A few models require *.pnvm files while we don't declare them via
MODULE_FIRMWARE(). This resulted in the breakage of WiFi on the
system that relies on the information from modinfo (e.g. openSUSE
installer image).
This patch adds those missing MODULE_FIRMWARE() entries for *.pnvm
files.
A common use of type_max() is to find the max for the type of a
variable. Using the pattern type_max(typeof(var)) is needlessly
verbose. Instead, since typeof(type) == type we can just explicitly
call typeof() on the argument to type_max() and type_min(). Add
wrappers for readability.
Offlining a CPU and bringing it back online is a common operation and it
happens frequently during system suspend/resume, where the non-boot CPUs
are hotplugged out during suspend and brought back at resume.
The cpufreq core already tries to make this path as fast as possible as
the changes are only temporary in nature and full cleanup of resources
isn't required in this case. For example the drivers can implement
online()/offline() callbacks to avoid a lot of tear down of resources.
On similar lines, there is no need to unregister the cpufreq cooling
device during suspend / resume, but only while the policy is getting
removed.
Moreover, unregistering the cpufreq cooling device is resulting in an
unwanted outcome, where the system suspend is eventually aborted in the
process. Currently, during system suspend the cpufreq core unregisters
the cooling device, which in turn removes a kobject using device_del()
and that generates a notification to the userspace via uevent broadcast.
This causes system suspend to abort in some setups.
This was also earlier reported (indirectly) by Roman [1]. Maybe there is
another way around to fixing that problem properly, but this change
makes sense anyways.
Move the registering and unregistering of the cooling device to policy
creation and removal times onlyy.
Currently buf_len field of ath11k_mhi_config_qca6390 is assigned
with 0, making MHI use a default size, 64KB, to allocate channel
buffers. This is likely to fail in some scenarios where system
memory is highly fragmented and memory compaction or reclaim is
not allowed.
Actually those buffers are used only by QMI target -> host communication.
And for WCN6855 and QCA6390, the largest packet size for that is less
than 6KB. So change buf_len field to 8KB, which results in order 1
allocation if page size is 4KB. In this way, we can at least save some
memory, and as well as decrease the possibility of allocation failure
in those scenarios.
On TDX it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to
take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared)
memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security
issues.
DMA could free decrypted/shared pages if dma_set_decrypted() fails. This
should be a rare case. Just leak the pages in this case instead of
freeing them.
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In particular the xpcs_soft_reset() and xpcs_do_config() functions
currently return -1 if invalid auto-negotiation mode is specified. That
value might be then passed to the generic kernel subsystems which require
a standard kernel errno value. Even though the erroneous conditions are
very specific (memory corruption or buggy driver implementation) using a
hard-coded -1 literal doesn't seem correct anyway especially when it comes
to passing it higher to the network subsystem or printing to the system
log. Convert the hard-coded error values to -EINVAL then.
Signed-off-by: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com> Tested-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In function get_pkg_num() if fopen_or_die() succeeds it returns a file
pointer to be used. But fclose() is never called before returning from
the function.
Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory
which can be NULL upon failure. Ensure the allocation was successful
by checking the pointer validity.
Some recent(ish) Dell AIO devices have a backlight controller board
connected to an UART.
This UART has a DELL0501 HID with CID set to PNP0501 so that the UART is
still handled by 8250_pnp.c. Unfortunately there is no separate ACPI device
with an UartSerialBusV2() resource to model the backlight-controller.
The next patch in this series will use acpi_quirk_skip_serdev_enumeration()
to still create a serdev for this for a backlight driver to bind to
instead of creating a /dev/ttyS0.
This new acpi_quirk_skip_serdev_enumeration() use is not limited to Android
X86 tablets, so move it out of the ifdef CONFIG_X86_ANDROID_TABLETS block.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Sicne the mapping is global, mapped register access needs to be protected
against concurrent access, otherwise a race condition might cause the reads
or writes to go towards the wrong register
Signed-off-by: Shayne Chen <shayne.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Chiu <chui-hao.chiu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The ACEPC W5 Pro HDMI stick contains quite generic names in the sys_vendor
and product_name DMI strings, without this patch brcmfmac will try to load:
"brcmfmac43455-sdio.$(DEFAULT_STRING)-$(DEFAULT_STRING).txt" as nvram file
which is both too generic and messy with the $ symbols in the name.
