From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 14:41:35 +0000 (+0200) Subject: 5.10-stable patches X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=f94a4ae1e18536116cc768a3f8032b7055fbd959;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git 5.10-stable patches added patches: alsa-timer-fix-uaf-at-snd_timer_user_params.patch arm-socfpga-fix-of-node-refcount-leak-in-smp-setup.patch drm-amd-display-reject-gpio_bitshift-32-in-bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info.patch ib-isert-reject-login-pdus-shorter-than-iser_headers_len.patch pidfd-refuse-access-to-tasks-that-have-started-exiting-harder.patch rdma-srp-bound-srp_rsp-sense-copy-by-the-received-length.patch usb-serial-io_ti-fix-heap-overflow-in-build_i2c_fw_hdr.patch usb-serial-io_ti-fix-heap-overflow-in-get_manuf_info.patch usb-serial-kl5kusb105-fix-bulk-out-buffer-overflow.patch usb-serial-option-add-usb-id-for-dell-wireless-dw5826e-m.patch vsock-vmci-fix-sk_ack_backlog-leak-on-failed-handshake.patch xfrm-espintcp-do-not-reuse-an-in-progress-partial-send.patch --- diff --git a/queue-5.10/alsa-timer-fix-uaf-at-snd_timer_user_params.patch b/queue-5.10/alsa-timer-fix-uaf-at-snd_timer_user_params.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6de3a3782e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/alsa-timer-fix-uaf-at-snd_timer_user_params.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 053a401b592be424fea9d57c789f66cd5d8cec11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Takashi Iwai +Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2026 18:11:41 +0200 +Subject: ALSA: timer: Fix UAF at snd_timer_user_params() + +From: Takashi Iwai + +commit 053a401b592be424fea9d57c789f66cd5d8cec11 upstream. + +At releasing a timer object, e.g. when a userspace timer +(CONFIG_SND_UTIMER) gets closed and snd_timer_free() is called, it +tries to detach the timer instances and release the resources. +However, it's still possible that other in-flight tasks are holding +the timer instance where the to-be-deleted timer object is associated, +and this may lead to racy accesses. + +Fortunately, most of ioctls dealing with the timer instance list +already have the protection with register_mutex, and this also avoids +such races. But, SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS isn't protected, hence the +concurrent ioctl may lead to use-after-free. + +This patch just adds the guard with register_mutex to protect +snd_timer_user_params() for covering the code path as a quick +workaround. It's no hot-path but rather a rarely issued ioctl, so the +performance penalty doesn't matter. + +Reported-by: Kyle Zeng +Tested-by: Kyle Zeng +Cc: +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260606161145.1933447-2-tiwai@suse.de +Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + sound/core/timer.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/sound/core/timer.c ++++ b/sound/core/timer.c +@@ -1842,6 +1842,7 @@ static int snd_timer_user_params(struct + struct snd_timer *t; + int err; + ++ guard(mutex)(®ister_mutex); + tu = file->private_data; + if (!tu->timeri) + return -EBADFD; diff --git a/queue-5.10/arm-socfpga-fix-of-node-refcount-leak-in-smp-setup.patch b/queue-5.10/arm-socfpga-fix-of-node-refcount-leak-in-smp-setup.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a961dedb52 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/arm-socfpga-fix-of-node-refcount-leak-in-smp-setup.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 63838c323924fe4a78b2323bd45aa1030f72ca60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yuho Choi +Date: Sun, 24 May 2026 22:47:09 -0400 +Subject: ARM: socfpga: Fix OF node refcount leak in SMP setup + +From: Yuho Choi + +commit 63838c323924fe4a78b2323bd45aa1030f72ca60 upstream. + +socfpga_smp_prepare_cpus() looks up the Cortex-A9 SCU node with +of_find_compatible_node(), which returns a node reference that must be +released with of_node_put(). + +The function maps the SCU registers and then returns without dropping +that reference, leaking the node on both the success path and the +of_iomap() failure path. + +Drop the reference once the mapping attempt is complete. The returned +MMIO mapping does not depend on keeping the device node reference held. + +Fixes: 122694a0c712 ("ARM: socfpga: use of_iomap to map the SCU") +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Yuho Choi +Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/arm/mach-socfpga/platsmp.