From dab5a9fdc6aafe0e829e7dbfaf99fb12fdfdf8ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 11:30:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] 4.19-stable patches added patches: bpf-fix-buggy-r0-retval-refinement-for-tracing-helpers.patch fbdev-potential-information-leak-in-do_fb_ioctl.patch iio-si1133-read-24-bit-signed-integer-for-measurement.patch keys-don-t-write-out-to-userspace-while-holding-key-semaphore.patch locktorture-print-ratio-of-acquisitions-not-failures.patch mtd-lpddr-fix-a-double-free-in-probe.patch mtd-phram-fix-a-double-free-issue-in-error-path.patch mtd-spinand-explicitly-use-mtd_ops_raw-to-write-the-bad-block-marker-to-oob.patch net-dsa-bcm_sf2-fix-overflow-checks.patch tty-evh_bytechan-fix-out-of-bounds-accesses.patch --- ...etval-refinement-for-tracing-helpers.patch | 147 +++++ ...tial-information-leak-in-do_fb_ioctl.patch | 46 ++ ...4-bit-signed-integer-for-measurement.patch | 131 ++++ ...serspace-while-holding-key-semaphore.patch | 572 ++++++++++++++++++ ...t-ratio-of-acquisitions-not-failures.patch | 50 ++ ...mtd-lpddr-fix-a-double-free-in-probe.patch | 33 + ...ix-a-double-free-issue-in-error-path.patch | 64 ++ ...to-write-the-bad-block-marker-to-oob.patch | 38 ++ .../net-dsa-bcm_sf2-fix-overflow-checks.patch | 59 ++ queue-4.19/series | 10 + ..._bytechan-fix-out-of-bounds-accesses.patch | 111 ++++ 11 files changed, 1261 insertions(+) create mode 100644 queue-4.19/bpf-fix-buggy-r0-retval-refinement-for-tracing-helpers.patch create mode 100644 queue-4.19/fbdev-potential-information-leak-in-do_fb_ioctl.patch create mode 100644 queue-4.19/iio-si1133-read-24-bit-signed-integer-for-measurement.patch create mode 100644 queue-4.19/keys-don-t-write-out-to-userspace-while-holding-key-semaphore.patch create mode 100644 queue-4.19/locktorture-print-ratio-of-acquisitions-not-failures.patch create mode 100644 queue-4.19/mtd-lpddr-fix-a-double-free-in-probe.patch create mode 100644 queue-4.19/mtd-phram-fix-a-double-free-issue-in-error-path.patch create mode 100644 queue-4.19/mtd-spinand-explicitly-use-mtd_ops_raw-to-write-the-bad-block-marker-to-oob.patch create mode 100644 queue-4.19/net-dsa-bcm_sf2-fix-overflow-checks.patch create mode 100644 queue-4.19/tty-evh_bytechan-fix-out-of-bounds-accesses.patch diff --git a/queue-4.19/bpf-fix-buggy-r0-retval-refinement-for-tracing-helpers.patch b/queue-4.19/bpf-fix-buggy-r0-retval-refinement-for-tracing-helpers.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..749fd53bd00 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/bpf-fix-buggy-r0-retval-refinement-for-tracing-helpers.patch @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +From daniel@iogearbox.net Wed Apr 22 10:21:06 2020 +From: Daniel Borkmann +Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 14:58:22 +0200 +Subject: bpf: fix buggy r0 retval refinement for tracing helpers +To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org +Cc: alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, kpsingh@chromium.org, jannh@google.com, fontanalorenz@gmail.com, leodidonato@gmail.com, yhs@fb.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann , Alexei Starovoitov +Message-ID: <20200421125822.14073-1-daniel@iogearbox.net> + +From: Daniel Borkmann + +[ no upstream commit ] + +See the glory details in 100605035e15 ("bpf: Verifier, do_refine_retval_range +may clamp umin to 0 incorrectly") for why 849fa50662fb ("bpf/verifier: refine +retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper") is buggy. The whole series however +is not suitable for stable since it adds significant amount [0] of verifier +complexity in order to add 32bit subreg tracking. Something simpler is needed. + +Unfortunately, reverting 849fa50662fb ("bpf/verifier: refine retval R0 state +for bpf_get_stack helper") or just cherry-picking 100605035e15 ("bpf: Verifier, +do_refine_retval_range may clamp umin to 0 incorrectly") is not an option since +it will break existing tracing programs badly (at least those that are using +bpf_get_stack() and bpf_probe_read_str() helpers). Not fixing it in stable is +also not an option since on 4.19 kernels an error will cause a soft-lockup due +to hitting dead-code sanitized branch since we don't hard-wire such branches +in old kernels yet. But even then for 5.x 849fa50662fb ("bpf/verifier: refine +retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper") would cause wrong bounds on the +verifier simluation when an error is hit. + +In one of the earlier iterations of mentioned patch series for upstream there +was the concern that just using smax_value in do_refine_retval_range() would +nuke bounds by subsequent <<32 >>32 shifts before the comparison against 0 [1] +which eventually led to the 32bit subreg tracking in the first place. While I +initially went for implementing the idea [1] to pattern match the two shift +operations, it turned out to be more complex than actually needed, meaning, we +could simply treat do_refine_retval_range() similarly to how we branch off +verification for conditionals or under speculation, that is, pushing a new +reg state to the stack for later verification. This means, instead of verifying +the current path with the ret_reg in [S32MIN, msize_max_value] interval where +later bounds would get nuked, we split this into two: i) for the success case +where ret_reg can be in [0, msize_max_value], and ii) for the error case with +ret_reg known to be in interval [S32MIN, -1]. Latter will preserve the bounds +during these shift patterns and can match reg < 0 test. test_progs also succeed +with this approach. + + [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158507130343.15666.8018068546764556975.