound-access.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2891477bd47 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-fix-out-of-bound-access.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 7ba0a3598cbf0e7919e81c456ffff62e3282ad3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2024 19:52:50 -0400 +Subject: net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix out-of-bound access + +From: Joseph Huang + +[ Upstream commit 528876d867a23b5198022baf2e388052ca67c952 ] + +If an ATU violation was caused by a CPU Load operation, the SPID could +be larger than DSA_MAX_PORTS (the size of mv88e6xxx_chip.ports[] array). + +Fixes: 75c05a74e745 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix counting of ATU violations") +Signed-off-by: Joseph Huang +Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240819235251.1331763-1-Joseph.Huang@garmin.com +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c +index 2b314b416256d..f2e07d903aa73 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c +@@ -421,7 +421,8 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob_irq_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id) + trace_mv88e6xxx_atu_full_violation(chip->dev, spid, + entry.portvec, entry.mac, + fid); +- chip->ports[spid].atu_full_violation++; ++ if (spid < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->ports)) ++ chip->ports[spid].atu_full_violation++; + } + mv88e6xxx_reg_unlock(chip); + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-global1_atu-add-helper-for-get-nex.patch b/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-global1_atu-add-helper-for-get-nex.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4ccd8ec33be --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-global1_atu-add-helper-for-get-nex.patch @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +From 742d1008be3ab74d96b8142e7882f92096f72096 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 01:13:00 +0100 +Subject: net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: global1_atu: Add helper for get next + +From: Andrew Lunn + +[ Upstream commit c5f299d592617847124900d75e5765cb0368ffae ] + +When retrieving the ATU statistics, and ATU get next has to be +performed to trigger the ATU to collect the statistics. Export a +helper from global1_atu to perform this. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Stable-dep-of: 528876d867a2 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix out-of-bound access") +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1.h | 1 + + drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c | 5 +++++ + drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.c | 11 ++--------- + drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.h | 2 +- + 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1.h b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1.h +index 0ae96a1e919b6..dc44e197817a8 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1.h ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1.h +@@ -339,5 +339,6 @@ int mv88e6390_g1_vtu_loadpurge(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, + int mv88e6xxx_g1_vtu_flush(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip); + int mv88e6xxx_g1_vtu_prob_irq_setup(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip); + void mv88e6xxx_g1_vtu_prob_irq_free(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip); ++int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_get_next(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 fid); + + #endif /* _MV88E6XXX_GLOBAL1_H */ +diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c +index 792a96ef418ff..d655a96f27f0a 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c +@@ -122,6 +122,11 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 fid, u16 op) + return mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op_wait(chip); + } + ++int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_get_next(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 fid) ++{ ++ return mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op(chip, fid, MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_GET_NEXT_DB); ++} ++ + /* Offset 0x0C: ATU Data Register */ + + static int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_data_read(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, +diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.c +index 6059c244373c8..4d4bd4a162815 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.c ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.c +@@ -288,16 +288,9 @@ int mv88e6xxx_g2_atu_stats_set(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 kind, u16 bin) + kind | bin); + } + +-int mv88e6xxx_g2_atu_stats_get(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip) ++int mv88e6xxx_g2_atu_stats_get(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 *stats) + { +- int err; +- u16 val; +- +- err = mv88e6xxx_g2_read(chip, MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS, &val); +- if (err) +- return err; +- +- return val & MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS_MASK; ++ return mv88e6xxx_g2_read(chip, MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS, stats); + } + + /* Offset 