The ACEPC W5 Pro uses the same Ampak AP6255 module as the ACEPC T8
and the nvram for the T8 is already in linux-firmware, so point the new
DMI nvram filename quirk to the T8 nvram file.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org> Link: https://msgid.link/20240216213649.251718-1-hdegoede@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The kfree() function was called in one case by
the get_filename() function during error handling
even if the passed variable contained a null pointer.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Thus return directly after a call of the function “kzalloc” failed
at the beginning.
syzbot managed to trigger following splat:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __skb_flow_dissect+0x4a3b/0x5e50
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888208a4000e by task a.out/2313
[..]
__skb_flow_dissect+0x4a3b/0x5e50
__skb_get_hash+0xb4/0x400
ip_tunnel_xmit+0x77e/0x26f0
ipip_tunnel_xmit+0x298/0x410
..
Analysis shows that the skb has a valid ->head, but bogus ->data
pointer.
skb->data gets its bogus value via the neigh layer, which does:
1556 __skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb));
... and the skb was already dodgy at this point:
skb_network_offset(skb) returns a negative value due to an
earlier overflow of skb->network_header (u16). __skb_pull thus
"adjusts" skb->data by a huge offset, pointing outside skb->head
area.
Allow debug builds to splat when we try to pull/push more than
INT_MAX bytes.
After this, the syzkaller reproducer yields a more precise splat
before the flow dissector attempts to read off skb->data memory:
We claim to have the AdminQ on our irq0 and thus cpu id 0,
but we need to be sure we set the affinity hint to try to
keep it there.
Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <shannon.nelson@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Brett Creeley <brett.creeley@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
According to i.MX8MP RM and HDMI ADD, the fdcc clock is part of
hdmi rx verification IP that should not enable for HDMI TX.
But actually if the clock is disabled before HDMI/LCDIF probe,
LCDIF will not get pixel clock from HDMI PHY and print the error
logs:
[CRTC:39:crtc-2] vblank wait timed out
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 9 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:1634 drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x23c/0x260
Add fdcc clock to LCDIF and HDMI TX power domains to fix the issue.
Signed-off-by: Adam Ford <aford173@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jacky Bai <ping.bai@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Sandor Yu <Sandor.yu@nxp.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240203165307.7806-5-aford173@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
devm_kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory
which can be NULL upon failure. Ensure the allocation was successful
by checking the pointer validity.
Fix rk3288 hdmi ports node so that it matches the
rockchip,dw-hdmi.yaml binding with some reordering
to align with the (new) documentation about
property ordering.
In C language, when you perform a multiplication operation, if
both operands are of int type, the multiplication operation is
performed on the int type, and then the result is converted to
the target type. This means that if the product of int type
multiplication exceeds the range that int type can represent,
an overflow will occur even if you store the result in a
variable of int64_t type.
For a multiplication of two int values, it is better to use
mul_u32_u32() rather than s->exit_latency_ns = s->exit_latency *
NSEC_PER_USEC to avoid potential overflow happenning.
Signed-off-by: C Cheng <C.Cheng@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Bo Ye <bo.ye@mediatek.com> Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>
[ rjw: New subject ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
If the kernel crashes in a context where printk() calls always
defer printing (such as in NMI or inside a printk_safe section)
then the final panic messages will be deferred to irq_work. But
if irq_work is not available, the messages will not get printed
unless explicitly flushed. The result is that the final
"end Kernel panic" banner does not get printed.
Add one final flush after the last printk() call to make sure
the final panic messages make it out as well.
Currently @suppress_panic_printk is checked along with
non-matching @panic_cpu and current CPU. This works
because @suppress_panic_printk is only set when
panic_in_progress() is true.
Rather than relying on the @suppress_panic_printk semantics,
use the concise helper function other_cpu_in_progress(). The
helper function exists to avoid open coding such tests.
Hardware puts RX descriptor and packet in RX DMA buffer, so it could be
over one buffer size if packet size is 11454, and then it will be split
into two segments. WiFi 7 chips use larger size of RX descriptor, so
enlarge DMA buffer size according to RX descriptor to have better
performance and simple flow.
