Mike Perry [Wed, 12 Dec 2012 19:53:18 +0000 (11:53 -0800)]
Bug 7691: Send a probe cell down certain types of circs.
In general, if we tried to use a circ for a stream, but then decided to place
that stream on a different circuit, we need to probe the original circuit
before deciding it was a "success".
We also need to do the same for cannibalized circuits that go unused.
Nick Mathewson [Thu, 6 Dec 2012 03:34:49 +0000 (22:34 -0500)]
Teach cpuworker and others about create_cell_t and friends
The unit of work sent to a cpuworker is now a create_cell_t; its
response is now a created_cell_t. Several of the things that call or
get called by this chain of logic now take create_cell_t or
created_cell_t too.
Since all cpuworkers are forked or spawned by Tor, they don't need a
stable wire protocol, so we can just send structs. This saves us some
insanity, and helps p
Nick Mathewson [Wed, 5 Dec 2012 02:39:54 +0000 (21:39 -0500)]
Rename handshake_digest to rend_circ_nonce
The handshake_digest field was never meaningfully a digest *of* the
handshake, but rather is a digest *from* the handshake that we exapted
to prevent replays of ESTABLISH_INTRO cells. The ntor handshake will
generate it as more key material rather than taking it from any part
of the circuit handshake reply..
Nick Mathewson [Tue, 4 Dec 2012 21:09:52 +0000 (16:09 -0500)]
Split onion.[ch] into onion{,_fast,_tap}.[ch]
I'm going to want a generic "onionskin" type and set of wrappers, and
for that, it will be helpful to isolate the different circuit creation
handshakes. Now the original handshake is in onion_tap.[ch], the
CREATE_FAST handshake is in onion_fast.[ch], and onion.[ch] now
handles the onion queue.
This commit does nothing but move code and adjust header files.
Here we try to handle curve25519 onion keys from generating them,
loading and storing them, publishing them in our descriptors, putting
them in microdescriptors, and so on.
This commit is untested and probably buggy like whoa
Nick Mathewson [Tue, 4 Dec 2012 20:57:16 +0000 (15:57 -0500)]
Move curve25519 keypair type to src/common; give it functions
This patch moves curve25519_keypair_t from src/or/onion_ntor.h to
src/common/crypto_curve25519.h, and adds new functions to generate,
load, and store keypairs.
Nick Mathewson [Tue, 4 Dec 2012 04:31:07 +0000 (23:31 -0500)]
Refactor strong os-RNG into its own function
Previously, we only used the strong OS entropy source as part of
seeding OpenSSL's RNG. But with curve25519, we'll have occasion to
want to generate some keys using extremely-good entopy, as well as the
means to do so. So let's!
This patch refactors the OS-entropy wrapper into its own
crypto_strongest_rand() function, and makes our new
curve25519_secret_key_generate function try it as appropriate.
Nick Mathewson [Tue, 4 Dec 2012 02:24:21 +0000 (21:24 -0500)]
Implementat the ntor handshake
The ntor handshake--described in proposal 216 and in a paper by
Goldberg, Stebila, and Ustaoglu--gets us much better performance than
our current approach.
Nick Mathewson [Mon, 3 Dec 2012 20:44:21 +0000 (15:44 -0500)]
Add a wrapper around, and test and build support for, curve25519.
We want to use donna-c64 when we have a GCC with support for
64x64->uint128_t multiplying. If not, we want to use libnacl if we
can, unless it's giving us the unsafe "ref" implementation. And if
that isn't going to work, we'd like to use the
portable-and-safe-but-slow 32-bit "donna" implementation.
We might need more library searching for the correct libnacl,
especially once the next libnacl release is out -- it's likely to have
bunches of better curve25519 implementations.
I also define a set of curve25519 wrapper functions, though it really
shouldn't be necessary.
We should eventually make the -donna*.c files get build with
-fomit-frame-pointer, since that can make a difference.
Nick Mathewson [Wed, 2 Jan 2013 15:37:03 +0000 (10:37 -0500)]
Avoid spurious local-port warnings
Our old warn_nonlocal_client_ports() would give a bogus warning for
every nonlocal port every time it parsed any ports at all. So if it
parsed a nonlocal socksport, it would complain that it had a nonlocal
socksport...and then turn around and complain about the nonlocal
socksport again, calling it a nonlocal transport or nonlocal dnsport,
if it had any of those.
Nick Mathewson [Wed, 28 Nov 2012 18:31:17 +0000 (13:31 -0500)]
Let servers choose better ciphersuites when clients support them
This implements the server-side of proposal 198 by detecting when
clients lack the magic list of ciphersuites that indicates that
they're lying faking some ciphers they don't really have. When
clients lack this list, we can choose any cipher that we'd actually
like. The newly allowed ciphersuites are, currently, "All ECDHE-RSA
ciphers that openssl supports, except for ECDHE-RSA-RC4".
The code to detect the cipher list relies on on (ab)use of
SSL_set_session_secret_cb.
Nick Mathewson [Wed, 28 Nov 2012 17:06:57 +0000 (12:06 -0500)]
Cache the type of client cipher list we have in the tor_tls_t
We already use this classification for deciding whether (as a server)
to do a v2/v3 handshake, and we're about to start using it for
deciding whether we can use good ciphersuites too.
Nick Mathewson [Tue, 27 Nov 2012 04:19:32 +0000 (23:19 -0500)]
prop198: Detect the list of ciphersuites we used to lie about having
This is less easy than you might think; we can't just look at the
client ciphers list, since openssl doesn't remember client ciphers if
it doesn't know about them. So we have to keep a list of the "v2"
ciphers, with the ones we don't know about removed.
Nick Mathewson [Sun, 25 Nov 2012 22:19:25 +0000 (17:19 -0500)]
Drop the maximum attempts to get a virtual address to 1000.
This is good enough to give P_success >= 999,999,999/1,000,000,000 so
long as the address space is less than 97.95 full. It'd be ridiculous
for that to happen for IPv6, and usome reasonable assumptions, it
would also be pretty silly for IPv4.