+++ /dev/null
-Index: openssl/Configure
-diff -u openssl/Configure:1.8.6.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/Configure:1.8.2.2
---- openssl/Configure:1.8.6.1.4.1.2.1 Thu Jul 3 12:12:31 2014
-+++ openssl/Configure Thu Jul 3 12:31:57 2014
-@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
-
- # see INSTALL for instructions.
-
--my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [enable-montasm] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-+my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [enable-montasm] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-
- # Options:
- #
-@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@
- # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can
- # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install".
- #
-+# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name.
-+# (No default)
-+#
-+# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only
-+# (No default)
-+#
- # --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected
- # to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in
- # include/. A value is required.
-@@ -336,7 +342,7 @@
- "linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL::linux_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
- #### IA-32 targets...
- "linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
- "linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_out_asm}",
- ####
- "linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-@@ -344,7 +350,7 @@
- "linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
- "linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
- "linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
- #### SPARC Linux setups
- # Ray Miller <ray.miller@computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently
- # assisted with debugging of following two configs.
-@@ -591,6 +597,10 @@
- my $idx_ranlib = $idx++;
- my $idx_arflags = $idx++;
-
-+# PKCS#11 engine patch
-+my $pk11_libname="";
-+my $pk11_flavor="";
-+
- my $prefix="";
- my $libdir="";
- my $openssldir="";
-@@ -829,6 +839,14 @@
- {
- $flags.=$_." ";
- }
-+ elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/)
-+ {
-+ $pk11_libname=$1;
-+ }
-+ elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/)
-+ {
-+ $pk11_flavor=$1;
-+ }
- elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
- {
- $prefix=$1;
-@@ -964,6 +982,22 @@
- exit 0;
- }
-
-+if (! $pk11_libname)
-+ {
-+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n";
-+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
-+ exit 1;
-+ }
-+
-+if (! $pk11_flavor
-+ || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only"))
-+ {
-+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n";
-+ print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n";
-+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
-+ exit 1;
-+ }
-+
- if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
- $target = "Cygwin".$1;
- }
-@@ -1079,6 +1113,25 @@
- print "\n";
- }
-
-+if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator")
-+ {
-+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
-+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
-+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
-+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so";
-+ print " no-hw-pkcs11so [pk11-flavor]";
-+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
-+ }
-+else
-+ {
-+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
-+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
-+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
-+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca";
-+ print " no-hw-pkcs11ca [pk11-flavor]";
-+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
-+}
-+
- my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds;
-
- $IsMK1MF=1 if ($target eq "mingw" && $^O ne "cygwin" && !is_msys());
-@@ -1130,6 +1183,8 @@
- if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; }
- else { $no_user_cflags=1; }
-
-+$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags";
-+
- # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through
- # the script "config" or manually.
- if (!$no_krb5)
-@@ -1493,6 +1548,7 @@
- s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/;
- s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
- s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
-+ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/;
- s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
- s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
- s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
-Index: openssl/Makefile.org
-diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.4.2.2
---- openssl/Makefile.org:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 Wed Dec 23 16:02:57 2015
-+++ openssl/Makefile.org Wed Dec 23 16:44:50 2015
-@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
- INSTALL_PREFIX=
- INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
-
-+# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option.
-+PK11_LIB_LOCATION=
-+
- # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
- OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
-
-Index: openssl/README.pkcs11
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.6.4.2
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015
-+++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Fri Oct 4 14:45:25 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
-+ISC modified
-+============
-+
-+The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility.
-+
-+The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and
-+sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the
-+PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second
-+is a stripped down version which provides only the useful
-+function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device
-+protected key store and key loading).
-+
-+As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor,
-+external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example
-+of the first, AEP Keyper of the second.
-+
-+Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in
-+config/Configure.
-+
-+It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine.
-+The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared
-+(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine
-+(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs).
-+
-+PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l
-+=========================================
-+
-+[Nov 19, 2009]
-+
-+Contents:
-+
-+Overview
-+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch
-+FAQs
-+Feedback
-+
-+Overview
-+========
-+
-+This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11
-+engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against
-+OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system
-+must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the
-+PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below.
-+
-+Patch can be applied like this:
-+
-+ # NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris
-+ tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz
-+ # now download the patch to the current directory
-+ # ...
-+ cd openssl-0.9.8l
-+ # NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system)
-+ patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19
-+
-+It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the
-+symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share
-+except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA.
-+
-+According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support
-+following mechanisms:
-+
-+ RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4,
-+ AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB,
-+ AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224,
-+ SHA256, SHA384, SHA512
-+
-+Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP
-+functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may
-+see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an
-+example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety
-+problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested).
-+
-+You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the
-+configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the
-+config script:
-+
-+ $ ./config
-+ Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2
-+ Configuring for solaris-x86-cc
-+ You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.
-+ See README.pkcs11 for more information.
-+
-+Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run
-+configure script like this:
-+
-+ ./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so
-+
-+To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run
-+"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the
-+output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary
-+and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits.
-+
-+The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against
-+PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and
-+OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project
-+(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more
-+information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the
-+system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself
-+and has functional PKCS#11 library.
-+
-+The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are
-+copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information.
-+
-+Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems,
-+Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more
-+information).
-+
-+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch
-+=======================================
-+
-+2009-11-19
-+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l
-+
-+- bugs and RFEs:
-+
-+ 6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores
-+ 6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split
-+ 6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the
-+ PKCS#11 engine
-+
-+2009-03-11
-+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j
-+
-+- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a
-+ tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied.
-+
-+- fixed bugs:
-+
-+ 6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4
-+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if
-+ meta slot is disabled
-+
-+2008-12-02
-+- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal)
-+
-+ 6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine
-+ 6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true
-+ 6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean
-+ 6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take
-+ it seriously
-+ 6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean
-+ 6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11
-+ engine code
-+ 6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API
-+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if
-+ meta slot is disabled
-+
-+2008-08-01
-+- fixed bug
-+
-+ 6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers
-+ and digests
-+
-+- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic
-+
-+2008-07-29
-+- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version
-+- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version:
-+
-+ 6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users
-+
-+- fixed bugs in the engine code:
-+
-+ 6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for
-+ asymmetric key operations
-+ 6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called
-+ atomically
-+ 6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys
-+ 6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners
-+ 6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in
-+ suboptimal way
-+ 6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more
-+ resilient to destroy failures
-+ 6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free()
-+ 6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys
-+ 6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine
-+ 6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size
-+ of big numbers leading to failures
-+ 6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of
-+ -1
-+ 6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references
-+ 6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not
-+ checked
-+ 6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to
-+ structure reuse
-+ 6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of
-+ OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH}
-+ defines but fails miserably
-+ 6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss
-+ 6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing
-+ generate_params parameter
-+ 6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes
-+ 6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the
-+ PKCS#11 engine
-+ 6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish()
-+
-+- new features and enhancements:
-+
-+ 6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512
-+ 6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes
-+ 6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric
-+ ciphers and digests
-+
-+2007-10-15
-+- update for 0.9.8f version
-+- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
-+
-+2007-10-02
-+- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
-+- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys"
-+
-+2007-09-26
-+- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes
-+ significant performance drop
-+- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine
-+
-+2007-05-25
-+- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers
-+
-+2007-05-19
-+- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code
-+
-+FAQs
-+====
-+
-+(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error:
-+
-+../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init':
-+hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork'
-+
-+Answer:
-+
-+ - don't use "no-threads" when configuring
-+ - if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by
-+ default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the
-+ architecture that Configure printed, for example:
-+
-+Configured for linux-elf.
-+
-+ - then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes),
-+ and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string.
-+ If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With
-+ "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after
-+ "-D_REENTRANT", like this:
-+
-+....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:.....
-+
-+(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for
-+pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch.
-+
-+Answer:
-+
-+ Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32
-+ (as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there.
-+
-+
-+Feedback
-+========
-+
-+Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was
-+created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris.
-+
-+Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp.
-+
-Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h
-diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.5.10.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.5
---- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.5.10.1 Sun Jan 15 15:45:34 2012
-+++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h Fri Sep 4 10:43:21 2009
-@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
-
- #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS
-+# define OPENSSL_THREADS
-+#endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
- # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
- #endif
-@@ -79,6 +82,8 @@
- # endif
- #endif
-
-+#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
-+
- /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
-
- #ifdef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND
-@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@
- * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
- * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
- */
--#undef RC4_CHUNK
-+#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long
- #endif
- #endif
-
-@@ -148,7 +153,7 @@
- /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
- * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
- #ifndef DES_LONG
--#define DES_LONG unsigned long
-+#define DES_LONG unsigned int
- #endif
- #endif
-
-@@ -162,9 +167,9 @@
- /* The prime number generation stuff may not work when
- * EIGHT_BIT but I don't care since I've only used this mode
- * for debuging the bignum libraries */
--#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
-+#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
- #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
--#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT
-+#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
- #undef SIXTEEN_BIT
- #undef EIGHT_BIT
- #endif
-@@ -178,7 +183,7 @@
-
- #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
- #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
--#undef BF_PTR
-+#define BF_PTR2
- #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
-
- #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
-@@ -208,7 +213,7 @@
- /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
- * Very mucy CPU dependant */
- #ifndef DES_UNROLL
--#undef DES_UNROLL
-+#define DES_UNROLL
- #endif
-
- /* These default values were supplied by
-Index: openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
-diff -u openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.5.6.1.12.1 openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.5.2.1
---- openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.5.6.1.12.1 Wed Dec 23 16:03:19 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c Wed Dec 23 16:45:10 2015
-@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
- if ((file = fopen(filename, mode)) == NULL) {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
- ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
-- if (errno == ENOENT)
-+ if ((errno == ENOENT) || ((*mode == 'r') && (errno == EACCES)))
- BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE);
- else
- BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.6.6.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.6
---- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.6.6.1 Sun Jan 15 15:45:35 2012
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Mon Jun 13 14:25:19 2011
-@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@
- eng_table.c eng_pkey.c eng_fat.c eng_all.c \
- tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \
- tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c \
-- eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c
-+ eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c \
-+ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c
- LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \
- eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \
- tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \
- tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o \
-- eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o
-+ eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o \
-+ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o
-
- SRC= $(LIBSRC)
-
-@@ -288,6 +290,102 @@
- eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
- eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h
- eng_table.o: eng_table.c
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11.c
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so_pub.c
- tb_cipher.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
- tb_cipher.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
- tb_cipher.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+/*
-+ * CDDL HEADER START
-+ *
-+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
-+ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only
-+ * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance
-+ * with the License.