If phydev->irq is set unconditionally, check
for valid interrupt handler or fall back to polling mode to prevent
nullptr exceptions in interrupt service routine.
Add a missing quirk to enable support for the StarFive JH7100 SoC.
Additionally, for greater flexibility in operation, allow using the
rgmii-rxid and rgmii-txid phy modes.
Co-developed-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk> Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk> Signed-off-by: Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
A potential string truncation was reported in bnx2x_fill_fw_str(),
when a long bp->fw_ver and a long phy_fw_ver might coexist, but seems
unlikely with real-world hardware.
Use scnprintf() to indicate the intent that truncations are tolerated.
While reading this code, I found a collection of various buffer size
counting issues. None looked like they might lead to a buffer overflow
with current code (the small buffers are 20 bytes and might only ever
consume 10 bytes twice with a trailing %NUL). However, early truncation
(due to a %NUL in the middle of the string) might be happening under
likely rare conditions. Regardless fix the formatters and related
functions:
- Switch from a separate strscpy() to just adding an additional "%s" to
the format string that immediately follows it in bnx2x_fill_fw_str().
- Use sizeof() universally instead of using unbound defines.
- Fix bnx2x_7101_format_ver() and bnx2x_null_format_ver() to report the
number of characters written, not including the trailing %NUL (as
already done with the other firmware formatting functions).
- Require space for at least 1 byte in bnx2x_get_ext_phy_fw_version()
for the trailing %NUL.
- Correct the needed buffer size in bnx2x_3_seq_format_ver().
In 'ath_ant_try_scan()', (most likely) the 2nd LNA's signal
strength should be used in comparison against RSSI when
selecting first LNA as the main one. Compile tested only.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <quic_kvalo@quicinc.com> Link: https://msgid.link/20231211172502.25202-1-dmantipov@yandex.ru Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Intel processors that aren't vulnerable to BHI will set
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[BHI_NO] = 1;. Guests may use this BHI_NO bit to
determine if they need to implement BHI mitigations or not. Allow this bit
to be passed to the guests.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
BHI mitigation mode spectre_bhi=auto does not deploy the software
mitigation by default. In a cloud environment, it is a likely scenario
where userspace is trusted but the guests are not trusted. Deploying
system wide mitigation in such cases is not desirable.
Update the auto mode to unconditionally mitigate against malicious
guests. Deploy the software sequence at VMexit in auto mode also, when
hardware mitigation is not available. Unlike the force =on mode,
software sequence is not deployed at syscalls in auto mode.
Branch history clearing software sequences and hardware control
BHI_DIS_S were defined to mitigate Branch History Injection (BHI).
Add cmdline spectre_bhi={on|off|auto} to control BHI mitigation:
auto - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available.
on - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available,
otherwise deploy the software sequence at syscall entry and
VMexit.
off - Turn off BHI mitigation.
The default is auto mode which does not deploy the software sequence
mitigation. This is because of the hardening done in the syscall
dispatch path, which is the likely target of BHI.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Newer processors supports a hardware control BHI_DIS_S to mitigate
Branch History Injection (BHI). Setting BHI_DIS_S protects the kernel
from userspace BHI attacks without having to manually overwrite the
branch history.
Define MSR_SPEC_CTRL bit BHI_DIS_S and its enumeration CPUID.BHI_CTRL.
Mitigation is enabled later.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Branch History Injection (BHI) attacks may allow a malicious application to
influence indirect branch prediction in kernel by poisoning the branch
history. eIBRS isolates indirect branch targets in ring0. The BHB can
still influence the choice of indirect branch predictor entry, and although
branch predictor entries are isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled,
the BHB itself is not isolated between modes.
Alder Lake and new processors supports a hardware control BHI_DIS_S to
mitigate BHI. For older processors Intel has released a software sequence
to clear the branch history on parts that don't support BHI_DIS_S. Add
support to execute the software sequence at syscall entry and VMexit to
overwrite the branch history.
