net: clear IP defragmentation state after returning a complete packet

During the IP defragmentation process, after the reassembly is finished
with the last packet arriving with MF=0, the reassembly state wrt.
static counters is not cleared. In case this last arriving packet with
MF=0 gets duplicated, payload bytes are mistakenly treated as hole data.

A malicious actor who can deliver fragmented IP traffic to a U-Boot
instance with CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG=y can corrupt memory via out-of-bound
writes and redirect control flow into attacker-supplied payload bytes
that already sit in `pkt_buff[]`.

Publicly available AI models are able to generate a reproducer based
on the provided information.

Fix: once the assembled packet has been handed back to the caller, mark
the reassembly state empty so that any further fragment (duplicate,
replay, or a brand-new datagram that happens to reuse the `ip_id`) goes
through the normal re-init path and rebuilds a clean hole list instead
of dereferencing payload bytes as struct hole.

Fixes: 5cfaa4e54d0e ("net: defragment IP packets")
Reported-by: Mariusz Madej <mariusz.madej@nokia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Alessandro Rubini <rubini@gnudd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Furdyna <mateusz.furdyna@nokia.com>

diff --git a/net/net.c b/net/net.c
index ae3b977781ff8b6cc5b772f09f6b7a00a3383472..61c5a6ef6c4f70cd6ca8920e51da3761593664f3 100644 (file)
--- a/net/net.c
+++ b/net/net.c
@@ -1103,6 +1103,15 @@ static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
 
        *lenp = total_len + IP_HDR_SIZE;
        localip->ip_len = htons(*lenp);
+
+       /*
+        * Mark the reassembly state empty so that any further
+        * fragment goes through the normal re-init path and
+        * rebuilds a clean hole list
+        */
+       total_len = 0;
+       first_hole = 0;
+
        return localip;
 }