-+ *
-+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
-+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
-+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
-+ * and limitations under the License.
-+ *
-+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
-+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
-+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
-+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
-+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
-+ *
-+ * CDDL HEADER END
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef _CRYPTOKI_H
-+#define _CRYPTOKI_H
-+
-+/* ident "@(#)cryptoki.h 1.2 05/06/08 SMI" */
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+extern "C" {
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_PTR
-+#define CK_PTR *
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION
-+#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#include <unistd.h> /* For NULL */
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint
-+ */
-+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#define CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#ifndef TRUE
-+#define TRUE 1
-+#endif /* TRUE */
-+#ifndef FALSE
-+#define FALSE 0
-+#endif /* FALSE */
-+#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */
-+
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+
-+/* Solaris specific functions */
-+
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+
-+/*
-+ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all
-+ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of
-+ * providing operations on the requested mechanism
-+ */
-+CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession);
-+
-+/*
-+ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given
-+ * mechanism from the rawkey data.
-+ */
-+CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len,
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj);
-+
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif /* _CRYPTOKI_H */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.4.2.2
---- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 Wed Dec 23 16:03:42 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Wed Dec 23 16:45:32 2015
-@@ -113,6 +113,14 @@
- # if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV)
- ENGINE_load_cryptodev();
- # endif
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
-+ ENGINE_load_pk11ca();
-+# endif
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
-+ ENGINE_load_pk11so();
-+# endif
-+# endif
- #endif
- }
-
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.4.2.2
---- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 Wed Dec 23 16:03:44 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Wed Dec 23 16:45:34 2015
-@@ -403,6 +403,12 @@
- void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
- void ENGINE_load_padlock(void);
- void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
-+void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void);
-+# endif
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
-+void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void);
-+# endif
-
- /*
- * Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.26.4.4
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Fri Oct 4 14:45:25 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,4116 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#endif
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+#include <openssl/aes.h>
-+#include <openssl/des.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <signal.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <dlfcn.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Debug mutexes */
-+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */
-+#define DEBUG_MUTEX
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+#define __USE_UNIX98
-+#endif
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
-+
-+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
-+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
-+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
-+/* #undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+/*
-+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun)
-+#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither
-+ * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes,
-+ * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then
-+ * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's
-+ * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's.
-+ */
-+#define SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+/*
-+ * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine
-+ * initialization.
-+ */
-+static int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef;
-+static int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef;
-+static int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+/*
-+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
-+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
-+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
-+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
-+ */
-+static int *hw_cnids;
-+static int *hw_dnids;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
-+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
-+
-+/*
-+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
-+ * logging into the token.
-+ */
-+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-+
-+/*
-+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
-+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
-+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
-+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
-+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
-+ * PK11_SESSION object.
-+ *
-+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
-+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
-+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
-+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
-+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
-+ *
-+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
-+ * They are also used for active list protection.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
-+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
-+ * list) for given algorithm type
-+ */
-+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
-+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
-+ * without losing the secret key objects.
-+ */
-+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+/* ENGINE level stuff */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-+
-+/* RAND stuff */
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
-+
-+/* These functions are also used in other files */
-+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+
-+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
-+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Local helper functions */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent);
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
-+
-+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
-+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln);
-+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
-+#else
-+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
-+#endif
-+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+ const int **nids, int nid);
-+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+ const int **nids, int nid);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+ int key_len);
-+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
-+ size_t count);
-+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
-+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
-+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-+
-+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ int *local_cipher_nids);
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
-+ int *local_digest_nids);
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
-+ int id);
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
-+ int id);
-+
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
-+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+/* Index for the supported ciphers */
-+enum pk11_cipher_id {
-+ PK11_DES_CBC,
-+ PK11_DES3_CBC,
-+ PK11_DES_ECB,
-+ PK11_DES3_ECB,
-+ PK11_RC4,
-+ PK11_AES_128_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_192_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_256_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_128_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_192_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_256_ECB,
-+ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ PK11_AES_128_CTR,
-+ PK11_AES_192_CTR,
-+ PK11_AES_256_CTR,
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+ PK11_CIPHER_MAX
-+};
-+
-+/* Index for the supported digests */
-+enum pk11_digest_id {
-+ PK11_MD5,
-+ PK11_SHA1,
-+ PK11_SHA224,
-+ PK11_SHA256,
-+ PK11_SHA384,
-+ PK11_SHA512,
-+ PK11_DIGEST_MAX
-+};
-+
-+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \
-+ { \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \
-+ { \
-+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \
-+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \
-+ } \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ }
-+
-+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-+static int cipher_count = 0;
-+static int digest_count = 0;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
-+ {
-+ enum pk11_cipher_id id;
-+ int nid;
-+ int iv_len;
-+ int min_key_len;
-+ int max_key_len;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
-+ } PK11_CIPHER;
-+
-+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
-+ {
-+ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8,
-+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8,
-+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256,
-+ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ /* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */
-+ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+ };
-+
-+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
-+ {
-+ enum pk11_digest_id id;
-+ int nid;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
-+ } PK11_DIGEST;
-+
-+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
-+ {
-+ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, },
-+ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, },
-+ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, },
-+ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, },
-+ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, },
-+ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, },
-+ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, },
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
-+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
-+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
-+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
-+ *
-+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
-+ */
-+
-+/* DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_cbc,
-+ 8, 8, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ede3_cbc,
-+ 8, 24, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
-+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ecb,
-+ 8, 8, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ede3_ecb,
-+ 8, 24, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_cbc,
-+ 16, 16, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_cbc,
-+ 16, 24, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_cbc,
-+ 16, 32, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
-+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_ecb,
-+ 16, 16, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_ecb,
-+ 16, 24, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_ecb,
-+ 16, 32, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+/*
-+ * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are
-+ * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures
-+ * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword.
-+ */
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_undef,
-+ 16, 16, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_undef,
-+ 16, 24, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_undef,
-+ 16, 32, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_bf_cbc,
-+ 8, 16, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
-+ {
-+ NID_rc4,
-+ 1, 16, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
-+ {
-+ NID_md5,
-+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
-+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ MD5_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha1,
-+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha224,
-+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
-+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha256,
-+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha384,
-+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
-+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha512,
-+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
-+ */
-+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
-+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
-+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
-+ {
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
-+ "SO_PATH",
-+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_PIN,
-+ "PIN",
-+ "Specifies the pin code",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SLOT,
-+ "SLOT",
-+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
-+ },
-+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_seed,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_cleanup,
-+ pk11_rand_add,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_status
-+ };
-+
-+
-+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
-+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
-+#endif
-+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
-+static const char *engine_pk11_name =
-+ "PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)";
-+
-+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
-+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
-+
-+/*
-+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
-+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
-+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
-+ */
-+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
-+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
-+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
-+char *pk11_pin = NULL;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
-+static int pk11_pid = 0;
-+
-+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
-+
-+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
-+
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ session_cache[type].lock =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+#else
-+ return (1);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+
-+ if (token_lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock);
-+ token_lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
-+ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
-+ */
-+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
-+ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ if (pk11_have_random)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+/*
-+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
-+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
-+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
-+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
-+ */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-+ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
-+ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
-+ if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE)
-+ pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
-+ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
-+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-+#error "dynamic engine not supported"
-+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
-+ {
-+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
-+
-+#else
-+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
-+
-+ if (!ret)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(ret))
-+ {
-+ ENGINE_free(ret);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+void
-+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
-+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
-+ */
-+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
-+ if (!pk11_dso)
-+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
-+ if (!e_pk11)
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
-+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
-+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
-+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
-+
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ ERR_clear_error();
-+ }
-+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
-+
-+/*
-+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
-+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
-+ */
-+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ }
-+
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+
-+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
-+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
-+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
-+ * accessible to all threads.
-+ */
-+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
-+{
-+ return (pk11_library_init(e));
-+}
-+
-+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args =
-+ {
-+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */
-+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
-+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
-+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
-+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
-+ CK_INFO info;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+ int any_slot_found;
-+ int i;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which
-+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still
-+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine
-+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is
-+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application
-+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork()
-+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can
-+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional
-+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In
-+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly
-+ * initialize the engine again.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_library_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ /*
-+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
-+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
-+ * engine first.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ /*
-+ * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all
-+ * NIDs there.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
-+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
-+ if (!p)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ rv = p(&pFuncList);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
-+
-+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
-+#endif
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
-+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
-+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
-+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
-+ * because no slot was present.