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/arch/arm/mach-socfpga/platsmp.c ++++ b/arch/arm/mach-socfpga/platsmp.c +@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static void __init socfpga_smp_prepare_c + } + + socfpga_scu_base_addr = of_iomap(np, 0); ++ of_node_put(np); + if (!socfpga_scu_base_addr) + return; + scu_enable(socfpga_scu_base_addr); diff --git a/queue-5.10/drm-amd-display-reject-gpio_bitshift-32-in-bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info.patch b/queue-5.10/drm-amd-display-reject-gpio_bitshift-32-in-bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a574c1c32 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/drm-amd-display-reject-gpio_bitshift-32-in-bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 49c3da65961fe9857c831d47fa1989084e87514a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Harry Wentland +Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 11:50:07 -0400 +Subject: drm/amd/display: Reject gpio_bitshift >= 32 in bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info() + +From: Harry Wentland + +commit 49c3da65961fe9857c831d47fa1989084e87514a upstream. + +[Why & How] +gpio_bitshift is a uint8_t read directly from the VBIOS GPIO pin table. +If the value is >= 32, the expression "1 << gpio_bitshift" triggers +undefined behaviour in C (shift count exceeds type width). On x86 the +shift is silently masked to 5 bits, producing an incorrect GPIO mask +that may cause wrong MMIO register bits to be toggled. + +Validate gpio_bitshift before use and return BP_RESULT_BADBIOSTABLE for +out-of-range values. + +Fixes: ae79c310b1a6 ("drm/amd/display: Add DCE12 bios parser support") +Assisted-by: Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 +Reviewed-by: Alex Hung +Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland +Signed-off-by: Ray Wu +Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler +Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher +(cherry picked from commit eadf438ab8d370b9d19acee9359918c85afeb80d) +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c | 6 ++++-- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c ++++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c +@@ -546,8 +546,10 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_gp + info->offset_en = info->offset + 1; + info->offset_mask = info->offset - 1; + +- info->mask = (uint32_t) (1 << +- header->gpio_pin[i].gpio_bitshift); ++ if (header->gpio_pin[i].gpio_bitshift >= 32) ++ return BP_RESULT_BADBIOSTABLE; ++ ++ info->mask = 1u << header->gpio_pin[i].gpio_bitshift; + info->mask_y = info->mask + 2; + info->mask_en = info->mask + 1; + info->mask_mask = info->mask - 1; diff --git a/queue-5.10/ib-isert-reject-login-pdus-shorter-than-iser_headers_len.patch b/queue-5.10/ib-isert-reject-login-pdus-shorter-than-iser_headers_len.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5ae3bdf22d --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/ib-isert-reject-login-pdus-shorter-than-iser_headers_len.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From 29e7b925ae6df64894e82ab6419994dc25580a8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Bommarito +Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 15:46:42 -0400 +Subject: IB/isert: Reject login PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN + +From: Michael Bommarito + +commit 29e7b925ae6df64894e82ab6419994dc25580a8a upstream. + +In drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c, isert_login_recv_done() +computes the login request payload length as wc->byte_len minus +ISER_HEADERS_LEN with no lower bound, and login_req_len is a signed int. +A remote iSER initiator can post a login Send work request carrying +fewer than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (76) bytes, so the subtraction underflows +and login_req_len becomes negative. + +isert_rx_login_req() then reads that negative length back into a signed +int, takes size = min(rx_buflen, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS), and because the +min() is signed it keeps the negative value; the value is then passed as +the memcpy() length and sign-extended to a multi-gigabyte size_t. The +copy into the 8192-byte login->req_buf runs far out of bounds and +faults, crashing the target node. The login phase precedes iSCSI +authentication, so no credentials are required to reach this path. + +Reject any login PDU shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN before the +subtraction, mirroring the existing early return on a failed work +completion, so login_req_len can never go negative. The upper bound was +already safe: a posted login buffer cannot deliver more than +ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so the difference stays at or below +MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the existing min() clamps it; only the missing +lower bound needs to be added. + +Fixes: b8d26b3be8b3 ("iser-target: Add iSCSI Extensions for RDMA (iSER) target driver") +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260602194642.2273217-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 +Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito +Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c ++++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c +@@ -1388,6 +1388,12 @@ isert_login_recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, + ib_dma_sync_single_for_cpu(ib_dev, isert_conn->login_desc->dma_addr, + ISER_RX_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); + ++ if (unlikely(wc->byte_len < ISER_HEADERS_LEN)) { ++ isert_dbg("login request length %u is too short\n", ++ wc->byte_len); ++ return; ++ } ++ + isert_conn->login_req_len = wc->byte_len - ISER_HEADERS_LEN; + + if (isert_conn->conn) { diff --git a/queue-5.10/pidfd-refuse-access-to-tasks-that-have-started-exiting-harder.patch b/queue-5.10/pidfd-refuse-access-to-tasks-that-have-started-exiting-harder.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..13f81135c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/pidfd-refuse-access-to-tasks-that-have-started-exiting-harder.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 62c4d31d78294bd61cf3403626b789e854357177 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brauner +Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 10:32:11 +0200 +Subject: pidfd: refuse access to tasks that have started exiting harder + +From: Christian Brauner + +commit 62c4d31d78294bd61cf3403626b789e854357177 upstream. + +The recent ptrace fix closed a hole where someone could rely on task->mm +becoming NULL during do_exit() to bypass dumpability checks. This api +here leans on on the very same check and so inherits the fix. + +But there is no good reason to let it succeed at all once the target has +entered do_exit(). PF_EXITING is set by exit_signals() at the very top +of do_exit(), before exit_mm() and exit_files() run. Once we observe it, +the task is committed to dying and exit_files() will release the fdtable +shortly. + +Fixes: 8649c322f75c ("pid: Implement pidfd_getfd syscall") +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518-obgleich-petersilie-2d77ccccf9b9@brauner +Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + kernel/pid.c | 8 +++++--- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/kernel/pid.c ++++ b/kernel/pid.c +@@ -637,10 +637,12 @@ static struct file *__pidfd_fget(struct + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + +- if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS)) +- file = fget_task(task, fd); +- else ++ if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS)) + file = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); ++ else if (task->flags & PF_EXITING) ++ file = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); ++ else ++ file = fget_task(task, fd); + + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + diff --git a/queue-5.10/rdma-srp-bound-srp_rsp-sense-copy-by-the-received-length.patch b/queue-5.10/rdma-srp-bound-srp_rsp-sense-copy-by-the-received-length.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7971573c6e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/rdma-srp-bound-srp_rsp-sense-copy-by-the-received-length.patch @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +From 13e91fd076306f5d0cdfa14f53d69e37274723c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Bommarito +Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 18:04:57 -0400 +Subject: RDMA/srp: bound SRP_RSP sense copy by the received length + +From: Michael Bommarito + +commit 13e91fd076306f5d0cdfa14f53d69e37274723c4 upstream. + +srp_process_rsp() copies sense data from rsp->data + resp_data_len, +where resp_data_len is the full 32-bit value supplied by the SRP target +and is never checked against the number of bytes actually received +(wc->byte_len). The copy length is bounded to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE, so +at most 96 bytes are copied, but the source offset is not bounded. + +A malicious or compromised SRP target on the InfiniBand/RoCE fabric that +the initiator has logged into can return an SRP_RSP with +SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID set and a large resp_data_len. The receive buffer +is allocated at the target-chosen max_ti_iu_len, so the source of the +sense copy lands past the bytes actually received; with resp_data_len +near 0xFFFFFFFF it is gigabytes past the buffer and the read faults. + +Copy the sense data only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if +the response header, the response data, and the sense region fit within +the bytes actually received; otherwise drop the sense and log. The +in-tree iSER and NVMe-RDMA