--- /dev/null
+From 2915681b89f817677ab9f1166d95b595bc144f5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sergey Temerkhanov <sergey.temerkhanov@intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2026 11:53:30 -0700
+Subject: ice: use READ_ONCE() to access cached PHC time
+
+From: Sergey Temerkhanov <sergey.temerkhanov@intel.com>
+
+commit 2915681b89f817677ab9f1166d95b595bc144f5f upstream.
+
+ptp.cached_phc_time is a 64-bit value updated by a periodic work item
+on one CPU and read locklessly on another. On 32-bit or non-atomic
+architectures this can result in a torn read. Use READ_ONCE() to
+enforce a single atomic load.
+
+Fixes: 77a781155a65 ("ice: enable receive hardware timestamping")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Sergey Temerkhanov <sergey.temerkhanov@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Tested-by: Rinitha S <sx.rinitha@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
+Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260717185340.3595286-9-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ptp.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ptp.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ptp.c
+@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ static u64 ice_ptp_extend_40b_ts(struct
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+- return ice_ptp_extend_32b_ts(pf->ptp.cached_phc_time,
++ return ice_ptp_extend_32b_ts(READ_ONCE(pf->ptp.cached_phc_time),
+ (in_tstamp >> 8) & mask);
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 92d3817649df2b0b6a008a686c8275c88d7ef594 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 07:49:03 -0400
+Subject: ila: reload IPv6 header after pskb_may_pull in checksum adjust
+
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+
+commit 92d3817649df2b0b6a008a686c8275c88d7ef594 upstream.
+
+ila_csum_adjust_transport() caches ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb) before calling
+pskb_may_pull(). On a non-linear skb whose transport header sits in a page
+fragment, pskb_may_pull() can call __pskb_pull_tail() / pskb_expand_head()
+and free the old skb head, leaving ip6h dangling; the following
+get_csum_diff(ip6h, p) then reads freed memory. ila_update_ipv6_locator()
+uses ip6h (and the iaddr derived from it) again after the csum-adjust
+call and additionally writes the new locator through that pointer.
+
+Impact: a remote IPv6 packet routed through a configured ILA
+csum-adjust-transport route or receive-side mapping triggers a
+slab-use-after-free in ila_update_ipv6_locator() (KASAN). The route or
+mapping requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to configure, but trigger packets are
+unauthenticated once it exists.
+
+Reload ip6h after each pskb_may_pull() in ila_csum_adjust_transport()
+before the csum-diff read. In ila_update_ipv6_locator() only the
+ILA_CSUM_ADJUST_TRANSPORT case pulls the skb, so reload ip6h and iaddr in
+that case alone before the destination-address write; the neutral-map
+modes never pull and keep their cached pointers.
+
+Fixes: 33f11d16142b ("ila: Create net/ipv6/ila directory")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714114903.3763420-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/ila/ila_common.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/ila/ila_common.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ila/ila_common.c
+@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static void ila_csum_adjust_transport(st
+ struct tcphdr *th = (struct tcphdr *)
+ (skb_network_header(skb) + nhoff);
+
++ ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+ diff = get_csum_diff(ip6h, p);
+ inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff(&th->check, skb,
+ diff, true, true);
+@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ static void ila_csum_adjust_transport(st
+ (skb_network_header(skb) + nhoff);
+
+ if (uh->check || skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
++ ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+ diff = get_csum_diff(ip6h, p);
+ inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff(&uh->check, skb,
+ diff, true, true);
+@@ -109,6 +111,7 @@ static void ila_csum_adjust_transport(st
+ struct icmp6hdr *ih = (struct icmp6hdr *)
+ (skb_network_header(skb) + nhoff);
+
++ ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+ diff = get_csum_diff(ip6h, p);
+ inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff(&ih->icmp6_cksum, skb,
+ diff, true, true);
+@@ -126,6 +129,15 @@ void ila_update_ipv6_locator(struct sk_b
+ switch (p->csum_mode) {
+ case ILA_CSUM_ADJUST_TRANSPORT:
+ ila_csum_adjust_transport(skb, p);
++ /*
++ * ila_csum_adjust_transport() calls pskb_may_pull(), which can
++ * reallocate the skb head and leave ip6h (and the iaddr derived
++ * from it) dangling; reload both before the write below. The
++ * other csum modes do not pull, so their cached pointers stay
++ * valid.
