Protect against small overread in SASLprep validation

(This is a cherry-pick of 390b3cbbb, which I hadn't realized wasn't
backpatched. It was originally reported to security@ and determined not
to be a vulnerability; thanks to Stanislav Osipov for noticing the
omission in the back branches.)

In case of torn UTF8 in the input data we might end up going
past the end of the string since we don't account for length.
While validation won't be performed on a sequence with a NULL
byte it's better to avoid going past the end to beging with.
Fix by taking the length into consideration.

Reported-by: Stanislav Osipov <stasos24@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAOYmi+mTnmM172g=_+Yvc47hzzeAsYPy2C4UBY3HK9p-AXNV0g@mail.gmail.com
Backpatch-through: 14

diff --git a/src/common/saslprep.c b/src/common/saslprep.c
index e7e909a0c871982d4f75bef75249721ac315ff0b..80b9edb3968f870c40a397bd5df6e60cceea733d 100644 (file)
--- a/src/common/saslprep.c
+++ b/src/common/saslprep.c
@@ -1009,15 +1009,17 @@ pg_utf8_string_len(const char *source)
        const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) source;
        int                     l;
        int                     num_chars = 0;
+       size_t          len = strlen(source);
 
-       while (*p)
+       while (len)
        {
                l = pg_utf_mblen(p);
 
-               if (!pg_utf8_islegal(p, l))
+               if (len < l || !pg_utf8_islegal(p, l))
                        return -1;
 
                p += l;
+               len -= l;
                num_chars++;
        }