receive paths already bound their parse by +wc->byte_len; this brings ib_srp into line with them. + +Fixes: aef9ec39c47f ("IB: Add SCSI RDMA Protocol (SRP) initiator") +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260602220457.2542840-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 +Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito +Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche +Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c ++++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +@@ -1929,7 +1929,8 @@ static int srp_post_recv(struct srp_rdma + return ib_post_recv(ch->qp, &wr, NULL); + } + +-static void srp_process_rsp(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch, struct srp_rsp *rsp) ++static void srp_process_rsp(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch, struct srp_rsp *rsp, ++ u32 byte_len) + { + struct srp_target_port *target = ch->target; + struct srp_request *req; +@@ -1970,10 +1971,27 @@ static void srp_process_rsp(struct srp_r + scmnd->result = rsp->status; + + if (rsp->flags & SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID) { +- memcpy(scmnd->sense_buffer, rsp->data + +- be32_to_cpu(rsp->resp_data_len), +- min_t(int, be32_to_cpu(rsp->sense_data_len), +- SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE)); ++ u32 resp_len = be32_to_cpu(rsp->resp_data_len); ++ u32 sense_len = be32_to_cpu(rsp->sense_data_len); ++ ++ /* ++ * The sense data starts resp_data_len bytes past the ++ * response data area; both lengths come from the ++ * target-controlled response. Copy the sense data ++ * only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if ++ * the full sense region fits within the bytes actually ++ * received. Otherwise the copy source would run past ++ * the receive buffer (sized to the target-chosen ++ * max_ti_iu_len), reading out of bounds. ++ */ ++ if (sizeof(*rsp) + (u64)resp_len + sense_len <= byte_len) ++ memcpy(scmnd->sense_buffer, ++ rsp->data + resp_len, ++ min(sense_len, SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE)); ++ else ++ shost_printk(KERN_ERR, target->scsi_host, ++ "dropping truncated sense data (resp_data_len %u sense_data_len %u, %u bytes received)\n", ++ resp_len, sense_len, byte_len); + } + + if (unlikely(rsp->flags & SRP_RSP_FLAG_DIUNDER)) +@@ -2083,7 +2101,7 @@ static void srp_recv_done(struct ib_cq * + + switch (opcode) { + case SRP_RSP: +- srp_process_rsp(ch, iu->buf); ++ srp_process_rsp(ch, iu->buf, wc->byte_len); + break; + + case SRP_CRED_REQ: diff --git a/queue-5.10/series b/queue-5.10/series index 184d82afee..2332a56d50 100644 --- a/queue-5.10/series +++ b/queue-5.10/series @@ -178,3 +178,15 @@ net-mvpp2-sync-rx-data-at-the-hardware-packet-offset.patch netfilter-nft_tunnel-fix-use-after-free-on-object-destroy.patch bluetooth-l2cap-reject-br-edr-signaling-packets-over-mtusig.patch drm-i915-gem-fix-phys-bo-pread-pwrite-with-offset.patch +xfrm-espintcp-do-not-reuse-an-in-progress-partial-send.patch +usb-serial-io_ti-fix-heap-overflow-in-get_manuf_info.patch +usb-serial-io_ti-fix-heap-overflow-in-build_i2c_fw_hdr.patch +usb-serial-option-add-usb-id-for-dell-wireless-dw5826e-m.patch +usb-serial-kl5kusb105-fix-bulk-out-buffer-overflow.patch +alsa-timer-fix-uaf-at-snd_timer_user_params.patch +drm-amd-display-reject-gpio_bitshift-32-in-bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info.patch +rdma-srp-bound-srp_rsp-sense-copy-by-the-received-length.patch +arm-socfpga-fix-of-node-refcount-leak-in-smp-setup.patch +vsock-vmci-fix-sk_ack_backlog-leak-on-failed-handshake.patch +ib-isert-reject-login-pdus-shorter-than-iser_headers_len.patch +pidfd-refuse-access-to-tasks-that-have-started-exiting-harder.patch diff --git a/queue-5.10/usb-serial-io_ti-fix-heap-overflow-in-build_i2c_fw_hdr.patch b/queue-5.10/usb-serial-io_ti-fix-heap-overflow-in-build_i2c_fw_hdr.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dbfa1c4ff1 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/usb-serial-io_ti-fix-heap-overflow-in-build_i2c_fw_hdr.