From: Jacob Champion <jchampion@postgresql.org>
Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2026 19:09:05 +0000 (-0800)
Subject: Protect against small overread in SASLprep validation
X-Git-Tag: REL_15_16~16
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=ff1d5810e907525b396c67ad900114dd4ef83dc2;p=thirdparty%2Fpostgresql.git

Protect against small overread in SASLprep validation

(This is a cherry-pick of 390b3cbbb, which I hadn't realized wasn't
backpatched. It was originally reported to security@ and determined not
to be a vulnerability; thanks to Stanislav Osipov for noticing the
omission in the back branches.)

In case of torn UTF8 in the input data we might end up going
past the end of the string since we don't account for length.
While validation won't be performed on a sequence with a NULL
byte it's better to avoid going past the end to beging with.
Fix by taking the length into consideration.

Reported-by: Stanislav Osipov <stasos24@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAOYmi+mTnmM172g=_+Yvc47hzzeAsYPy2C4UBY3HK9p-AXNV0g@mail.gmail.com
Backpatch-through: 14
---

diff --git a/src/common/saslprep.c b/src/common/saslprep.c
index 3dddb924088..b8fe2026f99 100644
--- a/src/common/saslprep.c
+++ b/src/common/saslprep.c
@@ -1009,15 +1009,17 @@ pg_utf8_string_len(const char *source)
 	const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) source;
 	int			l;
 	int			num_chars = 0;
+	size_t		len = strlen(source);
 
-	while (*p)
+	while (len)
 	{
 		l = pg_utf_mblen(p);
 
-		if (!pg_utf8_islegal(p, l))
+		if (len < l || !pg_utf8_islegal(p, l))
 			return -1;
 
 		p += l;
+		len -= l;
 		num_chars++;
 	}