--- /dev/null
+From 80bb50e2d459213cccff3111d5ef98ed4238c0d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Berk Cem Goksel <berkcgoksel@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 06:49:41 +0300
+Subject: ALSA: caiaq: take a reference on the USB device in create_card()
+
+From: Berk Cem Goksel <berkcgoksel@gmail.com>
+
+commit 80bb50e2d459213cccff3111d5ef98ed4238c0d5 upstream.
+
+The caiaq driver stores a pointer to the parent USB device in
+cdev->chip.dev but never takes a reference on it. The card's
+private_free callback, snd_usb_caiaq_card_free(), can run
+asynchronously via snd_card_free_when_closed() after the USB
+device has already been disconnected and freed, so any access to
+cdev->chip.dev in that path dereferences a freed usb_device.
+
+On top of the refcounting issue, the current card_free implementation
+calls usb_reset_device(cdev->chip.dev). A reset in a free callback
+is inappropriate: the device is going away, the call takes the
+device lock in a teardown context, and the reset races with the
+disconnect path that the callback is already cleaning up after.
+
+Take a reference on the USB device in create_card() with
+usb_get_dev(), drop it with usb_put_dev() in the free callback,
+and remove the usb_reset_device() call.
+
+Fixes: b04dcbb7f7b1 ("ALSA: caiaq: Use snd_card_free_when_closed() at disconnection")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Berk Cem Goksel <berkcgoksel@gmail.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260413034941.1131465-3-berkcgoksel@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ sound/usb/caiaq/device.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/sound/usb/caiaq/device.c
++++ b/sound/usb/caiaq/device.c
+@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static void card_free(struct snd_card *c
+ snd_usb_caiaq_input_free(cdev);
+ #endif
+ snd_usb_caiaq_audio_free(cdev);
+- usb_reset_device(cdev->chip.dev);
++ usb_put_dev(cdev->chip.dev);
+ }
+
+ static int create_card(struct usb_device *usb_dev,
+@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static int create_card(struct usb_device
+ return err;
+
+ cdev = caiaqdev(card);
+- cdev->chip.dev = usb_dev;
++ cdev->chip.dev = usb_get_dev(usb_dev);
+ cdev->chip.card = card;
+ cdev->chip.usb_id = USB_ID(le16_to_cpu(usb_dev->descriptor.idVendor),
+ le16_to_cpu(usb_dev->descriptor.idProduct));
--- /dev/null
+From 4513d3e0bbc0585b86ccf2631902593ff97e88f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Cryolitia PukNgae <cryolitia.pukngae@linux.dev>
+Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 13:36:57 +0800
+Subject: ALSA: usb-audio: apply quirk for MOONDROP JU Jiu
+
+From: Cryolitia PukNgae <cryolitia.pukngae@linux.dev>
+
+commit 4513d3e0bbc0585b86ccf2631902593ff97e88f5 upstream.
+
+It(ID 31b2:0111 JU Jiu) reports a MIN value -12800 for volume control, but
+will mute when setting it less than -10880.
+
+Thanks to my girlfriend Kagura for reporting this issue.
+
+Cc: Kagura <me@mail.kagurach.uk>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Cryolitia PukNgae <cryolitia.pukngae@linux.dev>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260402-syy-v1-1-068d3bc30ddc@linux.dev
+Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ sound/usb/mixer.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/sound/usb/mixer.c
++++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c
+@@ -1198,6 +1198,13 @@ static void volume_control_quirks(struct
+ cval->min = -14208; /* Mute under it */
+ }
+ break;
++ case USB_ID(0x31b2, 0x0111): /* MOONDROP JU Jiu */
++ if (!strcmp(kctl->id.name, "PCM Playback Volume")) {
++ usb_audio_info(chip,
++ "set volume quirk for MOONDROP JU Jiu\n");
++ cval->min = -10880; /* Mute under it */
++ }
++ break;
+ }
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From abe4a6d6f606113251868c2c4a06ba904bb41eed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2026 10:43:16 -0700
+Subject: crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy CSR to userspace if PSP command failed
+
+From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+
+commit abe4a6d6f606113251868c2c4a06ba904bb41eed upstream.
+
+When retrieving the PEK CSR, don't attempt to copy the blob to userspace
+if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid
+length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
+of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
+leak data to userspace.