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From 0fd2b00b2d3d05e3eaa13342b3dfb0fa85c226ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Adrian Korwel +Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 09:58:32 -0500 +Subject: USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in build_i2c_fw_hdr() + +From: Adrian Korwel + +commit 0fd2b00b2d3d05e3eaa13342b3dfb0fa85c226ae upstream. + +build_i2c_fw_hdr() allocates a fixed-size buffer of +(16*1024 - 512) + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec) bytes, then +copies le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length) bytes into it without +validating that Length fits within the available space after the +firmware record header. + +img_header->Length is a __le16 from the firmware file and can be +up to 65535. check_fw_sanity() validates the total firmware size +but not img_header->Length specifically. + +Fix by rejecting images where img_header->Length exceeds the +available destination space. + +Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Adrian Korwel +Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +--- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c +@@ -847,6 +847,11 @@ static int build_i2c_fw_hdr(u8 *header, + /* Pointer to fw_down memory image */ + img_header = (struct ti_i2c_image_header *)&fw->data[4]; + ++ if (le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length) > ++ buffer_size - sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec)) { ++ kfree(buffer); ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } + memcpy(buffer + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec), + &fw->data[4 + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_image_header)], + le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length)); diff --git a/queue-5.10/usb-serial-io_ti-fix-heap-overflow-in-get_manuf_info.patch b/queue-5.10/usb-serial-io_ti-fix-heap-overflow-in-get_manuf_info.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c47c1b05db --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/usb-serial-io_ti-fix-heap-overflow-in-get_manuf_info.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From 183c1076eca43bbb3e7bdf597456f91d81c73e74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Adrian Korwel +Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 09:58:31 -0500 +Subject: USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in get_manuf_info() + +From: Adrian Korwel + +commit 183c1076eca43bbb3e7bdf597456f91d81c73e74 upstream. + +get_manuf_info() reads le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) bytes from the +device I2C EEPROM into a buffer allocated with kmalloc_obj(), which +is sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor) = 10 bytes. + +The Size field comes from the device and is only validated (in +check_i2c_image()) to make sure the descriptor fits within +TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE (16384 bytes), not against the destination buffer size. +A malicious USB device can therefore set Size to any value up to 16377, +causing a heap overflow of up to 16367 bytes when plugged into a host +running this driver. + +valid_csum() is called after read_rom() and also iterates +buffer[0..Size-1], compounding the out-of-bounds access. + +Fix by rejecting descriptors with unexpected length before calling +read_rom(). + +Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Adrian Korwel +[ johan: amend commit message; also check for short descriptors ] +Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +--- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c +@@ -776,6 +776,12 @@ static int get_manuf_info(struct edgepor + } + + /* Read the descriptor data */ ++ if (le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) != sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor)) { ++ dev_err(dev, "unexpected Edge descriptor length: %u\n", ++ le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size)); ++ status = -EINVAL; ++ goto exit; ++ } + status = read_rom(serial, start_address+sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc), + le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size), buffer); + if (status) diff --git a/queue-5.10/usb-serial-kl5kusb105-fix-bulk-out-buffer-overflow.patch b/queue-5.10/usb-serial-kl5kusb105-fix-bulk-out-buffer-overflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7136e677c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/usb-serial-kl5kusb105-fix-bulk-out-buffer-overflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From 96d47e40bf9db4a9efd5c8fb53287a508d165f14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: HyeongJun An +Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 18:09:26 +0900 +Subject: USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix bulk-out buffer overflow + +From: HyeongJun An + +commit 96d47e40bf9db4a9efd5c8fb53287a508d165f14 upstream. + +klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer() is called by the generic write path +with the bulk-out buffer and its size (bulk_out_size, 64 bytes). It +stores a two-byte length header at the start of the buffer and copies +the payload from the write fifo starting at buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, but +passes the full buffer size as the number of bytes to copy: + + count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, + size, &port->lock); + +When the fifo holds at least