Nick Mathewson [Fri, 1 Jul 2011 16:06:54 +0000 (12:06 -0400)]
Use strlcpy in create_unix_sockaddr()
Using strncpy meant that if listenaddress were ever >=
sizeof(sockaddr_un.sun_path), we would fail to nul-terminate
sun_path. This isn't a big deal: we never read sun_path, and the
kernel is smart enough to reject the sockaddr_un if it isn't
nul-terminated. Nonetheless, it's a dumb failure mode. Instead, we
should reject addresses that don't fit in sockaddr_un.sun_path.
Coverity found this; it's CID 428. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
Nick Mathewson [Mon, 16 May 2011 18:44:23 +0000 (14:44 -0400)]
squash! Add crypto_pk_check_key_public_exponent function
Rename crypto_pk_check_key_public_exponent to crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok:
it's nice to name predicates s.t. you can tell how to interpret true
and false.
Nick Mathewson [Thu, 12 May 2011 02:05:41 +0000 (22:05 -0400)]
Fix crash when read_file_to_string() fails in SAVECONF
The new behavior is to try to rename the old file if there is one there
that we can't read. In all likelihood, that will fail too, but at least
we tried, and at least it won't crash.
Robert Ransom [Mon, 25 Apr 2011 13:38:35 +0000 (06:38 -0700)]
Fix a bug introduced by purging rend_cache on NEWNYM
If the user sent a SIGNAL NEWNYM command after we fetched a rendezvous
descriptor, while we were building the introduction-point circuit, we
would give up entirely on trying to connect to the hidden service.
Original patch by rransom slightly edited to go into 0.2.1
Nick Mathewson [Tue, 25 Jan 2011 19:01:04 +0000 (14:01 -0500)]
Backport: Generate version tags using Git, not (broken) svn revisions.
Partial backport of daa0326aaaa85a760be94ee2360cfa61a9fb5be2 .
Resolves bug 2402. Bugfix on 0.2.1.15 (for the part where we switched to
git) and on 0.2.1.30 (for the part where we dumped micro-revisions.)
Sebastian Hahn [Sun, 6 Mar 2011 17:20:28 +0000 (18:20 +0100)]
Disallow reject6 and accept6 lines in descriptors
This fixes a remotely triggerable assert on directory authorities, who
don't handle descriptors with ipv6 contents well yet. We will want to
revert this once we're ready to handle ipv6.
Issue raised by lorth on #tor, who wasn't able to use Tor anymore.
Analyzed with help from Christian Fromme. Fix suggested by arma. Bugfix
on 0.2.1.3-alpha.
Nick Mathewson [Mon, 24 Jan 2011 21:03:14 +0000 (16:03 -0500)]
Make the DH parameter we use for TLS match the one from Apache's mod_ssl
Our regular DH parameters that we use for circuit and rendezvous
crypto are unchanged. This is yet another small step on the path of
protocol fingerprinting resistance.
Nick Mathewson [Tue, 25 Jan 2011 19:08:13 +0000 (14:08 -0500)]
Simplest fix to bug2402: do not include SVN versions
When we stopped using svn, 0.2.1.x lost the ability to notice its svn
revision and report it in the version number. However, it kept
looking at the micro-revision.i file... so if you switched to master,
built tor, then switched to 0.2.1.x, you'd get a micro-revision.i file
from master reported as an SVN tag. This patch takes out the "include
the svn tag" logic entirely.
Nick Mathewson [Wed, 19 Jan 2011 18:22:50 +0000 (13:22 -0500)]
Fix two more SIZE_T_CEILING issues
This patch imposes (very long) limits on the length of a line in a
directory document, and on the length of a certificate. I don't
think it should actually be possible to overrun these remotely,
since we already impose a maximum size on any directory object we're
downloading, but a little defensive programming never hurt anybody.
Roger emailed me that doorss reported these on IRC, but nobody seems
to have put them on the bugtracker.
Nick Mathewson [Mon, 10 Jan 2011 21:18:32 +0000 (16:18 -0500)]
Always nul-terminate the result passed to evdns_server_add_ptr_reply
In dnsserv_resolved(), we carefully made a nul-terminated copy of the
answer in a PTR RESOLVED cell... then never used that nul-terminated
copy. Ouch.
Surprisingly this one isn't as huge a security problem as it could be.
The only place where the input to dnsserv_resolved wasn't necessarily
nul-terminated was when it was called indirectly from relay.c with the
contents of a relay cell's payload. If the end of the payload was
filled with junk, eventdns.c would take the strdup() of the name [This
part is bad; we might crash there if the cell is in a bad part of the
stack or the heap] and get a name of at least length
495[*]. eventdns.c then rejects any name of length over 255, so the
bogus data would be neither transmitted nor altered.
[*] If the name was less than 495 bytes long, the client wouldn't
actually be reading off the end of the cell.
Nonetheless this is a reasonably annoying bug. Better fix it.
Found while looking at bug 2332, reported by doorss. Bugfix on
0.2.0.1-alpha.
Nick Mathewson [Wed, 12 Jan 2011 19:29:38 +0000 (14:29 -0500)]
Make our replacement INT32_MAX always signed
The C standard says that INT32_MAX is supposed to be a signed
integer. On platforms that have it, we get the correct
platform-defined value. Our own replacement, however, was
unsigned. That's going to cause a bug somewhere eventually.
Nick Mathewson [Mon, 10 Jan 2011 21:18:32 +0000 (16:18 -0500)]
Always nul-terminate the result passed to evdns_server_add_ptr_reply
In dnsserv_resolved(), we carefully made a nul-terminated copy of the
answer in a PTR RESOLVED cell... then never used that nul-terminated
copy. Ouch.
Surprisingly this one isn't as huge a security problem as it could be.
The only place where the input to dnsserv_resolved wasn't necessarily
nul-terminated was when it was called indirectly from relay.c with the
contents of a relay cell's payload. If the end of the payload was
filled with junk, eventdns.c would take the strdup() of the name [This
part is bad; we might crash there if the cell is in a bad part of the
stack or the heap] and get a name of at least length
495[*]. eventdns.c then rejects any name of length over 255, so the
bogus data would be neither transmitted nor altered.
[*] If the name was less than 495 bytes long, the client wouldn't
actually be reading off the end of the cell.
Nonetheless this is a reasonably annoying bug. Better fix it.
Found while looking at bug 2332, reported by doorss. Bugfix on
0.2.0.1-alpha.
Nick Mathewson [Mon, 10 Jan 2011 17:12:11 +0000 (12:12 -0500)]
Impose maximum sizes on parsed objects
An object, you'll recall, is something between -----BEGIN----- and
-----END----- tags in a directory document. Some of our code, as
doorss has noted in bug 2352, could assert if one of these ever
overflowed SIZE_T_CEILING but not INT_MAX. As a solution, I'm setting
a maximum size on a single object such that neither of these limits
will ever be hit. I'm also fixing the INT_MAX checks, just to be sure.