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
+ Read of size 2084 at addr ffff898144612e20 by task syz.9.219/21405
+
+ CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 21405 Comm: syz.9.219 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
+ Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
+ Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
+ print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
+ print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
+ kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
+ check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
+ kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
+ instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
+ _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
+ _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
+ copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
+ sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr+0x31f/0x590 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:1872
+ sev_ioctl+0x3a4/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2562
+ vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
+ __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
+ __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
+ do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
+ </TASK>
+
+WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
+says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
+firwmware error.
+
+Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+Reported-by: Sebastian Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
+Fixes: e799035609e1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR ioctl command")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
++++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+@@ -669,7 +669,10 @@ cmd:
+
+ ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR, &data, &argp->error);
+
+- /* If we query the CSR length, FW responded with expected data. */
++ /*
++ * Firmware will returns the length of the CSR blob (either the minimum
++ * required length or the actual length written), return it to the user.
++ */
+ input.length = data.len;
+
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)argp->data, &input, sizeof(input))) {
+@@ -677,6 +680,9 @@ cmd:
+ goto e_free_blob;
+ }
+
++ if (ret || WARN_ON_ONCE(argp->error))
++ goto e_free_blob;
++
+ if (blob) {
+ if (copy_to_user(input_address, blob, input.length))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
--- /dev/null
+From 4f685dbfa87c546e51d9dc6cab379d20f275e114 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2026 10:57:31 -0700
+Subject: crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy ID to userspace if PSP command failed
+
+From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+
+commit 4f685dbfa87c546e51d9dc6cab379d20f275e114 upstream.
+
+When retrieving the ID for the CPU, don't attempt to copy the ID blob to
+userspace if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an
+invalid length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying
+the number of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated
+buffer and leak data to userspace.
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
+ Read of size 64 at addr ffff8881867f5960 by task syz.0.906/24388
+
+ CPU: 130 UID: 0 PID: 24388 Comm: syz.0.906 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
+ Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
+ Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
+ print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
+ print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
+ kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
+ check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
+ kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
+ instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
+ _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
+ _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
+ copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
+ sev_ioctl_do_get_id2+0x361/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2222
+ sev_ioctl+0x25f/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2575
+ vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
+ __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
+ __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
+ do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
+ </TASK>
+
+WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
+says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
+firwmware error.
+
+Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+Reported-by: Sebastian Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
+Fixes: d6112ea0cb34 ("crypto: ccp - introduce SEV_GET_ID2 command")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
++++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+@@ -927,6 +927,9 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_get_id2(struct s
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
++ if (ret || WARN_ON_ONCE(argp->error))
++ goto e_free;
++
+ if (id_blob) {
+ if (copy_to_user(input_address, id_blob, data.len)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
--- /dev/null
+From e76239fed3cffd6d304d8ca3ce23984fd24f57d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2026 10:48:53 -0700
+Subject: crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy PDH cert to userspace if PSP command failed
+
+From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+
+commit e76239fed3cffd6d304d8ca3ce23984fd24f57d3 upstream.
+
+When retrieving the PDH cert, don't attempt to copy the blobs to userspace
+if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid
+length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
+of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
+leak data to userspace.
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
+ Read of size 2084 at addr ffff8885c4ab8aa0 by task syz.0.186/21033
+
+ CPU: 51 UID: 0 PID: 21033 Comm: syz.0.186 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
+ Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
+ Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.84.12-0 11/17/2025
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
+ print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
+ print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
+ kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
+ check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
+ kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
+ instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
+ _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
+ _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
+ copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
+ sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export+0x3d3/0x7c0 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2347
+ sev_ioctl+0x2a2/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2568
+ vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
+ __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
+ __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
+ do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
+ </TASK>
+
+WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
+says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
+firwmware error.
+
+Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+Reported-by: Sebastian Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
+Fixes: 76a2b524a4b1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT ioctl command")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
++++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+@@ -1041,7 +1041,10 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(struc
+ cmd:
+ ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT, &data, &argp->error);
+
+- /* If we query the length, FW responded with expected data. */
++ /*
++ * Firmware will return the length of the blobs (either the minimum
++ * required length or the actual length written), return 'em to the user.