size bytes, size bytes are copied starting +two bytes into the size-byte buffer, writing KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes past its +end. Copy at most size - KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes instead, leaving room for +the header as safe_serial already does. + +Writing bulk_out_size or more bytes to the tty triggers a slab +out-of-bounds write, observed with KASAN by emulating the device with +dummy_hcd and raw-gadget: + + BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kfifo_copy_out+0x83/0xc0 + Write of size 64 at addr ffff888112c62202 by task python3 + kfifo_copy_out + klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer [kl5kusb105] + usb_serial_generic_write_start [usbserial] + Allocated by task 139: + usb_serial_probe [usbserial] + The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region + +The out-of-bounds write no longer occurs with this change applied. + +Fixes: 60b3013cdaf3 ("USB: kl5usb105: reimplement using generic framework") +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 +Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An +Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c +@@ -359,8 +359,8 @@ static int klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer + unsigned char *buf = dest; + int count; + +- count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, size, +- &port->lock); ++ count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, ++ size - KLSI_HDR_LEN, &port->lock); + put_unaligned_le16(count, buf); + + return count + KLSI_HDR_LEN; diff --git a/queue-5.10/usb-serial-option-add-usb-id-for-dell-wireless-dw5826e-m.patch b/queue-5.10/usb-serial-option-add-usb-id-for-dell-wireless-dw5826e-m.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ad79a2c2a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/usb-serial-option-add-usb-id-for-dell-wireless-dw5826e-m.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From 1938fb9fe38c4f04a3f30bea44f8071c80a63be4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jack Wu +Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 10:04:40 +0800 +Subject: USB: serial: option: add usb-id for Dell Wireless DW5826e-m + +From: Jack Wu + +commit 1938fb9fe38c4f04a3f30bea44f8071c80a63be4 upstream. + +Add support for Dell DW5826e-m with USB-id 0x413c:0x81ea + +T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=04 Cnt=01 Dev#= 8 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 +D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 +P: Vendor=413c ProdID=81ea Rev= 5.04 +S: Manufacturer=DELL +S: Product=DW5826e-m Qualcomm Snapdragon X12 Global LTE-A +S: SerialNumber=358988870177734 +C:* #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA +A: FirstIf#=12 IfCount= 2 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00 +I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option +E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=usbfs +E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option +E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms +E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option +E: Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms +E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none) +E: Ad=87(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms +I:* If#=12 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim +E: Ad=88(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms +I: If#=13 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim +I:* If#=13 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim +E: Ad=8e(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=0f(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms + +Signed-off-by: Jack Wu +Reviewed-by: Lars Melin +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +[ johan: reserve also interface 4 ] +Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c +@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struc + #define DELL_PRODUCT_5821E_ESIM 0x81e0 + #define DELL_PRODUCT_5829E_ESIM 0x81e4 + #define DELL_PRODUCT_5829E 0x81e6 ++#define DELL_PRODUCT_5826E_ESIM 0x81ea + + #define DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R_ESIM 0x8213 + #define DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R 0x8215 +@@ -1123,6 +1124,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option + .driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(6) }, + { USB_DEVICE(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_5829E_ESIM), + .driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(6) }, ++ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_5826E_ESIM, 0xff), ++ .driver_info = RSVD(1) | RSVD(4) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R, 0xff) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R_ESIM, 0xff) }, + { USB_DEVICE(ANYDATA_VENDOR_ID, ANYDATA_PRODUCT_ADU_E100A) }, /* ADU-E100, ADU-310 */ diff --git a/queue-5.10/vsock-vmci-fix-sk_ack_backlog-leak-on-failed-handshake.patch b/queue-5.10/vsock-vmci-fix-sk_ack_backlog-leak-on-failed-handshake.