"git" built with RUNTIME_PREFIX flag turned on could figure out
gitexecdir and other paths as relative to "git" executable.
However, in the section specifies gitexecdir, RUNTIME_PREFIX wasn't
mentioned, thus users may wrongly assume that "git" always locates
gitexecdir as relative path to the executable.
Let's clarify that only "git" built with RUNTIME_PREFIX will locate
gitexecdir as relative path.
Signed-off-by: Đoàn Trần Công Danh <congdanhqx@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.33:
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
8959555cee7 (setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level
directory, 2022-03-02), adds a function to check for ownership of
repositories using a directory that is representative of it, and ways to
add exempt a specific repository from said check if needed, but that
check didn't account for owership of the gitdir, or (when used) the
gitfile that points to that gitdir.
An attacker could create a git repository in a directory that they can
write into but that is owned by the victim to work around the fix that
was introduced with CVE-2022-24765 to potentially run code as the
victim.
An example that could result in privilege escalation to root in *NIX would
be to set a repository in a shared tmp directory by doing (for example):
$ git -C /tmp init
To avoid that, extend the ensure_valid_ownership function to be able to
check for all three paths.
This will have the side effect of tripling the number of stat() calls
when a repository is detected, but the effect is expected to be likely
minimal, as it is done only once during the directory walk in which Git
looks for a repository.
Additionally make sure to resolve the gitfile (if one was used) to find
the relevant gitdir for checking.
While at it change the message printed on failure so it is clear we are
referring to the repository by its worktree (or gitdir if it is bare) and
not to a specific directory.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <junio@pobox.com> Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Junio C Hamano [Thu, 26 May 2022 21:51:32 +0000 (14:51 -0700)]
Merge branch 'cb/path-owner-check-with-sudo'
With a recent update to refuse access to repositories of other
people by default, "sudo make install" and "sudo git describe"
stopped working. This series intends to loosen it while keeping
the safety.
* cb/path-owner-check-with-sudo:
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
Previous changes introduced a regression which will prevent root for
accessing repositories owned by thyself if using sudo because SUDO_UID
takes precedence.
Loosen that restriction by allowing root to access repositories owned
by both uid by default and without having to add a safe.directory
exception.
A previous workaround that was documented in the tests is no longer
needed so it has been removed together with its specially crafted
prerequisite.
Helped-by: Johanness Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
Add a support library that provides one function that can be used
to run a "scriplet" of commands through sudo and that helps invoking
sudo in the slightly awkward way that is required to ensure it doesn't
block the call (if shell was allowed as tested in the prerequisite)
and it doesn't run the command through a different shell than the one
we intended.
Add additional negative tests as suggested by Junio and that use a
new workspace that is owned by root.
Document a regression that was introduced by previous commits where
root won't be able anymore to access directories they own unless
SUDO_UID is removed from their environment.
The tests document additional ways that this new restriction could
be worked around and the documentation explains why it might be instead
considered a feature, but a "fix" is planned for a future change.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
bdc77d1d685 (Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the
current user, 2022-03-02) checks for the effective uid of the running
process using geteuid() but didn't account for cases where that user was
root (because git was invoked through sudo or a compatible tool) and the
original uid that repository trusted for its config was no longer known,
therefore failing the following otherwise safe call:
guy@renard ~/Software/uncrustify $ sudo git describe --always --dirty
[sudo] password for guy:
fatal: unsafe repository ('/home/guy/Software/uncrustify' is owned by someone else)
Attempt to detect those cases by using the environment variables that
those tools create to keep track of the original user id, and do the
ownership check using that instead.
This assumes the environment the user is running on after going
privileged can't be tampered with, and also adds code to restrict that
the new behavior only applies if running as root, therefore keeping the
most common case, which runs unprivileged, from changing, but because of
that, it will miss cases where sudo (or an equivalent) was used to change
to another unprivileged user or where the equivalent tool used to raise
privileges didn't track the original id in a sudo compatible way.
