rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check

rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check

rxgk_verify_response() decodes auth_len from the packet and is supposed
to verify that it fits in the remaining bytes. The existing check is
inverted, so oversized RESPONSE authenticators are accepted and passed
to rxgk_decrypt_skb(), which can later reach skb_to_sgvec() with an
impossible length and hit BUG_ON(len).

Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:

RIP: __skb_to_sgvec()
  [net/core/skbuff.c:5285 (discriminator 1)]
Call Trace:
 skb_to_sgvec() [net/core/skbuff.c:5305]
 rxgk_decrypt_skb() [net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h:81]
 rxgk_verify_response() [net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1268]
 rxrpc_process_connection()
   [net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
    net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
 process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]
 worker_thread()
   [kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]
 kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]
 ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]

Reject authenticator lengths that exceed the remaining packet payload.

Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Signed-off-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-14-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>