--- /dev/null
+DNS Extensions working group V.Dolmatov, Ed.
+Internet-Draft Cryptocom Ltd.
+Intended status: Standards Track April 8, 2009
+Expires: December 31, 2009
+
+
+ Use of GOST signature algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records
+ for DNSSEC
+ draft-dolmatov-dnsext-dnssec-gost-00
+
+Status of this Memo
+
+ This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
+ provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
+
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+ This Internet-Draft will expire on 31 December 2009.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+ document authors. All rights reserved.
+
+ This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
+ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
+ publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
+ Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
+ and restrictions with respect to this document.
+
+Abstract
+
+ This document describes how to produce GOST signature and hash algorithms
+ DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records for use in the Domain Name System
+ Security Extensions (DNSSEC, RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035).
+
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 2. DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 2.1. Using a public key with existing cryptographic libraries. .
+ 2.2. GOST DNSKEY RR Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 3. RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 4. DS Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 5. NSEC3 Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 6. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 6.1. Key Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 6.2. Signature Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 6.3. Digest Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 7. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 7.1. Support for GOST signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 7.2. Support for NSEC3 Denial of Existence . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 7.2.1. NSEC3 in Authoritative servers . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 7.2.2. NSEC3 in Validators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+ Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical distributed
+ database for Internet Naming. The DNS has been extended to use
+ cryptographic keys and digital signatures for the verification of the
+ authenticity and integrity of its data. RFC 4033 [RFC4033], RFC 4034
+ [RFC4034], and RFC 4035 [RFC4035] describe these DNS Security
+ Extensions, called DNSSEC.
+
+ RFC 4034 describes how to store DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records,
+ and specifies a list of cryptographic algorithms to use. This
+ document extends that list with the signature and hash algorithms
+ GOST [GOST3410, GOST3411],
+ and specifies how to store DNSKEY data and how to produce
+ RRSIG resource records with these hash algorithms.
+
+ Familiarity with DNSSEC and GOST signature and hash
+ algorithms is assumed in this document.
+
+ The term "GOST" is not officially defined, but is usually used to
+ refer to the collection of the Russian cryptographic algorithms
+ GOST R 34.10-2001, GOST R 34.11-94, GOST 28147-89. Since GOST 28147-89
+ is not used in DNSSEC, GOST will only refer to GOST R 34.10-2001
+ (signatire algorithm) and GOST R 34.11-94 (hash algorithm) in this
+ document.
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
+ document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
+
+
+2. DNSKEY Resource Records
+
+ The format of the DNSKEY RR can be found in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
+
+ GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys are stored with the algorithm number {TBA1}.
+
+ The public key parameters are those identified by
+ id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet (1.2.643.2.2.35.1) [RFC4357].
+ The digest parameters for signature are those identified by
+ id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet (1.2.643.2.2.30.1) [RFC4357].
+
+ The wire format of the public key is compatible with RFC 4491 [RFC4491]:
+
+ According to [GOSTR341001], a public key is a point on the elliptic
+ curve Q = (x,y).
+
+ The wire representation of a public key MUST contain 64 octets, where the
+ first 32 octets contain the little-endian representation of x and the
+ second 32 octets contain the little-endian representation of y. This
+ corresponds to the binary representation of (<y>256||<x>256) from
+ [GOSTR341001], ch. 5.3.
+
+2.1. Using a public key with existing cryptographic libraries
+
+ Existing GOST-aware cryptographic libraries at time of this document
+ writing are capable to read GOST public keys via generic X509 API if the
+ key is encoded according to RFC 4491 [RFC4491], section 2.3.2.
+
+ To make this encoding from the wire format of a GOST public key, prepend
+ a key data with the following 37-byte sequence:
+
+ 0x30 0x63 0x30 0x1c 0x06 0x06 0x2a 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x13 0x30 0x12
+ 0x06 0x07 0x2a 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x23 0x01 0x06 0x07 0x2a 0x85 0x03
+ 0x02 0x02 0x1e 0x01 0x03 0x43 0x00 0x04 0x40
+
+2.2. GOST DNSKEY RR Example
+
+ The following DNSKEY RR stores a DNS zone key for example.com
+
+ example.com. 86400 IN DNSKEY 256 3 {TBA1} ( RamuUwTG1r4RUqsgXu/xF6B+Y
+ tJLzZEykiZ4C2Fa1gV1pI/8GA
+ el2Wm69Cz5h1T9eYAQKFAGwzW
+ m4Lke0E26aw== )
+
+3. RRSIG Resource Records
+
+ The value of the signature field in the RRSIG RR follows the RFC 4490
+ [RFC4490] and is calculated as follows. The values for the RDATA fields
+ that precede the signature data are specified in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
+
+ hash = GOSTR3411(data)
+
+ where "data" is the wire format data of the resource record set that is
+ signed, as specified in RFC 4034 [RFC4034]. Hash MUST be calculated with
+ GOST R 34.11-94 parameters identified by
+ id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357].
+
+ Signature is calculated from the hash according to the GOST R 34.10-2001
+ standard and its wire format is compatible with RFC 4490 [RFC4490].
+ Quoting RFC 4490:
+
+ "The signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001 generates a digital
+ signature in the form of two 256-bit numbers, r and s. Its octet
+ string representation consists of 64 octets, where the first 32
+ octets contain the big-endian representation of s and the second 32
+ octets contain the big-endian representation of r."
+
+4. DS Resource Records
+
+ GOST R 34.11-94 digest algorithm is denoted in DS RR by the digest type
+ {TBA2}. The wire format of a digest value is compatible with RFC 4490
+ [RFC4490]. Quoting RFC 4490:
+
+ "A 32-byte digest in little-endian representation."