Because of compatibility with sudo, the code assumes that uid_t is an
unsigned integer type (which is not required by the standard) but is used
that way in their codebase to generate SUDO_UID. In systems where uid_t
is signed, sudo might be also patched to NOT be unsigned and that might
be able to trigger an edge case and a bug (as described in the code), but
it is considered unlikely to happen and even if it does, the code would
just mostly fail safely, so there was no attempt either to detect it or
prevent it by the code, which is something that might change in the future,
based on expected user feedback.
Reported-by: Guy Maurel <guy.j@maurel.de> Helped-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com> Helped-by: Randall Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com> Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
Originally reported after release of v2.35.2 (and other maint branches)
for CVE-2022-24765 and blocking otherwise harmless commands that were
done using sudo in a repository that was owned by the user.
Add a new test script with very basic support to allow running git
commands through sudo, so a reproduction could be implemented and that
uses only `git status` as a proxy of the issue reported.
Note that because of the way sudo interacts with the system, a much
more complete integration with the test framework will require a lot
more work and that was therefore intentionally punted for now.
The current implementation requires the execution of a special cleanup
function which should always be kept as the last "test" or otherwise
the standard cleanup functions will fail because they can't remove
the root owned directories that are used. This also means that if
failures are found while running, the specifics of the failure might
not be kept for further debugging and if the test was interrupted, it
will be necessary to clean the working directory manually before
restarting by running:
The test file also uses at least one initial "setup" test that creates
a parallel execution directory under the "root" sub directory, which
should be used as top level directory for all repositories that are
used in this test file. Unlike all other tests the repository provided
by the test framework should go unused.
Special care should be taken when invoking commands through sudo, since
the environment is otherwise independent from what the test framework
setup and might have changed the values for HOME, SHELL and dropped
several relevant environment variables for your test. Indeed `git status`
was used as a proxy because it doesn't even require commits in the
repository to work and usually doesn't require much from the environment
to run, but a future patch will add calls to `git init` and that will
fail to honor the default branch name, unless that setting is NOT
provided through an environment variable (which means even a CI run
could fail that test if enabled incorrectly).
A new SUDO prerequisite is provided that does some sanity checking
to make sure the sudo command that will be used allows for passwordless
execution as root without restrictions and doesn't mess with git's
execution path. This matches what is provided by the macOS agents that
are used as part of GitHub actions and probably nowhere else.
Most of those characteristics make this test mostly only suitable for
CI, but it might be executed locally if special care is taken to provide
for all of them in the local configuration and maybe making use of the
sudo credential cache by first invoking sudo, entering your password if
needed, and then invoking the test with:
If it fails to run, then it means your local setup wouldn't work for the
test because of the configuration sudo has or other system settings, and
things that might help are to comment out sudo's secure_path config, and
make sure that the account you are using has no restrictions on the
commands it can run through sudo, just like is provided for the user in
the CI.
For example (assuming a username of marta for you) something probably
similar to the following entry in your /etc/sudoers (or equivalent) file:
marta ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
Reported-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com> Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
With the addition of the safe.directory in 8959555ce
(setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory,
2022-03-02) released in v2.35.2, we are receiving feedback from a
variety of users about the feature.
Some users have a very large list of shared repositories and find it
cumbersome to add this config for every one of them.
In a more difficult case, certain workflows involve running Git commands
within containers. The container boundary prevents any global or system
config from communicating `safe.directory` values from the host into the
container. Further, the container almost always runs as a different user
than the owner of the directory in the host.
To simplify the reactions necessary for these users, extend the
definition of the safe.directory config value to include a possible '*'
value. This value implies that all directories are safe, providing a
single setting to opt-out of this protection.
Note that an empty assignment of safe.directory clears all previous
values, and this is already the case with the "if (!value || !*value)"
condition.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It seems that nothing is ever checking to make sure the safe directories
in the configs actually have the key safe.directory, so some unrelated
config that has a value with a certain directory would also make it a
safe directory.