-+ */
-+ if (any_slot_found == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
-+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
-+ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
-+ */
-+ /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */
-+ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
-+ != CKR_OK) {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
-+ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ digest_count = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
-+ pk11_pid = getpid();
-+ /*
-+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
-+ * will do the cleanup.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
-+ goto err;
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
-+ /*
-+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
-+ * for asymmetric ciphers.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ active_list[i] = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
-+ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
-+ * library.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
-+
-+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* free all active lists */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ pk11_free_active_list(i);
-+
-+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects.
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ pFuncList = NULL;
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ pk11_pid = 0;
-+ /*
-+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
-+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
-+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
-+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
-+ * the engine before calling fork().
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
-+ {
-+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
-+
-+ switch (cmd)
-+ {
-+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (initialized)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
-+ case PK11_CMD_PIN:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
-+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
-+ {
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
-+ * the calling functions do not care anyway
-+ */
-+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
-+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
-+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
-+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
-+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
-+ */
-+PK11_SESSION *
-+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
-+#endif
-+ static pid_t pid = 0;
-+ pid_t new_pid;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
-+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
-+ * here, with no PID information.
-+ */
-+ if (pid == 0)
-+ pid = getpid();
-+
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp = freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
-+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
-+ * structure from the freelist.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
-+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
-+ * mark them as unused.
-+ */
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
-+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
-+ */
-+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
-+ {
-+ pid = new_pid;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
-+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
-+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
-+ * head of the list).
-+ */
-+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp1->next;
-+ /*
-+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
-+ * sessions and destroy all objects.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
-+ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
-+
-+ /* Initialize the process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
-+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
-+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
-+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
-+ * re-initialization.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
-+ * the caller cope with the situation.
-+ */
-+ freelist = sp;
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->pid == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
-+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (sp != NULL)
-+ sp->next = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (sp);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+void
-+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
-+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
-+ * next time we will ask for a new session.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
-+ return;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp->next = freelist;
-+ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ int type;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
-+ * return 0 on exit.
-+ */
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
-+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
-+ * return an error on return.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
-+ pid_t mypid = getpid();
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ int ret = 1;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ myslot = SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are probably a child process so force the
-+ * reinitialize of the session
-+ */
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
-+ return (0);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ }
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->pid = getpid();
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
-+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
-+ */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e'
-+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We
-+ * must free those as well.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
-+ *
-+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
-+ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
-+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
-+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
-+ */
-+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
-+
-+static int
-+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
-+ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
-+ return (ciphers[i].id);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
-+ {
-+ if (cipher_count > 0)
-+ *nids = cipher_nids;
-+ else
-+ *nids = NULL;
-+ return (cipher_count);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
-+ {
-+ if (digest_count > 0)
-+ *nids = digest_nids;
-+ else
-+ *nids = NULL;
-+ return (digest_count);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
-+ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
-+ * pk11_init_symetric() is called.
-+ */
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
-+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
-+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
-+ {
-+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
-+ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
-+ /*
-+ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
-+ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
-+ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
-+ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
-+ * add code so that the counter length can be set via
-+ * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
-+ */
-+ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+ }
-+ else
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+ {
-+ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
-+ {
-+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
-+ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
-+ else
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+ int index;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
-+
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
-+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
-+ /*
-+ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
-+ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
-+ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
-+ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
-+ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
-+ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
-+ * code serves as a sanity check.
-+ *
-+ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
-+ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
-+ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
-+ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
-+ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
-+ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
-+ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
-+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-+
-+ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
-+ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
-+ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
-+ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
-+ {
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
-+ * needs to be created.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
-+ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
-+ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
-+ {
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* now initialize the context with a new key */
-+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
-+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
-+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
-+ * that it needs not be recreated.
-+ *
-+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
-+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
-+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
-+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
-+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
-+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
-+ */
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
-+#else
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
-+#endif
-+ {
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ unsigned long outl = inl;
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
-+
-+ if (!inl)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
-+ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
-+ * the same size of input.
-+ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
-+ * correctly aligned buffers.
-+ */
-+ if (inl != outl)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
-+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
-+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
-+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
-+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
-+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
-+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
-+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
-+ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
-+
-+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
-+ * rid of the context.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
-+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
-+ else
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
-+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
-+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
-+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+ const int **nids, int nid)
-+ {
-+ if (!cipher)
-+ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
-+
-+ switch (nid)
-+ {
-+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_bf_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_rc4:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_rc4;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ /*
-+ * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs
-+ * here are not constants.
-+ */
-+ if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr)
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
-+ else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr)
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
-+ else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
-+ else
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+ *cipher = NULL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ return (*cipher != NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+ const int **nids, int nid)
-+ {
-+ if (!digest)
-+ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
-+
-+ switch (nid)
-+ {
-+ case NID_md5:
-+ *digest = &pk11_md5;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha1:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha1;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha224:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha224;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha256:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha256;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha384:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha384;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha512:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha512;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ *digest = NULL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ return (*digest != NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
-+ unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
-+ * can use the key handles. Here is why:
-+ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
-+ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
-+ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
-+ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
-+ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
-+ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
-+ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
-+ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
-+ * terminate the active operation.
-+ */
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX)
-+ {
-+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
-+ memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len);
-+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES) ||
-+ (key_type == CKK_DES2) ||
-+ (key_type == CKK_DES3))
-+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]);
-+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) ||
-+ (key_type == CKK_DES3))
-+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]);
-+ if (key_type == CKK_DES3)
-+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]);
-+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf;
-+ }
-+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Save the key information used in this session.
-+ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX;
-+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len;
-+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len);
-+ }
-+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
-+err:
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
-+ if (digests[i].nid == nid)
-+ return (digests[i].id);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+ int index;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
-+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ pdp = &digests[index];
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
-+ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
-+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+
-+ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
-+ if (count == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
-+ count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ unsigned long len;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+ len = ctx->digest->md_size;
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
-+ * to the pool
-+ */
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+
-+ /* The copy-from state */
-+ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Initialize the copy-to state */
-+ if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
-+ goto err;
-+ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
-+
-+ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
-+ &ul_state_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (ul_state_len == 0)
-+ {
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
-+ if (pstate == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
-+ &ul_state_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
-+ ul_state_len, 0, 0);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
-+ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = 1;
-+err:
-+ if (pstate != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pstate);
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
-+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+
-+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
-+ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
-+ * that might have been allocated in the token when
-+ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
-+ * will return the session to the cache.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
-+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
-+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
-+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
-+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
-+ * prefix.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+ int key_len)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
-+ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
-+ {
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
-+ }
-+
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * The secret key object is created in the
-+ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key().
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+err:
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_RSA_X_509
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
-+ * CKM_DSA
-+ *
-+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
-+ * public key slot.
-+ *
-+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_DES3_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES_CBC
-+ * CKM_AES_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES3_ECB
-+ * CKM_DES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_CTR
-+ * CKM_RC4
-+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
-+ *
-+ * Digests optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_MD5
-+ * CKM_SHA_1
-+ * CKM_SHA224
-+ * CKM_SHA256
-+ * CKM_SHA384
-+ * CKM_SHA512
-+ *
-+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
-+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
-+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
-+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
-+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
-+ {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ int slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ int slot_n_digest = 0;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
-+ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-+
-+ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-+
-+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 0;
-+
-+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ /* Check if slot has random support. */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
-+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
-+ &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
-+ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER)
-+ {
-+ slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+ * verifying with CKM_DSA.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
-+ &mech_info);
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
-+ * derivation.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ if (!found_candidate_slot &&
-+ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
-+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
-+ pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover;
-+ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
-+ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might
-+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature
-+ * is used.
-+ */
-+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ best_slot_sofar);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to "
-+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+#else
-+ } /* if */
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ } /* for */
-+
-+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
-+ }
-+
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+ current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-+ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
-+ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
-+
-+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
-+
-+ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ current_slot_n_cipher);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ current_slot_n_digest);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n",
-+ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
-+ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
-+ * otherwise leave it where it is.
-+ */
-+ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
-+ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest))
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n",
-+ PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
-+ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
-+ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
-+ sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
-+ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids,
-+ sizeof (local_digest_nids));
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
-+ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 1;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ int *local_cipher_nids, int id)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
-+ {
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids))
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
-+ ciphers[id].nid;
-+ }
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
-+ int id)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
-+ {
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids))
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
-+ digests[id].nid;
-+ }
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */
-+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln)
-+ {
-+ ASN1_OBJECT *o;
-+ int nid;
-+
-+ if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"",
-+ 1, sn, ln)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* will return NID_undef on error */
-+ nid = OBJ_add_object(o);
-+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
-+
-+ return (nid);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we
-+ * have to help ourselves here.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void)
-+ {
-+ /* are we already set? */
-+ if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just
-+ * follow the format of those that exist.
-+ */
-+ if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) ==
-+ NID_undef)
-+ goto err;
-+ ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr;
-+ if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) ==
-+ NID_undef)
-+ goto err;
-+ ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr;
-+ if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) ==
-+ NID_undef)
-+ goto err;
-+ ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr;
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
-+ {
-+ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
-+ ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
-+ {
-+ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type,
-+ current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
-+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
-+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
-+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
-+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
-+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
-+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
-+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
-+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
-+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
-+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
-+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
-+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
-+ *
-+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
-+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
-+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
-+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
-+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
-+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
-+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said
-+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with
-+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code
-+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for
-+ * asymmetric operations.