For now, branch history is not cleared at interrupt entry, as malicious
applications are not believed to have sufficient control over the
registers, since previous register state is cleared at interrupt
entry. Researchers continue to poke at this area and it may become
necessary to clear at interrupt entry as well in the future.
This mitigation is only defined here. It is enabled later.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Make <asm/syscall.h> build a switch statement instead, and the compiler can
either decide to generate an indirect jump, or - more likely these days due
to mitigations - just a series of conditional branches.
Yes, the conditional branches also have branch prediction, but the branch
prediction is much more controlled, in that it just causes speculatively
running the wrong system call (harmless), rather than speculatively running
possibly wrong random less controlled code gadgets.
This doesn't mitigate other indirect calls, but the system call indirection
is the first and most easily triggered case.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change the format of the 'spectre_v2' vulnerabilities sysfs file
slightly by converting the commas to semicolons, so that mitigations for
future variants can be grouped together and separated by commas.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The early SME/SEV code parses the command line very early, in order to
decide whether or not memory encryption should be enabled, which needs
to occur even before the initial page tables are created.
This is problematic for a number of reasons:
- this early code runs from the 1:1 mapping provided by the decompressor
or firmware, which uses a different translation than the one assumed by
the linker, and so the code needs to be built in a special way;
- parsing external input while the entire kernel image is still mapped
writable is a bad idea in general, and really does not belong in
security minded code;
- the current code ignores the built-in command line entirely (although
this appears to be the case for the entire decompressor)
Given that the decompressor/EFI stub is an intrinsic part of the x86
bootable kernel image, move the command line parsing there and out of
the core kernel. This removes the need to build lib/cmdline.o in a
special way, or to use RIP-relative LEA instructions in inline asm
blocks.
This involves a new xloadflag in the setup header to indicate
that mem_encrypt=on appeared on the kernel command line.
Currently, the EFI stub invokes the EFI memory attributes protocol to
strip any NX restrictions from the entire loaded kernel, resulting in
all code and data being mapped read-write-execute.
The point of the EFI memory attributes protocol is to remove the need
for all memory allocations to be mapped with both write and execute
permissions by default, and make it the OS loader's responsibility to
transition data mappings to code mappings where appropriate.
Even though the UEFI specification does not appear to leave room for
denying memory attribute changes based on security policy, let's be
cautious and avoid relying on the ability to create read-write-execute
mappings. This is trivially achievable, given that the amount of kernel
code executing via the firmware's 1:1 mapping is rather small and
limited to the .head.text region. So let's drop the NX restrictions only
on that subregion, but not before remapping it as read-only first.
In preparation for implementing rigorous build time checks to enforce
that only code that can support it will be called from the early 1:1
mapping of memory, move SEV init code that is called in this manner to
the .head.text section.
The .head.text section is the initial primary entrypoint of the core
kernel, and is entered with the CPU executing from a 1:1 mapping of
memory. Such code must never access global variables using absolute
references, as these are based on the kernel virtual mapping which is
not active yet at this point.
Given that the SME startup code is also called from this early execution
context, move it into .head.text as well. This will allow more thorough
build time checks in the future to ensure that early startup code only
uses RIP-relative references to global variables.
Also replace some occurrences of __pa_symbol() [which relies on the
compiler generating an absolute reference, which is not guaranteed] and
an open coded RIP-relative access with RIP_REL_REF().
Parse the mem_encrypt= command line parameter from the EFI stub if
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT=y, so that it can be passed to the early
boot code by the arch code in the stub.
This avoids the need for the core kernel to do any string parsing very
early in the boot.
BPF link for some program types is passed as a "context" which can be
used by those BPF programs to look up additional information. E.g., for
multi-kprobes and multi-uprobes, link is used to fetch BPF cookie values.
Because of this runtime dependency, when bpf_link refcnt drops to zero
there could still be active BPF programs running accessing link data.
This patch adds generic support to defer bpf_link dealloc callback to
after RCU GP, if requested. This is done by exposing two different
deallocation callbacks, one synchronous and one deferred. If deferred
one is provided, bpf_link_free() will schedule dealloc_deferred()
callback to happen after RCU GP.
