Document SIG(0) verification removal

diff --git a/doc/arm/general.rst b/doc/arm/general.rst
index 09bcaa9725e9aeaf32872f6008fc37e8c0e641d9..cabf5c859159961fb13f0a94eb75ebaaf6868382 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/arm/general.rst
+++ b/doc/arm/general.rst
@@ -391,10 +391,8 @@ Notes
 .. [#rfc1035_2] CLASS ANY queries are not supported. This is considered a
    feature.
 
-.. [#rfc2931] When receiving a query signed with a SIG(0), the server is
-   only able to verify the signature if it has the key in its local
-   authoritative data; it cannot do recursion or validation to
-   retrieve unknown keys.
+.. [#rfc2931] Support for SIG(0) message verification was removed
+   as part of the mitigation of CVE-2024-1975.
 
 .. [#rfc2874] Compliance is with loading and serving of A6 records only.
    A6 records were moved to the experimental category by :rfc:`3363`.

diff --git a/doc/arm/intro-security.inc.rst b/doc/arm/intro-security.inc.rst
index 87db9701da0b6c858c2f2ed2f9cdf663df31dd32..996e910a6d2d1719cb322257f427f8b30f0c7749 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/arm/intro-security.inc.rst
+++ b/doc/arm/intro-security.inc.rst
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ or ports come preconfigured with local (loopback address) security preconfigured
 If ``rndc`` is being invoked from a remote host, further configuration is required.
 The ``nsupdate`` tool uses **Dynamic DNS (DDNS)** features and allows users to dynamically
 change the contents of the zone file(s). ``nsupdate`` access and security may be controlled
-using ``named.conf`` :ref:`statements or using TSIG or SIG(0) cryptographic methods <dynamic_update_security>`.
+using ``named.conf`` :ref:`statements or via the TSIG cryptographic method <dynamic_update_security>`.
 Clearly, if the remote hosts used for either ``rndc`` or DDNS lie within a network entirely
 under the user's control, the security threat may be regarded as non-existent. Any implementation requirements,
 therefore, depend on the site's security policy.

diff --git a/doc/arm/reference.rst b/doc/arm/reference.rst
index 2ddc368514fffeed4abb91e03e555dc4218f24a9..d6dd932948d5ee0548ecad14a8ed4be1bb0c88e3 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/arm/reference.rst
+++ b/doc/arm/reference.rst
@@ -7450,7 +7450,7 @@ the zone's filename, unless :any:`inline-signing` is enabled.
    updates are allowed. It specifies a set of rules, in which each rule
    either grants or denies permission for one or more names in the zone to
    be updated by one or more identities. Identity is determined by the key
-   that signed the update request, using either TSIG or SIG(0). In most
+   that signed the update request, using TSIG. In most
    cases, :any:`update-policy` rules only apply to key-based identities. There
    is no way to specify update permissions based on the client source address.
 
@@ -7507,7 +7507,7 @@ the zone's filename, unless :any:`inline-signing` is enabled.
    field. Details for each rule type are described below.
 
    The ``identity`` field must be set to a fully qualified domain name. In
-   most cases, this represents the name of the TSIG or SIG(0) key that
+   most cases, this represents the name of the TSIG key that
    must be used to sign the update request. If the specified name is a
    wildcard, it is subject to DNS wildcard expansion, and the rule may
    apply to multiple identities. When a TKEY exchange has been used to

diff --git a/doc/arm/security.inc.rst b/doc/arm/security.inc.rst
index 878fa379fe984f582ff21cc7e48b710e6f37ec61..8fc65d3820a90acd61a84a364c3defd455132448 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/arm/security.inc.rst
+++ b/doc/arm/security.inc.rst
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Limiting access to the server by outside parties can help prevent
 spoofing and denial of service (DoS) attacks against the server.
 
 ACLs match clients on the basis of up to three characteristics: 1) The
-client's IP address; 2) the TSIG or SIG(0) key that was used to sign the
+client's IP address; 2) the TSIG key that was used to sign the
 request, if any; and 3) an address prefix encoded in an EDNS
 Client-Subnet option, if any.
 
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ and no queries at all from the networks specified in ``bogusnets``.
 
 In addition to network addresses and prefixes, which are matched against
 the source address of the DNS request, ACLs may include ``key``
-elements, which specify the name of a TSIG or SIG(0) key.
+elements, which specify the name of a TSIG key.
 
 When BIND 9 is built with GeoIP support, ACLs can also be used for
 geographic access restrictions. This is done by specifying an ACL

diff --git a/doc/arm/sig0.inc.rst b/doc/arm/sig0.inc.rst
index 048dbeae7cba3156a338f41da1894a2aaebe949d..6e6fc3219e0d98e1d57de13f2ac28bb4b7b1c9bf 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/arm/sig0.inc.rst
+++ b/doc/arm/sig0.inc.rst
@@ -12,17 +12,5 @@
 SIG(0)
 ------
 
-BIND partially supports DNSSEC SIG(0) transaction signatures as
-specified in :rfc:`2535` and :rfc:`2931`. SIG(0) uses public/private keys to
-authenticate messages. Access control is performed in the same manner as with
-TSIG keys; privileges can be granted or denied in ACL directives based
-on the key name.
-
-When a SIG(0) signed message is received, it is only verified if
-the key is known and trusted by the server. The server does not attempt
-to recursively fetch or validate the key.
-
-SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams is not supported.
-
-The only tool shipped with BIND 9 that generates SIG(0) signed messages
-is :iscman:`nsupdate`.
+Support for DNSSEC SIG(0) transaction signatures has been removed.
+This is a countermeasure for CVE-2024-1975.