0x0F: Priority Override Table */ +diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.h b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.h +index 0e0ecf78f5ea7..a0cc40e7c2508 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.h ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.h +@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ extern const struct mv88e6xxx_gpio_ops mv88e6352_gpio_ops; + int mv88e6xxx_g2_scratch_gpio_set_smi(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, + bool external); + int mv88e6xxx_g2_atu_stats_set(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 kind, u16 bin); +-int mv88e6xxx_g2_atu_stats_get(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip); ++int mv88e6xxx_g2_atu_stats_get(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 *stats); + + #else /* !CONFIG_NET_DSA_MV88E6XXX_GLOBAL2 */ + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-global2-expose-atu-stats-register.patch b/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-global2-expose-atu-stats-register.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f367f271103 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-global2-expose-atu-stats-register.patch @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +From c6749d0d346d802ab3585ae2891a0703b0b451b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 01:12:59 +0100 +Subject: net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: global2: Expose ATU stats register + +From: Andrew Lunn + +[ Upstream commit 6239a386e784aed13c3ead54c3992ebcb0512d5f ] + +Add helpers to set/get the ATU statistics register. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Stable-dep-of: 528876d867a2 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix out-of-bound access") +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.h | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++- + 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.c +index 7674b0b8cc707..6059c244373c8 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.c ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.c +@@ -280,6 +280,26 @@ int mv88e6xxx_g2_set_switch_mac(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u8 *addr) + return err; + } + ++/* Offset 0x0E: ATU Statistics */ ++ ++int mv88e6xxx_g2_atu_stats_set(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 kind, u16 bin) ++{ ++ return mv88e6xxx_g2_write(chip, MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS, ++ kind | bin); ++} ++ ++int mv88e6xxx_g2_atu_stats_get(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip) ++{ ++ int err; ++ u16 val; ++ ++ err = mv88e6xxx_g2_read(chip, MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS, &val); ++ if (err) ++ return err; ++ ++ return val & MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS_MASK; ++} ++ + /* Offset 0x0F: Priority Override Table */ + + static int mv88e6xxx_g2_pot_write(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int pointer, +diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.h b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.h +index 12807e52ecea1..0e0ecf78f5ea7 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.h ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global2.h +@@ -113,7 +113,16 @@ + #define MV88E6XXX_G2_SWITCH_MAC_DATA_MASK 0x00ff + + /* Offset 0x0E: ATU Stats Register */ +-#define MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS 0x0e ++#define MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS 0x0e ++#define MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS_BIN_0 (0x0 << 14) ++#define MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS_BIN_1 (0x1 << 14) ++#define MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS_BIN_2 (0x2 << 14) ++#define MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS_BIN_3 (0x3 << 14) ++#define MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS_MODE_ALL (0x0 << 12) ++#define MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS_MODE_ALL_DYNAMIC (0x1 << 12) ++#define MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS_MODE_FID_ALL (0x2 << 12) ++#define MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS_MODE_FID_ALL_DYNAMIC (0x3 << 12) ++#define MV88E6XXX_G2_ATU_STATS_MASK 0x0fff + + /* Offset 0x0F: Priority Override Table */ + #define MV88E6XXX_G2_PRIO_OVERRIDE 0x0f +@@ -354,6 +363,8 @@ extern const struct mv88e6xxx_gpio_ops mv88e6352_gpio_ops; + + int mv88e6xxx_g2_scratch_gpio_set_smi(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, + bool external); ++int mv88e6xxx_g2_atu_stats_set(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 kind, u16 bin); ++int mv88e6xxx_g2_atu_stats_get(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip); + + #else /* !CONFIG_NET_DSA_MV88E6XXX_GLOBAL2 */ + +@@ -516,6 +527,17 @@ static inline int mv88e6xxx_g2_device_mapping_write(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } + ++static inline int mv88e6xxx_g2_atu_stats_set(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, ++ u16 kind, u16 bin) ++{ ++ return -EOPNOTSUPP; ++} ++ ++static inline int mv88e6xxx_g2_atu_stats_get(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip) ++{ ++ return -EOPNOTSUPP; ++} ++ + #endif /* CONFIG_NET_DSA_MV88E6XXX_GLOBAL2 */ + + #endif /* _MV88E6XXX_GLOBAL2_H */ +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-read-fid-when-handling-atu-violati.patch b/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-read-fid-when-handling-atu-violati.