++ */
+ input.cert_chain_len = data.cert_chain_len;
+ input.pdh_cert_len = data.pdh_cert_len;
+
+@@ -1050,6 +1053,9 @@ cmd:
+ goto e_free_cert;
+ }
+
++ if (ret || WARN_ON_ONCE(argp->error))
++ goto e_free_cert;
++
+ if (pdh_blob) {
+ if (copy_to_user(input_pdh_cert_address,
+ pdh_blob, input.pdh_cert_len)) {
--- /dev/null
+From 39d4ee19c1e7d753dd655aebee632271b171f43a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: George Saad <geoo115@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2026 11:21:23 +0000
+Subject: f2fs: fix use-after-free of sbi in f2fs_compress_write_end_io()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: George Saad <geoo115@gmail.com>
+
+commit 39d4ee19c1e7d753dd655aebee632271b171f43a upstream.
+
+In f2fs_compress_write_end_io(), dec_page_count(sbi, type) can bring
+the F2FS_WB_CP_DATA counter to zero, unblocking
+f2fs_wait_on_all_pages() in f2fs_put_super() on a concurrent unmount
+CPU. The unmount path then proceeds to call
+f2fs_destroy_page_array_cache(sbi), which destroys
+sbi->page_array_slab via kmem_cache_destroy(), and eventually
+kfree(sbi). Meanwhile, the bio completion callback is still executing:
+when it reaches page_array_free(sbi, ...), it dereferences
+sbi->page_array_slab — a destroyed slab cache — to call
+kmem_cache_free(), causing a use-after-free.
+
+This is the same class of bug as CVE-2026-23234 (which fixed the
+equivalent race in f2fs_write_end_io() in data.c), but in the
+compressed writeback completion path that was not covered by that fix.
+
+Fix this by moving dec_page_count() to after page_array_free(), so
+that all sbi accesses complete before the counter decrement that can
+unblock unmount. For non-last folios (where atomic_dec_return on
+cic->pending_pages is nonzero), dec_page_count is called immediately
+before returning — page_array_free is not reached on this path, so
+there is no post-decrement sbi access. For the last folio,
+page_array_free runs while the F2FS_WB_CP_DATA counter is still
+nonzero (this folio has not yet decremented it), keeping sbi alive,
+and dec_page_count runs as the final operation.
+
+Fixes: 4c8ff7095bef ("f2fs: support data compression")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: George Saad <geoo115@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/f2fs/compress.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/f2fs/compress.c
++++ b/fs/f2fs/compress.c
+@@ -1444,10 +1444,10 @@ void f2fs_compress_write_end_io(struct b
+
+ f2fs_compress_free_page(page);
+
+- dec_page_count(sbi, type);
+-
+- if (atomic_dec_return(&cic->pending_pages))
++ if (atomic_dec_return(&cic->pending_pages)) {
++ dec_page_count(sbi, type);
+ return;
++ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cic->nr_rpages; i++) {
+ WARN_ON(!cic->rpages[i]);
+@@ -1457,6 +1457,14 @@ void f2fs_compress_write_end_io(struct b
+
+ page_array_free(cic->inode, cic->rpages, cic->nr_rpages);
+ kmem_cache_free(cic_entry_slab, cic);
++
++ /*
++ * Make sure dec_page_count() is the last access to sbi.
++ * Once it drops the F2FS_WB_CP_DATA counter to zero, the
++ * unmount thread can proceed to destroy sbi and
++ * sbi->page_array_slab.
++ */
++ dec_page_count(sbi, type);
+ }
+
+ static int f2fs_write_raw_pages(struct compress_ctx *cc,
--- /dev/null
+From 0ca0485e4b2e837ebb6cbd4f2451aba665a03e4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2026 16:37:15 +0200
+Subject: fs/ntfs3: validate rec->used in journal-replay file record check
+
+From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+commit 0ca0485e4b2e837ebb6cbd4f2451aba665a03e4b upstream.
+
+check_file_record() validates rec->total against the record size but
+never validates rec->used. The do_action() journal-replay handlers read
+rec->used from disk and use it to compute memmove lengths:
+
+ DeleteAttribute: memmove(attr, ..., used - asize - roff)
+ CreateAttribute: memmove(..., attr, used - roff)
+ change_attr_size: memmove(..., used - PtrOffset(rec, next))
+
+When rec->used is smaller than the offset of a validated attribute, or
+larger than the record size, these subtractions can underflow allowing
+us to copy huge amounts of memory in to a 4kb buffer, generally
+considered a bad idea overall.