Signed-off-by: Matheus Valadares <me@m28.io> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It is difficult to change the ownership on a directory in our test
suite, so insert a new GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER environment
variable to trick Git into thinking we are in a differently-owned
directory. This allows us to test that the config is parsed correctly.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.33:
Git 2.33.2
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
GIT-VERSION-GEN: bump to v2.33.1
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
Fix `GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES` with `C:\` and the likes
When determining the length of the longest ancestor of a given path with
respect to to e.g. `GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES`, we special-case the root
directory by returning 0 (i.e. we pretend that the path `/` does not end
in a slash by virtually stripping it).
That is the correct behavior because when normalizing paths, the root
directory is special: all other directory paths have their trailing
slash stripped, but not the root directory's path (because it would
become the empty string, which is not a legal path).
However, this special-casing of the root directory in
`longest_ancestor_length()` completely forgets about Windows-style root
directories, e.g. `C:\`. These _also_ get normalized with a trailing
slash (because `C:` would actually refer to the current directory on
that drive, not necessarily to its root directory).
In fc56c7b34b (mingw: accomodate t0060-path-utils for MSYS2,
2016-01-27), we almost got it right. We noticed that
`longest_ancestor_length()` expects a slash _after_ the matched prefix,
and if the prefix already ends in a slash, the normalized path won't
ever match and -1 is returned.
But then that commit went astray: The correct fix is not to adjust the
_tests_ to expect an incorrect -1 when that function is fed a prefix
that ends in a slash, but instead to treat such a prefix as if the
trailing slash had been removed.
Likewise, that function needs to handle the case where it is fed a path
that ends in a slash (not only a prefix that ends in a slash): if it
matches the prefix (plus trailing slash), we still need to verify that
the path does not end there, otherwise the prefix is not actually an
ancestor of the path but identical to it (and we need to return -1 in
that case).
With these two adjustments, we no longer need to play games in t0060
where we only add `$rootoff` if the passed prefix is different from the
MSYS2 pseudo root, instead we also add it for the MSYS2 pseudo root
itself. We do have to be careful to skip that logic entirely for Windows
paths, though, because they do are not subject to that MSYS2 pseudo root
treatment.
This patch fixes the scenario where a user has set
`GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES=C:\`, which would be ignored otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
It poses a security risk to search for a git directory outside of the
directories owned by the current user.
For example, it is common e.g. in computer pools of educational
institutes to have a "scratch" space: a mounted disk with plenty of
space that is regularly swiped where any authenticated user can create
a directory to do their work. Merely navigating to such a space with a
Git-enabled `PS1` when there is a maliciously-crafted `/scratch/.git/`
can lead to a compromised account.
The same holds true in multi-user setups running Windows, as `C:\` is
writable to every authenticated user by default.
To plug this vulnerability, we stop Git from accepting top-level
directories owned by someone other than the current user. We avoid
looking at the ownership of each and every directories between the
current and the top-level one (if there are any between) to avoid
introducing a performance bottleneck.
This new default behavior is obviously incompatible with the concept of
shared repositories, where we expect the top-level directory to be owned
by only one of its legitimate users. To re-enable that use case, we add
support for adding exceptions from the new default behavior via the
config setting `safe.directory`.
The `safe.directory` config setting is only respected in the system and
global configs, not from repository configs or via the command-line, and
can have multiple values to allow for multiple shared repositories.
We are particularly careful to provide a helpful message to any user
trying to use a shared repository.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
This function will be used in the next commit to prevent
`setup_git_directory()` from discovering a repository in a directory
that is owned by someone other than the current user.
Note: We cannot simply use `st.st_uid` on Windows just like we do on
Linux and other Unix-like platforms: according to
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/c-runtime-library/reference/stat-functions
this field is always zero on Windows (because Windows' idea of a user ID
does not fit into a single numerical value). Therefore, we have to do
something a little involved to replicate the same functionality there.
