Yu Watanabe [Mon, 8 Mar 2021 03:00:32 +0000 (12:00 +0900)]
seccomp: do not ignore deny-listed syscalls with errno when list is allow-list
Previously, if the hashmap is allow-list and a new deny-listed syscall
is added, seccomp_parse_syscall_filter() simply drop the new syscall
from hashmap even if error number is specified.
This makes 'allow-list' hashmap store two types of entries:
- allow-listed syscalls, which are stored with negative value (-1).
- deny-listed syscalls, which are stored with specified errno.
Yu Watanabe [Mon, 8 Mar 2021 02:54:05 +0000 (11:54 +0900)]
core: drop meaningless parse_syscall_and_errno() calls
parse_syscall_and_errno() does not check the validity of syscall name or
syscall group name, but it just split into syscall name and errno.
So, it is not necessary to call it for SystemCallLog=.
homed: unref the sd_event object after the sources
Shouldn't make any difference, but let's first flush any pending messages, then
unref the reference-counted stuff, and only at the end do the direct free calls.
We'd crash when trying to access an already-deallocated object:
Thread no. 1 (7 frames)
#2 log_assert_failed_realm at ../src/basic/log.c:844
#3 event_inotify_data_drop at ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:3035
#4 source_dispatch at ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:3250
#5 sd_event_dispatch at ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:3631
#6 sd_event_run at ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:3689
#7 sd_event_loop at ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:3711
#8 run at ../src/home/homed.c:47
The source in question is an inotify source, and the messages are:
systemd-homed[1340]: /home/ moved or renamed, recreating watch and rescanning.
systemd-homed[1340]: Assertion '*_head == _item' failed at src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:3035, function event_inotify_data_drop(). Aborting.
on_home_inotify() got called, then manager_watch_home(), which unrefs the
existing inotify_event_source. I assume that the source gets dispatched again
because it was still in the pending queue.
I can't reproduce the issue (timing?), but this should
fix #17824, https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1899264.
Dell new Privacy feature provide new hardware level privacy
protect for users
This patch remaps scancode 0x120001 to key code F20 micmute
The old matching string cannot cover some other Dell products
which have the privacy feature,expand the string to all the system
that can load the privacy driver,privacy driver already detect the
system if it can support this feature. So here we can safely just
map the micmute key to scancode 0x120001
This test would normally get stuck when trying to mount the verity image
due to:
systemd-udevd[299]: dm-0: '/usr/sbin/dmsetup udevflags 6293812'(err) '==371==ASan runtime does not come first in initial library list; you should either link runtime to your application or manually preload it with LD_PRELOAD.'
systemd-udevd[299]: dm-0: Process '/usr/sbin/dmsetup udevflags 6293812' failed with exit code 1
...
systemd-udevd[299]: dm-0: '/usr/sbin/dmsetup udevcomplete 6293812'(err) '==372==ASan runtime does not come first in initial library list; you should either link runtime to your application or manually preload it with LD_PRELOAD.'
systemd-udevd[299]: dm-0: Process '/usr/sbin/dmsetup udevcomplete 6293812' failed with exit code 1.
systemd-udevd[299]: dm-0: Command "/usr/sbin/dmsetup udevcomplete 6293812" returned 1 (error), ignoring.
so let's add a simple udev rule which sets $LD_PRELOAD for the block
subsystem.
Also, install the ASan library along with necessary dependencies into
the verity minimal image, to get rid of the annoying (yet harmless)
errors about missing library from $LD_LIBRARY.
resolved: when synthesizing stub replies from multiple upstream packet, let's avoid RR duplicates
If we synthesize a stub reply from multiple upstream packet (i.e. a
series of CNAME/DNAME redirects), it might happen that we add the same
RR to a different reply section at a different CNAME/DNAME redirect
chain element. Let's clean this up once we are about to send the reply
message to the client: let's remove sections from "lower-priority"
sections when they are already listed in a "higher-priority" section.
resolved: fully follow CNAMEs in the DNS stub after all
In 2f4d8e577ca7bc51fb054b8c2c8dd57c2e188a41 I argued that following
CNAMEs in the stub is not necessary anymore. However, I think it' better
to revert to the status quo ante and follow it after all, given it is
easy for us and makes sure our D-Bus/varlink replies are more similar to
our DNS stub replies that way, and we save clients potential roundtrips.
Hence, whenever we hit a CNAME/DNAME redirect, let's restart the query
like we do for the D-Bus/Varlink case, and collect replies as we go.
resolved: handle multiple CNAME redirects in a single reply from upstream
www.netflix.com responds with a chain of CNAMEs in the same packet.
Let's handle that properly (so far we only followed CNAMEs a single step
when in the same packet)
resolved: tighten checks in dns_resource_record_get_cname_target()
Let's refuse to consider CNAME/DNAME replies matching for RR types where
that is not really conceptually allow (i.e. on CNAME/DNAME lookups
themselves).
(And add a similar check to dns_resource_key_match_cname_or_dname() too,
which implements a smilar match)
Also use structued initialization in one more place, use '\0' for NUL bytes,
and move variable to the right block (the code was OK, but it is strange to
have 'char *value' defined in a different scope then 'size_t value_allocated').