++ */
++ ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
++ iaddr = ila_a2i(&ip6h->daddr);
+ break;
+ case ILA_CSUM_NEUTRAL_MAP:
+ if (sir2ila) {
--- /dev/null
+From 234e5e898b713bc0b3a631b6f002897f43d046c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
+Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 23:12:28 +0200
+Subject: mac802154: hold an interface reference across the scan worker
+
+From: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
+
+commit 234e5e898b713bc0b3a631b6f002897f43d046c8 upstream.
+
+mac802154_scan_worker() captures the scanning sub-interface under RCU
+and then keeps dereferencing sdata->dev after rcu_read_unlock() and
+outside the rtnl -- in the failure traces, in
+mac802154_transmit_beacon_req() (skb->dev = sdata->dev), and in the
+end_scan cleanup. Nothing keeps that netdev alive across the worker
+iteration.
+
+A concurrent DEL_INTERFACE or PHY removal can unregister the interface
+once the worker drops the rtnl between its two drv_set_channel()
+sections. unregister_netdevice() frees the netdev asynchronously from
+netdev_run_todo() with the rtnl already dropped, so neither holding the
+rtnl nor the per-PHY IEEE802154_IS_SCANNING flag prevents a stale worker
+iteration from dereferencing the freed netdev -- a KASAN
+slab-use-after-free, reachable by racing TRIGGER_SCAN against
+DEL_INTERFACE (both CAP_NET_ADMIN).
+
+Pin the netdev with netdev_hold() while the RCU read lock is still held,
+and release it at every worker exit.
+
+Fixes: 57588c71177f ("mac802154: Handle passive scanning")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260721211228.34578-1-security@auditcode.ai
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/mac802154/scan.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/mac802154/scan.c
++++ b/net/mac802154/scan.c
+@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ void mac802154_scan_worker(struct work_s
+ enum nl802154_scan_types scan_req_type;
+ struct ieee802154_sub_if_data *sdata;
+ unsigned int scan_duration = 0;
++ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker;
+ struct wpan_phy *wpan_phy;
+ u8 scan_req_duration;
+ u8 page, channel;
+@@ -209,6 +210,14 @@ void mac802154_scan_worker(struct work_s
+ return;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * sdata->dev is dereferenced below after rcu_read_unlock() and outside
++ * the rtnl, and a concurrent DEL_INTERFACE / PHY teardown can free it
++ * asynchronously from netdev_run_todo(). Pin it with a reference taken
++ * while the RCU read lock is still held, and drop it at every exit.
++ */
++ netdev_hold(sdata->dev, &dev_tracker, GFP_ATOMIC);
++
+ wpan_phy = scan_req->wpan_phy;
+ scan_req_type = scan_req->type;
+ scan_req_duration = scan_req->duration;
+@@ -262,12 +271,14 @@ void mac802154_scan_worker(struct work_s
+ "Scan page %u channel %u for %ums\n",
+ page, channel, jiffies_to_msecs(scan_duration));
+ queue_delayed_work(local->mac_wq, &local->scan_work, scan_duration);
++ netdev_put(sdata->dev, &dev_tracker);
+ return;
+
+ end_scan:
+ rtnl_lock();
+ mac802154_scan_cleanup_locked(local, sdata, false);
+ rtnl_unlock();
++ netdev_put(sdata->dev, &dev_tracker);
+ }
+
+ int mac802154_trigger_scan_locked(struct ieee802154_sub_if_data *sdata,
--- /dev/null
+From fd3a3f28ed60c6af4b2a39933b151d6b27842c3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
+Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 21:34:23 +0200
+Subject: mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag
+
+From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
+
+commit fd3a3f28ed60c6af4b2a39933b151d6b27842c3b upstream.
+
+llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the
+AEAD request as
+
+ assoclen += datalen - authlen;
+
+where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen
+(4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies
+that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A
+secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes
+datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to
+aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so
+crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that
+only spans the real frame.
+
+The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any
+IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is
+shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.
+
+Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault
+in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.