-+ *
-+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what
-+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can
-+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be
-+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before,
-+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only.
-+ *
-+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find
-+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric
-+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table
-+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays
-+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the
-+ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token
-+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more
-+ * information.
-+ *
-+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined
-+ * the code won't be used.
-+ */
-+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64)
-+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
-+#else
-+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists,
-+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware
-+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms.
-+ */
-+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ void *handle;
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0;
-+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL;
-+ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
-+ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
-+ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
-+ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ /* this means empty tables */
-+ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef;
-+ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also
-+ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the
-+ * search.
-+ */
-+ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
-+ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1;
-+ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int));
-+ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int));
-+ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef
-+ * is zero now.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i)
-+ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef;
-+ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i)
-+ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are
-+ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables.
-+ */
-+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i],
-+ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids);
-+ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i],
-+ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by
-+ * dlclose(3C).
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ (void) dlclose(handle);
-+ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids;
-+ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids);
-+ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e.,
-+ * non-existent).
-+ */
-+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table)
-+ {
-+ int i = 0;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new
-+ * table.
-+ */
-+ if (nid_table == NULL)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * the table is never full, there is always at least one
-+ * NID_undef.
-+ */
-+ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef)
-+ {
-+ if (nid_table[i++] == nid)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.4.10.1
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Tue Jun 14 21:52:40 2011
-@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-+
-+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]=
-+{
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"},
-+{ 0, NULL}
-+};
-+
-+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]=
-+{
-+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"},
-+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"},
-+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"},
-+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"},
-+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"},
-+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"},
-+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"},
-+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"},
-+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"},
-+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"},
-+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"},
-+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"},
-+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"},
-+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"},
-+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"},
-+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" },
-+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login() failed on token" },
-+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" },
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" },
-+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" },
-+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" },
-+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen() dialog command" },
-+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" },
-+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" },
-+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" },
-+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" },
-+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" },
-+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" },
-+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork() failed" },
-+{ 0, NULL}
-+};
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */
-+
-+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0;
-+static int pk11_error_init = 1;
-+
-+static void
-+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
-+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
-+
-+ if (pk11_error_init)
-+ {
-+ pk11_error_init = 0;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
-+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_error_init == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
-+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
-+#endif
-+ pk11_error_init = 1;
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+void
-+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
-+{
-+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
-+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
-+ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv)
-+{
-+ char tmp_buf[20];
-+
-+ PK11err(function, reason);
-+ (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
-+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
-+}
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.9.10.2
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Fri Oct 4 14:45:25 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H
-+#define HW_PK11_ERR_H
-+
-+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
-+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv);
-+#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
-+
-+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */
-+
-+/* Function codes. */
-+
-+#define PK11_F_INIT 100
-+#define PK11_F_FINISH 101
-+#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102
-+#define PK11_F_CTRL 103
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114
-+#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115
-+#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116
-+#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117
-+#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130
-+#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131
-+#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132
-+#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133
-+#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134
-+#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135
-+#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136
-+#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139
-+#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143
-+#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145
-+#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD 147
-+#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148
-+#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151
-+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152
-+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153
-+#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154
-+#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155
-+#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156
-+#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157
-+#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159
-+#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160
-+#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161
-+#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162
-+#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163
-+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164
-+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165
-+#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166
-+
-+/* Reason codes. */
-+#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100
-+#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101
-+#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102
-+#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103
-+#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104
-+#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105
-+#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106
-+#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107
-+#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108
-+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109
-+#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110
-+#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111
-+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112
-+#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116
-+#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118
-+#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119
-+#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120
-+#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123
-+#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124
-+#define PK11_R_SIGN 125
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131
-+#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132
-+#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133
-+#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138
-+#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139
-+#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140
-+#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141
-+#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142
-+#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143
-+#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144
-+#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148
-+#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156
-+#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157
-+#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158
-+#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159
-+#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160
-+#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162
-+#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164
-+#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165
-+#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166
-+
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167
-+#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169
-+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170
-+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171
-+#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172
-+#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173
-+#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177
-+#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179
-+#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180
-+#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181
-+#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182
-+#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183
-+#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183
-+#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184
-+#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185
-+#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186
-+
-+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */
-+#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32
-+
-+#ifdef NOPTHREADS
-+/*
-+ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the
-+ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global
-+ * per-process lock for the whole engine.
-+ *
-+ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as
-+ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but
-+ * it's safe.
-+ */
-+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11
-+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the
-+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation
-+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list.
-+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object
-+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls.
-+ *
-+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list
-+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request
-+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done.
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION
-+ {
-+ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next;
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */
-+ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */
-+ CK_BBOOL pub_persistent; /* is pub key in keystore? */
-+ CK_BBOOL priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */
-+ union
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
-+ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */
-+ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */
-+ } u_RSA;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
-+ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */
-+ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */
-+ } u_DSA;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */
-+ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */
-+ } u_DH;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */
-+ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
-+ int key_len; /* priv key len */
-+ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */
-+ } u_cipher;
-+ } opdata_u;
-+ } PK11_SESSION;
-+
-+#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key
-+#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key
-+#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub
-+#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv
-+#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_pn_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_pe_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num
-+#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key
-+#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh
-+#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num
-+#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key
-+#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key
-+#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len
-+#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt
-+
-+/*
-+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types:
-+ * 1) asymmetric operations
-+ * 2) random operations
-+ * 3) symmetric and digest operations
-+ *
-+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware
-+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware
-+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support
-+ * only a single group of operations.
-+ *
-+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have
-+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from
-+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots.
-+ *
-+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are
-+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache.
-+ */
-+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM
-+ {
-+ OP_RAND,
-+ OP_RSA,
-+ OP_DSA,
-+ OP_DH,
-+ OP_CIPHER,
-+ OP_DIGEST,
-+ OP_MAX
-+ } PK11_OPTYPE;
-+
-+/*
-+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches
-+ * and locks associated with the lists.
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *head;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *lock;
-+#endif
-+ } PK11_CACHE;
-+
-+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */
-+typedef struct PK11_active_st
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h;
-+ unsigned int refcnt;
-+ struct PK11_active_st *prev;
-+ struct PK11_active_st *next;
-+ } PK11_active;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[];
-+#endif
-+extern PK11_active *active_list[];
-+/*
-+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See
-+ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation.
-+ */
-+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0)
-+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0)
-+#else
-+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
-+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
-+#endif
-+
-+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
-+
-+#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.32.4.7
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:45:25 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
-+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
-+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
-+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* RSA stuff */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa);
-+#else
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa);
-+#endif
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* DSA stuff */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
-+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
-+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
-+ DSA *dsa);
-+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* DH stuff */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
-+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
-+#endif
-+
-+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
-+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
-+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
-+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
-+
-+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private);
-+
-+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
-+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
-+#else
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
-+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
-+ * variable and jump to the specified label.
-+ */
-+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
-+ { \
-+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
-+ { \
-+ var = TRUE; \
-+ if (unlock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ goto label; \
-+ } \
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
-+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
-+ if (entry->h == h)
-+ return (entry);
-+
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
-+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
-+ * failure.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* search for entry in the active list */
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
-+ entry->refcnt++;
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
-+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
-+ if (entry == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ entry->h = h;
-+ entry->refcnt = 1;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
-+ if (active_list[type] == NULL)
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ else /* make the entry first in the list */
-+ {
-+ entry->next = active_list[type];
-+ active_list[type]->prev = entry;
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (entry->refcnt);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+void
-+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *prev_entry;
-+
-+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
-+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ prev_entry->next = entry->next;
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ active_list[type] = entry->next;
-+ /* we were the first but not the only one */
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* sanitization */
-+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ OPENSSL_free(entry);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
-+void
-+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
-+ switch (type)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
-+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
-+ *
-+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
-+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
-+ entry->refcnt--;
-+ if (entry->refcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 RSA method",
-+ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */
-+ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */
-+ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */
-+ NULL, /* app_data */
-+ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */
-+ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */
-+ };
-+
-+RSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_RSA(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_rsa);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 DSA method",
-+ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */
-+ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
-+ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */
-+ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */
-+ 0, /* flags */
-+ NULL /* app_data */
-+ };
-+
-+DSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_DSA(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_dsa);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/*
-+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
-+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
-+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
-+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
-+ * enough.