+
+This requires a corrupted filesystem, which isn't a threat model the
+kernel really needs to worry about, but checking for such an obvious
+out-of-bounds value is good to keep things robust, especially on journal
+replay
+
+Fix this up by bounding rec->used correctly.
+
+This is much like commit b2bc7c44ed17 ("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds
+read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot") which checked different values in this
+same switch statement.
+
+Cc: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
+Fixes: b46acd6a6a62 ("fs/ntfs3: Add NTFS journal")
+Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
+Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 12 +++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c
++++ b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c
+@@ -2792,13 +2792,14 @@ static inline bool check_file_record(con
+ u16 fn = le16_to_cpu(rec->rhdr.fix_num);
+ u16 ao = le16_to_cpu(rec->attr_off);
+ u32 rs = sbi->record_size;
++ u32 used = le32_to_cpu(rec->used);
+
+ /* Check the file record header for consistency. */
+ if (rec->rhdr.sign != NTFS_FILE_SIGNATURE ||
+ fo > (SECTOR_SIZE - ((rs >> SECTOR_SHIFT) + 1) * sizeof(short)) ||
+ (fn - 1) * SECTOR_SIZE != rs || ao < MFTRECORD_FIXUP_OFFSET_1 ||
+ ao > sbi->record_size - SIZEOF_RESIDENT || !is_rec_inuse(rec) ||
+- le32_to_cpu(rec->total) != rs) {
++ le32_to_cpu(rec->total) != rs || used > rs || used < ao) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+@@ -2810,6 +2811,15 @@ static inline bool check_file_record(con
+ return false;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * The do_action() handlers compute memmove lengths as
++ * "rec->used - <offset of validated attr>", which underflows when
++ * rec->used is smaller than the attribute walk reached. At this
++ * point attr is the ATTR_END marker; rec->used must cover it.
++ */
++ if (used < PtrOffset(rec, attr) + sizeof(attr->type))
++ return false;
++
+ return true;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 129a45f9755a89f573c6a513a6b9e3d234ce89b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2026 15:06:50 -0800
+Subject: fuse: quiet down complaints in fuse_conn_limit_write
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
+
+commit 129a45f9755a89f573c6a513a6b9e3d234ce89b0 upstream.
+
+gcc 15 complains about an uninitialized variable val that is passed by
+reference into fuse_conn_limit_write:
+
+ control.c: In function ‘fuse_conn_congestion_threshold_write’:
+ include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:55:37: warning: ‘val’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
+ 55 | *(volatile typeof(x) *)&(x) = (val); \
+ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~
+ include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:61:9: note: in expansion of macro ‘__WRITE_ONCE’
+ 61 | __WRITE_ONCE(x, val); \
+ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~
+ control.c:178:9: note: in expansion of macro ‘WRITE_ONCE’
+ 178 | WRITE_ONCE(fc->congestion_threshold, val);
+ | ^~~~~~~~~~
+ control.c:166:18: note: ‘val’ was declared here
+ 166 | unsigned val;
+ | ^~~
+
+Unfortunately there's enough macro spew involved in kstrtoul_from_user
+that I think gcc gives up on its analysis and sprays the above warning.
+AFAICT it's not actually a bug, but we could just zero-initialize the
+variable to enable using -Wmaybe-uninitialized to find real problems.
+
+Previously we would use some weird uninitialized_var annotation to quiet
+down the warnings, so clearly this code has been like this for quite
+some time.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.9
+Fixes: 3f649ab728cda8 ("treewide: Remove uninitialized_var() usage")
+Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/fuse/control.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/fuse/control.c
++++ b/fs/fuse/control.c
+@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ static ssize_t fuse_conn_max_background_
+ const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+ {
+- unsigned val;
++ unsigned int val = 0;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ ret = fuse_conn_limit_write(file, buf, count, ppos, &val,
+@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static ssize_t fuse_conn_congestion_thre
+ const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+ {
+- unsigned val;
++ unsigned int val = 0;
+ struct fuse_conn *fc;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
--- /dev/null
+From 51a8de6c50bf947c8f534cd73da4c8f0a13e7bed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Samuel Page <sam@bynar.io>
+Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 11:01:37 +0200
+Subject: fuse: reject oversized dirents in page cache
+
+From: Samuel Page <sam@bynar.io>
+
+commit 51a8de6c50bf947c8f534cd73da4c8f0a13e7bed upstream.