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower/ + [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158015334199.28573.4940395881683556537.stgit@john-XPS-13-9370/T/#m2e0ad1d5949131014748b6daa48a3495e7f0456d + +Fixes: 849fa50662fb ("bpf/verifier: refine retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper") +Reported-by: Lorenzo Fontana +Reported-by: Leonardo Di Donato +Reported-by: John Fastabend +Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann +Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov +Acked-by: John Fastabend +Tested-by: John Fastabend +Tested-by: Lorenzo Fontana +Tested-by: Leonardo Di Donato +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c ++++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +@@ -188,8 +188,7 @@ struct bpf_call_arg_meta { + bool pkt_access; + int regno; + int access_size; +- s64 msize_smax_value; +- u64 msize_umax_value; ++ u64 msize_max_value; + }; + + static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); +@@ -2076,8 +2075,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_ver + /* remember the mem_size which may be used later + * to refine return values. + */ +- meta->msize_smax_value = reg->smax_value; +- meta->msize_umax_value = reg->umax_value; ++ meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; + + /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check + * happens using its boundaries. +@@ -2448,21 +2446,44 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_ + return 0; + } + +-static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, +- int func_id, +- struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) ++static int do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, ++ struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, ++ int func_id, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) + { + struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; ++ struct bpf_reg_state tmp_reg = *ret_reg; ++ bool ret; + + if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER || + (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack && + func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str)) +- return; ++ return 0; ++ ++ /* Error case where ret is in interval [S32MIN, -1]. */ ++ ret_reg->smin_value = S32_MIN; ++ ret_reg->smax_value = -1; + +- ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_smax_value; +- ret_reg->umax_value = meta->msize_umax_value; + __reg_deduce_bounds(ret_reg); + __reg_bound_offset(ret_reg); ++ __update_reg_bounds(ret_reg); ++ ++ ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, false); ++ if (!ret) ++ return -EFAULT; ++ ++ *ret_reg = tmp_reg; ++ ++ /* Success case where ret is in range [0, msize_max_value]. */ ++ ret_reg->smin_value = 0; ++ ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; ++ ret_reg->umin_value = ret_reg->smin_value; ++ ret_reg->umax_value = ret_reg->smax_value; ++ ++ __reg_deduce_bounds(ret_reg); ++ __reg_bound_offset(ret_reg); ++ __update_reg_bounds(ret_reg); ++ ++ return 0; + } + + static int +@@ -2617,7 +2638,9 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_ + return -EINVAL; + } + +- do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); ++ err = do_refine_retval_range(env, regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); ++ if (err) ++ return err; + + err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); + if (err) diff --git a/queue-4.19/fbdev-potential-information-leak-in-do_fb_ioctl.patch b/queue-4.19/fbdev-potential-information-leak-in-do_fb_ioctl.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2e017d515e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/fbdev-potential-information-leak-in-do_fb_ioctl.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From d3d19d6fc5736a798b118971935ce274f7deaa82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dan Carpenter +Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 14:08:14 +0300 +Subject: fbdev: potential information leak in do_fb_ioctl() + +From: Dan Carpenter + +commit d3d19d6fc5736a798b118971935ce274f7deaa82 upstream. + +The "fix" struct has a 2 byte hole after ->ywrapstep and the +"fix = info->fix;" assignment doesn't necessarily clear it. It depends +on the compiler. The solution is just to replace the assignment with an +memcpy(). + +Fixes: 1f5e31d7e55a ("fbmem: don't call copy_from/to_user() with mutex held") +Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter +Cc: Andrew Morton +Cc: Arnd Bergmann +Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" +Cc: Andrea Righi +Cc: Daniel Vetter +Cc: Sam Ravnborg +Cc: Maarten Lankhorst +Cc: Daniel Thompson +Cc: Peter Rosin +Cc: Jani Nikula +Cc: Gerd Hoffmann +Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz +Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200113100132.ixpaymordi24n3av@kili.mountain +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c ++++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +@@ -1122,7 +1122,7 @@ static long do_fb_ioctl(struct fb_info * + case FBIOGET_FSCREENINFO: + if (!lock_fb_info(info)) + return -ENODEV; +- fix = info->fix; ++ memcpy(&fix, &info->fix, sizeof(fix)); + unlock_fb_info(info); + + ret = copy_to_user(argp, &fix, sizeof(fix)) ? -EFAULT : 0; diff --git a/queue-4.19/iio-si1133-read-24-bit-signed-integer-for-measurement.patch b/queue-4.19/iio-si1133-read-24-bit-signed-integer-for-measurement.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..fd6c03b0c88 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/iio-si1133-read-24-bit-signed-integer-for-measurement.patch @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +From 328b50e9a0ad1fe8accdf8c19923deebab5e0c01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Maxime=20Roussin-B=C3=A9langer?= + +Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 12:40:08 -0500 +Subject: iio: si1133: read 24-bit signed integer for measurement +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: Maxime Roussin-Bélanger + +commit 328b50e9a0ad1fe8accdf8c19923deebab5e0c01 upstream. + +The chip is configured in 24 bit mode. The values read from +it must always be treated as is. This fixes the issue by +replacing the previous 16 bits value by a 24 bits buffer. + +This changes affects the value output by previous version of +the driver, since the least significant byte was missing. +The upper half of 16 bit values previously output are now +the upper half of a 24 bit value. + +Fixes: e01e7eaf37d8 ("iio: light: introduce si1133") + +Reported-by: Simon Goyette +Co-authored-by: Guillaume Champagne +Signed-off-by: Maxime Roussin-Bélanger +Signed-off-by: Guillaume Champagne +Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + drivers/iio/light/si1133.