-+ */
-+#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8
-+
-+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 DH method",
-+ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */
-+ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_DH_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */
-+ 0, /* flags */
-+ NULL, /* app_data */
-+ NULL /* generate_params */
-+ };
-+
-+DH_METHOD *
-+PK11_DH(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_dh);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
-+
-+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
-+#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20
-+#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/*
-+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
-+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
-+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
-+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-+err:
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
-+ * should be catched in the padding functions
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-+err:
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ BIGNUM f;
-+ int j, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *p;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ BN_init(&f);
-+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
-+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
-+ */
-+ if (flen > num)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* make data into a big number */
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
-+ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
-+ */
-+ for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
-+ if (buf[j] != 0)
-+ break;
-+
-+ p = buf + j;
-+ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (r < 0)
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-+
-+err:
-+ BN_clear_free(&f);
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ BIGNUM f;
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *p;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ BN_init(&f);
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-+ if (buf == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
-+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
-+ */
-+ if (flen > num)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
-+ * Needs to skip these 0's here
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
-+ if (buf[i] != 0)
-+ break;
-+
-+ p = buf + i;
-+ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (r < 0)
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-+
-+err:
-+ BN_clear_free(&f);
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
-+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_encrypted;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
-+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
-+ rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ retval = ul_sig_len;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
-+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_decrypted;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
-+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
-+ p_mech, h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_decrypted;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
-+ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
-+ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
-+ * structures.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
-+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
-+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ unsigned long ulsiglen;
-+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
-+
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ ulsiglen = j;
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
-+ *siglen = ulsiglen;
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa)
-+#else
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa)
-+#endif
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i,
-+ (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
-+
-+#define MAXATTR 1024
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *privkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for private keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
-+ * never ask for private components.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_TRUE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
-+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
-+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm
-+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer
-+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However,
-+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect
-+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We
-+ * do not check the return value because even in case
-+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key
-+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and
-+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the
-+ * OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not
-+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for
-+ * consistency reasons.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
-+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we
-+ * must take care of handle management ourselves.
-+ */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
-+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+ /*
-+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
-+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
-+ * in the keystore.
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(privkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ rollback = rollback;
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *pubkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for public keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_FALSE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
-+ * structure. No cache hit is possible.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling
-+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
-+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
-+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
-+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
-+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
-+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
-+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
-+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
-+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
-+ */
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(pubkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
-+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ int i;
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
-+
-+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
-+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
-+ *rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
-+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
-+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto set;
-+ }
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd'
-+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA
-+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for
-+ * searching for the private key handle.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ /*
-+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
-+ * session keys.
-+ */
-+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components
-+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the
-+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a
-+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just
-+ * create a new session key using the private
-+ * components from the RSA structure.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+set:
-+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never
-+ * extract private components from the keystore. In
-+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the
-+ * application to properly cope with that. It is
-+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by
-+ * reference are used we expect it to be used
-+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there
-+ * is no problem. If the application expects the
-+ * private components to be read from the keystore
-+ * then that is not a supported way of usage.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ *rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
-+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
-+ * 'n'/'e' components as well.
-+ */
-+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n);
-+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e);
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0 &&
-+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
-+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ *
-+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
-+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
-+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
-+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
-+ * both data signing and verifying.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making
-+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent
-+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure
-+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the
-+ * public component since with the keys by reference
-+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA
-+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we
-+ * compare the handle as well.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* The DSA function implementation */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static DSA_SIG *
-+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
-+ int i;
-+ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
-+
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
-+ * each is 20 bytes long
-+ */
-+ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
-+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
-+ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
-+
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+
-+ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
-+ if (dlen > i)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto ret;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+
-+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
-+ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ dsa_sig->r = r;
-+ dsa_sig->s = s;
-+
-+ret:
-+ if (dsa_sig == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (r != NULL)
-+ BN_free(r);
-+ if (s != NULL)
-+ BN_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
-+ return (dsa_sig);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
-+ DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int retval = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
-+
-+ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
-+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
-+ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
-+
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+
-+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
-+
-+ if (dlen > i)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto ret;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
-+ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
-+ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
-+ */
-+ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
-+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
-+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
-+ BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ retval = 1;
-+ret:
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
-+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
-+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ int i;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
-+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */
-+ };
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
-+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
-+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
-+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */
-+ };
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
-+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
-+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/* The DH function implementation */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Generate DH key-pair.
-+ *
-+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
-+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
-+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
-+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
-+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG i;
-+ CK_RV rv, rv1;
-+ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
-+
-+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
-+ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
-+ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
-+ */
-+ pub_key_template[1].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
-+ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
-+ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
-+ {
-+ pub_key_template[2].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
-+ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
-+ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
-+ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are
-+ * destroyed before return and thus not cached.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
-+ &mechanism,
-+ pub_key_template,
-+ ul_pub_key_attr_count,
-+ priv_key_template,
-+ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
-+ &h_pub_key,
-+ &h_priv_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
-+ * should be sufficient for reuse.
-+ */
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
-+ {
-+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
-+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
-+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
-+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
-+ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
-+ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
-+ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
-+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
-+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
-+ {
-+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
-+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
-+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
-+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
-+ {
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = 1;
-+
-+err:
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
-+ DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ CK_ULONG seclen;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
-+ {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)},
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int ret = -1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
-+ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+ seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
-+ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
-+ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
-+
-+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
-+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
-+ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
-+ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
-+ &mechanism,
-+ h_key,
-+ priv_key_template,
-+ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
-+ &h_derived_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
-+ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
-+ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
-+ */
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
-+ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
-+ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
-+ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
-+ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
-+ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
-+ * pre-master secret.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
-+ {
-+ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
-+ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+
-+ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (mechanism.pParameter)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
-+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
-+ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ int i;
-+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
-+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ key_template[0].pValue = &class;
-+ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+
-+ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
-+
-+ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
-+ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
-+
-+ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
-+ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dh;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
-+ key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ *
-+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
-+ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
-+ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
-+ * in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * Local function to simplify key template population
-+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
-+ */
-+static int
-+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
-+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG len = 0;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is
-+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers.
-+ */
-+ if (bn != NULL)
-+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-+
-+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ *ul_value_len = len;
-+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
-+ if (*p_value == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static void
-+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
-+ {
-+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
-+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the
-+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got.
-+ * Assume object store locked.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 OK
-+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found
-+ */
-+static int
-+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG objcnt;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+
-+ if (objcnt > 1)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ else if (objcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* from uri stuff */
-+
-+extern char *pk11_pin;
-+
-+static int pk11_get_pin(void);
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_get_pin(void)
-+{
-+ char *pin;
-+
-+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: ");
-+ if (pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
-+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
-+ * multiple threads.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#if 0
-+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been
-+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we
-+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access
-+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for
-+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED
-+ * flag is set.
-+ */
-+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) &&
-+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread
-+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We
-+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with
-+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the
-+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment
-+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
-+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call
-+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We
-+ * lock right before C_Login().
-+ */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE))
-+ {
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
-+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
-+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
-+ * the engine.
-+ *
-+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
-+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
-+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
-+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+ goto err_locked;
-+ }
-+
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If token does not require login we take it as the
-+ * login was done.
-+ */
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err_locked:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the
-+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login()
-+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for
-+ * this.
-+ *
-+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
-+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
-+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
-+ {
-+ static char buf[128];
-+ HANDLE h;
-+ DWORD cc, mode;
-+ int cnt;
-+
-+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
-+ fputs(prompt, stderr);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
-+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
-+
-+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
-+ {
-+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
-+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
-+ break;
-+ fputc('*', stdout);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ }
-+
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
-+ buf[cnt] = '\0';
-+ fputs("\n", stderr);
-+ return buf;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.2.4.2
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:32 2011
-@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
-+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */
-+
-+#define token_lock pk11ca_token_lock
-+#define find_lock pk11ca_find_lock
-+#define active_list pk11ca_active_list
-+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags
-+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID
-+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11ca_error
-+#define PK11err_add_data PK11CAerr_add_data
-+#define pk11_get_session pk11ca_get_session
-+#define pk11_return_session pk11ca_return_session
-+#define pk11_active_add pk11ca_active_add
-+#define pk11_active_delete pk11ca_active_delete
-+#define pk11_active_remove pk11ca_active_remove
-+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11ca_free_active_list
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv
-+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11ca_load_privkey
-+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11ca_load_pubkey
-+#define PK11_RSA PK11CA_RSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv
-+#define PK11_DSA PK11CA_DSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11ca_destroy_dh_object
-+#define PK11_DH PK11CA_DH
-+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11ca_token_relogin
-+#define pFuncList pk11ca_pFuncList
-+#define pk11_pin pk11ca_pin
-+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11ca
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.3.4.3
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c Fri Oct 4 14:45:25 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#error RSA is disabled
-+#endif
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <signal.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <dlfcn.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Debug mutexes */
-+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */
-+#define DEBUG_MUTEX
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+#define __USE_UNIX98
-+#endif
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
-+
-+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
-+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
-+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
-+/*#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#define OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11so.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
-+
-+/*
-+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
-+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
-+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
-+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
-+
-+/*
-+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
-+ * logging into the token.
-+ */
-+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-+
-+/*
-+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
-+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
-+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
-+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
-+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
-+ * PK11_SESSION object.
-+ *
-+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
-+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
-+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
-+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
-+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
-+ *
-+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
-+ * They are also used for active list protection.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
-+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
-+ * list) for given algorithm type
-+ */
-+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
-+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
-+ * without losing the secret key objects.
-+ */
-+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+/* ENGINE level stuff */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-+
-+/* RAND stuff */
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
-+
-+/* These functions are also used in other files */
-+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+
-+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
-+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+
-+/* Local helper functions */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent);
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
-+
-+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
-+
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
-+
-+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \
-+ { \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \
-+ { \
-+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \
-+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \
-+ } \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ }
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
-+ */
-+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
-+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
-+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
-+ {
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
-+ "SO_PATH",
-+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_PIN,
-+ "PIN",
-+ "Specifies the pin code",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SLOT,
-+ "SLOT",
-+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
-+ },
-+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_seed,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_cleanup,
-+ pk11_rand_add,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_status
-+ };
-+
-+
-+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
-+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
-+#endif
-+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
-+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)";
-+
-+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
-+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
-+
-+/*
-+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
-+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
-+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
-+ */
-+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
-+
-+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
-+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
-+char *pk11_pin = NULL;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
-+static int pk11_pid = 0;
-+
-+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
-+
-+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
-+
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr);
-+
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr);
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ session_cache[type].lock =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+#else
-+ return (1);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+
-+ if (token_lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock);
-+ token_lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
-+ */
-+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_have_random)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
-+ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
-+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-+#error "dynamic engine not supported"
-+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
-+ {
-+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
-+
-+#else
-+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
-+
-+ if (!ret)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(ret))
-+ {
-+ ENGINE_free(ret);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+void
-+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
-+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
-+ */
-+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
-+ if (!pk11_dso)
-+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
-+ if (!e_pk11)
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
-+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
-+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
-+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
-+
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ ERR_clear_error();
-+ }
-+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
-+
-+/*
-+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
-+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
-+ */
-+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ }
-+
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+
-+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
-+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
-+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
-+ * accessible to all threads.
