/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsa
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
having this key zero'ed is acceptable. E.g. in testing
scenarios.
+ tsa= [X86] Control mitigation for Transient Scheduler
+ Attacks on AMD CPUs. Search the following in your
+ favourite search engine for more details:
+
+ "Technical guidance for mitigating transient scheduler
+ attacks".
+
+ off - disable the mitigation
+ on - enable the mitigation (default)
+ user - mitigate only user/kernel transitions
+ vm - mitigate only guest/host transitions
+
+
tsc= Disable clocksource stability checks for TSC.
Format: <string>
[x86] reliable: mark tsc clocksource as reliable, this
disabled, mitigation cannot be enabled via cmdline.
See <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/indirect-target-selection.rst>
+config MITIGATION_TSA
+ bool "Mitigate Transient Scheduler Attacks"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable mitigation for Transient Scheduler Attacks. TSA is a hardware
+ security vulnerability on AMD CPUs which can lead to forwarding of
+ invalid info to subsequent instructions and thus can affect their
+ timing and thereby cause a leakage.
endif
config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
extern struct cpumask cpus_stop_mask;
+union zen_patch_rev {
+ struct {
+ __u32 rev : 8,
+ stepping : 4,
+ model : 4,
+ __reserved : 4,
+ ext_model : 4,
+ ext_fam : 8;
+ };
+ __u32 ucode_rev;
+};
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPU_H */
#define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0) /* No Nested Data Breakpoints */
#define X86_FEATURE_WRMSR_XX_BASE_NS (20*32+ 1) /* WRMSR to {FS,GS,KERNEL_GS}_BASE is non-serializing */
#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC (20*32+ 2) /* LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VERW_CLEAR (20*32+ 5) /* The memory form of VERW mitigates TSA */
#define X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE (20*32+ 6) /* Null Selector Clears Base */
#define X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS (20*32+ 8) /* Automatic IBRS */
#define X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR (20*32+ 9) /* SMM_CTL MSR is not present */
#define X86_FEATURE_FAST_CPPC (21*32 + 5) /* AMD Fast CPPC */
#define X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_THUNK_ITS (21*32 + 6) /* Use thunk for indirect branches in lower half of cacheline */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO (21*32+11) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-SQ */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO (21*32+12) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-L1 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM (21*32+13) /* Clear CPU buffers using VERW before VMRUN */
+
/*
* BUG word(s)
*/
#define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET X86_BUG(1*32 + 4) /* "ibpb_no_ret" IBPB omits return target predictions */
#define X86_BUG_ITS X86_BUG(1*32 + 5) /* "its" CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
#define X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY X86_BUG(1*32 + 6) /* "its_native_only" CPU is affected by ITS, VMX is not affected */
+#define X86_BUG_TSA X86_BUG( 1*32+ 9) /* "tsa" CPU is affected by Transient Scheduler Attacks */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
static __always_inline void __mwaitx(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ebx,
unsigned long ecx)
{
- /* No MDS buffer clear as this is AMD/HYGON only */
+ /* No need for TSA buffer clearing on AMD */
/* "mwaitx %eax, %ebx, %ecx;" */
asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfb;"
* CFLAGS.ZF.
* Note: Only the memory operand variant of VERW clears the CPU buffers.
*/
-.macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+.macro __CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS feature
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- ALTERNATIVE "", "verw x86_verw_sel(%rip)", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "verw x86_verw_sel(%rip)", \feature
#else
/*
* In 32bit mode, the memory operand must be a %cs reference. The data
* segments may not be usable (vm86 mode), and the stack segment may not
* be flat (ESPFIX32).
*/
- ALTERNATIVE "", "verw %cs:x86_verw_sel", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "verw %cs:x86_verw_sel", \feature
#endif
.endm
+#define CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS \
+ __CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
+
+#define VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS \
+ __CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
.macro CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP
/**
* x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Buffer clearing support in idle for the MDS
- * vulnerability
+ * and TSA vulnerabilities.