Also note: On Windows, a user's home directory is not actually owned by
said user, but by the administrator. For all practical purposes, it is
under the user's control, though, therefore we pretend that it is owned
by the user.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
mingw-w64's pthread_unistd.h had a bug that mistakenly (because there is
no support for the *lockfile() functions required[1]) defined
_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS and that was being worked around since 3ecd153a3b (compat/mingw: support MSys2-based MinGW build, 2016-01-14).
The bug was fixed in winphtreads, but as a side effect, leaves the
reentrant functions from time.h no longer visible and therefore breaks
the build.
Since the intention all along was to avoid using the fallback functions,
formalize the use of POSIX by setting the corresponding feature flag and
compile out the implementation for the fallback functions.
[1] https://unix.org/whitepapers/reentrant.html
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Acked-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Junio C Hamano [Tue, 23 Nov 2021 22:48:00 +0000 (14:48 -0800)]
Merge branch 'hm/paint-hits-in-log-grep' into maint
"git grep" looking in a blob that has non-UTF8 payload was
completely broken when linked with versions of PCREv2 library older
than 10.34 in the latest release.
* hm/paint-hits-in-log-grep:
Revert "grep/pcre2: fix an edge case concerning ascii patterns and UTF-8 data"
The change in f652672 (dir: select directories correctly, 2021-09-24)
caused a regression in directory-based matches with non-cone-mode
patterns, especially for .gitignore patterns. A test is included to
prevent this regression in the future.
The commit ed495847 (dir: fix pattern matching on dirs, 2021-09-24) was
reverted in 5ceb663 (dir: fix directory-matching bug, 2021-11-02) for
similar reasons. Neither commit changed tests, and tests added later in
the series continue to pass when these commits are reverted.
Reported-by: Danial Alihosseini <danial.alihosseini@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Junio C Hamano [Fri, 19 Nov 2021 17:06:36 +0000 (09:06 -0800)]
Revert "grep/pcre2: fix an edge case concerning ascii patterns and UTF-8 data"
This reverts commit ae39ba431ab861548eb60b4bd2e1d8b8813db76f, as it
breaks "grep" when looking for a string in non UTF-8 haystack, when
linked with certain versions of PCREv2 library.
Erwin Villejo [Wed, 17 Nov 2021 07:55:50 +0000 (07:55 +0000)]
pull: should be noop when already-up-to-date
The already-up-to-date pull bug was fixed for --ff-only but it did not
include the case where --ff or --ff-only are not specified. This updates
the --ff-only fix to include the case where --ff or --ff-only are not
specified in command line flags or config.
Signed-off-by: Erwin Villejo <erwin.villejo@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Philippe Blain [Sat, 13 Nov 2021 20:38:05 +0000 (20:38 +0000)]
SubmittingPatches: fix Asciidoc syntax in "GitHub CI" section
A superfluous ']' was added to the title of the GitHub CI section in f003a91f5c (SubmittingPatches: replace discussion of Travis with GitHub
Actions, 2021-07-22). Remove it.
While at it, format the URL for a GitHub user's workflow runs of Git
between backticks, since if not Asciidoc formats only the first part,
"https://github.com/<Your", as a link, which is not very useful.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Blain <levraiphilippeblain@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Jiang Xin [Thu, 11 Nov 2021 00:54:16 +0000 (08:54 +0800)]
l10n: ko: fix typos found by git-po-helper
When checking typos in file "po/ko.po", "git-po-helper" reports lots of
false positives because there are no spaces between ASCII and Korean
characters. After applied commit adee197 "(dict: add smudge table for
Korean language, 2021-11-11)" of "git-l10n/git-po-helper" to suppress
these false positives, some easy-to-fix typos are found and fixed.
Josh Steadmon [Thu, 11 Nov 2021 22:34:25 +0000 (14:34 -0800)]
trace2: increment event format version
In 64bc752 (trace2: add trace2_child_ready() to report on background
children, 2021-09-20), we added a new "child_ready" event. In
Documentation/technical/api-trace2.txt, we promise that adding a new
event type will result in incrementing the trace2 event format version
number, but this was not done. Correct this in code & docs.