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f1d7740b265 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-read-fid-when-handling-atu-violati.patch @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +From cd071baccbf871147b37508c4d26d2e5509449b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2022 19:28:15 +0200 +Subject: net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: read FID when handling ATU violations + +From: Hans J. Schultz + +[ Upstream commit 4bf24ad09bc0b05e97fb48b962b2c9246fc76727 ] + +When an ATU violation occurs, the switch uses the ATU FID register to +report the FID of the MAC address that incurred the violation. It would +be good for the driver to know the FID value for purposes such as +logging and CPU-based authentication. + +Up until now, the driver has been calling the mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op() +function to read ATU violations, but that doesn't do exactly what we +want, namely it calls mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_fid_write() with FID 0. +(side note, the documentation for the ATU Get/Clear Violation command +says that writes to the ATU FID register have no effect before the +operation starts, it's only that we disregard the value that this +register provides once the operation completes) + +So mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_fid_write() is not what we want, but rather +mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_fid_read(). However, the latter doesn't exist, we need +to write it. + +The remainder of mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op() except for +mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_fid_write() is still needed, namely to send a +GET_CLR_VIOLATION command to the ATU. In principle we could have still +kept calling mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op(), but the MDIO writes to the ATU FID +register are pointless, but in the interest of doing less CPU work per +interrupt, write a new function called mv88e6xxx_g1_read_atu_violation() +and call it. + +The FID will be the port default FID as set by mv88e6xxx_port_set_fid() +if the VID from the packet cannot be found in the VTU. Otherwise it is +the FID derived from the VTU entry associated with that VID. + +Signed-off-by: Hans J. Schultz +Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean +Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Stable-dep-of: 528876d867a2 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix out-of-bound access") +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c +index d655a96f27f0a..13ca45bf0f0bb 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c +@@ -82,6 +82,19 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op_wait(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip) + return mv88e6xxx_g1_wait_bit(chip, MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP, bit, 0); + } + ++static int mv88e6xxx_g1_read_atu_violation(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip) ++{ ++ int err; ++ ++ err = mv88e6xxx_g1_write(chip, MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP, ++ MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_BUSY | ++ MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_GET_CLR_VIOLATION); ++ if (err) ++ return err; ++ ++ return mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op_wait(chip); ++} ++ + static int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 fid, u16 op) + { + u16 val; +@@ -127,6 +140,41 @@ int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_get_next(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 fid) + return mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op(chip, fid, MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_GET_NEXT_DB); + } + ++static int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_fid_read(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 *fid) ++{ ++ u16 val = 0, upper = 0, op = 0; ++ int err = -EOPNOTSUPP; ++ ++ if (mv88e6xxx_num_databases(chip) > 256) { ++ err = mv88e6xxx_g1_read(chip, MV88E6352_G1_ATU_FID, &val); ++ val &= 0xfff; ++ if (err) ++ return err; ++ } else { ++ err = mv88e6xxx_g1_read(chip, MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP, &op); ++ if (err) ++ return err; ++ if (mv88e6xxx_num_databases(chip) > 64) { ++ /* ATU DBNum[7:4] are located in ATU Control 15:12 */ ++ err = mv88e6xxx_g1_read(chip, MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_CTL, ++ &upper); ++ if (err) ++ return err; ++ ++ upper = (upper >> 8) & 0x00f0; ++ } else if (mv88e6xxx_num_databases(chip) > 16) { ++ /* ATU DBNum[5:4] are located in ATU Operation 9:8 */ ++ upper = (op >> 4) & 0x30; ++ } ++ ++ /* ATU DBNum[3:0] are located in ATU Operation 3:0 */ ++ val = (op & 0xf) | upper; ++ } ++ *fid = val; ++ ++ return err; ++} ++ + /* Offset 0x0C: ATU Data Register */ + + static int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_data_read(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, +@@ -321,14 +369,12 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob_irq_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id) + { + struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip = dev_id; + struct mv88e6xxx_atu_entry entry; +- int spid; +- int err; +- u16 val; ++ int err, spid; ++ u16 val, fid; + + mv88e6xxx_reg_lock(chip); + +- err = mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op(chip, 0, +- MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_GET_CLR_VIOLATION); ++ err = mv88e6xxx_g1_read_atu_violation(chip); + if (err) + goto out; + +@@ -336,6 +382,10 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob_irq_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id) + if (err) + goto out; + ++ err = mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_fid_read(chip, &fid); ++ if (err) ++ goto out; ++ + err = mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_data_read(chip, &entry); + if (err) + goto out; +@@ -354,22 +404,22 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob_irq_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id) + + if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_MEMBER_VIOLATION) { + dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev, +- "ATU member violation for %pM portvec %x spid %d\n", +- entry.mac, entry.portvec, spid); ++ "ATU member violation for %pM fid %u portvec %x spid %d\n", ++ entry.mac, fid, entry.portvec, spid); + chip->ports[spid].atu_member_violation++; + } + + if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_MISS_VIOLATION) { + dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev, +- "ATU miss violation for %pM portvec %x spid %d\n", +- entry.mac, entry.portvec, spid); ++ "ATU miss violation for %pM fid %u portvec %x spid %d\n", ++ entry.mac, fid, entry.portvec, spid); + chip->ports[spid].atu_miss_violation++; + } + + if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_FULL_VIOLATION) { + dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev, +- "ATU full violation for %pM portvec %x spid %d\n", +- entry.mac, entry.portvec, spid); ++ "ATU full violation for %pM fid %u portvec %x spid %d\n", ++ entry.mac, fid, entry.portvec, spid); + chip->ports[spid].atu_full_violation++; + } + mv88e6xxx_reg_unlock(chip); +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-replace-atu-violation-prints-with-.patch b/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-replace-atu-violation-prints-with-.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9840d1ad256 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-replace-atu-violation-prints-with-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +From ddafb2d6f17c30ae9caa121a6f8982434da0ffb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2022 19:28:16 +0200 +Subject: net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: replace ATU violation prints with trace points + +From: Vladimir Oltean + +[ Upstream commit 8646384d80f3d3b4a66b3284dbbd8232d1b8799e ] + +In applications where the switch ports must perform 802.1X based +authentication and are therefore locked, ATU violation interrupts are +quite to be expected as part of normal operation. The problem is that +they currently spam the kernel log, even if rate limited. + +Create a series of trace points, all derived from the same event class, +which log these violations to the kernel's trace buffer, which is both +much faster and much easier to ignore than printing to a serial console. + +New usage model: + +$ trace-cmd list | grep mv88e6xxx +mv88e6xxx +mv88e6xxx:mv88e6xxx_atu_full_violation +mv88e6xxx:mv88e6xxx_atu_miss_violation +mv88e6xxx:mv88e6xxx_atu_member_violation +$ trace-cmd record -e mv88e6xxx sleep 10 + +Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean +Reviewed-by: Saeed Mahameed +Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Stable-dep-of: 528876d867a2 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix out-of-bound access") +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/Makefile | 4 ++ + drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c | 19 +++---- + drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.c | 6 +++ + drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.h | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.c + create mode 100644 drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.h + +diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/Makefile b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/Makefile +index aa645ff86f641..2347d56c7155d 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/Makefile ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/Makefile +@@ -14,3 +14,7 @@ mv88e6xxx-objs += port_hidden.o + mv88e6xxx-$(CONFIG_NET_DSA_MV88E6XXX_PTP) += ptp.o + mv88e6xxx-objs += serdes.o + mv88e6xxx-objs += smi.o ++mv88e6xxx-objs += trace.o ++ ++# for tracing framework to find trace.h ++CFLAGS_trace.o := -I$(src) +diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c +index 13ca45bf0f0bb..2b314b416256d 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c +@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ + + #include "chip.h" + #include "global1.h" ++#include "trace.h" + + /* Offset 0x01: ATU FID Register */ + +@@ -403,23 +404,23 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob_irq_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id) + } + + if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_MEMBER_VIOLATION) { +- dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev, +- "ATU member violation for %pM fid %u portvec %x spid %d\n", +- entry.mac, fid, entry.portvec, spid); ++ trace_mv88e6xxx_atu_member_violation(chip->dev, spid, ++ entry.portvec, entry.mac, ++ fid); + chip->ports[spid].atu_member_violation++; + } + + if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_MISS_VIOLATION) { +- dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev, +- "ATU miss violation for %pM fid %u portvec %x spid %d\n", +- entry.mac, fid, entry.portvec, spid); ++ trace_mv88e6xxx_atu_miss_violation(chip->dev, spid, ++ entry.portvec, entry.mac, ++ fid); + chip->ports[spid].atu_miss_violation++; + } + + if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_FULL_VIOLATION) { +- dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev, +- "ATU full violation for %pM fid %u portvec %x spid %d\n", +- entry.mac, fid, entry.portvec, spid); ++ trace_mv88e6xxx_atu_full_violation(chip->dev, spid, ++ entry.portvec, entry.mac, ++ fid); + chip->ports[spid].atu_full_violation++; + } + mv88e6xxx_reg_unlock(chip); +diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000000..7833cb50ca5d7 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.c +@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later ++/* Copyright 2022 NXP ++ */ ++ ++#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS ++#include "trace.h" +diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.h b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000000..d9ab5c8dee55d +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.h +@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ ++/* Copyright 2022 NXP ++ */ ++ ++#undef TRACE_SYSTEM ++#define TRACE_SYSTEM mv88e6xxx ++ ++#if !defined(_MV88E6XXX_TRACE_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) ++#define _MV88E6XXX_TRACE_H ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(mv88e6xxx_atu_violation, ++ ++ TP_PROTO(const struct device *dev, int spid, u16 portvec, ++ const unsigned char *addr, u16 fid), ++ ++ TP_ARGS(dev, spid, portvec, addr, fid), ++ ++ TP_STRUCT__entry( ++ __string(name, dev_name(dev)) ++ __field(int, spid) ++ __field(u16, portvec) ++ __array(unsigned char, addr, ETH_ALEN) ++ __field(u16, fid) ++ ), ++ ++ TP_fast_assign( ++ __assign_str(name, dev_name(dev)); ++ __entry->spid = spid; ++ __entry->portvec = portvec; ++ memcpy(__entry->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN); ++ __entry->fid = fid; ++ ), ++ ++ TP_printk("dev %s spid %d portvec 0x%x addr %pM fid %u", ++ __get_str(name), __entry->spid, __entry->portvec, ++ __entry->addr, __entry->fid) ++); ++ ++DEFINE_EVENT(mv88e6xxx_atu_violation, mv88e6xxx_atu_member_violation, ++ TP_PROTO(const struct device *dev, int spid, u16 portvec, ++ const unsigned char *addr, u16 fid), ++ TP_ARGS(dev, spid, portvec, addr, fid)); ++ ++DEFINE_EVENT(mv88e6xxx_atu_violation, mv88e6xxx_atu_miss_violation, ++ TP_PROTO(const struct device *dev, int spid, u16 portvec, ++ const unsigned char *addr, u16 fid), ++ TP_ARGS(dev, spid, portvec, addr, fid)); ++ ++DEFINE_EVENT(mv88e6xxx_atu_violation, mv88e6xxx_atu_full_violation, ++ TP_PROTO(const struct device *dev, int spid, u16 portvec, ++ const unsigned char *addr, u16 fid), ++ TP_ARGS(dev, spid, portvec, addr, fid)); ++ ++#endif /* _MV88E6XXX_TRACE_H */ ++ ++/* We don't want to use include/trace/events */ ++#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH ++#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH . ++#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE ++#define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE trace ++/* This part must be outside protection */ ++#include +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/net-xilinx-axienet-always-disable-promiscuous-mode.patch b/queue-5.4/net-xilinx-axienet-always-disable-promiscuous-mode.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..84ae1b2689a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/net-xilinx-axienet-always-disable-promiscuous-mode.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From ed4fb025a5a4a211e115c61289c751f40281ef2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 11:40:55 -0400 +Subject: net: xilinx: axienet: Always disable promiscuous mode + +From: Sean Anderson + +[ Upstream commit 4ae738dfef2c0323752ab81786e2d298c9939321 ] + +If promiscuous mode is disabled when there are fewer than four multicast +addresses, then it will not be reflected in the hardware. Fix this by +always clearing the promiscuous mode flag even when we program multicast +addresses. + +Fixes: 8a3b7a252dca ("drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx: added Xilinx AXI Ethernet driver") +Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson +Reviewed-by: Simon Horman +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822154059.1066595-2-sean.anderson@linux.dev +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c +index 1156719210cdb..80bb6b85bd441 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c ++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c +@@ -427,6 +427,10 @@ static void axienet_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *ndev) + } else if (!netdev_mc_empty(ndev)) { + struct netdev_hw_addr *ha; + ++ reg = axienet_ior(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET); ++ reg &= ~XAE_FMI_PM_MASK; ++ axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET, reg); ++ + i = 0; + netdev_for_each_mc_addr(ha, ndev) { + if (i >= XAE_MULTICAST_CAM_TABLE_NUM) +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/net-xilinx-axienet-fix-dangling-multicast-addresses.patch b/queue-5.4/net-xilinx-axienet-fix-dangling-multicast-addresses.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..178b3c9729f --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/net-xilinx-axienet-fix-dangling-multicast-addresses.patch @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +From 4fb9074230809ceec3b185c6d37db545544c89a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 11:40:56 -0400 +Subject: net: xilinx: axienet: Fix dangling multicast addresses + +From: Sean Anderson + +[ Upstream commit 797a68c9de0f5a5447baf4bd3bb9c10a3993435b ] + +If a multicast address is removed but there are still some multicast +addresses, that address would remain programmed into the frame filter. +Fix this by explicitly setting the enable bit for each filter. + +Fixes: 8a3b7a252dca ("drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx: added Xilinx AXI Ethernet driver") +Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson +Reviewed-by: Simon Horman +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822154059.1066595-3-sean.anderson@linux.dev +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet.h | 1 + + .../net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c | 21 ++++++++----------- + 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet.h +index bf1a19a00adc6..c43d437f22bdf 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet.h ++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet.h +@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ + #define XAE_UAW0_OFFSET 0x00000700 /* Unicast address word 0 */ + #define XAE_UAW1_OFFSET 0x00000704 /* Unicast address word 1 */ + #define XAE_FMI_OFFSET 0x00000708 /* Frame Filter Control */ ++#define XAE_FFE_OFFSET 0x0000070C /* Frame Filter Enable */ + #define XAE_AF0_OFFSET 0x00000710 /* Address Filter 0 */ + #define XAE_AF1_OFFSET 0x00000714 /* Address Filter 1 */ + +diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c +index 80bb6b85bd441..2aacc077ee2bc 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c ++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c +@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static int netdev_set_mac_address(struct net_device *ndev, void *p) + */ + static void axienet_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *ndev) + { +- int i; ++ int i = 0; + u32 reg, af0reg, af1reg; + struct axienet_local *lp = netdev_priv(ndev); + +@@ -431,7 +431,6 @@ static void axienet_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *ndev) + reg &= ~XAE_FMI_PM_MASK; + axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET, reg); + +- i = 0; + netdev_for_each_mc_addr(ha, ndev) { + if (i >= XAE_MULTICAST_CAM_TABLE_NUM) + break; +@@ -450,6 +449,7 @@ static void axienet_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *ndev) + axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET, reg); + axienet_iow(lp, XAE_AF0_OFFSET, af0reg); + axienet_iow(lp, XAE_AF1_OFFSET, af1reg); ++ axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FFE_OFFSET, 1); + i++; + } + } else { +@@ -457,18 +457,15 @@ static void axienet_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *ndev) + reg &= ~XAE_FMI_PM_MASK; + + axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET, reg); +- +- for (i = 0; i < XAE_MULTICAST_CAM_TABLE_NUM; i++) { +- reg = axienet_ior(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET) & 0xFFFFFF00; +- reg |= i; +- +- axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET, reg); +- axienet_iow(lp, XAE_AF0_OFFSET, 0); +- axienet_iow(lp, XAE_AF1_OFFSET, 0); +- } +- + dev_info(&ndev->dev, "Promiscuous mode disabled.\n"); + } ++ ++ for (; i < XAE_MULTICAST_CAM_TABLE_NUM; i++) { ++ reg = axienet_ior(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET) & 0xFFFFFF00; ++ reg |= i; ++ axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET, reg); ++ axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FFE_OFFSET, 0); ++ } + } + + /** +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/netem-fix-return-value-if-duplicate-enqueue-fails.patch b/queue-5.4/netem-fix-return-value-if-duplicate-enqueue-fails.