*
* Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
*/
#endif
}
+static bool amd_check_tsa_microcode(void)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+ union zen_patch_rev p;
+ u32 min_rev = 0;
+
+ p.ext_fam = c->x86 - 0xf;
+ p.model = c->x86_model;
+ p.stepping = c->x86_stepping;
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN3) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN4)) {
+ switch (p.ucode_rev >> 8) {
+ case 0xa0011: min_rev = 0x0a0011d7; break;
+ case 0xa0012: min_rev = 0x0a00123b; break;
+ case 0xa0082: min_rev = 0x0a00820d; break;
+ case 0xa1011: min_rev = 0x0a10114c; break;
+ case 0xa1012: min_rev = 0x0a10124c; break;
+ case 0xa1081: min_rev = 0x0a108109; break;
+ case 0xa2010: min_rev = 0x0a20102e; break;
+ case 0xa2012: min_rev = 0x0a201211; break;
+ case 0xa4041: min_rev = 0x0a404108; break;
+ case 0xa5000: min_rev = 0x0a500012; break;
+ case 0xa6012: min_rev = 0x0a60120a; break;
+ case 0xa7041: min_rev = 0x0a704108; break;
+ case 0xa7052: min_rev = 0x0a705208; break;
+ case 0xa7080: min_rev = 0x0a708008; break;
+ case 0xa70c0: min_rev = 0x0a70c008; break;
+ case 0xaa002: min_rev = 0x0aa00216; break;
+ default:
+ pr_debug("%s: ucode_rev: 0x%x, current revision: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__, p.ucode_rev, c->microcode);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!min_rev)
+ return false;
+
+ return c->microcode >= min_rev;
+}
+
+static void tsa_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ return;
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN3) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN4)) {
+ if (amd_check_tsa_microcode())
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_VERW_CLEAR);
+ } else {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO);
+ }
+}
+
static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)) {
}
bsp_determine_snp(c);
+
+ tsa_init(c);
+
return;
warn:
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init its_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init tsa_select_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
srso_select_mitigation();
gds_select_mitigation();
its_select_mitigation();
+ tsa_select_mitigation();
}
/*
#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Transient Scheduler Attacks: " fmt
+
+enum tsa_mitigations {
+ TSA_MITIGATION_NONE,
+ TSA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ TSA_MITIGATION_USER_KERNEL,
+ TSA_MITIGATION_VM,
+ TSA_MITIGATION_FULL,
+};
+
+static const char * const tsa_strings[] = {
+ [TSA_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
+ [TSA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+ [TSA_MITIGATION_USER_KERNEL] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers: user/kernel boundary",
+ [TSA_MITIGATION_VM] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers: VM",
+ [TSA_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+};
+
+static enum tsa_mitigations tsa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TSA) ? TSA_MITIGATION_FULL : TSA_MITIGATION_NONE;
+
+static int __init tsa_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+ tsa_mitigation = TSA_MITIGATION_NONE;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
+ tsa_mitigation = TSA_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "user"))
+ tsa_mitigation = TSA_MITIGATION_USER_KERNEL;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "vm"))
+ tsa_mitigation = TSA_MITIGATION_VM;
+ else
+ pr_err("Ignoring unknown tsa=%s option.\n", str);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("tsa", tsa_parse_cmdline);
+
+static void __init tsa_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (tsa_mitigation == TSA_MITIGATION_NONE)
+ return;
+
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off() || !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TSA)) {
+ tsa_mitigation = TSA_MITIGATION_NONE;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VERW_CLEAR))
+ tsa_mitigation = TSA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+ switch (tsa_mitigation) {
+ case TSA_MITIGATION_USER_KERNEL:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+ break;
+
+ case TSA_MITIGATION_VM:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
+ break;
+
+ case TSA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ goto out;
+
+ pr_notice("Forcing mitigation on in a VM\n");
+
+ /*
+ * On the off-chance that microcode has been updated
+ * on the host, enable the mitigation in the guest just
+ * in case.
+ */
+ fallthrough;
+ case TSA_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+out:
+ pr_info("%s\n", tsa_strings[tsa_mitigation]);
+}
+
void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
{
mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
break;
}
+ switch (tsa_mitigation) {
+ case TSA_MITIGATION_USER_KERNEL:
+ case TSA_MITIGATION_VM:
+ case TSA_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ case TSA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ /*
+ * TSA-SQ can potentially lead to info leakage between
+ * SMT threads.
+ */
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ static_branch_enable(&cpu_buf_idle_clear);
+ else
+ static_branch_disable(&cpu_buf_idle_clear);
+ break;
+ case TSA_MITIGATION_NONE:
+ break;
+ }
+
mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
}
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
}
+static ssize_t tsa_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", tsa_strings[tsa_mitigation]);
+}
+
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
case X86_BUG_ITS:
return its_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_TSA:
+ return tsa_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITS);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_tsa(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_TSA);
+}
#endif
void __warn_thunk(void)
#define ITS BIT(8)
/* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection, but guest-host isolation is not affected */
#define ITS_NATIVE_ONLY BIT(9)
+/* CPU is affected by Transient Scheduler Attacks */
+#define TSA BIT(10)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
- VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO),
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO | TSA),
{}
};
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY);
}
+ if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO) ||
+ !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO)) {
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, TSA) ||
+ /* Enable bug on Zen guests to allow for live migration. */
+ (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN)))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TSA);
+ }
+ }
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
struct equiv_cpu_entry *entry;
} equiv_table;
-union zen_patch_rev {
- struct {
- __u32 rev : 8,
- stepping : 4,
- model : 4,
- __reserved : 4,
- ext_model : 4,
- ext_fam : 8;
- };
- __u32 ucode_rev;
-};
-
union cpuid_1_eax {
struct {
__u32 stepping : 4,
{ X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 6, 0x80000008, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_SMBA, CPUID_EBX, 2, 0x80000020, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_BMEC, CPUID_EBX, 3, 0x80000020, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO, CPUID_ECX, 1, 0x80000021, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x80000021, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x80000022, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x80000022, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE, CPUID_EAX, 2, 0x80000022, 0 },
#endif
mov VCPU_RDI(%_ASM_DI), %_ASM_DI
+ /* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */
+ VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+
/* Enter guest mode */
3: vmrun %_ASM_AX
4:
mov SVM_current_vmcb(%rdi), %rax
mov KVM_VMCB_pa(%rax), %rax
+ /* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */
+ VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+
/* Enter guest mode */
1: vmrun %rax
2:
CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(gds);
CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(reg_file_data_sampling);
CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(indirect_target_selection);
+CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(tsa);
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(gather_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_gds, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(reg_file_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(indirect_target_selection, 0444, cpu_show_indirect_target_selection, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(tsa, 0444, cpu_show_tsa, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
&dev_attr_gather_data_sampling.attr,
&dev_attr_reg_file_data_sampling.attr,
&dev_attr_indirect_target_selection.attr,
+ &dev_attr_tsa.attr,
NULL
};
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern ssize_t cpu_show_indirect_target_selection(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_tsa(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern __printf(4, 5)
struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable.git / commitdiff