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- + 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/iio/light/si1133.c ++++ b/drivers/iio/light/si1133.c +@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@ + #define SI1133_INPUT_FRACTION_LOW 15 + #define SI1133_LUX_OUTPUT_FRACTION 12 + #define SI1133_LUX_BUFFER_SIZE 9 ++#define SI1133_MEASURE_BUFFER_SIZE 3 ++ ++#define SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX 23 + + static const int si1133_scale_available[] = { + 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128}; +@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ static const struct si1133_lux_coeff lux + } + }; + +-static int si1133_calculate_polynomial_inner(u32 input, u8 fraction, u16 mag, ++static int si1133_calculate_polynomial_inner(s32 input, u8 fraction, u16 mag, + s8 shift) + { + return ((input << fraction) / mag) << shift; + } + +-static int si1133_calculate_output(u32 x, u32 y, u8 x_order, u8 y_order, ++static int si1133_calculate_output(s32 x, s32 y, u8 x_order, u8 y_order, + u8 input_fraction, s8 sign, + const struct si1133_coeff *coeffs) + { +@@ -276,7 +279,7 @@ static int si1133_calculate_output(u32 x + * The algorithm is from: + * https://siliconlabs.github.io/Gecko_SDK_Doc/efm32zg/html/si1133_8c_source.html#l00716 + */ +-static int si1133_calc_polynomial(u32 x, u32 y, u8 input_fraction, u8 num_coeff, ++static int si1133_calc_polynomial(s32 x, s32 y, u8 input_fraction, u8 num_coeff, + const struct si1133_coeff *coeffs) + { + u8 x_order, y_order; +@@ -614,7 +617,7 @@ static int si1133_measure(struct si1133_ + { + int err; + +- __be16 resp; ++ u8 buffer[SI1133_MEASURE_BUFFER_SIZE]; + + err = si1133_set_adcmux(data, 0, chan->channel); + if (err) +@@ -625,12 +628,13 @@ static int si1133_measure(struct si1133_ + if (err) + return err; + +- err = si1133_bulk_read(data, SI1133_REG_HOSTOUT(0), sizeof(resp), +- (u8 *)&resp); ++ err = si1133_bulk_read(data, SI1133_REG_HOSTOUT(0), sizeof(buffer), ++ buffer); + if (err) + return err; + +- *val = be16_to_cpu(resp); ++ *val = sign_extend32((buffer[0] << 16) | (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2], ++ SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX); + + return err; + } +@@ -704,9 +708,9 @@ static int si1133_get_lux(struct si1133_ + { + int err; + int lux; +- u32 high_vis; +- u32 low_vis; +- u32 ir; ++ s32 high_vis; ++ s32 low_vis; ++ s32 ir; + u8 buffer[SI1133_LUX_BUFFER_SIZE]; + + /* Activate lux channels */ +@@ -719,9 +723,16 @@ static int si1133_get_lux(struct si1133_ + if (err) + return err; + +- high_vis = (buffer[0] << 16) | (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2]; +- low_vis = (buffer[3] << 16) | (buffer[4] << 8) | buffer[5]; +- ir = (buffer[6] << 16) | (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8]; ++ high_vis = ++ sign_extend32((buffer[0] << 16) | (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2], ++ SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX); ++ ++ low_vis = ++ sign_extend32((buffer[3] << 16) | (buffer[4] << 8) | buffer[5], ++ SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX); ++ ++ ir = sign_extend32((buffer[6] << 16) | (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8], ++ SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX); + + if (high_vis > SI1133_ADC_THRESHOLD || ir > SI1133_ADC_THRESHOLD) + lux = si1133_calc_polynomial(high_vis, ir, diff --git a/queue-4.19/keys-don-t-write-out-to-userspace-while-holding-key-semaphore.patch b/queue-4.19/keys-don-t-write-out-to-userspace-while-holding-key-semaphore.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a859074d3d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/keys-don-t-write-out-to-userspace-while-holding-key-semaphore.patch @@ -0,0 +1,572 @@ +From d3ec10aa95819bff18a0d936b18884c7816d0914 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Waiman Long +Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2020 21:11:24 -0400 +Subject: KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore + +From: Waiman Long + +commit d3ec10aa95819bff18a0d936b18884c7816d0914 upstream. + +A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a +keyutils test: + +[12537.027242] ====================================================== +[12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected +[12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - - +[12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------ +[12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock: +[12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 +[12537.208365] +[12537.208365] but task is already holding lock: +[12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 +[12537.270476] +[12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock. +[12537.270476] +[12537.307209] +[12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: +[12537.340754] +[12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}: +[12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110 +[12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280 +[12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70 +[12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80 +[12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] +[12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] +[12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] +[12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] +[12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] +[12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] +[12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 +[12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 +[12537.636225] +[12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}: +[12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 +[12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70 +[12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80 +[12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] +[12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] +[12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] +[12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] +[12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] +[12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] +[12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 +[12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 +[12537.908649] +[12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}: +[12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 +[12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs] +[12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs] +[12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs] +[12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560 +[12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0 +[12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10 +[12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830 +[12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260 +[12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0 +[12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0 +[12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550 +[12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60 +[12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0 +[12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 +[12538.243010] +[12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: +[12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 +[12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 +[12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 +[12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 +[12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 +[12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 +[12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 +[12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf +[12538.435535] +[12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this: +[12538.435535] +[12538.472829] Chain exists of: +[12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class +[12538.472829] +[12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario: +[12538.524820] +[12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1 +[12538.572654] ---- ---- +[12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class); +[12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock); +[12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class); +[12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem); +[12538.687758] +[12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK *** +[12538.687758] +[12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598: +[12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 +[12538.770573] +[12538.770573] stack backtrace: +[12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G +[12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015 +[12538.881963] Call Trace: +[12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0 +[12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279 +[12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250 +[12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0 +[12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190 +[12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550 +[12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 +[12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0 +[12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0 +[12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10 +[12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 +[12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 +[12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 +[12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 +[12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 +[12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110 +[12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 +[12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 +[12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0 +[12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 +[12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 +[12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf + +One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not +allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead, +an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the +read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding +the lock. + +That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant +read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace +write helpers. That is, + + 1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy. + 2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy(). + 3) All the fault handling code is removed. + +Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is +reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch. + +Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") +Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen +Signed-off-by: Waiman Long +Signed-off-by: David Howells +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + include/keys/big_key-type.h | 2 + include/keys/user-type.h | 3 - + include/linux/key-type.h | 2 + net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 2 + net/rxrpc/key.c | 27 +++-------- + security/keys/big_key.c | 11 +--- + security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 7 +- + security/keys/keyctl.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- + security/keys/keyring.c | 6 -- + security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 7 +- + security/keys/trusted.c | 14 ----- + security/keys/user_defined.c | 5 -- + 12 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-) + +--- a/include/keys/big_key-type.h ++++ b/include/keys/big_key-type.h +@@ -21,6 +21,6 @@ extern void big_key_free_preparse(struct + extern void big_key_revoke(struct key *key); + extern void big_key_destroy(struct key *key); + extern void big_key_describe(const struct key *big_key, struct seq_file *m); +-extern long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen); ++extern long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen); + + #endif /* _KEYS_BIG_KEY_TYPE_H */ +--- a/include/keys/user-type.h ++++ b/include/keys/user-type.h +@@ -45,8 +45,7 @@ extern int user_update(struct key *key, + extern void user_revoke(struct key *key); + extern void user_destroy(struct key *key); + extern void user_describe(const struct key *user, struct seq_file *m); +-extern long user_read(const struct key *key, +- char __user *buffer, size_t buflen); ++extern long user_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen); + + static inline const struct user_key_payload *user_key_payload_rcu(const struct key *key) + { +--- a/include/linux/key-type.h ++++ b/include/linux/key-type.h +@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ struct key_type { + * much is copied into the buffer + * - shouldn't do the copy if the buffer is NULL + */ +- long (*read)(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen); ++ long (*read)(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen); + + /* handle request_key() for this type instead of invoking + * /sbin/request-key (optional) +--- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c ++++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static void dns_resolver_describe(const + * - the key's semaphore is read-locked + */ + static long dns_resolver_read(const struct key *key, +- char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) ++ char *buffer, size_t buflen) + { + int err = PTR_ERR(key->payload.data[dns_key_error]); + +--- a/net/rxrpc/key.c ++++ b/net/rxrpc/key.c +@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(struct + static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *); + static void rxrpc_destroy_s(struct key *); + static void rxrpc_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); +-static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t); ++static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t); + + /* + * rxrpc defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an +@@ -1044,12 +1044,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_get_null_key); + * - this returns the result in XDR form + */ + static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key, +- char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) ++ char *buffer, size_t buflen) + { + const struct rxrpc_key_token *token; + const struct krb5_principal *princ; + size_t size; +- __be32 __user *xdr, *oldxdr; ++ __be32 *xdr, *oldxdr; + u32 cnlen, toksize, ntoks, tok, zero; + u16 toksizes[AFSTOKEN_MAX]; + int loop; +@@ -1126,30 +1126,25 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key + if (!buffer || buflen < size) + return size; + +- xdr = (__be32 __user *) buffer; ++ xdr = (__be32 *)buffer; + zero = 0; + #define ENCODE(x) \ + do { \ +- __be32 y = htonl(x); \ +- if (put_user(y, xdr++) < 0) \ +- goto fault; \ ++ *xdr++ = htonl(x); \ + } while(0) + #define ENCODE_DATA(l, s) \ + do { \ + u32 _l = (l); \ + ENCODE(l); \ +- if (copy_to_user(xdr, (s), _l) != 0) \ +- goto fault; \ +- if (_l & 3 && \ +- copy_to_user((u8 __user *)xdr + _l, &zero, 4 - (_l & 3)) != 0) \ +- goto fault; \ ++ memcpy(xdr, (s), _l); \ ++ if (_l & 3) \ ++ memcpy((u8 *)xdr + _l, &zero, 4 - (_l & 3)); \ + xdr += (_l + 3) >> 2; \ + } while(0) + #define ENCODE64(x) \ + do { \ + __be64 y = cpu_to_be64(x); \ +- if (copy_to_user(xdr, &y, 8) != 0) \ +- goto fault; \ ++ memcpy(xdr, &y, 8); \ + xdr += 8 >> 2; \ + } while(0) + #define ENCODE_STR(s) \ +@@ -1240,8 +1235,4 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key + ASSERTCMP((char __user *) xdr - buffer, ==, size); + _leave(" = %zu", size); + return size; +- +-fault: +- _leave(" = -EFAULT"); +- return -EFAULT; + } +--- a/security/keys/big_key.c ++++ b/security/keys/big_key.c +@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key * + * read the key data + * - the key's semaphore is read-locked + */ +-long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) ++long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) + { + size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len]; + long ret; +@@ -395,9 +395,8 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, + + ret = datalen; + +- /* copy decrypted data to user */ +- if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf->virt, datalen) != 0) +- ret = -EFAULT; ++ /* copy out decrypted data */ ++ memcpy(buffer, buf->virt, datalen); + + err_fput: + fput(file); +@@ -405,9 +404,7 @@ error: + big_key_free_buffer(buf); + } else { + ret = datalen; +- if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], +- datalen) != 0) +- ret = -EFAULT; ++ memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen); + } + + return ret; +--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c ++++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +@@ -895,14 +895,14 @@ out: + } + + /* +- * encrypted_read - format and copy the encrypted data to userspace ++ * encrypted_read - format and copy out the encrypted data + * + * The resulting datablob format is: + * + * + * On success, return to userspace the encrypted key datablob size. + */ +-static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, ++static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, + size_t buflen) + { + struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload; +@@ -950,8 +950,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct + key_put(mkey); + memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key)); + +- if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len) != 0) +- ret = -EFAULT; ++ memcpy(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len); + kzfree(ascii_buf); + + return asciiblob_len; +--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c ++++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c +@@ -743,6 +743,21 @@ error: + } + + /* ++ * Call the read method ++ */ ++static long __keyctl_read_key(struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) ++{ ++ long ret; ++ ++ down_read(&key->sem); ++ ret = key_validate(key); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen); ++ up_read(&key->sem); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++/* + * Read a key's payload. + * + * The key must either grant the caller Read permission, or it must grant the +@@ -757,26 +772,27 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, + struct key *key; + key_ref_t key_ref; + long ret; ++ char *key_data; + + /* find the key first */ + key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { + ret = -ENOKEY; +- goto error; ++ goto out; + } + + key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + + ret = key_read_state(key); + if (ret < 0) +- goto error2; /* Negatively instantiated */ ++ goto key_put_out; /* Negatively instantiated */ + + /* see if we can read it directly */ + ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ); + if (ret == 0) + goto can_read_key; + if (ret != -EACCES) +- goto error2; ++ goto key_put_out; + + /* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings + * - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be +@@ -784,26 +800,51 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, + */ + if (!is_key_possessed(key_ref)) { + ret = -EACCES; +- goto error2; ++ goto key_put_out; + } + + /* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */ + can_read_key: +- ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; +- if (key->type->read) { +- /* Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep) +- * to protect against the key being updated or revoked. +- */ +- down_read(&key->sem); +- ret = key_validate(key); +- if (ret == 0) +- ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen); +- up_read(&key->sem); ++ if (!key->type->read) { ++ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; ++ goto key_put_out; ++ } ++ ++ if (!buffer || !buflen) { ++ /* Get the key length from the read method */ ++ ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, NULL, 0); ++ goto key_put_out; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep) ++ * to protect against the key being updated or revoked. ++ * ++ * Allocating a temporary buffer to hold the keys before ++ * transferring them to user buffer to avoid potential ++ * deadlock involving page fault and mmap_sem. ++ */ ++ key_data = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL); ++ ++ if (!key_data) { ++ ret = -ENOMEM; ++ goto key_put_out; ++ } ++ ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, key_data, buflen); ++ ++ /* ++ * Read methods will just return