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..049b87b7f04 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/netem-fix-return-value-if-duplicate-enqueue-fails.patch @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +From 141ca204dec0e3e6ed56ff580ba002837903ac6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2024 10:56:45 -0700 +Subject: netem: fix return value if duplicate enqueue fails + +From: Stephen Hemminger + +[ Upstream commit c07ff8592d57ed258afee5a5e04991a48dbaf382 ] + +There is a bug in netem_enqueue() introduced by +commit 5845f706388a ("net: netem: fix skb length BUG_ON in __skb_to_sgvec") +that can lead to a use-after-free. + +This commit made netem_enqueue() always return NET_XMIT_SUCCESS +when a packet is duplicated, which can cause the parent qdisc's q.qlen +to be mistakenly incremented. When this happens qlen_notify() may be +skipped on the parent during destruction, leaving a dangling pointer +for some classful qdiscs like DRR. + +There are two ways for the bug happen: + +- If the duplicated packet is dropped by rootq->enqueue() and then + the original packet is also dropped. +- If rootq->enqueue() sends the duplicated packet to a different qdisc + and the original packet is dropped. + +In both cases NET_XMIT_SUCCESS is returned even though no packets +are enqueued at the netem qdisc. + +The fix is to defer the enqueue of the duplicate packet until after +the original packet has been guaranteed to return NET_XMIT_SUCCESS. + +Fixes: 5845f706388a ("net: netem: fix skb length BUG_ON in __skb_to_sgvec") +Reported-by: Budimir Markovic +Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger +Reviewed-by: Simon Horman +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240819175753.5151-1-stephen@networkplumber.org +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/sched/sch_netem.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- + 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/net/sched/sch_netem.c b/net/sched/sch_netem.c +index 265a02b6ad099..591ca93e2a01d 100644 +--- a/net/sched/sch_netem.c ++++ b/net/sched/sch_netem.c +@@ -437,12 +437,10 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, + struct netem_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch); + /* We don't fill cb now as skb_unshare() may invalidate it */ + struct netem_skb_cb *cb; +- struct sk_buff *skb2; ++ struct sk_buff *skb2 = NULL; + struct sk_buff *segs = NULL; + unsigned int prev_len = qdisc_pkt_len(skb); + int count = 1; +- int rc = NET_XMIT_SUCCESS; +- int rc_drop = NET_XMIT_DROP; + + /* Do not fool qdisc_drop_all() */ + skb->prev = NULL; +@@ -471,19 +469,11 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, + skb_orphan_partial(skb); + + /* +- * If we need to duplicate packet, then re-insert at top of the +- * qdisc tree, since parent queuer expects that only one +- * skb will be queued. ++ * If we need to duplicate packet, then clone it before ++ * original is modified. + */ +- if (count > 1 && (skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC)) != NULL) { +- struct Qdisc *rootq = qdisc_root_bh(sch); +- u32 dupsave = q->duplicate; /* prevent duplicating a dup... */ +- +- q->duplicate = 0; +- rootq->enqueue(skb2, rootq, to_free); +- q->duplicate = dupsave; +- rc_drop = NET_XMIT_SUCCESS; +- } ++ if (count > 1) ++ skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + + /* + * Randomized packet corruption. +@@ -495,7 +485,8 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, + if (skb_is_gso(skb)) { + skb = netem_segment(skb, sch, to_free); + if (!skb) +- return rc_drop; ++ goto finish_segs; ++ + segs = skb->next; + skb_mark_not_on_list(skb); + qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len = skb->len; +@@ -521,7 +512,24 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, + /* re-link segs, so that qdisc_drop_all() frees them all */ + skb->next = segs; + qdisc_drop_all(skb, sch, to_free); +- return rc_drop; ++ if (skb2) ++ __qdisc_drop(skb2, to_free); ++ return NET_XMIT_DROP; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If doing duplication then re-insert at top of the ++ * qdisc tree, since parent queuer expects that only one ++ * skb will be queued. ++ */ ++ if (skb2) { ++ struct Qdisc *rootq = qdisc_root_bh(sch); ++ u32 dupsave = q->duplicate; /* prevent duplicating a dup... */ ++ ++ q->duplicate = 0; ++ rootq->enqueue(skb2, rootq, to_free); ++ q->duplicate = dupsave; ++ skb2 = NULL; + } + + qdisc_qstats_backlog_inc(sch, skb); +@@ -592,9 +600,12 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, + } + + finish_segs: ++ if (skb2) ++ __qdisc_drop(skb2, to_free); ++ + if (segs) { + unsigned int len, last_len; +- int nb; ++ int rc, nb; + + len = skb ? skb->len : 0; + nb = skb ? 1 : 0; +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/netfilter-nft_counter-synchronize-nft_counter_reset-.patch b/queue-5.4/netfilter-nft_counter-synchronize-nft_counter_reset-.