-+ */
-+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
-+{
-+ return (pk11_library_init(e));
-+}
-+
-+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args =
-+ {
-+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */
-+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
-+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
-+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
-+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
-+ CK_INFO info;
-+ int any_slot_found;
-+ int i;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which
-+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still
-+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine
-+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is
-+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application
-+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork()
-+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can
-+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional
-+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In
-+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly
-+ * initialize the engine again.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_library_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ /*
-+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
-+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
-+ * engine first.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
-+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
-+ if (!p)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ rv = p(&pFuncList);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
-+
-+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
-+#endif
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
-+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
-+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
-+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
-+ * because no slot was present.
-+ */
-+ if (any_slot_found == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
-+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
-+ pk11_pid = getpid();
-+ /*
-+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
-+ * will do the cleanup.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
-+ goto err;
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
-+ /*
-+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
-+ * for asymmetric ciphers.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ active_list[i] = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
-+ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
-+ * library.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
-+
-+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* free all active lists */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ pk11_free_active_list(i);
-+
-+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects.
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ pFuncList = NULL;
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ pk11_pid = 0;
-+ /*
-+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
-+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
-+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
-+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
-+ * the engine before calling fork().
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
-+ {
-+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
-+
-+ switch (cmd)
-+ {
-+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (initialized)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
-+ case PK11_CMD_PIN:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
-+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
-+ {
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
-+ * the calling functions do not care anyway
-+ */
-+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
-+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
-+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
-+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
-+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
-+ */
-+PK11_SESSION *
-+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
-+#endif
-+ static pid_t pid = 0;
-+ pid_t new_pid;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
-+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
-+ * here, with no PID information.
-+ */
-+ if (pid == 0)
-+ pid = getpid();
-+
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp = freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
-+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
-+ * structure from the freelist.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
-+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
-+ * mark them as unused.
-+ */
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
-+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
-+ */
-+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
-+ {
-+ pid = new_pid;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
-+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
-+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
-+ * head of the list).
-+ */
-+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp1->next;
-+ /*
-+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
-+ * sessions and destroy all objects.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
-+ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
-+
-+ /* Initialize the process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
-+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
-+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
-+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
-+ * re-initialization.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
-+ * the caller cope with the situation.
-+ */
-+ freelist = sp;
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->pid == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
-+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (sp != NULL)
-+ sp->next = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (sp);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+void
-+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
-+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
-+ * next time we will ask for a new session.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
-+ return;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp->next = freelist;
-+ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ int type;
-+
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
-+ * return 0 on exit.
-+ */
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
-+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
-+ * return an error on return.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
-+ pid_t mypid = getpid();
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ int ret = 1;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are probably a child process so force the
-+ * reinitialize of the session
-+ */
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
-+ return (0);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ }
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->pid = getpid();
-+
-+ if (optype == OP_RSA)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
-+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
-+ */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e'
-+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We
-+ * must free those as well.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
-+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
-+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
-+ */
-+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
-+ *
-+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
-+ * public key slot.
-+ *
-+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
-+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
-+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
-+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
-+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
-+ {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
-+
-+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 0;
-+
-+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ /* Check if slot has random support. */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
-+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
-+ &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
-+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might
-+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature
-+ * is used.
-+ */
-+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ best_slot_sofar);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to "
-+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+#else
-+ } /* if */
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ } /* for */
-+
-+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 1;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.2.4.2
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:32 2011
-@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
-+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */
-+
-+#define token_lock pk11so_token_lock
-+#define find_lock pk11so_find_lock
-+#define active_list pk11so_active_list
-+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11so_pubkey_token_flags
-+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID
-+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11so_error
-+#define PK11err_add_data PK11SOerr_add_data
-+#define pk11_get_session pk11so_get_session
-+#define pk11_return_session pk11so_return_session
-+#define pk11_active_add pk11so_active_add
-+#define pk11_active_delete pk11so_active_delete
-+#define pk11_active_remove pk11so_active_remove
-+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11so_free_active_list
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv
-+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11so_load_privkey
-+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11so_load_pubkey
-+#define PK11_RSA PK11SO_RSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv
-+#define PK11_DSA PK11SO_DSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11so_destroy_dh_object
-+#define PK11_DH PK11SO_DH
-+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11so_token_relogin
-+#define pFuncList pk11so_pFuncList
-+#define pk11_pin pk11so_pin
-+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11so
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.2.4.6
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:45:25 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#error RSA is disabled
-+#endif
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
-+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11so.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
-+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
-+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x)
-+#endif
-+
-+/* RSA stuff */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+
-+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
-+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
-+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
-+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
-+
-+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private);
-+
-+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
-+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
-+#else
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
-+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
-+ * variable and jump to the specified label.
-+ */
-+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
-+ { \
-+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
-+ { \
-+ var = TRUE; \
-+ if (unlock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ goto label; \
-+ } \
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
-+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
-+ if (entry->h == h)
-+ return (entry);
-+
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
-+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
-+ * failure.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* search for entry in the active list */
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
-+ entry->refcnt++;
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
-+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
-+ if (entry == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ entry->h = h;
-+ entry->refcnt = 1;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
-+ if (active_list[type] == NULL)
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ else /* make the entry first in the list */
-+ {
-+ entry->next = active_list[type];
-+ active_list[type]->prev = entry;
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (entry->refcnt);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+void
-+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *prev_entry;
-+
-+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
-+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ prev_entry->next = entry->next;
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ active_list[type] = entry->next;
-+ /* we were the first but not the only one */
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* sanitization */
-+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ OPENSSL_free(entry);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
-+void
-+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
-+ switch (type)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
-+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
-+ *
-+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
-+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
-+ entry->refcnt--;
-+ if (entry->refcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa;
-+
-+RSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_RSA(void)
-+ {
-+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa;
-+
-+ if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-+ memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa));
-+ pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method";
-+ pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign;
-+ }
-+ return (&pk11_rsa);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
-+
-+/*
-+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
-+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
-+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ unsigned long ulsiglen;
-+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
-+
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ ulsiglen = j;
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
-+ *siglen = ulsiglen;
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
-+
-+#define MAXATTR 1024
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *privkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for private keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
-+ * never ask for private components.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_TRUE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
-+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
-+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm
-+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer
-+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However,
-+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect
-+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We
-+ * do not check the return value because even in case
-+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key
-+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and
-+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the
-+ * OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not
-+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for
-+ * consistency reasons.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
-+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we
-+ * must take care of handle management ourselves.
-+ */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
-+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+ /*
-+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
-+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
-+ * in the keystore.
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(privkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ rollback = rollback;
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *pubkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for public keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_FALSE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
-+ * structure. No cache hit is possible.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling
-+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
-+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
-+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
-+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
-+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
-+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
-+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
-+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
-+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
-+ */
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(pubkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
-+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ int i;
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
-+
-+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
-+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
-+ *rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
-+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
-+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto set;
-+ }
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd'
-+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA
-+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for
-+ * searching for the private key handle.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ /*
-+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
-+ * session keys.
-+ */
-+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components
-+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the
-+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a
-+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just
-+ * create a new session key using the private
-+ * components from the RSA structure.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+set:
-+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never
-+ * extract private components from the keystore. In
-+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the
-+ * application to properly cope with that. It is
-+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by
-+ * reference are used we expect it to be used
-+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there
-+ * is no problem. If the application expects the
-+ * private components to be read from the keystore
-+ * then that is not a supported way of usage.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ *rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
-+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
-+ * 'n'/'e' components as well.
-+ */
-+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n);
-+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e);
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0 &&
-+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
-+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ *
-+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
-+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
-+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
-+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
-+ * both data signing and verifying.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making
-+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent
-+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure
-+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the
-+ * public component since with the keys by reference
-+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA
-+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we
-+ * compare the handle as well.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Local function to simplify key template population
-+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
-+ */
-+static int
-+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
-+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG len = 0;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is
-+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers.
-+ */
-+ if (bn != NULL)
-+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-+
-+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ *ul_value_len = len;
-+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
-+ if (*p_value == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static void
-+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
-+ {
-+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
-+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the
-+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got.
-+ * Assume object store locked.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 OK
-+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found
-+ */
-+static int
-+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG objcnt;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+
-+ if (objcnt > 1)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ else if (objcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* from uri stuff */
-+
-+extern char *pk11_pin;
-+
-+static int pk11_get_pin(void);
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_get_pin(void)
-+{
-+ char *pin;
-+
-+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: ");
-+ if (pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
-+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
-+ * multiple threads.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#if 0
-+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been
-+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we
-+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access
-+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for
-+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED
-+ * flag is set.
