Two concurrent SMB2 durable reconnects (DH2C/DHnC) on the same
persistent_id race the fp->owner.name compare-read in
ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner() against the kfree() in
ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd()'s reopen-success path. fp->owner.name is a
standalone kstrdup() buffer whose lifetime is independent of the fp
refcount, and the two sites share no lock: the compare reads the buffer
while the reopen frees it, so the strcmp() can dereference freed memory.
Commit
7ce4fc40018d ("ksmbd: fix durable reconnect double-bind race in
ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd") made the fp->conn claim atomic under
global_ft.lock (closing the owner.name double-free and the ksmbd_file
write-UAF), but the compare-read versus reopen-free pair was left
unserialized.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in strcmp+0x2c/0x80
Read of size 1 by task kworker
strcmp
ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner
smb2_check_durable_oplock
smb2_open
Freed by task kworker:
kfree
ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd
smb2_open
Allocated by task kworker:
kstrdup
session_fd_check
smb2_session_logoff
The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-8
Serialize both sides of the race with fp->f_lock. The global durable
file-table lock still protects the durable reconnect claim, but
fp->owner.name is per-open state and does not need to block unrelated
durable table lookups or reconnects. The teardown is left at its
existing location after the reopen-success point so that an __open_id()
rollback still retains owner.name for a later legitimate reconnect to
verify.
Fixes: 49110a8ce654 ("ksmbd: validate owner of durable handle on reconnect")
Assisted-by: Henry (Claude):claude-opus-4
Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy <dddhkts1@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
static int ksmbd_vfs_copy_durable_owner(struct ksmbd_file *fp,
struct ksmbd_user *user)
{
+ char *name;
+
if (!user)
return -EINVAL;
/* Duplicate the user name to ensure identity persistence */
- fp->owner.name = kstrdup(user->name, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!fp->owner.name)
+ name = kstrdup(user->name, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!name)
return -ENOMEM;
+ spin_lock(&fp->f_lock);
fp->owner.uid = user->uid;
fp->owner.gid = user->gid;
+ fp->owner.name = name;
+ spin_unlock(&fp->f_lock);
return 0;
}
bool ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner(struct ksmbd_file *fp,
struct ksmbd_user *user)
{
- if (!user || !fp->owner.name)
+ bool ret = false;
+
+ if (!user)
return false;
+ spin_lock(&fp->f_lock);
+ if (!fp->owner.name)
+ goto out;
+
/* Check if the UID and GID match first (fast path) */
if (fp->owner.uid != user->uid || fp->owner.gid != user->gid)
- return false;
+ goto out;
/* Validate the account name to ensure the same SecurityContext */
- if (strcmp(fp->owner.name, user->name))
- return false;
-
- return true;
+ ret = (strcmp(fp->owner.name, user->name) == 0);
+out:
+ spin_unlock(&fp->f_lock);
+ return ret;
}
static bool session_fd_check(struct ksmbd_tree_connect *tcon,
}
up_write(&ci->m_lock);
+ spin_lock(&fp->f_lock);
fp->owner.uid = fp->owner.gid = 0;
kfree(fp->owner.name);
fp->owner.name = NULL;
+ spin_unlock(&fp->f_lock);
return 0;
}