+
+fuse_add_dirent_to_cache() computes a serialized dirent size from the
+server-controlled namelen field and copies the dirent into a single
+page-cache page. The existing logic only checks whether the dirent fits
+in the remaining space of the current page and advances to a fresh page
+if not. It never checks whether the dirent itself exceeds PAGE_SIZE.
+
+As a result, a malicious FUSE server can return a dirent with
+namelen=4095, producing a serialized record size of 4120 bytes. On 4 KiB
+page systems this causes memcpy() to overflow the cache page by 24 bytes
+into the following kernel page.
+
+Reject dirents that cannot fit in a single page before copying them into
+the readdir cache.
+
+Fixes: 69e34551152a ("fuse: allow caching readdir")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.16+
+Assisted-by: Bynario AI
+Signed-off-by: Samuel Page <sam@bynar.io>
+Reported-by: Qi Tang <tpluszz77@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Zijun Hu <nightu@northwestern.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260420090139.662772-1-mszeredi@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/fuse/readdir.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/fuse/readdir.c
++++ b/fs/fuse/readdir.c
+@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@ static void fuse_add_dirent_to_cache(str
+ unsigned int offset;
+ void *addr;
+
++ /* Dirent doesn't fit in readdir cache page? Skip caching. */
++ if (reclen > PAGE_SIZE)
++ return;
++
+ spin_lock(&fi->rdc.lock);
+ /*
+ * Is cache already completed? Or this entry does not go at the end of
--- /dev/null
+From 30010c952077a1c89ecdd71fc4d574c75a8f5617 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2026 19:33:17 +0000
+Subject: ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds write in smb2_get_ea() EA alignment
+
+From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
+
+commit 30010c952077a1c89ecdd71fc4d574c75a8f5617 upstream.
+
+smb2_get_ea() applies 4-byte alignment padding via memset() after
+writing each EA entry. The bounds check on buf_free_len is performed
+before the value memcpy, but the alignment memset fires unconditionally
+afterward with no check on remaining space.
+
+When the EA value exactly fills the remaining buffer (buf_free_len == 0
+after value subtraction), the alignment memset writes 1-3 NUL bytes
+past the buf_free_len boundary. In compound requests where the response
+buffer is shared across commands, the first command (e.g., READ) can
+consume most of the buffer, leaving a tight remainder for the QUERY_INFO
+EA response. The alignment memset then overwrites past the physical
+kvmalloc allocation into adjacent kernel heap memory.
+
+Add a bounds check before the alignment memset to ensure buf_free_len
+can accommodate the padding bytes.
+
+This is the same bug pattern fixed by commit beef2634f81f ("ksmbd: fix
+potencial OOB in get_file_all_info() for compound requests") and
+commit fda9522ed6af ("ksmbd: fix OOB write in QUERY_INFO for compound
+requests"), both of which added bounds checks before unconditional
+writes in QUERY_INFO response handlers.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: e2b76ab8b5c9 ("ksmbd: add support for read compound")
+Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
+Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+@@ -4495,6 +4495,8 @@ static int smb2_get_ea(struct ksmbd_work
+ /* align next xattr entry at 4 byte bundary */
+ alignment_bytes = ((next_offset + 3) & ~3) - next_offset;
+ if (alignment_bytes) {
++ if (buf_free_len < alignment_bytes)
++ break;
+ memset(ptr, '\0', alignment_bytes);
+ ptr += alignment_bytes;
+ next_offset += alignment_bytes;
--- /dev/null
+From 299f962c0b02d048fb45d248b4da493d03f3175d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2026 19:54:57 +0000
+Subject: ksmbd: use check_add_overflow() to prevent u16 DACL size overflow
+
+From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
+
+commit 299f962c0b02d048fb45d248b4da493d03f3175d upstream.
+
+set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() and set_ntacl_dacl() accumulate ACE sizes
+in u16 variables. When a file has many POSIX ACL entries, the
+accumulated size can wrap past 65535, causing the pointer arithmetic
+(char *)pndace + *size to land within already-written ACEs. Subsequent
+writes then overwrite earlier entries, and pndacl->size gets a
+truncated value.