-+ */
-+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) &&
-+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread
-+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We
-+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with
-+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the
-+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment
-+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
-+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call
-+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We
-+ * lock right before C_Login().
-+ */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE))
-+ {
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
-+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
-+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
-+ * the engine.
-+ *
-+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
-+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
-+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
-+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+ goto err_locked;
-+ }
-+
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If token does not require login we take it as the
-+ * login was done.
-+ */
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err_locked:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the
-+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login()
-+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for
-+ * this.
-+ *
-+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
-+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
-+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
-+ {
-+ static char buf[128];
-+ HANDLE h;
-+ DWORD cc, mode;
-+ int cnt;
-+
-+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
-+ fputs(prompt, stderr);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
-+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
-+
-+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
-+ {
-+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
-+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
-+ break;
-+ fputc('*', stdout);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ }
-+
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
-+ buf[cnt] = '\0';
-+ fputs("\n", stderr);
-+ return buf;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
-@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
-+/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */
-+
-+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
-+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
-+
-+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
-+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
-+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
-+ * referencing the derived work.
-+
-+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
-+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
-+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
-+ * warranty of any kind.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef _PKCS11_H_
-+#define _PKCS11_H_ 1
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+extern "C" {
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by
-+ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These
-+ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them
-+ * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend
-+ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also
-+ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or
-+ * dynamically).
-+ *
-+ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention
-+ * for Cryptoki structures should be set. The Cryptoki
-+ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte
-+ * aligned.
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
-+ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following
-+ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
-+ *
-+ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+ *
-+ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including
-+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
-+ *
-+ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using
-+ * the following preprocessor directive before including
-+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
-+ *
-+ * #pragma pack(1)
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this. You might
-+ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything.
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * Now for the macros:
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an
-+ * object. It can be used like this:
-+ *
-+ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
-+ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_PTR *
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_PTR far *
-+ *
-+ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_PTR *
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
-+ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a
-+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the
-+ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in
-+ * a Cryptoki library:
-+ *
-+ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
-+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
-+ * )
-+ * {
-+ * ...
-+ * }
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a
-+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
-+ * might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType name
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
-+ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a
-+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the
-+ * following fashion:
-+ *
-+ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
-+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
-+ * );
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a
-+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
-+ * might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType name
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro
-+ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or
-+ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a
-+ * function name. It should be used in the following fashion:
-+ *
-+ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function
-+ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV.
-+ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args);
-+ *
-+ * or
-+ *
-+ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a
-+ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning
-+ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type
-+ * // funcPtrType.
-+ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args);
-+ * funcPtrType funcPtr;
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access
-+ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might
-+ * be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __export _far _pascal (* name)
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType (* name)
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
-+ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of
-+ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback.
-+ * It should be used in the following fashion:
-+ *
-+ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args);
-+ *
-+ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback
-+ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also
-+ * be used like this:
-+ *
-+ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args);
-+ * myCallbackType myCallback;
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32
-+ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType (* name)
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType _far _pascal (* name)
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType (* name)
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer.
-+ *
-+ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well),
-+ * this should best be defined by
-+ *
-+ * #ifndef NULL_PTR
-+ * #define NULL_PTR 0
-+ * #endif
-+ */
-+
-+
-+/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the
-+ * file pkcs11t.h. */
-+#include "pkcs11t.h"
-+
-+#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y
-+
-+
-+/* ==============================================================
-+ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points.
-+ * ==============================================================
-+ */
-+
-+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
-+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
-+ extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name)
-+
-+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
-+ * function prototypes. */
-+#include "pkcs11f.h"
-+
-+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+
-+/* ==============================================================
-+ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for
-+ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is
-+ * a pointer to that kind of function.
-+ * ==============================================================
-+ */
-+
-+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
-+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
-+ typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name))
-+
-+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
-+ * function prototypes. */
-+#include "pkcs11f.h"
-+
-+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+
-+/* ==============================================================
-+ * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST
-+ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version
-+ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in
-+ * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in
-+ * pkcs11t.h.
-+ * ==============================================================
-+ */
-+
-+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
-+ __PASTE(CK_,name) name;
-+
-+struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST {
-+
-+ CK_VERSION version; /* Cryptoki version */
-+
-+/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */
-+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
-+ * function prototypes. */
-+#include "pkcs11f.h"
-+
-+};
-+
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+
-+#undef __PASTE
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
-@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@
-+/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */
-+
-+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
-+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
-+
-+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
-+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
-+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
-+ * referencing the derived work.
-+
-+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
-+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
-+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
-+ * warranty of any kind.
-+ */
-+
-+/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */
-+/* Cryptoki function prototypes. Because this information is */
-+/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */
-+/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */
-+/* should not be altered. */
-+
-+/* General-purpose */
-+
-+/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets
-+ * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR
-+ * and dereferenced */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the
-+ * Cryptoki library. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to
-+ * function list */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Slot and token management */
-+
-+/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in
-+ * the system. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */
-+ CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token
-+ * in the system. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types
-+ * supported by a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular
-+ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Session management */
-+
-+/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a
-+ * token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */
-+ CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a
-+ * token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation
-+ * in a session. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
-+ * operation in a session. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */
-+ CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Object management */
-+
-+/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the
-+ * copy. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object
-+ * attributes. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object
-+ * attributes */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session
-+ * objects that match a template. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session
-+ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object
-+ * handles. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session
-+ * objects. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Encryption and decryption */
-+
-+/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Message digesting */
-+
-+/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting
-+ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of
-+ * the data already digested. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Signing and MACing */
-+
-+/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption)
-+ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to
-+ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the
-+ *signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single
-+ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the
-+ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
-+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
-+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation,
-+ * returning the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where
-+ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the
-+ * data can be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Verifying signatures and MACs */
-+
-+/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the
-+ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot
-+ * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
-+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext
-+ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification
-+ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data,
-+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification
-+ * operation, checking the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification
-+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part
-+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
-+
-+/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting
-+ * and encryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
-+ * digesting operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
-+ * encryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
-+ * verify operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Key management */
-+
-+/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key
-+ * object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair,
-+ * creating new key objects. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session
-+ * handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen
-+ * mech. */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template
-+ * for pub.
-+ * key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub.
-+ * attrs. */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template
-+ * for priv.
-+ * key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv.
-+ * attrs. */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub.
-+ * key
-+ * handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets
-+ * priv. key
-+ * handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new
-+ * key object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */
-+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key
-+ * object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */
-+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Random number generation */
-+
-+/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's
-+ * random number generator. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Parallel function management */
-+
-+/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an
-+ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an
-+ * application. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function
-+ * running in parallel. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */
-+
-+/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion,
-+ * removal, etc.) to occur. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */
-+);
-+#endif
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008
-@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@
-+/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */
-+
-+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
-+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
-+
-+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
-+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
-+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
-+ * referencing the derived work.
-+
-+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
-+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
-+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
-+ * warranty of any kind.
-+ */
-+
-+/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that
-+ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that
-+ * must be set before including this file. */
-+
-+#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_
-+#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1
-+
-+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2
-+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20
-+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3
-+
-+#define CK_TRUE 1
-+#define CK_FALSE 0
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#ifndef FALSE
-+#define FALSE CK_FALSE
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef TRUE
-+#define TRUE CK_TRUE
-+#endif
-+#endif
-+
-+/* an unsigned 8-bit value */
-+typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE;
-+
-+/* an unsigned 8-bit character */
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR;
-+
-+/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR;
-+
-+/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL;
-+
-+/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */
-+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG;
-+
-+/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */
-+/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef long int CK_LONG;
-+
-+/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS;
-+
-+
-+/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */
-+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL)
-+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0
-+
-+
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
-+typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR;
-+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR;
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR;
-+typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR;
-+
-+/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */
-+typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */
-+/* handle or object handle */
-+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_VERSION {
-+ CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */
-+ CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */
-+} CK_VERSION;
-+
-+typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_INFO {
-+ /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from
-+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
-+ CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* Cryptoki interface ver */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */
-+
-+ /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */
-+} CK_INFO;
-+
-+typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that
-+ * Cryptoki provides to an application */
-+/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG
-+ * for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION;
-+#define CKN_SURRENDER 0
-+
-+/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED 1
-+
-+
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID;
-+
-+typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */
-+typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO {
-+ /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from
-+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags;
-+
-+ /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */
-+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */
-+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */
-+} CK_SLOT_INFO;
-+
-+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */
-+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/
-+#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */
-+
-+typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */
-+typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO {
-+ /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from
-+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */
-+
-+ /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount,
-+ * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been
-+ * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */
-+
-+ /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */
-+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */
-+ CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */
-+} CK_TOKEN_INFO;
-+
-+/* The flags parameter is defined as follows:
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random #
-+ * generator */
-+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is
-+ * write-
-+ * protected */
-+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must
-+ * login */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's
-+ * PIN is set */
-+
-+/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set,
-+ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic
-+ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys
-+ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */
-+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020
-+
-+/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means
-+ * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that
-+ * clock is returned in the token info structure */
-+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040
-+
-+/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is
-+ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login
-+ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */
-+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100
-+
-+/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true,
-+ * that means that a single session with the token can perform
-+ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and
-+ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt
-+ * and sign) */
-+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200
-+
-+/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
-+ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an
-+ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11.