Signed-off-by: Josh Steadmon <steadmon@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
object-file: free(*contents) only in read_loose_object() caller
In the preceding commit a free() of uninitialized memory regression in 96e41f58fe1 (fsck: report invalid object type-path combinations,
2021-10-01) was fixed, but we'd still have an issue with leaking
memory from fsck_loose(). Let's fix that issue too.
That issue was introduced in my 31deb28f5e0 (fsck: don't hard die on
invalid object types, 2021-10-01). It can be reproduced under
SANITIZE=leak with the test I added in 093fffdfbec (fsck tests: add
test for fsck-ing an unknown type, 2021-10-01):
./t1450-fsck.sh --run=84 -vixd
In some sense it's not a problem, we lost the same amount of memory in
terms of things malloc'd and not free'd. It just moved from the "still
reachable" to "definitely lost" column in valgrind(1) nomenclature[1],
since we'd have die()'d before.
But now that we don't hard die() anymore in the library let's properly
free() it. Doing so makes this code much easier to follow, since we'll
now have one function owning the freeing of the "contents" variable,
not two.
For context on that memory management pattern the read_loose_object()
function was added in f6371f92104 (sha1_file: add read_loose_object()
function, 2017-01-13) and subsequently used in c68b489e564 (fsck:
parse loose object paths directly, 2017-01-13). The pattern of it
being the task of both sides to free() the memory has been there in
this form since its inception.
Junio C Hamano [Thu, 11 Nov 2021 20:34:41 +0000 (12:34 -0800)]
Revert "connected: do not sort input revisions"
This reverts commit f45022dc2fd692fd024f2eb41a86a66f19013d43,
as this is like breakage in the traversal more likely. In a
history with 10 single strand of pearls,
1-->2-->3--...->7-->8-->9-->10
asking "rev-list --unsorted-input 1 10 --not 9 8 7 6 5 4" fails to
paint the bottom 1 uninteresting as the traversal stops, without
completing the propagation of uninteresting bit starting at 4 down
through 3 and 2 to 1.
object-file: fix SEGV on free() regression in v2.34.0-rc2
Fix a regression introduced in my 96e41f58fe1 (fsck: report invalid
object type-path combinations, 2021-10-01). When fsck-ing blobs larger
than core.bigFileThreshold, we'd free() a pointer to uninitialized
memory.
This issue would have been caught by SANITIZE=address, but since it
involves core.bigFileThreshold, none of the existing tests in our test
suite covered it.
Running them with the "big_file_threshold" in "environment.c" changed
to say "6" would have shown this failure, but let's add a dedicated
test for this scenario based on Han Xin's report[1].
The bug was introduced between v9 and v10[2] of the fsck series merged
in 061a21d36d8 (Merge branch 'ab/fsck-unexpected-type', 2021-10-25).
Reported-by: Han Xin <chiyutianyi@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Junio C Hamano [Wed, 10 Nov 2021 23:01:20 +0000 (15:01 -0800)]
Merge branch 'js/simple-ipc-cygwin-socket-fix'
The way Cygwin emulates a unix-domain socket, on top of which the
simple-ipc mechanism is implemented, can race with the program on
the other side that wants to use the socket, and briefly make it
appear as a regular file before lstat(2) starts reporting it as a
socket. We now have a workaround on the side that connects to a
unix domain socket.
* js/simple-ipc-cygwin-socket-fix:
simple-ipc: work around issues with Cygwin's Unix socket emulation
"git pull --ff-only" and "git pull --rebase --ff-only" should make
it a no-op to attempt pulling from a remote that is behind us, but
instead the command errored out by saying it was impossible to
fast-forward, which may technically be true, but not a useful thing
to diagnose as an error. This has been corrected.
* jc/fix-pull-ff-only-when-already-up-to-date:
pull: --ff-only should make it a noop when already-up-to-date
Jeff King [Wed, 10 Nov 2021 06:00:47 +0000 (01:00 -0500)]
t/lib-gpg: avoid broken versions of ssh-keygen
The "-Y find-principals" option of ssh-keygen seems to be broken in
Debian's openssh-client 1:8.7p1-1, whereas it works fine in 1:8.4p1-5.