+
+Use check_add_overflow() at each accumulation point to detect the
+wrap before it corrupts the buffer, consistent with existing
+check_mul_overflow() usage elsewhere in smbacl.c.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
+Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
+Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
+@@ -596,6 +596,7 @@ static void set_posix_acl_entries_dacl(s
+ struct smb_sid *sid;
+ struct smb_ace *ntace;
+ int i, j;
++ u16 ace_sz;
+
+ if (!fattr->cf_acls)
+ goto posix_default_acl;
+@@ -640,8 +641,10 @@ static void set_posix_acl_entries_dacl(s
+ flags = 0x03;
+
+ ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pndace + *size);
+- *size += fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED, flags,
++ ace_sz = fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED, flags,
+ pace->e_perm, 0777);
++ if (check_add_overflow(*size, ace_sz, size))
++ break;
+ (*num_aces)++;
+ if (pace->e_tag == ACL_USER)
+ ntace->access_req |=
+@@ -650,8 +653,10 @@ static void set_posix_acl_entries_dacl(s
+ if (S_ISDIR(fattr->cf_mode) &&
+ (pace->e_tag == ACL_USER || pace->e_tag == ACL_GROUP)) {
+ ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pndace + *size);
+- *size += fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED,
++ ace_sz = fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ 0x03, pace->e_perm, 0777);
++ if (check_add_overflow(*size, ace_sz, size))
++ break;
+ (*num_aces)++;
+ if (pace->e_tag == ACL_USER)
+ ntace->access_req |=
+@@ -691,8 +696,10 @@ posix_default_acl:
+ }
+
+ ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pndace + *size);
+- *size += fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED, 0x0b,
++ ace_sz = fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED, 0x0b,
+ pace->e_perm, 0777);
++ if (check_add_overflow(*size, ace_sz, size))
++ break;
+ (*num_aces)++;
+ if (pace->e_tag == ACL_USER)
+ ntace->access_req |=
+@@ -728,7 +735,8 @@ static void set_ntacl_dacl(struct user_n
+ break;
+
+ memcpy((char *)pndace + size, ntace, nt_ace_size);
+- size += nt_ace_size;
++ if (check_add_overflow(size, nt_ace_size, &size))
++ break;
+ aces_size -= nt_ace_size;
+ ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ntace + nt_ace_size);
+ num_aces++;
--- /dev/null
+From ac33733b10b484d666f97688561670afd5861383 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2026 17:14:35 +0100
+Subject: rxrpc: Fix missing validation of ticket length in non-XDR key preparsing
+
+From: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
+
+commit ac33733b10b484d666f97688561670afd5861383 upstream.
+
+In rxrpc_preparse(), there are two paths for parsing key payloads: the
+XDR path (for large payloads) and the non-XDR path (for payloads <= 28
+bytes). While the XDR path (rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad()) correctly
+validates the ticket length against AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX, the non-XDR
+path fails to do so.
+
+This allows an unprivileged user to provide a very large ticket length.
+When this key is later read via rxrpc_read(), the total
+token size (toksize) calculation results in a value that exceeds
+AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON().
+
+[ 2001.302904] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2108 at net/rxrpc/key.c:778 rxrpc_read+0x109/0x5c0 [rxrpc]
+
+Fix this by adding a check in the non-XDR parsing path of rxrpc_preparse()
+to ensure the ticket length does not exceed AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX,
+bringing it into parity with the XDR parsing logic.