BPF is using two flavors of RCU: "classic" non-sleepable one and RCU
tasks trace one. The latter is used when sleepable BPF programs are
used. bpf_link_free() accommodates that by checking underlying BPF
program's sleepable flag, and goes either through normal RCU GP only for
non-sleepable, or through RCU tasks trace GP *and* then normal RCU GP
(taking into account rcu_trace_implies_rcu_gp() optimization), if BPF
program is sleepable.
We use this for multi-kprobe and multi-uprobe links, which dereference
link during program run. We also preventively switch raw_tp link to use
deferred dealloc callback, as upcoming changes in bpf-next tree expose
raw_tp link data (specifically, cookie value) to BPF program at runtime
as well.
There is no need to delay putting either path or task to deallocation
step. It can be done right after bpf_uprobe_unregister. Between release
and dealloc, there could be still some running BPF programs, but they
don't access either task or path, only data in link->uprobes, so it is
safe to do.
On the other hand, doing path_put() in dealloc callback makes this
dealloc sleepable because path_put() itself might sleep. Which is
problematic due to the need to call uprobe's dealloc through call_rcu(),
which is what is done in the next bug fix patch. So solve the problem by
releasing these resources early.
Current MPTCP servers increment MPTcpExtMPCapableFallbackACK when they
accept non-MPC connections. As reported by Christoph, this is "surprising"
because the counter might become greater than MPTcpExtMPCapableSYNRX.
MPTcpExtMPCapableFallbackACK counter's name suggests it should only be
incremented when a connection was seen using MPTCP options, then a
fallback to TCP has been done. Let's do that by incrementing it when
the subflow context of an inbound MPC connection attempt is dropped.
Also, update mptcp_connect.sh kselftest, to ensure that the
above MIB does not increment in case a pure TCP client connects to a
MPTCP server.
Fixes: fc518953bc9c ("mptcp: add and use MIB counter infrastructure") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/449 Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240329-upstream-net-20240329-fallback-mib-v1-1-324a8981da48@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> The fact that mptcp_is_tcpsk() was able to write over sock->ops was a
> bit strange to me.
> mptcp_is_tcpsk() should answer a question, with a read-only argument.
re-factor code to avoid overwriting sock_ops inside that function. Also,
change the helper name to reflect the semantics and to disambiguate from
its dual, sk_is_mptcp(). While at it, collapse mptcp_stream_accept() and
mptcp_accept() into a single function, where fallback / non-fallback are
separated into a single sk_is_mptcp() conditional.
Link: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/432 Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matttbe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
shellcheck recently helped to prevent issues. It is then good to fix the
other harmless issues in order to spot "real" ones later.
Here, two categories of warnings are now ignored:
- SC2317: Command appears to be unreachable. The cleanup() function is
invoked indirectly via the EXIT trap.
- SC2086: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting. This is
recommended, but the current usage is correct and there is no need to
do all these modifications to be compliant with this rule.
For the modifications:
- SC2034: ksft_skip appears unused.
- SC2181: Check exit code directly with e.g. 'if mycmd;', not
indirectly with $?.
- SC2004: $/${} is unnecessary on arithmetic variables.
- SC2155: Declare and assign separately to avoid masking return
values.
- SC2166: Prefer [ p ] && [ q ] as [ p -a q ] is not well defined.
- SC2059: Don't use variables in the printf format string. Use printf
'..%s..' "$foo".
Now this script is shellcheck (0.9.0) compliant. We can easily spot new
issues.
In of_modalias(), we can get passed the str and len parameters which would
cause a kernel oops in vsnprintf() since it only allows passing a NULL ptr
when the length is also 0. Also, we need to filter out the negative values
of the len parameter as these will result in a really huge buffer since
snprintf() takes size_t parameter while ours is ssize_t...
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the Svace static
analysis tool.
We want a fixed load CCS balancing consisting in all slices
sharing one single user engine. For this reason do not create the
intel_engine_cs structure with its dedicated command streamer for
CCS slices beyond the first.
Fixes: d2eae8e98d59 ("drm/i915/dg2: Drop force_probe requirement") Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@linux.intel.com> Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.2+ Acked-by: Michal Mrozek <michal.mrozek@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240328073409.674098-3-andi.shyti@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit c7a5aa4e57f88470313a8277eb299b221b86e3b1) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In the current implementation, CIFS close sends a close to the
server and does not check for the success of the server close.