+
+Fixes: 4c14a2fb5d14 ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260716193423.32498-1-doruk@0sec.ai
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/mac802154/llsec.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c
++++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
+@@ -891,6 +891,11 @@ llsec_do_decrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *sk
+ data = skb_mac_header(skb) + skb->mac_len;
+ datalen = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - data;
+
++ if (datalen < authlen) {
++ kfree_sensitive(req);
++ return -EBADMSG;
++ }
++
+ sg_init_one(&sg, skb_mac_header(skb), assoclen + datalen);
+
+ if (!(hdr->sec.level & IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)) {
--- /dev/null
+From 793b9b729f1e8de57be8c8daf1a9838be96cabed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
+Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 10:20:21 +0200
+Subject: mctp: serial: handle zero-length frames to prevent rx buffer overflow
+
+From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
+
+commit 793b9b729f1e8de57be8c8daf1a9838be96cabed upstream.
+
+The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in
+mctp_serial_push_header() case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only:
+
+ if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) {
+ dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR;
+ } else {
+ dev->rxlen = c;
+ dev->rxpos = 0;
+ dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
+ ...
+ }
+
+A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state
+machine advances to STATE_DATA. In mctp_serial_push() STATE_DATA, the
+incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is
+tested:
+
+ dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c;
+ dev->rxpos++;
+ dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
+ if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) {
+ dev->rxpos = 0;
+ dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER;
+ }
+
+With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is
+already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past
+the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the
+netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled
+1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a
+frame (0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded.
+
+Reaching this requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach the N_MCTP line
+discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which
+the bytes arrive via the tty receive path.
+
+Route a zero-length frame straight to STATE_TRAILER instead of
+STATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame
+resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser
+never enters STATE_DATA with rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can
+no longer occur.
+
+KASAN, on a frame of 0x7e 0x01 0x00 followed by data bytes (before this
+change):
+
+ UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370
+ index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]'
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf
+ Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0
+ mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf
+ tty_ldisc_receive_buf
+ flush_to_ldisc
+ Allocated by task 152:
+ alloc_netdev_mqs
+ mctp_serial_open
+
+v2: route zero-length frames to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_ERR so
+ the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr).
+
+Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
+Fixes: a0c2ccd9b5ad ("mctp: Add MCTP-over-serial transport binding")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Suggested-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au>
+Assisted-by: 0sec:multi-model
+Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260715082021.46315-1-doruk@0sec.ai
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c
++++ b/drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c
+@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static void mctp_serial_push_header(stru
+ } else {
+ dev->rxlen = c;
+ dev->rxpos = 0;
+- dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
++ dev->rxstate = c > 0 ? STATE_DATA : STATE_TRAILER;
+ dev->rxfcs = crc_ccitt_byte(dev->rxfcs, c);
+ }
+ break;
--- /dev/null
+From e9c238f6fe42fb1b4dba3a578277de32cb487937 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>
+Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2026 09:38:43 +0000
+Subject: pppoe: reload header pointer after dev_hard_header()
+
+From: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>
+
+commit e9c238f6fe42fb1b4dba3a578277de32cb487937 upstream.
+
+pppoe_sendmsg() saves a pointer to the PPPoE header before calling
+dev_hard_header(). Device header callbacks are allowed to reallocate the
+skb head, invalidating pointers into it.
+
+This can happen when a send is blocked in copy_from_user() while the first
+non-Ethernet port is added to an empty team device. The team's delegated
+GRE header callback then expands the skb head. PPPoE subsequently writes
+six bytes through the stale pointer into the freed head.
+
+Reload the PPPoE header through the skb's network-header offset after
+device header creation. pskb_expand_head() updates that offset when it
+relocates the head.