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..41b7a5ecea7 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/netfilter-nft_counter-synchronize-nft_counter_reset-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 1384507cd1c1ae9ce8ae829a36111b5fcbed0094 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 09:54:31 +0200 +Subject: netfilter: nft_counter: Synchronize nft_counter_reset() against + reader. + +From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior + +[ Upstream commit a0b39e2dc7017ac667b70bdeee5293e410fab2fb ] + +nft_counter_reset() resets the counter by subtracting the previously +retrieved value from the counter. This is a write operation on the +counter and as such it requires to be performed with a write sequence of +nft_counter_seq to serialize against its possible reader. + +Update the packets/ bytes within write-sequence of nft_counter_seq. + +Fixes: d84701ecbcd6a ("netfilter: nft_counter: rework atomic dump and reset") +Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior +Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal +Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/netfilter/nft_counter.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_counter.c b/net/netfilter/nft_counter.c +index f6d4d0fa23a62..bf829fabf2785 100644 +--- a/net/netfilter/nft_counter.c ++++ b/net/netfilter/nft_counter.c +@@ -105,11 +105,16 @@ static void nft_counter_reset(struct nft_counter_percpu_priv *priv, + struct nft_counter *total) + { + struct nft_counter *this_cpu; ++ seqcount_t *myseq; + + local_bh_disable(); + this_cpu = this_cpu_ptr(priv->counter); ++ myseq = this_cpu_ptr(&nft_counter_seq); ++ ++ write_seqcount_begin(myseq); + this_cpu->packets -= total->packets; + this_cpu->bytes -= total->bytes; ++ write_seqcount_end(myseq); + local_bh_enable(); + } + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/series b/queue-5.4/series index 31cdfd5d37f..ca7baa91f1e 100644 --- a/queue-5.4/series +++ b/queue-5.4/series @@ -79,3 +79,18 @@ media-solo6x10-replace-max-a-min-b-c-by-clamp-b-a-c.patch dm-mpath-pass-io-start-time-to-path-selector.patch dm-do-not-use-waitqueue-for-request-based-dm.patch dm-suspend-return-erestartsys-instead-of-eintr.patch +bluetooth-make-use-of-__check_timeout-on-hci_sched_l.patch +bluetooth-hci_core-fix-not-handling-link-timeouts-pr.patch +bluetooth-hci_core-fix-le-quote-calculation.patch +tc-testing-don-t-access-non-existent-variable-on-exc.patch +kcm-serialise-kcm_sendmsg-for-the-same-socket.patch +netfilter-nft_counter-synchronize-nft_counter_reset-.patch +net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-global2-expose-atu-stats-register.patch +net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-global1_atu-add-helper-for-get-nex.patch +net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-read-fid-when-handling-atu-violati.patch +net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-replace-atu-violation-prints-with-.patch +net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-fix-out-of-bound-access.patch +netem-fix-return-value-if-duplicate-enqueue-fails.patch +ipv6-prevent-uaf-in-ip6_send_skb.patch +net-xilinx-axienet-always-disable-promiscuous-mode.patch +net-xilinx-axienet-fix-dangling-multicast-addresses.patch diff --git a/queue-5.4/tc-testing-don-t-access-non-existent-variable-on-exc.patch b/queue-5.4/tc-testing-don-t-access-non-existent-variable-on-exc.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d022fe2b7a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/tc-testing-don-t-access-non-existent-variable-on-exc.patch @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From 3d1a569663cdee596dddfa6f36bf5275f9924080 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2024 16:37:13 +0100 +Subject: tc-testing: don't access non-existent variable on exception + +From: Simon Horman + +[ Upstream commit a0c9fe5eecc97680323ee83780ea3eaf440ba1b7 ] + +Since commit 255c1c7279ab ("tc-testing: Allow test cases to be skipped") +the variable test_ordinal doesn't exist in call_pre_case(). +So it should not be accessed when an exception occurs. + +This resolves the following splat: + + ... + During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred: + + Traceback (most recent call last): + File ".../tdc.py", line 1028, in + main() + File ".../tdc.py", line 1022, in main + set_operation_mode(pm, parser, args, remaining) + File ".../tdc.py", line 966, in set_operation_mode + catresults = test_runner_serial(pm, args, alltests) + File ".../tdc.py", line 642, in test_runner_serial + (index, tsr) = test_runner(pm, args, alltests) + File ".../tdc.py", line 536, in test_runner + res = run_one_test(pm, args, index, tidx) + File ".../tdc.py", line 419, in run_one_test + pm.call_pre_case(tidx) + File ".../tdc.py", line 146, in call_pre_case + print('test_ordinal is {}'.format(test_ordinal)) + NameError: name 'test_ordinal' is not defined + +Fixes: 255c1c7279ab ("tc-testing: Allow test cases to be skipped") +Signed-off-by: Simon Horman +Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240815-tdc-test-ordinal-v1-1-0255c122a427@kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing/tdc.py | 1 - + 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing/tdc.py b/tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing/tdc.py +index e566c70e64a19..81f76a5d12ac6 100755 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing/tdc.py ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing/tdc.py +@@ -129,7 +129,6 @@ class PluginMgr: + except Exception as ee: + print('exception {} in call to pre_case for {} plugin'. + format(ee, pgn_inst.__class__)) +- print('test_ordinal is {}'.format(test_ordinal)) + print('testid is {}'.format(caseinfo['id'])) + raise + +-- +2.43.0 +