This patch adds functionality to check for server close return
status and retries in case of an EBUSY or EAGAIN error.
This can help avoid handle leaks
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ritvik Budhiraja <rbudhiraja@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The tcons created by cifs_construct_tcon() on multiuser mounts must
also be able to failover and refresh DFS referrals, so set the
appropriate fields in order to get a full DFS tcon. They could be
shared among different superblocks later, too.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.4+ Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202404021518.3Xu2VU4s-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread
in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since
the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the
gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other
means.
[From the email thread]
The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used
for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or
when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have
PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.
childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable
from userspace in at least five ways:
1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting
register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has
sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers
zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.
This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only
way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.
2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread
before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only
happen at user/kernel boundaries.
3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for
user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the
registers it returns.
4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel
addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses
are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under
LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.
5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have
not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user
registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.
Align system call table on 8 bytes. With sys_call_table entry size
of 8 bytes that eliminates the possibility of a system call pointer
crossing cache line boundary.
folio_is_secretmem() currently relies on secretmem folios being LRU
folios, to save some cycles.
However, folios might reside in a folio batch without the LRU flag set, or
temporarily have their LRU flag cleared. Consequently, the LRU flag is
unreliable for this purpose.
In particular, this is the case when secretmem_fault() allocates a fresh
page and calls filemap_add_folio()->folio_add_lru(). The folio might be
added to the per-cpu folio batch and won't get the LRU flag set until the
batch was drained using e.g., lru_add_drain().
Consequently, folio_is_secretmem() might not detect secretmem folios and
GUP-fast can succeed in grabbing a secretmem folio, crashing the kernel
when we would later try reading/writing to the folio, because the folio
has been unmapped from the directmap.
Fix it by removing that unreliable check.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240326143210.291116-2-david@redhat.com Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com> Reported-by: yue sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CABOYnLyevJeravW=QrH0JUPYEcDN160aZFb7kwndm-J2rmz0HQ@mail.gmail.com/ Debugged-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Tested-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The SVE register sets have two different formats, one of which is a wrapped
version of the standard FPSIMD register set and another with actual SVE
register data. At present we check TIF_SVE to see if full SVE register
state should be provided when reading the SVE regset but if we were in a
syscall we may have saved only floating point registers even though that is
set.
Fix this and simplify the logic by checking and using the format which we
recorded when deciding if we should use FPSIMD or SVE format.
Fixes: 8c845e273104 ("arm64/sve: Leave SVE enabled on syscall if we don't context switch") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.2.x Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325-arm64-ptrace-fp-type-v1-1-8dc846caf11f@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG MSR register is used to configure which data groups
should be generated into a PEBS record, and it's shared among all counters.
If there are different configurations among counters, perf combines all the
configurations.
The first perf command as below requires a complete PEBS record
(including memory info, GPRs, XMMs, and LBRs). The second perf command
only requires a basic group. However, after the second perf command is
running, the MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG register is cleared. Only a basic group is
generated in a PEBS record, which is wrong. The required information
for the first perf command is missed.
The first PEBS event is a system-wide PEBS event. The second PEBS event
is a per-thread event. When the thread is scheduled out, the
intel_pmu_pebs_del() function is invoked to update the PEBS state.
Since the system-wide event is still available, the cpuc->n_pebs is 1.
The cpuc->pebs_data_cfg is cleared. The data configuration for the
system-wide PEBS event is lost.
The (cpuc->n_pebs == 1) check was introduced in commit:
There are few uses of CoCo that don't rely on working cryptography and
hence a working RNG. Unfortunately, the CoCo threat model means that the
VM host cannot be trusted and may actively work against guests to
extract secrets or manipulate computation. Since a malicious host can
modify or observe nearly all inputs to guests, the only remaining source
of entropy for CoCo guests is RDRAND.
If RDRAND is broken -- due to CPU hardware fault -- the RNG as a whole
is meant to gracefully continue on gathering entropy from other sources,
but since there aren't other sources on CoCo, this is catastrophic.
This is mostly a concern at boot time when initially seeding the RNG, as
after that the consequences of a broken RDRAND are much more
theoretical.