+
+Fixes: 8a7a3eb4ddbe ("KEYS: RxRPC: Use key preparsing")
+Fixes: 84924aac08a4 ("rxrpc: Fix checker warning")
+Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
+Signed-off-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
+cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
+cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
+cc: stable@kernel.org
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-7-dhowells@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/rxrpc/key.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/rxrpc/key.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/key.c
+@@ -340,6 +340,10 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_pre
+ if (v1->security_index != RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD)
+ goto error;
+
++ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
++ if (v1->ticket_length > AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX)
++ goto error;
++
+ plen = sizeof(*token->kad) + v1->ticket_length;
+ prep->quotalen += plen + sizeof(*token);
+
arm64-mm-fix-va-range-sanity-check.patch
rxrpc-fix-anonymous-key-handling.patch
rxrpc-only-handle-response-during-service-challenge.patch
+fs-ntfs3-validate-rec-used-in-journal-replay-file-record-check.patch
+fuse-reject-oversized-dirents-in-page-cache.patch
+fuse-quiet-down-complaints-in-fuse_conn_limit_write.patch
+smb-server-fix-active_num_conn-leak-on-transport-allocation-failure.patch
+smb-server-fix-max_connections-off-by-one-in-tcp-accept-path.patch
+smb-client-require-a-full-nfs-mode-sid-before-reading-mode-bits.patch
+smb-client-fix-oob-read-in-smb2_ioctl_query_info-query_info-path.patch
+ksmbd-fix-out-of-bounds-write-in-smb2_get_ea-ea-alignment.patch
+ksmbd-use-check_add_overflow-to-prevent-u16-dacl-size-overflow.patch
+f2fs-fix-use-after-free-of-sbi-in-f2fs_compress_write_end_io.patch
+alsa-usb-audio-apply-quirk-for-moondrop-ju-jiu.patch
+alsa-caiaq-take-a-reference-on-the-usb-device-in-create_card.patch
+crypto-ccp-don-t-attempt-to-copy-csr-to-userspace-if-psp-command-failed.patch
+crypto-ccp-don-t-attempt-to-copy-pdh-cert-to-userspace-if-psp-command-failed.patch
+crypto-ccp-don-t-attempt-to-copy-id-to-userspace-if-psp-command-failed.patch
+rxrpc-fix-missing-validation-of-ticket-length-in-non-xdr-key-preparsing.patch
--- /dev/null
+From a58c5af19ff0d6f44f6e9fe31e33a2c92223f77e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2026 19:35:19 -0400
+Subject: smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path
+
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+
+commit a58c5af19ff0d6f44f6e9fe31e33a2c92223f77e upstream.
+
+smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL
+and the default QUERY_INFO path. The QUERY_INFO branch clamps
+qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then
+copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp->Buffer to userspace, but
+it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within
+rsp_iov[1].iov_len.
+
+A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual
+QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response
+buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.
+
+Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer
+payload. Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length)
+rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on
+32-bit builds.
+
+Fixes: f5778c398713 ("SMB3: Allow SMB3 FSCTL queries to be sent to server from tools")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
+Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
++++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
+@@ -1701,6 +1701,12 @@ smb2_ioctl_query_info(const unsigned int
+ qi_rsp = (struct smb2_query_info_rsp *)rsp_iov[1].iov_base;
+ if (le32_to_cpu(qi_rsp->OutputBufferLength) < qi.input_buffer_length)
+ qi.input_buffer_length = le32_to_cpu(qi_rsp->OutputBufferLength);
++ if (qi.input_buffer_length > 0 &&
++ struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length) >
++ rsp_iov[1].iov_len) {
++ rc = -EFAULT;
++ goto out;
++ }
+ if (copy_to_user(&pqi->input_buffer_length,
+ &qi.input_buffer_length,
+ sizeof(qi.input_buffer_length))) {
--- /dev/null
+From 2757ad3e4b6f9e0fed4c7739594e702abc5cab21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 09:50:58 -0400
+Subject: smb: client: require a full NFS mode SID before reading mode bits
+
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+
+commit 2757ad3e4b6f9e0fed4c7739594e702abc5cab21 upstream.
+
+parse_dacl() treats an ACE SID matching sid_unix_NFS_mode as an NFS
+mode SID and reads sid.sub_auth[2] to recover the mode bits.
+
+That assumes the ACE carries three subauthorities, but compare_sids()
+only compares min(a, b) subauthorities. A malicious server can return
+an ACE with num_subauth = 2 and sub_auth[] = {88, 3}, which still
+matches sid_unix_NFS_mode and then drives the sub_auth[2] read four
+bytes past the end of the ACE.
+
+Require num_subauth >= 3 before treating the ACE as an NFS mode SID.
+This keeps the fix local to the special-SID mode path without changing
+compare_sids() semantics for the rest of cifsacl.
+
+Fixes: e2f8fbfb8d09 ("cifs: get mode bits from special sid on stat")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
+Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c
++++ b/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c
+@@ -807,6 +807,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct cifs_acl *
+ dump_ace(ppace[i], end_of_acl);
+ #endif
+ if (mode_from_special_sid &&
++ ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth >= 3 &&
+ (compare_sids(&(ppace[i]->sid),
+ &sid_unix_NFS_mode) == 0)) {
+ /*
--- /dev/null
+From 6551300dc452ac16a855a83dbd1e74899542d3b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2026 18:54:38 -0400
+Subject: smb: server: fix active_num_conn leak on transport allocation failure
+
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+
+commit 6551300dc452ac16a855a83dbd1e74899542d3b3 upstream.
