From: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git@fscked.org>
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 01:29:16 +0000 (-0800)
Subject: Note more potential issues.
X-Git-Tag: tor-0.2.4.8-alpha~18^2~22
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=dc86d7c35bd48d12d84feb6f63014904eabe0902;p=thirdparty%2Ftor.git

Note more potential issues.
---

diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c
index eb7fc75286..7163c351c6 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitlist.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c
@@ -1383,6 +1383,12 @@ circuit_mark_for_close_(circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line,
           pathbias_count_collapse(ocirc);
         }
       } else if (circ->timestamp_dirty && !ocirc->any_streams_succeeded) {
+        // XXX: May open up attacks if the adversary can force connections
+        // on unresponsive hosts to use new circs. Vidalia displayes a "Retrying"
+        // state.. Can we use that? Does optimistic data change this?
+        // XXX: For the hidserv side, we could only care about INTRODUCING purposes
+        // for server+client, and REND purposes for the server... Can we
+        // somehow only count those?
         /* Any circuit where there were attempted streams but no successful
          * streams could be bias */
         /* FIXME: This may be better handled by limiting the number of retries