the required length without ++ * any copying if the provided length isn't large enough. ++ */ ++ if (ret > 0 && ret <= buflen) { ++ if (copy_to_user(buffer, key_data, ret)) ++ ret = -EFAULT; + } ++ kzfree(key_data); + +-error2: ++key_put_out: + key_put(key); +-error: ++out: + return ret; + } + +--- a/security/keys/keyring.c ++++ b/security/keys/keyring.c +@@ -432,7 +432,6 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const v + { + struct keyring_read_iterator_context *ctx = data; + const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); +- int ret; + + kenter("{%s,%d},,{%zu/%zu}", + key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->buflen); +@@ -440,10 +439,7 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const v + if (ctx->count >= ctx->buflen) + return 1; + +- ret = put_user(key->serial, ctx->buffer); +- if (ret < 0) +- return ret; +- ctx->buffer++; ++ *ctx->buffer++ = key->serial; + ctx->count += sizeof(key->serial); + return 0; + } +--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c ++++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static int request_key_auth_instantiate( + static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); + static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *); + static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *); +-static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t); ++static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t); + + /* + * The request-key authorisation key type definition. +@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(co + * - the key's semaphore is read-locked + */ + static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key, +- char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) ++ char *buffer, size_t buflen) + { + struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(key); + size_t datalen; +@@ -102,8 +102,7 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const + if (buflen > datalen) + buflen = datalen; + +- if (copy_to_user(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen) != 0) +- ret = -EFAULT; ++ memcpy(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen); + } + + return ret; +--- a/security/keys/trusted.c ++++ b/security/keys/trusted.c +@@ -1135,11 +1135,10 @@ out: + * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex. + * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size. + */ +-static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, ++static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, + size_t buflen) + { + const struct trusted_key_payload *p; +- char *ascii_buf; + char *bufp; + int i; + +@@ -1148,18 +1147,9 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct ke + return -EINVAL; + + if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { +- ascii_buf = kmalloc_array(2, p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); +- if (!ascii_buf) +- return -ENOMEM; +- +- bufp = ascii_buf; ++ bufp = buffer; + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) + bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); +- if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { +- kzfree(ascii_buf); +- return -EFAULT; +- } +- kzfree(ascii_buf); + } + return 2 * p->blob_len; + } +--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c ++++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c +@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe); + * read the key data + * - the key's semaphore is read-locked + */ +-long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) ++long user_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) + { + const struct user_key_payload *upayload; + long ret; +@@ -185,8 +185,7 @@ long user_read(const struct key *key, ch + if (buflen > upayload->datalen) + buflen = upayload->datalen; + +- if (copy_to_user(buffer, upayload->data, buflen) != 0) +- ret = -EFAULT; ++ memcpy(buffer, upayload->data, buflen); + } + + return ret; diff --git a/queue-4.19/locktorture-print-ratio-of-acquisitions-not-failures.patch b/queue-4.19/locktorture-print-ratio-of-acquisitions-not-failures.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..90f0de64c60 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/locktorture-print-ratio-of-acquisitions-not-failures.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 80c503e0e68fbe271680ab48f0fe29bc034b01b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Paul E. McKenney" +Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 09:19:01 -0800 +Subject: locktorture: Print ratio of acquisitions, not failures + +From: Paul E. McKenney + +commit 80c503e0e68fbe271680ab48f0fe29bc034b01b7 upstream. + +The __torture_print_stats() function in locktorture.c carefully +initializes local variable "min" to statp[0].n_lock_acquired, but +then compares it to statp[i].n_lock_fail. Given that the .n_lock_fail +field should normally be zero, and given the initialization, it seems +reasonable to display the maximum and minimum number acquisitions +instead of miscomputing the maximum and minimum number of failures. +This commit therefore switches from failures to acquisitions. + +And this turns out to be not only a day-zero bug, but entirely my +own fault. I hate it when that happens! + +Fixes: 0af3fe1efa53 ("locktorture: Add a lock-torture kernel module") +Reported-by: Will Deacon +Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney +Acked-by: Will Deacon +Cc: Davidlohr Bueso +Cc: Josh Triplett +Cc: Peter Zijlstra +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + kernel/locking/locktorture.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/kernel/locking/locktorture.c ++++ b/kernel/locking/locktorture.c +@@ -710,10 +710,10 @@ static void __torture_print_stats(char * + if (statp[i].n_lock_fail) + fail = true; + sum += statp[i].n_lock_acquired; +- if (max < statp[i].n_lock_fail) +- max = statp[i].n_lock_fail; +- if (min > statp[i].n_lock_fail) +- min = statp[i].n_lock_fail; ++ if (max < statp[i].n_lock_acquired) ++ max = statp[i].n_lock_acquired; ++ if (min > statp[i].n_lock_acquired) ++ min = statp[i].n_lock_acquired; + } + page += sprintf(page, + "%s: Total: %lld Max/Min: %ld/%ld %s Fail: %d %s\n", diff --git a/queue-4.19/mtd-lpddr-fix-a-double-free-in-probe.patch b/queue-4.19/mtd-lpddr-fix-a-double-free-in-probe.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3ea2b58ac64 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/mtd-lpddr-fix-a-double-free-in-probe.