+
+ The digest MUST always be calculated with GOST R 34.11-94 parameters
+ identified by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357].
+
+5. NSEC3 Resource Records
+
+ GOST R 34.11-94 digest algorithm is denoted in NSEC3 RR by the digest type
+ {TBA2}. The wire format of a digest value is compatible with RFC 4490
+ [RFC4490]. Quoting RFC 4490:
+
+ "A 32-byte digest in little-endian representation."
+
+ The digest MUST always be calculated with GOST R 34.11-94 parameters
+ identified by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357].
+
+6. Deployment Considerations
+
+6.1. Key Sizes
+
+ According to RFC4357 [RFC4357] key size of GOST public keys MUST
+ be 512 bits.
+
+6.2. Signature Sizes
+
+ According to GOST signature algorithm [GOST3410] size of GOST signature
+ is 512 bit.
+
+6.3. Digest Sizes
+
+ According to GOST R 34.11-94 [GOST3411] size of GOST digest is 256 bit.
+
+7. Implementation Considerations
+
+7.1. Support for GOST signatures
+
+ DNSSEC aware implementations SHOULD be able to support RRSIG and
+ DNSKEY resource records created with the GOST algorithms as
+ defined in this document.
+
+7.2. Support for NSEC3 Denial of Existence
+
+ RFC5155 [RFC5155] defines new algorithm identifiers for existing
+ signing algorithms, to indicate that zones signed with these
+ algorithm identifiers use NSEC3 instead of NSEC records to provide
+ denial of existence. That mechanism was chosen to protect
+ implementations predating RFC5155 from encountering resource records
+ they could not know about. This document does not define such
+ algorithm aliases, and support for NSEC3 denial of existence is
+ implicitly signaled with support for one of the algorithms defined in
+ this document.
+
+7.2.1. NSEC3 in Authoritative servers
+
+ An authoritative server that does not implement NSEC3 MAY still serve
+ zones that use GOST with NSEC denial of existence.
+
+7.2.2. NSEC3 in Validators
+
+ A DNSSEC validator that implements GOST MUST be able to handle
+ both NSEC and NSEC3 [RFC5155] negative answers. If this is not the
+ case, the validator MUST treat a zone signed with GOST
+ as signed with an unknown algorithm, and thus as insecure.
+
+
+8. IANA Considerations
+
+ This document updates the IANA registry "DNS SECURITY ALGORITHM
+ NUMBERS -- per [RFC4035] "
+ (http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers). The following
+ entries are added to the registry:
+ Zone Trans.
+ Value Algorithm Mnemonic Signing Sec. References Status
+ {TBA1} GOST R 34.10-2001 GOST Y * (this memo) OPTIONAL
+
+ This document updates the RFC 4034 [RFC4034] Digest Types assignment
+ (RFC 4034, section A.2):
+
+ Value Algorithm Status
+ {TBA2} GOST R 34.11-94 OPTIONAL
+
+9. Acknowledgments
+
+ This document is a minor extension to RFC 4034 [RFC4034]. Also, we
+ try to follow the documents RFC 3110 [RFC3110], RFC 4509 [RFC4509]
+ and RFC 4357 [RFC4357] for consistency. The authors of and
+ contributors to these documents are gratefully acknowledged for
+ their hard work.
+
+ The following people provided additional feedback and text: Dmitry
+ Burkov, Jaap Akkerhuis, Jelte Jansen and Wouter Wijngaards.
+
+
+10. References
+
+10.1. Normative References
+
+ [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+ Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+ [RFC3110] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain
+ Name System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.
+
+ [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
+ Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
+ RFC 4033, March 2005.
+
+ [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
+ Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
+ RFC 4034, March 2005.
+
+ [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
+ Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
+ Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
+
+ [GOST3410] "Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
+ Signature and verification processes of [electronic]
+ digital signature.", GOST R 34.10-2001, Gosudarstvennyi
+ Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of
+ the Russia for Standards, 2001. (In Russian)
+
+ [GOST3411] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
+ Hashing function.", GOST R 34.11-94, Gosudarstvennyi
+ Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of
+ the Russia for Standards, 1994. (In Russian)
+
+ [RFC4357] Popov, V., Kurepkin, I., and S. Leontiev, "Additional
+ Cryptographic Algorithms for Use with GOST 28147-89,
+ GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
+ Algorithms", RFC 4357, January 2006.
+
+ [RFC4490] S. Leontiev and G. Chudov, "Using the GOST 28147-89,
+ GOST R 34.11-94, GOST R 34.10-94, and GOST R 34.10-2001
+ Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
+ RFC 4490, May 2006.
+
+ [RFC4491] S. Leontiev and D. Shefanovski, "Using the GOST
+ R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
+ Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key
+ Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 4491,
+ May 2006.
+
+
+
+10.2. Informative References
+
+ [NIST800-57]
+ Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., and M. Smid,
+ "Recommendations for Key Management", NIST SP 800-57,
+ March 2007.
+
+ [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
+ Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
+ Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
+
+ [RFC4509] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
+ (DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.
+
+ [RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
+ Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
+ Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.
+
+Authors' Addresses
+
+
+Vasily Dolmatov, Ed.
+Cryptocom Ltd.
+Bolotnikovskaya, 23
+Moscow, 117303, Russian Federation
+
+EMail: dol@cryptocom.ru
+
+Artem Chuprina
+Cryptocom Ltd.
+Bolotnikovskaya, 23
+Moscow, 117303, Russian Federation
+
+EMail: ran@cryptocom.ru
+
+Igor Ustinov
+Cryptocom Ltd.
+Bolotnikovskaya, 23
+Moscow, 117303, Russian Federation
+
+EMail: igus@cryptocom.ru
+
+ Expires December 31, 2009 [Page ]
+
+
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