6.1-stable patches

added patches:
	buffer-overflow-in-drivers-xen-sys-hypervisor.c.patch
	xen-privcmd-fix-double-free-via-vma-splitting.patch

diff --git a/queue-6.1/buffer-overflow-in-drivers-xen-sys-hypervisor.c.patch b/queue-6.1/buffer-overflow-in-drivers-xen-sys-hypervisor.c.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..399ce83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-6.1/buffer-overflow-in-drivers-xen-sys-hypervisor.c.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From 08108583b86912f181ef8282630c68f2248de146 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2026 14:13:38 +0100
+Subject: Buffer overflow in drivers/xen/sys-hypervisor.c
+
+From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+
+commit 27fdbab4221b375de54bf91919798d88520c6e28 upstream.
+
+The build id returned by HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_build_id) is
+neither NUL terminated nor a string.
+
+The first causes a buffer overflow as sprintf in buildid_show will
+read and copy till it finds a NUL.
+
+00000000  f4 91 51 f4 dd 38 9e 9d  65 47 52 eb 10 71 db 50  |..Q..8..eGR..q.P|
+00000010  b9 a8 01 42 6f 2e 32                              |...Bo.2|
+00000017
+
+So use a memcpy instead of sprintf to have the correct value:
+
+00000000  f4 91 51 f4 dd 00 9e 9d  65 47 52 eb 10 71 db 50  |..Q.....eGR..q.P|
+00000010  b9 a8 01 42                                       |...B|
+00000014
+
+(the above have a hack to embed a zero inside and check it's
+returned correctly).
+
+This is XSA-485 / CVE-2026-31786
+
+Fixes: 84b7625728ea ("xen: add sysfs node for hypervisor build id")
+Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/xen/sys-hypervisor.c |    8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/xen/sys-hypervisor.c
++++ b/drivers/xen/sys-hypervisor.c
+@@ -363,6 +363,8 @@ static ssize_t buildid_show(struct hyp_s
+                       ret = sprintf(buffer, "<denied>");
+               return ret;
+       }
++      if (ret > PAGE_SIZE)
++              return -ENOSPC;
+ 
+       buildid = kmalloc(sizeof(*buildid) + ret, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!buildid)
+@@ -370,8 +372,10 @@ static ssize_t buildid_show(struct hyp_s
+ 
+       buildid->len = ret;
+       ret = HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_build_id, buildid);
+-      if (ret > 0)
+-              ret = sprintf(buffer, "%s", buildid->buf);
++      if (ret > 0) {
++              /* Build id is binary, not a string. */
++              memcpy(buffer, buildid->buf, ret);
++      }
+       kfree(buildid);
+ 
+       return ret;

diff --git a/queue-6.1/series b/queue-6.1/series
index e75a52f302be557b342f33e0e15cc717e47e2ef8..4de6e548f18a7bbaec449a7def5027a1fffa9227 100644 (file)
--- a/queue-6.1/series
+++ b/queue-6.1/series
@@ -178,3 +178,5 @@ regset-use-kvzalloc-for-regset_get_alloc.patch
 device-property-make-modifications-of-fwnode-flags-thread-safe.patch
 ocfs2-split-transactions-in-dio-completion-to-avoid-credit-exhaustion.patch
 driver-core-don-t-let-a-device-probe-until-it-s-read.patch
+buffer-overflow-in-drivers-xen-sys-hypervisor.c.patch
+xen-privcmd-fix-double-free-via-vma-splitting.patch

diff --git a/queue-6.1/xen-privcmd-fix-double-free-via-vma-splitting.patch b/queue-6.1/xen-privcmd-fix-double-free-via-vma-splitting.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..28aa98b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-6.1/xen-privcmd-fix-double-free-via-vma-splitting.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 1931e8c58bdab67fc8bcdf6543aa4946a359218a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 09:20:04 +0200
+Subject: xen/privcmd: fix double free via VMA splitting
+
+From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+
+commit 24daca4fc07f3ff8cd0e3f629cd982187f48436a upstream.
+
+privcmd_vm_ops defines .close (privcmd_close), but neither .may_split
+nor .open. When userspace does a partial munmap() on a privcmd mapping,
+the kernel splits the VMA via __split_vma(). Since may_split is NULL,
+the split is allowed. vm_area_dup() copies vm_private_data (a pages
+array allocated in alloc_empty_pages()) into the new VMA without any
+fixup, because there is no .open callback.
+
+Both VMAs now point to the same pages array. When the unmapped portion
+is closed, privcmd_close() calls:
+    - xen_unmap_domain_gfn_range()
+    - xen_free_unpopulated_pages()
+    - kvfree(pages)
+
+The surviving VMA still holds the dangling pointer. When it is later
+destroyed, the same sequence runs again, which leads to a double free.
+
+Fix this issue by adding a .may_split callback denying the VMA split.
+
+This is XSA-487 / CVE-2026-31787
+
+Fixes: d71f513985c2 ("xen: privcmd: support autotranslated physmap guests.")
+Reported-by: Atharva Vartak <atharva.a.vartak@gmail.com>
+Suggested-by: Atharva Vartak <atharva.a.vartak@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/xen/privcmd.c |    7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
++++ b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
+@@ -934,6 +934,12 @@ static void privcmd_close(struct vm_area
+       kvfree(pages);
+ }
+ 
++static int privcmd_may_split(struct vm_area_struct *area, unsigned long addr)
++{
++      /* Forbid splitting, avoids double free via privcmd_close(). */
++      return -EINVAL;
++}
++
+ static vm_fault_t privcmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+ {
+       printk(KERN_DEBUG "privcmd_fault: vma=%p %lx-%lx, pgoff=%lx, uv=%p\n",
+@@ -945,6 +951,7 @@ static vm_fault_t privcmd_fault(struct v
+ 
+ static const struct vm_operations_struct privcmd_vm_ops = {
+       .close = privcmd_close,
++      .may_split = privcmd_may_split,
+       .fault = privcmd_fault
+ };
+