--- /dev/null
+From ben@decadent.org.uk Wed Dec 27 21:04:06 2017
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Sat, 23 Dec 2017 02:26:17 +0000
+Subject: bpf/verifier: Fix states_equal() comparison of pointer and UNKNOWN
+To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
+Message-ID: <20171223022617.GO2971@decadent.org.uk>
+Content-Disposition: inline
+
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+
+An UNKNOWN_VALUE is not supposed to be derived from a pointer, unless
+pointer leaks are allowed. Therefore, states_equal() must not treat
+a state with a pointer in a register as "equal" to a state with an
+UNKNOWN_VALUE in that register.
+
+This was fixed differently upstream, but the code around here was
+largely rewritten in 4.14 by commit f1174f77b50c "bpf/verifier: rework
+value tracking". The bug can be detected by the bpf/verifier sub-test
+"pointer/scalar confusion in state equality check (way 1)".
+
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Cc: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
+Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
+Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+
+---
+ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
++++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+@@ -2722,11 +2722,12 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_veri
+
+ /* If we didn't map access then again we don't care about the
+ * mismatched range values and it's ok if our old type was
+- * UNKNOWN and we didn't go to a NOT_INIT'ed reg.
++ * UNKNOWN and we didn't go to a NOT_INIT'ed or pointer reg.
+ */
+ if (rold->type == NOT_INIT ||
+ (!varlen_map_access && rold->type == UNKNOWN_VALUE &&
+- rcur->type != NOT_INIT))
++ rcur->type != NOT_INIT &&
++ !__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, rcur)))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Don't care about the reg->id in this case. */