+
+Commit 77ffbcac4e56 ("smb: server: fix leak of active_num_conn in
+ksmbd_tcp_new_connection()") addressed the kthread_run() failure
+path. The earlier alloc_transport() == NULL path in the same
+function has the same leak, is reachable pre-authentication via any
+TCP connect to port 445, and was empirically reproduced on UML
+(ARCH=um, v7.0-rc7): a small number of forced allocation failures
+were sufficient to put ksmbd into a state where every subsequent
+connection attempt was rejected for the remainder of the boot.
+
+ksmbd_kthread_fn() increments active_num_conn before calling
+ksmbd_tcp_new_connection() and discards the return value, so when
+alloc_transport() returns NULL the socket is released and -ENOMEM
+returned without decrementing the counter. Each such failure
+permanently consumes one slot from the max_connections pool; once
+cumulative failures reach the cap, atomic_inc_return() hits the
+threshold on every subsequent accept and every new connection is
+rejected. The counter is only reset by module reload.
+
+An unauthenticated remote attacker can drive the server toward the
+memory pressure that makes alloc_transport() fail by holding open
+connections with large RFC1002 lengths up to MAX_STREAM_PROT_LEN
+(0x00FFFFFF); natural transient allocation failures on a loaded
+host produce the same drift more slowly.
+
+Mirror the existing rollback pattern in ksmbd_kthread_fn(): on the
+alloc_transport() failure path, decrement active_num_conn gated on
+server_conf.max_connections.
+
+Repro details: with the patch reverted, forced alloc_transport()
+NULL returns leaked counter slots and subsequent connection
+attempts -- including legitimate connects issued after the
+forced-fail window had closed -- were all rejected with "Limit the
+maximum number of connections". With this patch applied, the same
+connect sequence produces no rejections and the counter cycles
+cleanly between zero and one on every accept.
+
+Fixes: 0d0d4680db22 ("ksmbd: add max connections parameter")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
+Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4
+Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c
+@@ -199,6 +199,8 @@ static int ksmbd_tcp_new_connection(stru
+ t = alloc_transport(client_sk);
+ if (!t) {
+ sock_release(client_sk);
++ if (server_conf.max_connections)
++ atomic_dec(&active_num_conn);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From ce23158bfe584bd90d1918f279fdf9de57802012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: DaeMyung Kang <charsyam@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2026 06:17:35 +0900
+Subject: smb: server: fix max_connections off-by-one in tcp accept path
+
+From: DaeMyung Kang <charsyam@gmail.com>
+
+commit ce23158bfe584bd90d1918f279fdf9de57802012 upstream.
+
+The global max_connections check in ksmbd's TCP accept path counts
+the newly accepted connection with atomic_inc_return(), but then
+rejects the connection when the result is greater than or equal to
+server_conf.max_connections.
+
+That makes the effective limit one smaller than configured. For
+example:
+
+- max_connections=1 rejects the first connection
+- max_connections=2 allows only one connection
+
+The per-IP limit in the same function uses <= correctly because it
+counts only pre-existing connections. The global limit instead checks
+the post-increment total, so it should reject only when that total
+exceeds the configured maximum.
+
+Fix this by changing the comparison from >= to >, so exactly
+max_connections simultaneous connections are allowed and the next one
+is rejected. This matches the documented meaning of max_connections
+in fs/smb/server/ksmbd_netlink.h as the "Number of maximum simultaneous
+connections".
+
+Fixes: 0d0d4680db22 ("ksmbd: add max connections parameter")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: DaeMyung Kang <charsyam@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c
++++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c
+@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int ksmbd_kthread_fn(void *p)
+
+ skip_max_ip_conns_limit:
+ if (server_conf.max_connections &&
+- atomic_inc_return(&active_num_conn) >= server_conf.max_connections) {
++ atomic_inc_return(&active_num_conn) > server_conf.max_connections) {
+ pr_info_ratelimited("Limit the maximum number of connections(%u)\n",
+ atomic_read(&active_num_conn));
+ atomic_dec(&active_num_conn);
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
