Avoid using a pronoun where it makes comments unclear.
Avoid using gender for things that don't have it.
Avoid assigning gender to people unnecessarily.
}
/** Implementation of strtok_r for platforms whose coders haven't figured out
- * how to write one. Hey guys! You can use this code here for free! */
+ * how to write one. Hey, retrograde libc developers! You can use this code
+ * here for free! */
char *
tor_strtok_r_impl(char *str, const char *sep, char **lasts)
{
}
/* Call even if result is 0, since the global read bucket may
- * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this guy needs to
+ * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this connection needs to
* know to stop reading. */
connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(conn);
if (n_written > 0 && connection_is_writing(conn))
}
/* Call even if result is 0, since the global write bucket may
- * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this guy needs to
+ * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this connection needs to
* know to stop writing. */
connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(conn);
if (n_read > 0 && connection_is_reading(conn))
return 0;
}
/* Make sure to get the 'real' address of the previous hop: the
- * caller might want to know whether his IP address has changed, and
- * we might already have corrected base_.addr[ess] for the relay's
+ * caller might want to know whether the remote IP address has changed,
+ * and we might already have corrected base_.addr[ess] for the relay's
* canonical IP address. */
if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan)
address = tor_strdup(channel_get_actual_remote_address(or_circ->p_chan));
*
* If we initiated this connection (<b>started_here</b> is true), make sure
* the other side sent a correctly formed certificate. If I initiated the
- * connection, make sure it's the right guy.
+ * connection, make sure it's the right relay by checking the certificate.
*
* Otherwise (if we _didn't_ initiate this connection), it's okay for
* the certificate to be weird or absent.
* 1) Set conn->circ_id_type according to tor-spec.txt.
* 2) If we're an authdirserver and we initiated the connection: drop all
* descriptors that claim to be on that IP/port but that aren't
- * this guy; and note that this guy is reachable.
+ * this relay; and note that this relay is reachable.
* 3) If this is a bridge and we didn't configure its identity
* fingerprint, remember the keyid we just learned.
*/
* router listening at <b>address</b>:<b>or_port</b>, and has yielded
* a certificate with digest <b>digest_rcvd</b>.
*
- * Inform the reachability checker that we could get to this guy.
+ * Inform the reachability checker that we could get to this relay.
*/
void
dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr,
* marked.) */
const char *marked_for_close_file; /**< For debugging: in which file were
* we marked for close? */
- char *address; /**< FQDN (or IP) of the guy on the other end.
+ char *address; /**< FQDN (or IP) of the other end.
* strdup into this, because free_connection() frees it. */
/** Another connection that's connected to this one in lieu of a socket. */
struct connection_t *linked_conn;
* allows exit enclaving. Trying it anyway would open up a cool attack
* where the node refuses due to exitpolicy, the client reacts in
* surprise by rewriting the node's exitpolicy to reject *:*, and then
- * a bad guy targets users by causing them to attempt such connections
+ * an adversary targets users by causing them to attempt such connections
* to 98% of the exits.
*
* Once microdescriptors can handle addresses in special cases (e.g. if
ADD(4, "clownshoes 22alpha4 http://quumble.example.cam/ blake2=fooa");
ADD(5, "clownshoes 22alpha4 http://quumble.example.cam/ blake2=fooa");
- /* Five votes for A ... all from the same guy. Three for B. */
+ /* Five votes for A ... all from the same authority. Three for B. */
ADD(0, "cbc 99.1.11.1.1 http://example.com/cbc/ cubehash=ahooy sha512=m");
ADD(1, "cbc 99.1.11.1.1 http://example.com/cbc/ cubehash=ahooy sha512=m");
ADD(3, "cbc 99.1.11.1.1 http://example.com/cbc/ cubehash=ahooy sha512=m");