Some domains (such as us.ynuf.alipay.com) almost appear as if they actively
want to sabotage our DNSSEC work. Specifically, they unconditionally
return SERVFAIL on SOA lookups and always only after a 1s delay (at
least). This is pretty bad for our validation logic, as we use SOA
lookups to distuingish zones from non-terminal names. Moreover, SERVFAIL
is an error that is typically returned if we send requests a server
doesn't grok, and thus is reason for us to downgrade our protocol and
try again. In case of these zones this means we'll accept the SERVFAIL
response only after a full iterative downgrade to our lowest feature
level: TCP. In combination with the 1s delays this has the effect of
making us hit our transaction timeout way to easily.
As first attempt to improve the situation: let's start caching SERVFAIL
responses in our cache, after the full downgrade for a short period of
time.
Conceptually this is exposed as "weird rcode" caching, but for now we
only consider SERVFAIL a "weird rcode" worthy of caching. Later on we
might want to add more.