So, try at boot to seed the RNG using 256 bits of RDRAND output. If this
fails, panic(). This will also trigger if the system is booted without
RDRAND, as RDRAND is essential for a safe CoCo boot.
Add this deliberately to be "just a CoCo x86 driver feature" and not
part of the RNG itself. Many device drivers and platforms have some
desire to contribute something to the RNG, and add_device_randomness()
is specifically meant for this purpose.
Any driver can call it with seed data of any quality, or even garbage
quality, and it can only possibly make the quality of the RNG better or
have no effect, but can never make it worse.
Rather than trying to build something into the core of the RNG, consider
the particular CoCo issue just a CoCo issue, and therefore separate it
all out into driver (well, arch/platform) code.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326160735.73531-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
PAT handling won't do the right thing in COW mappings: the first PTE (or,
in fact, all PTEs) can be replaced during write faults to point at anon
folios. Reliably recovering the correct PFN and cachemode using
follow_phys() from PTEs will not work in COW mappings.
Using follow_phys(), we might just get the address+protection of the anon
folio (which is very wrong), or fail on swap/nonswap entries, failing
follow_phys() and triggering a WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn() and
track_pfn_copy(), not properly calling free_pfn_range().
In free_pfn_range(), we either wouldn't call memtype_free() or would call
it with the wrong range, possibly leaking memory.
To fix that, let's update follow_phys() to refuse returning anon folios,
and fallback to using the stored PFN inside vma->vm_pgoff for COW mappings
if we run into that.
We will now properly handle untrack_pfn() with COW mappings, where we
don't need the cachemode. We'll have to fail fork()->track_pfn_copy() if
the first page was replaced by an anon folio, though: we'd have to store
the cachemode in the VMA to make this work, likely growing the VMA size.
For now, lets keep it simple and let track_pfn_copy() just fail in that
case: it would have failed in the past with swap/nonswap entries already,
and it would have done the wrong thing with anon folios.
Simple reproducer to trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn():
In the following sequence:
1) of_platform_depopulate()
2) of_overlay_remove()
During the step 1, devices are destroyed and devlinks are removed.
During the step 2, OF nodes are destroyed but
__of_changeset_entry_destroy() can raise warnings related to missing
of_node_put():
ERROR: memory leak, expected refcount 1 instead of 2 ...
Indeed, during the devlink removals performed at step 1, the removal
itself releasing the device (and the attached of_node) is done by a job
queued in a workqueue and so, it is done asynchronously with respect to
function calls.
When the warning is present, of_node_put() will be called but wrongly
too late from the workqueue job.
In order to be sure that any ongoing devlink removals are done before
the of_node destruction, synchronize the of_changeset_destroy() with the
devlink removals.
The commit 80dd33cf72d1 ("drivers: base: Fix device link removal")
introduces a workqueue to release the consumer and supplier devices used
in the devlink.
In the job queued, devices are release and in turn, when all the
references to these devices are dropped, the release function of the
device itself is called.
Nothing is present to provide some synchronisation with this workqueue
in order to ensure that all ongoing releasing operations are done and
so, some other operations can be started safely.
For instance, in the following sequence:
1) of_platform_depopulate()
2) of_overlay_remove()
During the step 1, devices are released and related devlinks are removed
(jobs pushed in the workqueue).
During the step 2, OF nodes are destroyed but, without any
synchronisation with devlink removal jobs, of_overlay_remove() can raise
warnings related to missing of_node_put():
ERROR: memory leak, expected refcount 1 instead of 2
Indeed, the missing of_node_put() call is going to be done, too late,
from the workqueue job execution.
Introduce device_link_wait_removal() to offer a way to synchronize
operations waiting for the end of devlink removals (i.e. end of
workqueue jobs).
Also, as a flushing operation is done on the workqueue, the workqueue
used is moved from a system-wide workqueue to a local one.
If we look up the kbuf, ensure that it doesn't get unregistered until
after we're done with it. Since we're inside mmap, we cannot safely use
the io_uring lock. Rely on the fact that we can lookup the buffer list
under RCU now and grab a reference to it, preventing it from being
unregistered until we're done with it. The lookup returns the
io_buffer_list directly with it referenced.