+
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>
+Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>
+Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260722093814.3017176-1-manizada@pm.me
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
+@@ -900,6 +900,7 @@ static int pppoe_sendmsg(struct socket *
+ dev_hard_header(skb, dev, ETH_P_PPP_SES,
+ po->pppoe_pa.remote, NULL, total_len);
+
++ ph = pppoe_hdr(skb);
+ memcpy(ph, &hdr, sizeof(struct pppoe_hdr));
+
+ ph->length = htons(total_len);
selftests-ftrace-reset-triggers-at-top-level-before-instance-loop.patch
rbd-reset-positive-result-codes-to-zero-in-object-map-update-path.patch
ksmbd-defer-destroy_previous_session-until-after-ntlm-authentication.patch
+ice-use-read_once-to-access-cached-phc-time.patch
+ila-reload-ipv6-header-after-pskb_may_pull-in-checksum-adjust.patch
+mac802154-hold-an-interface-reference-across-the-scan-worker.patch
+mac802154-llsec-reject-frames-shorter-than-the-authentication-tag.patch
+mctp-serial-handle-zero-length-frames-to-prevent-rx-buffer-overflow.patch
+pppoe-reload-header-pointer-after-dev_hard_header.patch
+tipc-clear-sock-sk-on-the-failed-insert-path-in-tipc_sk_create.patch
+vxlan-mdb-fix-source-list-corruption-on-a-failed-replace.patch
--- /dev/null
+From ba0533fc163f905fe817cfabdf8ed4058da44800 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 22:19:39 +0900
+Subject: tipc: clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path in tipc_sk_create()
+
+From: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com>
+
+commit ba0533fc163f905fe817cfabdf8ed4058da44800 upstream.
+
+When tipc_sk_create() fails to insert the new socket (tipc_sk_insert()
+returns non-zero), its error path frees the sk with sk_free() but leaves
+sock->sk pointing at the freed object:
+
+ if (tipc_sk_insert(tsk)) {
+ sk_free(sk);
+ pr_warn("Socket create failed; port number exhausted\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+This is harmless for plain socket(): the syscall layer clears sock->ops
+before releasing, so tipc_release() is never called. It is not harmless
+on the accept() path. tipc_accept() creates the pre-allocated child
+socket with tipc_sk_create(net, new_sock, 0, kern); on failure it leaves
+new_sock->sk dangling and new_sock->ops non-NULL, and do_accept() then
+fput()s the new file, so __sock_release() -> tipc_release() runs
+lock_sock(new_sock->sk) on the freed sk -- a use-after-free write of the
+sk_lock spinlock.
+
+tipc_release() already guards this exact "failed accept() releases a
+pre-allocated child" case with "if (sk == NULL) return 0;", but the
+guard is bypassed because tipc_sk_create() left sock->sk non-NULL
+(dangling) rather than NULL.
+
+Clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path so the existing tipc_release()
+NULL check fires and the use-after-free is avoided.
+
+The tipc_sk_insert() failure is reached when the per-netns socket
+rhashtable hits its max_size (tsk_rht_params.max_size = 1048576, ~2M
+elements) -- i.e. once a netns holds ~2M TIPC sockets every insert
+returns -E2BIG.
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839)
+ Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880047cdc38 by task init/1
+ lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839)
+ tipc_release (net/tipc/socket.c:638)
+ __sock_release (net/socket.c:710)
+ sock_close (net/socket.c:1501)
+ __fput (fs/file_table.c:512)
+ Allocated by task 1:
+ sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2308)
+ tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:487)
+ tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744)
+ do_accept (net/socket.c:2034)
+ Freed by task 1:
+ __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2391)
+ tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:504)
+ tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744)
+ do_accept (net/socket.c:2034)
+
+Fixes: 00aff3590fc0 ("net: tipc: fix possible refcount leak in tipc_sk_create()")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
+Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
+Signed-off-by: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714131939.1255974-1-4ncienth@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/tipc/socket.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/net/tipc/socket.c
++++ b/net/tipc/socket.c
+@@ -504,6 +504,7 @@ static int tipc_sk_create(struct net *ne
+ tipc_set_sk_state(sk, TIPC_OPEN);
+ if (tipc_sk_insert(tsk)) {
+ sk_free(sk);
++ sock->sk = NULL;
+ pr_warn("Socket create failed; port number exhausted\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From dcd9b465965422b9654f6026e8a2fa8984f74c3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: James Raphael Tiovalen <jamestiotio@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:04:24 +0800
+Subject: vxlan: mdb: Fix source list corruption on a failed replace
+
+From: James Raphael Tiovalen <jamestiotio@gmail.com>
+
+commit dcd9b465965422b9654f6026e8a2fa8984f74c3c upstream.