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b68bb445df --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/vsock-vmci-fix-sk_ack_backlog-leak-on-failed-handshake.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From c05fa14db43ebef3bd862ca9d073981c0358b3f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Raf Dickson +Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 10:43:56 +0000 +Subject: vsock/vmci: fix sk_ack_backlog leak on failed handshake + +From: Raf Dickson + +commit c05fa14db43ebef3bd862ca9d073981c0358b3f0 upstream. + +When vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server() returns an error, +vmci_transport_recv_listen() calls vsock_remove_pending() but never +calls sk_acceptq_removed(). This leaves sk_ack_backlog incremented +permanently. + +Repeated handshake failures (malformed packets, queue pair alloc +failure, event subscribe failure) cause sk_ack_backlog to climb +toward sk_max_ack_backlog. Once it reaches the limit the listener +permanently refuses all new connections with -ECONNREFUSED, a +silent denial of service requiring a process restart to recover. + +The two existing sk_acceptq_removed() calls in af_vsock.c do not +cover this path: line 764 checks vsock_is_pending() which returns +false after vsock_remove_pending(), and line 1889 is only reached +on successful accept(). + +Fix by balancing sk_acceptq_added() with sk_acceptq_removed() on +the error path. + +Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets") +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Raf Dickson +Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260526104356.469928-1-rafdog35@gmail.com +Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c ++++ b/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c +@@ -974,8 +974,10 @@ static int vmci_transport_recv_listen(st + err = -EINVAL; + } + +- if (err < 0) ++ if (err < 0) { + vsock_remove_pending(sk, pending); ++ sk_acceptq_removed(sk); ++ } + + release_sock(pending); + vmci_transport_release_pending(pending); diff --git a/queue-5.10/xfrm-espintcp-do-not-reuse-an-in-progress-partial-send.patch b/queue-5.10/xfrm-espintcp-do-not-reuse-an-in-progress-partial-send.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1e9e77972b --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/xfrm-espintcp-do-not-reuse-an-in-progress-partial-send.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From c381039ade2e161ab08c0eda73c4f8b9a7115928 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Wyatt Feng +Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 00:46:27 +0800 +Subject: xfrm: espintcp: do not reuse an in-progress partial send + +From: Wyatt Feng + +commit c381039ade2e161ab08c0eda73c4f8b9a7115928 upstream. + +espintcp keeps a single in-flight transmit in ctx->partial. +Before building a new sk_msg, espintcp_sendmsg() first tries to flush +that state through espintcp_push_msgs(). + +For blocking callers, espintcp_push_msgs() may return success even when +the previous partial send is still pending. espintcp_sendmsg() would +then reinitialize emsg->skmsg and reuse ctx->partial while the old +transfer still owns that state. + +Do not rebuild the send message when ctx->partial is still in progress. +If espintcp_push_msgs() returns with emsg->len still set, fail the new +send instead of overwriting the live partial state. + +This is a memory-safety fix: reusing the live partial-send state can +leave a stale offset attached to a new sk_msg and lead to an out-of- +bounds read in the send path. + +tcp_sendmsg_locked() already handles waiting for send buffer memory, so +the fix here is just to preserve espintcp's one-message-at-a-time +transmit state. + +Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)") +Cc: stable@kernel.org +Reported-by: Yuan Tan +Reported-by: Yifan Wu +Reported-by: Juefei Pu +Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang +Reported-by: Xin Liu +Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4 +Signed-off-by: Wyatt Feng +Signed-off-by: Ren Wei +Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/xfrm/espintcp.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +--- a/net/xfrm/espintcp.c ++++ b/net/xfrm/espintcp.c +@@ -340,6 +340,10 @@ static int espintcp_sendmsg(struct sock + err = -ENOBUFS; + goto unlock; + } ++ if (emsg->len) { ++ err = -ENOBUFS; ++ goto unlock; ++ } + + sk_msg_init(&emsg->skmsg); + while (1) {