Rather than use the system unbound event workqueue, use an io_uring
specific one. This avoids dependencies with the tty, which also uses
the system_unbound_wq, and issues flushes of said workqueue from inside
its poll handling.
This patch addresses an issue with the Panasonic CF-SZ6's existing quirk,
specifically its headset microphone functionality. Previously, the quirk
used ALC269_FIXUP_HEADSET_MODE, which does not support the CF-SZ6's design
of a single 3.5mm jack for both mic and audio output effectively. The
device uses pin 0x19 for the headset mic without jack detection.
Following verification on the CF-SZ6 and discussions with the original
patch author, i determined that the update to
ALC269_FIXUP_ASPIRE_HEADSET_MIC is the appropriate solution. This change
is custom-designed for the CF-SZ6's unique hardware setup, which includes
a single 3.5mm jack for both mic and audio output, connecting the headset
microphone to pin 0x19 without the use of jack detection.
Fixes: 0fca97a29b83 ("ALSA: hda/realtek - Add Panasonic CF-SZ6 headset jack quirk") Signed-off-by: I Gede Agastya Darma Laksana <gedeagas22@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Message-ID: <20240401174602.14133-1-gedeagas22@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This patch adds the existing fixup to certain TF platforms implementing
the ALC274 codec with a headset jack. It fixes/activates the inactive
microphone of the headset.
SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION flag should be used only for 3.0 and
3.0.2 dialects. This flags set cause compatibility problems with
other SMB clients.
Reported-by: James Christopher Adduono <jc@adduono.com> Tested-by: James Christopher Adduono <jc@adduono.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If installing malicious ksmbd-tools, ksmbd.mountd can return invalid ipc
response to ksmbd kernel server. ksmbd should validate payload size of
ipc response from ksmbd.mountd to avoid memory overrun or
slab-out-of-bounds. This patch validate 3 ipc response that has payload.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Chao Ma <machao2019@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When adding sanitization of the label, the path through
edge_detector_setup() that leads to debounce_setup() was overlooked.
A request taking this path does not allocate a new label and the
request label is freed twice when the request is released, resulting
in memory corruption.
Add label sanitization to debounce_setup().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b34490879baa ("gpio: cdev: sanitize the label before requesting the interrupt") Signed-off-by: Kent Gibson <warthog618@gmail.com>
[Bartosz: rebased on top of the fix for empty GPIO labels] Co-developed-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
We need to take into account that a line's consumer label may be NULL
and not try to kstrdup() it in that case but rather pass the NULL
pointer up the stack to the interrupt request function.
To that end: let make_irq_label() return NULL as a valid return value
and use ERR_PTR() instead to signal an allocation failure to callers.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b34490879baa ("gpio: cdev: sanitize the label before requesting the interrupt") Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240402093534.212283-1-naresh.kamboju@linaro.org/ Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org> Tested-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
srso_alias_untrain_ret() is special code, even if it is a dummy
which is called in the !SRSO case, so annotate it like its real
counterpart, to address the following objtool splat:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: .export_symbol+0x2b290: data relocation to !ENDBR: srso_alias_untrain_ret+0x0
Currently the CB_RECALL_ANY job takes a cl_rpc_users reference to the
client. While a callback job is technically an RPC that counter is
really more for client-driven RPCs, and this has the effect of
preventing the client from being unhashed until the callback completes.
If nfsd decides to send a CB_RECALL_ANY just as the client reboots, we
can end up in a situation where the callback can't complete on the (now
dead) callback channel, but the new client can't connect because the old
client can't be unhashed. This usually manifests as a NFS4ERR_DELAY
return on the CREATE_SESSION operation.
The job is only holding a reference to the client so it can clear a flag
after the RPC completes. Fix this by having CB_RECALL_ANY instead hold a
reference to the cl_nfsdfs.cl_ref. Typically we only take that sort of
reference when dealing with the nfsdfs info files, but it should work
appropriately here to ensure that the nfs4_client doesn't disappear.
Fixes: 44df6f439a17 ("NFSD: add delegation reaper to react to low memory condition") Reported-by: Vladimir Benes <vbenes@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable.git / log