+
+When replacing the source list of an MDB remote entry, all existing
+sources are first marked for deletion and vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add()
+is then called to add the new source list. Sources present in the new
+list have their deletion mark cleared, and any sources left marked
+afterwards are removed.
+
+If vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add() fails partway through, its error path
+deletes all entries on the remote's source list. That rollback is only
+correct for its other caller, vxlan_mdb_remote_add(), where the remote
+was just allocated and the list contains solely entries added during
+the call. On the replace path the list also holds pre-existing sources,
+so a failed replace tears them down together with their (S, G)
+forwarding entries instead of leaving the entry unchanged.
+
+This is reachable from an existing (*, G) remote. An EXCLUDE filter
+that loses sources starts forwarding traffic that should be blocked,
+while an INCLUDE filter that loses sources drops traffic that should be
+forwarded.
+
+Mark entries created during the current pass with a new
+VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW flag. On failure, delete only those entries and clear
+the deletion mark on the pre-existing ones, so a failed replace leaves
+the source list untouched. Retain the flag until the whole operation
+succeeds and then clear it. Also stop vxlan_mdb_remote_src_add() from
+deleting a pre-existing entry it only looked up when adding that
+entry's forwarding entry fails.
+
+Fixes: a3a48de5eade ("vxlan: mdb: Add MDB control path support")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: James Raphael Tiovalen <jamestiotio@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
+Reviewed-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260720160428.249356-1-jamestiotio@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_mdb.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_mdb.c
++++ b/drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_mdb.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct vxlan_mdb_remote {
+ };
+
+ #define VXLAN_SGRP_F_DELETE BIT(0)
++#define VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW BIT(1)
+
+ struct vxlan_mdb_src_entry {
+ struct hlist_node node;
+@@ -838,6 +839,7 @@ vxlan_mdb_remote_src_add(const struct vx
+ ent = vxlan_mdb_remote_src_entry_add(remote, &src->addr);
+ if (!ent)
+ return -ENOMEM;
++ ent->flags |= VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW;
+ } else if (!(cfg->nlflags & NLM_F_REPLACE)) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Source entry already exists");
+ return -EEXIST;
+@@ -847,15 +849,16 @@ vxlan_mdb_remote_src_add(const struct vx
+ if (err)
+ goto err_src_del;
+
+- /* Clear flags in case source entry was marked for deletion as part of
+- * replace flow.
++ /* Clear the deletion mark so the entry survives the replace sweep.
++ * The new mark is retained until the whole operation succeeds.
+ */
+- ent->flags = 0;
++ ent->flags &= ~VXLAN_SGRP_F_DELETE;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ err_src_del:
+- vxlan_mdb_remote_src_entry_del(ent);
++ if (ent->flags & VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW)
++ vxlan_mdb_remote_src_entry_del(ent);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+@@ -883,11 +886,19 @@ static int vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add(con
+ goto err_src_del;
+ }
+
++ hlist_for_each_entry(ent, &remote->src_list, node)
++ ent->flags &= ~VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW;
++
+ return 0;
+
+ err_src_del:
+- hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &remote->src_list, node)
+- vxlan_mdb_remote_src_del(cfg->vxlan, &cfg->group, remote, ent);
++ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &remote->src_list, node) {
++ if (ent->flags & VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW)
++ vxlan_mdb_remote_src_del(cfg->vxlan, &cfg->group, remote,
++ ent);
++ else
++ ent->flags &= ~VXLAN_SGRP_F_DELETE;
++ }
+ return err;
+ }
+
+@@ -1053,7 +1064,7 @@ vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_replace(const stru
+
+ err = vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add(cfg, remote, extack);
+ if (err)
+- goto err_clear_delete;
++ return err;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &remote->src_list, node) {
+ if (ent->flags & VXLAN_SGRP_F_DELETE)
+@@ -1062,11 +1073,6 @@ vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_replace(const stru
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+-
+-err_clear_delete:
+- hlist_for_each_entry(ent, &remote->src_list, node)
+- ent->flags &= ~VXLAN_SGRP_F_DELETE;
+- return err;
+ }
+
+ static int vxlan_mdb_remote_replace(const struct vxlan_mdb_config *cfg,
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