This causes several failures for GPGSSH tests. We fulfill the
prerequisite because generating the keys works fine, but actually
verifying a signature causes results ranging from bogus results to
ssh-keygen segfaulting.
We can find the broken version during the prereq check by feeding it
empty input. This should result in it complaining to stderr, but in the
broken version it triggers the segfault, causing the GPGSSH tests to be
skipped.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Derrick Stolee [Wed, 10 Nov 2021 18:35:59 +0000 (18:35 +0000)]
maintenance: disable cron on macOS
In eba1ba9 (maintenance: `git maintenance run` learned
`--scheduler=<scheduler>`, 2021-09-04), we introduced the ability to
specify a scheduler explicitly. This led to some extra checks around
whether an alternative scheduler was available. This added the
functionality of removing background maintenance from schedulers other
than the one selected.
On macOS, cron is technically available, but running 'crontab' triggers
a UI prompt asking for special permissions. This is the major reason why
launchctl is used as the default scheduler. The is_crontab_available()
method triggers this UI prompt, causing user disruption.
Remove this disruption by using an #ifdef to prevent running crontab
this way on macOS. This has the unfortunate downside that if a user
manually selects cron via the '--scheduler' option, then adjusting the
scheduler later will not remove the schedule from cron. The
'--scheduler' option ignores the is_available checks, which is how we
can get into this situation.
Extract the new check_crontab_process() method to avoid making the
'child' variable unused on macOS. The method is marked MAYBE_UNUSED
because it has no callers on macOS.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
simple-ipc: work around issues with Cygwin's Unix socket emulation
Cygwin emulates Unix sockets by writing files with custom contents and
then marking them as system files.
The tricky problem is that while the file is written and its `system`
bit is set, it is still identified as a file. This caused test failures
when Git is too fast looking for the Unix sockets and then complains
that there is a plain file in the way.
Let's work around this by adding a delayed retry loop, specifically for
Cygwin.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> Tested-by: Ramsay Jones <ramsay@ramsayjones.plus.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Jiang Xin [Wed, 10 Nov 2021 00:55:14 +0000 (08:55 +0800)]
Merge branch 'master' of github.com:git/git
* 'master' of github.com:git/git:
Git 2.34-rc2
parse-options.[ch]: revert use of "enum" for parse_options()
t/lib-git.sh: fix ACL-related permissions failure
A few fixes before -rc2
async_die_is_recursing: work around GCC v11.x issue on Fedora
Document positive variant of commit and merge option "--no-verify"
pull: honor --no-verify and do not call the commit-msg hook
http-backend: remove a duplicated code branch
parse-options.[ch]: revert use of "enum" for parse_options()
Revert the parse_options() prototype change in my recent 352e761388b (parse-options.[ch]: consistently use "enum
parse_opt_result", 2021-10-08) was incorrect. The parse_options()
function returns the number of argc elements that haven't been
processed, not "enum parse_opt_result".
Reported-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Adam Dinwoodie [Fri, 5 Nov 2021 19:31:06 +0000 (19:31 +0000)]
t/lib-git.sh: fix ACL-related permissions failure
As well as checking that the relevant functionality is available, the
GPGSSH prerequisite check creates the SSH keys that are used by the test
functions it gates. If these keys are created in a directory that
has a default Access Control List, the key files can inherit those
permissions.
This can result in a scenario where the private keys are created
successfully, so the prerequisite check passes and the tests are run,
but the key files have permissions that are too permissive, meaning
OpenSSH will refuse to load them and the tests will fail.
To avoid this happening, before creating the keys, clear any default ACL
set on the directory that will contain them. This step allowed to fail;
if setfacl isn't present, that's a very likely indicator that the
filesystem in question simply doesn't support default ACLs.
Helped-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de> Signed-off-by: Adam Dinwoodie <adam@dinwoodie.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
projects / thirdparty / git.git / log