The fuzzer seems to have no trouble with this sample. It seems that the
problem reported in the bug is not caused by the match parsing code. But
let's add the sample just in case.
This fuzzer is based on test-bus-match. Even the initial corpus is
derived entirely from it.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1935084 shows an crash
in bus_match_parse(). I checked the coverage stats on oss-fuzz, and
sadly existing fuzzing did not cover this code at all.
==305970== Invalid free() / delete / delete[] / realloc()
==305970== at 0x483E9F1: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:538)
==305970== by 0x4012CD: mfree (alloc-util.h:48)
==305970== by 0x4012EF: freep (alloc-util.h:83)
==305970== by 0x4017F4: LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput (fuzz-bus-match.c:58)
==305970== by 0x401A58: main (fuzz-main.c:39)
==305970== Address 0x59972f0 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 8,192 free'd
==305970== at 0x483FCE4: realloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:834)
==305970== by 0x4C986F7: _IO_mem_finish (in /usr/lib64/libc-2.33.so)
==305970== by 0x4C8F5E0: fclose@@GLIBC_2.2.5 (in /usr/lib64/libc-2.33.so)
==305970== by 0x49D2CDB: fclose_nointr (fd-util.c:108)
==305970== by 0x49D2D3D: safe_fclose (fd-util.c:124)
==305970== by 0x4A4BCCC: fclosep (fd-util.h:41)
==305970== by 0x4A4E00F: bus_match_to_string (bus-match.c:859)
==305970== by 0x4016C2: LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput (fuzz-bus-match.c:58)
==305970== by 0x401A58: main (fuzz-main.c:39)
==305970== Block was alloc'd at
==305970== at 0x483FAE5: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:760)
==305970== by 0x4C98787: open_memstream (in /usr/lib64/libc-2.33.so)
==305970== by 0x49D56D6: open_memstream_unlocked (fileio.c:97)
==305970== by 0x4A4DEC5: bus_match_to_string (bus-match.c:859)
==305970== by 0x4016C2: LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput (fuzz-bus-match.c:58)
==305970== by 0x401A58: main (fuzz-main.c:39)
==305970==
So the fclose() which is called from _cleanup_fclose_ clearly reallocates the
buffer (maybe to save memory?). open_memstream(3) says:
The locations referred to by these pointers are updated each time the
stream is flushed (fflush(3)) and when the stream is closed (fclose(3)).
This seems to mean that we should close the stream first before grabbing the
buffer pointer.
Michal Sekletar [Thu, 4 Mar 2021 16:35:22 +0000 (17:35 +0100)]
udev: run link_update() with increased retry count in second invocation
In PR #17431 we have introduced retry loop in link_update() in order to
maximize the chance that we end up with correct target when there are
multiple contenders for given symlink.
Number of iterations in retry loop is either 1 or
LINK_UPDATE_MAX_RETRIES, depending on the value of 'initialized' db
flag. When device appears for the first time we need to set the
flag before calling link_update() via update_devnode() for the second
time to make sure we run the second invocation with higher retry loop
counter.
When running integration tests under sanitizers D-Bus fails to
shutdown cleanly, causing unnecessary noise in the logs:
```
dbus-daemon[272]: ==272==LeakSanitizer has encountered a fatal error.
dbus-daemon[272]: ==272==HINT: For debugging, try setting environment variable LSAN_OPTIONS=verbosity=1:log_threads=1
dbus-daemon[272]: ==272==HINT: LeakSanitizer does not work under ptrace (strace, gdb, etc)
```
Since we're not "sanitizing" D-Bus anyway let's disable LSan's at_exit
check for the dbus.service to get rid of this error.
Luca Boccassi [Fri, 5 Mar 2021 20:19:44 +0000 (20:19 +0000)]
dissect: avoid overflow access by NULLSTR_FOREACH
NULLSTR_FOREACH expects two terminating NULs, but the joined string
for extension-release.d only had the canonical one.
Use a placeholder when joining and fix it manually.
sysctl-util: use read_full_virtual_file() for reading sysctls
Given these files are part of procfs, let's use the correct API calls
for reading them.
This changes one occasion of read_one_line_file() to
read_full_virtual_file(), which superficially is a different thing, but
shouldn't actually be a difference, since sysctls can't be longer than
4K anyway, and the piecemeal logic behind read_one_line_file() cannot
work with the special semantics of procfs anyway.
run: tweak algorithm for generating unit name from dbus unique name
This reverts behaviour of systemd-run's unit name generation to the
status quo ante of #18871: we chop off the ":1." prefix if we can.
However, to address the issue that the unique name can overrun we then
do what #18871 did as fallback: only chop off the ":" prefix.
This way we should have pretty names that look like they always looked
in the common case, but in the case of a unique name overrun we still
will have names that work.
rm-rf: fix up chmod in the _cleanup_ rm_rf() destructors
REMOVE_CHMOD is necessary to remove files/dirs that are owned by us but
have an access mode that would not allow us to remove them. In generic
destructor calls for use with `_cleanup_` that are "fire-and-forget"
style we should make use of that, to maximize the chance we can actually
remove the files/dirs.
(Also, add in REMOVE_MISSING_OK. Just because prettier, we ignore the
return codes anyway, but it' a bit nicer to ignore a bit fewer errors.)
projects / thirdparty / systemd.git / log
