From: Nathan Rebello Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2026 22:24:53 +0000 (-0400) Subject: usb: typec: ucsi: validate connector number in ucsi_notify_common() X-Git-Tag: v7.0-rc7~10^2~33 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=d2d8c17ac01a1b1f638ea5d340a884ccc5015186;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Flinux.git usb: typec: ucsi: validate connector number in ucsi_notify_common() The connector number extracted from CCI via UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR() is a 7-bit field (0-127) that is used to index into the connector array in ucsi_connector_change(). However, the array is only allocated for the number of connectors reported by the device (typically 2-4 entries). A malicious or malfunctioning device could report an out-of-range connector number in the CCI, causing an out-of-bounds array access in ucsi_connector_change(). Add a bounds check in ucsi_notify_common(), the central point where CCI is parsed after arriving from hardware, so that bogus connector numbers are rejected before they propagate further. Fixes: bdc62f2bae8f ("usb: typec: ucsi: Simplified registration and I/O API") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus Signed-off-by: Nathan Rebello Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260313222453.123-1-nathan.c.rebello@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c index f38a4d7ebc42..8333bdaf5566 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c @@ -43,8 +43,13 @@ void ucsi_notify_common(struct ucsi *ucsi, u32 cci) if (cci & UCSI_CCI_BUSY) return; - if (UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR(cci)) - ucsi_connector_change(ucsi, UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR(cci)); + if (UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR(cci)) { + if (UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR(cci) <= ucsi->cap.num_connectors) + ucsi_connector_change(ucsi, UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR(cci)); + else + dev_err(ucsi->dev, "bogus connector number in CCI: %lu\n", + UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR(cci)); + } if (cci & UCSI_CCI_ACK_COMPLETE && test_and_clear_bit(ACK_PENDING, &ucsi->flags))