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 4da0ea71ea934af18db4c63396ba2af1a679ef02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dan Carpenter +Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 12:25:54 +0300 +Subject: mtd: lpddr: Fix a double free in probe() + +From: Dan Carpenter + +commit 4da0ea71ea934af18db4c63396ba2af1a679ef02 upstream. + +This function is only called from lpddr_probe(). We free "lpddr" both +here and in the caller, so it's a double free. The best place to free +"lpddr" is in lpddr_probe() so let's delete this one. + +Fixes: 8dc004395d5e ("[MTD] LPDDR qinfo probing.") +Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter +Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20200228092554.o57igp3nqhyvf66t@kili.mountain +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + drivers/mtd/lpddr/lpddr_cmds.c | 1 - + 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/drivers/mtd/lpddr/lpddr_cmds.c ++++ b/drivers/mtd/lpddr/lpddr_cmds.c +@@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ struct mtd_info *lpddr_cmdset(struct map + shared = kmalloc_array(lpddr->numchips, sizeof(struct flchip_shared), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!shared) { +- kfree(lpddr); + kfree(mtd); + return NULL; + } diff --git a/queue-4.19/mtd-phram-fix-a-double-free-issue-in-error-path.patch b/queue-4.19/mtd-phram-fix-a-double-free-issue-in-error-path.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..6fbb74c42c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/mtd-phram-fix-a-double-free-issue-in-error-path.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From 49c64df880570034308e4a9a49c4bc95cf8cdb33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Wen Yang +Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 23:31:56 +0800 +Subject: mtd: phram: fix a double free issue in error path + +From: Wen Yang + +commit 49c64df880570034308e4a9a49c4bc95cf8cdb33 upstream. + +The variable 'name' is released multiple times in the error path, +which may cause double free issues. +This problem is avoided by adding a goto label to release the memory +uniformly. And this change also makes the code a bit more cleaner. + +Fixes: 4f678a58d335 ("mtd: fix memory leaks in phram_setup") +Signed-off-by: Wen Yang +Cc: Joern Engel +Cc: Miquel Raynal +Cc: Richard Weinberger +Cc: Vignesh Raghavendra +Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org +Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20200318153156.25612-1-wenyang@linux.alibaba.com +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c | 15 +++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c ++++ b/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c +@@ -240,22 +240,25 @@ static int phram_setup(const char *val) + + ret = parse_num64(&start, token[1]); + if (ret) { +- kfree(name); + parse_err("illegal start address\n"); ++ goto error; + } + + ret = parse_num64(&len, token[2]); + if (ret) { +- kfree(name); + parse_err("illegal device length\n"); ++ goto error; + } + + ret = register_device(name, start, len); +- if (!ret) +- pr_info("%s device: %#llx at %#llx\n", name, len, start); +- else +- kfree(name); ++ if (ret) ++ goto error; + ++ pr_info("%s device: %#llx at %#llx\n", name, len, start); ++ return 0; ++ ++error: ++ kfree(name); + return ret; + } + diff --git a/queue-4.19/mtd-spinand-explicitly-use-mtd_ops_raw-to-write-the-bad-block-marker-to-oob.patch b/queue-4.19/mtd-spinand-explicitly-use-mtd_ops_raw-to-write-the-bad-block-marker-to-oob.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..24ce954760c --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/mtd-spinand-explicitly-use-mtd_ops_raw-to-write-the-bad-block-marker-to-oob.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 621a7b780bd8b7054647d53d5071961f2c9e0873 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Frieder Schrempf +Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2020 10:05:25 +0000 +Subject: mtd: spinand: Explicitly use MTD_OPS_RAW to write the bad block marker to OOB + +From: Frieder Schrempf + +commit 621a7b780bd8b7054647d53d5071961f2c9e0873 upstream. + +When writing the bad block marker to the OOB area the access mode +should be set to MTD_OPS_RAW as it is done for reading the marker. +Currently this only works because req.mode is initialized to +MTD_OPS_PLACE_OOB (0) and spinand_write_to_cache_op() checks for +req.mode != MTD_OPS_AUTO_OOB. + +Fix this by explicitly setting req.mode to MTD_OPS_RAW. + +Fixes: 7529df465248 ("mtd: nand: Add core infrastructure to support SPI NANDs") +Signed-off-by: Frieder Schrempf +Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon +Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20200218100432.32433-3-frieder.schrempf@kontron.de +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c ++++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c +@@ -670,6 +670,7 @@ static int spinand_markbad(struct nand_d + .ooboffs = 0, + .ooblen = sizeof(marker), + .oobbuf.out = marker, ++ .mode = MTD_OPS_RAW, + }; + int ret; + diff --git a/queue-4.19/net-dsa-bcm_sf2-fix-overflow-checks.patch b/queue-4.19/net-dsa-bcm_sf2-fix-overflow-checks.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e3740b0f455 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/net-dsa-bcm_sf2-fix-overflow-checks.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From d0802dc411f469569a537283b6f3833af47aece9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Florian Fainelli +Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 14:38:46 -0700 +Subject: net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Fix overflow checks + +From: Florian Fainelli + +commit d0802dc411f469569a537283b6f3833af47aece9 upstream. + +Commit f949a12fd697 ("net: dsa: bcm_sf2: fix buffer overflow doing +set_rxnfc") tried to fix the some user controlled buffer overflows in +bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_set() and bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_del() but the fix was using +CFP_NUM_RULES, which while it is correct not to overflow the bitmaps, is +not representative of what the device actually supports. Correct that by +using bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_size() instead. + +The latter subtracts the number of rules by 1, so change the checks from +greater than or equal to greater than accordingly. + +Fixes: f949a12fd697 ("net: dsa: bcm_sf2: fix buffer overflow doing set_rxnfc") +Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c | 9 +++------ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c +@@ -742,17 +742,14 @@ static int bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_set(struct d + fs->m_ext.data[1])) + return -EINVAL; + +- if (fs->location != RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && fs->location >= CFP_NUM_RULES) ++ if (fs->location != RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && ++ fs->location > bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_size(priv)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (fs->location != RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && + test_bit(fs->location, priv->cfp.used)) + return -EBUSY; + +- if (fs->location != RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && +- fs->location > bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_size(priv)) +- return -EINVAL; +- + /* This rule is a Wake-on-LAN filter and we must specifically + * target the CPU port in order for it to be working. + */ +@@ -839,7 +836,7 @@ static int bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_del(struct b + u32 next_loc = 0; + int ret; + +- if (loc >= CFP_NUM_RULES) ++ if (loc > bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_size(priv)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Refuse deleting unused rules, and those that are not unique since diff --git a/queue-4.19/series b/queue-4.19/series index c61e968dcda..e8e9251046e 100644 --- a/queue-4.19/series +++ b/queue-4.19/series @@ -52,3 +52,13 @@ power-supply-axp288_fuel_gauge-broaden-vendor-check-.patch libnvdimm-out-of-bounds-read-in-__nd_ioctl.patch iommu-amd-fix-the-configuration-of-gcr3-table-root-p.patch f2fs-fix-to-wait-all-node-page-writeback.patch +net-dsa-bcm_sf2-fix-overflow-checks.patch +fbdev-potential-information-leak-in-do_fb_ioctl.patch +iio-si1133-read-24-bit-signed-integer-for-measurement.patch +tty-evh_bytechan-fix-out-of-bounds-accesses.patch +locktorture-print-ratio-of-acquisitions-not-failures.patch +mtd-spinand-explicitly-use-mtd_ops_raw-to-write-the-bad-block-marker-to-oob.patch +mtd-lpddr-fix-a-double-free-in-probe.patch +mtd-phram-fix-a-double-free-issue-in-error-path.patch +keys-don-t-write-out-to-userspace-while-holding-key-semaphore.patch +bpf-fix-buggy-r0-retval-refinement-for-tracing-helpers.patch diff --git a/queue-4.19/tty-evh_bytechan-fix-out-of-bounds-accesses.patch b/queue-4.19/tty-evh_bytechan-fix-out-of-bounds-accesses.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cc5a710f61d --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/tty-evh_bytechan-fix-out-of-bounds-accesses.patch @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +From 3670664b5da555a2a481449b3baafff113b0ac35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stephen Rothwell +Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2020 18:39:12 +1100 +Subject: tty: evh_bytechan: Fix out of bounds accesses +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: Stephen Rothwell + +commit 3670664b5da555a2a481449b3baafff113b0ac35 upstream. + +ev_byte_channel_send() assumes that its third argument is a 16 byte +array. Some places where it is called it may not be (or we can't +easily tell if it is). Newer compilers have started producing warnings +about this, so make sure we actually pass a 16 byte array. + +There may be more elegant solutions to this, but the driver is quite +old and hasn't been updated in many years. + +The warnings (from a powerpc allyesconfig build) are: + + In file included from include/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:5, + from arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/byteorder.h:14, + from include/asm-generic/bitops/le.h:6, + from arch/powerpc/include/asm/bitops.h:250, + from include/linux/bitops.h:29, + from include/linux/kernel.h:12, + from include/asm-generic/bug.h:19, + from arch/powerpc/include/asm/bug.h:109, + from include/linux/bug.h:5, + from include/linux/mmdebug.h:5, + from include/linux/gfp.h:5, + from include/linux/slab.h:15, + from drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c:24: + drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c: In function ‘ehv_bc_udbg_putc’: + arch/powerpc/include/asm/epapr_hcalls.h:298:20: warning: array subscript 1 is outside array bounds of ‘const char[1]’ [-Warray-bounds] + 298 | r6 = be32_to_cpu(p[1]); + include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:40:51: note: in definition of macro ‘__be32_to_cpu’ + 40 | #define __be32_to_cpu(x) ((__force __u32)(__be32)(x)) + | ^ + arch/powerpc/include/asm/epapr_hcalls.h:298:7: note: in expansion of macro ‘be32_to_cpu’ + 298 | r6 = be32_to_cpu(p[1]); + | ^~~~~~~~~~~ + drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c:166:13: note: while referencing ‘data’ + 166 | static void ehv_bc_udbg_putc(char c) + | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Fixes: dcd83aaff1c8 ("tty/powerpc: introduce the ePAPR embedded hypervisor byte channel driver") +Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell +Tested-by: Laurentiu Tudor +[mpe: Trim warnings from change log] +Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200109183912.5fcb52aa@canb.auug.org.au +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c ++++ b/drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c +@@ -136,6 +136,21 @@ static int find_console_handle(void) + return 1; + } + ++static unsigned int local_ev_byte_channel_send(unsigned int handle, ++ unsigned int *count, ++ const char *p) ++{ ++ char buffer[EV_BYTE_CHANNEL_MAX_BYTES]; ++ unsigned int c = *count; ++ ++ if (c < sizeof(buffer)) { ++ memcpy(buffer, p, c); ++ memset(&buffer[c], 0, sizeof(buffer) - c); ++ p = buffer; ++ } ++ return ev_byte_channel_send(handle, count, p); ++} ++ + /*************************** EARLY CONSOLE DRIVER ***************************/ + + #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_EARLY_DEBUG_EHV_BC +@@ -154,7 +169,7 @@ static void byte_channel_spin_send(const + + do { + count = 1; +- ret = ev_byte_channel_send(CONFIG_PPC_EARLY_DEBUG_EHV_BC_HANDLE, ++ ret = local_ev_byte_channel_send(CONFIG_PPC_EARLY_DEBUG_EHV_BC_HANDLE, + &count, &data); + } while (ret == EV_EAGAIN); + } +@@ -221,7 +236,7 @@ static int ehv_bc_console_byte_channel_s + while (count) { + len = min_t(unsigned int, count, EV_BYTE_CHANNEL_MAX_BYTES); + do { +- ret = ev_byte_channel_send(handle, &len, s); ++ ret = local_ev_byte_channel_send(handle, &len, s); + } while (ret == EV_EAGAIN); + count -= len; + s += len; +@@ -401,7 +416,7 @@ static void ehv_bc_tx_dequeue(struct ehv + CIRC_CNT_TO_END(bc->head, bc->tail, BUF_SIZE), + EV_BYTE_CHANNEL_MAX_BYTES); + +- ret = ev_byte_channel_send(bc->handle, &len, bc->buf + bc->tail); ++ ret = local_ev_byte_channel_send(bc->handle, &len, bc->buf + bc->tail); + + /* 'len' is valid only if the return code is 0 or EV_EAGAIN */ + if (!ret || (ret == EV_EAGAIN)) -- 2.47.3