-+ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause
-+ * the token to be reinitialized. */
-+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400
-+
-+/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is
-+ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for
-+ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and
-+ onwards. */
-+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
-+ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once
-+ * since the last successful authentication. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
-+ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not
-+ * possible. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token
-+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
-+ * expired by the card. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
-+ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since
-+ * the last successful authentication. */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO
-+ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible.
-+ */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token
-+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
-+ * expired by the card. */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000
-+
-+typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that
-+ * identifies a session */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE;
-+
-+typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */
-+/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE;
-+/* Security Officer */
-+#define CKU_SO 0
-+/* Normal user */
-+#define CKU_USER 1
-+/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */
-+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2
-+
-+/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */
-+/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE;
-+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0
-+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1
-+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2
-+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3
-+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */
-+typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
-+ CK_STATE state;
-+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */
-+
-+ /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */
-+} CK_SESSION_INFO;
-+
-+/* The flags are defined in the following table:
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */
-+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */
-+
-+typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an
-+ * object */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE;
-+
-+typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or
-+ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined
-+ * as follows: */
-+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS;
-+
-+/* The following classes of objects are defined: */
-+/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */
-+/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */
-+/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000
-+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001
-+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002
-+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003
-+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004
-+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005
-+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006
-+#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007
-+
-+/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKO_OTP_KEY 0x00000008
-+
-+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a
-+ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object
-+ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The following hardware feature types are defined */
-+/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001
-+#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002
-+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003
-+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */
-+/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE;
-+
-+/* the following key types are defined: */
-+#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000
-+#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001
-+#define CKK_DH 0x00000002
-+
-+/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */
-+/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */
-+#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003
-+#define CKK_EC 0x00000003
-+#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004
-+#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005
-+
-+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010
-+#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011
-+#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012
-+#define CKK_DES 0x00000013
-+#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014
-+#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015
-+
-+/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016
-+#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017
-+/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */
-+#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018
-+#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018
-+#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019
-+#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A
-+#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B
-+#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C
-+#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D
-+#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E
-+#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F
-+
-+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020
-+#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021
-+
-+/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKK_SECURID 0x00000022
-+#define CKK_HOTP 0x00000023
-+#define CKK_ACTI 0x00000024
-+
-+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025
-+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026
-+
-+
-+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+
-+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate
-+ * type */
-+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG
-+ * for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The following certificate types are defined: */
-+/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */
-+/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000
-+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001
-+#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002
-+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+
-+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute
-+ * type */
-+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which
-+ consists of an array of values. */
-+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1
-+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL 0
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL 1
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY 3
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1
-+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */
-+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED 0
-+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL 1
-+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY 2
-+
-+/* The following attribute types are defined: */
-+#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000
-+#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001
-+#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002
-+#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003
-+#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010
-+#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011
-+
-+/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012
-+
-+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080
-+#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081
-+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082
-+
-+/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new
-+ * for v2.10 */
-+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083
-+#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084
-+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085
-+
-+/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086
-+
-+/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ...
-+ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087
-+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088
-+#define CKA_URL 0x00000089
-+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A
-+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B
-+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090
-+
-+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100
-+#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101
-+#define CKA_ID 0x00000102
-+#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103
-+#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104
-+#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105
-+#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106
-+#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107
-+#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108
-+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109
-+#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A
-+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B
-+#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C
-+#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110
-+#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111
-+#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120
-+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121
-+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122
-+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123
-+#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124
-+#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125
-+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126
-+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127
-+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128
-+#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130
-+#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131
-+#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132
-+
-+/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133
-+#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134
-+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS
-+/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */
-+
-+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160
-+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161
-+
-+/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
-+ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS,
-+ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162
-+#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163
-+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164
-+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165
-+
-+/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166
-+
-+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170
-+
-+/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11,
-+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */
-+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180
-+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180
-+
-+#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181
-+
-+/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS,
-+ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */
-+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200
-+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201
-+
-+/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ...
-+ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202
-+
-+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210
-+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211)
-+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212)
-+
-+/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */
-+#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT 0x00000220
-+#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH 0x00000221
-+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL 0x00000222
-+#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE 0x00000223
-+#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224
-+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT 0x00000225
-+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT 0x00000226
-+#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT 0x00000227
-+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER 0x0000022E
-+#define CKA_OTP_TIME 0x0000022F
-+#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022A
-+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022B
-+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO 0x0000022C
-+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE 0x0000022D
-+
-+
-+/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET
-+ * are new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300
-+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301
-+#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302
-+
-+/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400
-+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401
-+#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402
-+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403
-+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404
-+#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405
-+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406
-+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480
-+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481
-+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482
-+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500
-+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501
-+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502
-+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503
-+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600)
-+
-+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length
-+ * and value of an attribute */
-+typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE {
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
-+
-+ /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */
-+} CK_ATTRIBUTE;
-+
-+typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */
-+typedef struct CK_DATE{
-+ CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */
-+ CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */
-+ CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */
-+} CK_DATE;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism
-+ * type */
-+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE;
-+
-+/* the following mechanism types are defined: */
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001
-+#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002
-+#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003
-+
-+/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS
-+ * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */
-+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004
-+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005
-+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006
-+
-+/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009
-+
-+/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31,
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A
-+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B
-+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D
-+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E
-+
-+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010
-+#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011
-+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012
-+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020
-+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021
-+
-+/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE,
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for
-+ * v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032
-+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040
-+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041
-+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042
-+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043
-+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044
-+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045
-+
-+/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046
-+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047
-+
-+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100
-+#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101
-+#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102
-+#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103
-+
-+/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104
-+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105
-+
-+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110
-+#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111
-+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120
-+#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121
-+#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122
-+#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123
-+
-+/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124
-+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125
-+
-+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130
-+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131
-+#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132
-+#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133
-+#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134
-+
-+/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN,
-+ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC,
-+ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135
-+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136
-+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140
-+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141
-+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142
-+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143
-+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144
-+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145
-+
-+/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150
-+#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151
-+#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152
-+#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153
-+
-+#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200
-+
-+/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201
-+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202
-+
-+#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210
-+
-+/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211
-+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212
-+
-+#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221
-+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222
-+
-+/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC,
-+ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC,
-+ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250
-+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251
-+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252
-+
-+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255
-+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256
-+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257
-+
-+#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260
-+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261
-+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262
-+#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270
-+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271
-+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272
-+
-+/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN 0x00000280
-+#define CKM_SECURID 0x00000282
-+
-+/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN 0x00000290
-+#define CKM_HOTP 0x00000291
-+
-+/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKM_ACTI 0x000002A0
-+#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN 0x000002A1
-+
-+/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */
-+/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */
-+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300
-+#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301
-+#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302
-+#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303
-+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304
-+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305
-+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310
-+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311
-+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312
-+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313
-+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314
-+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315
-+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320
-+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320
-+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321
-+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321
-+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322
-+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322
-+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323
-+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323
-+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324
-+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324
-+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325
-+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325
-+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330
-+#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331
-+#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332
-+#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333
-+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334
-+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335
-+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340
-+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341
-+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342
-+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343
-+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344
-+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345
-+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350
-+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360
-+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362
-+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363
-+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364
-+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365
-+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370
-+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371
-+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372
-+
-+/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN,
-+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and
-+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373
-+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374
-+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375
-+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376
-+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377
-+
-+/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378
-+
-+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380
-+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381
-+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390
-+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391
-+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393
-+#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394
-+#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395
-+
-+/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396
-+
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB
-+
-+/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0
-+
-+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0
-+
-+/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0
-+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1
-+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2
-+#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3
-+#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4
-+#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5
-+
-+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400
-+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401
-+
-+/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500
-+
-+/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */
-+#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE 0x00000510
-+#define CKM_KIP_WRAP 0x00000511
-+#define CKM_KIP_MAC 0x00000512
-+
-+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558
-+
-+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560
-+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561
-+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562
-+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563
-+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564
-+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565
-+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566
-+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567
-+
-+/* Fortezza mechanisms */
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a
-+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010
-+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011
-+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020
-+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030
-+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031
-+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032
-+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033
-+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034
-+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035
-+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036
-+
-+/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11,
-+ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */
-+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040
-+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040
-+
-+#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041
-+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042
-+
-+/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE
-+ * are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050
-+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051
-+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052
-+
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065
-+#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070
-+
-+/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC,
-+ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN,
-+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are
-+ * new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080
-+#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081
-+#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082
-+#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083
-+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084
-+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085
-+
-+/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086
-+
-+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090
-+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091
-+#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092
-+#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093
-+
-+
-+/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100
-+#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101
-+#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102
-+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103
-+#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104
-+#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105
-+
-+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000
-+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002
-+
-+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular
-+ * mechanism */
-+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pParameter;
-+
-+ /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */
-+} CK_MECHANISM;
-+
-+typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular
-+ * mechanism */
-+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO {
-+ CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize;
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize;
-+ CK_FLAGS flags;
-+} CK_MECHANISM_INFO;
-+
-+/* The flags are defined as follows:
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */
-+#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */
-+
-+/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN,
-+ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER,
-+ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP,
-+ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not
-+ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */
-+#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100
-+#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200
-+#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400
-+#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800
-+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000
-+#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000
-+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000
-+#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000
-+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000
-+#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000
-+#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000
-+#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000
-+
-+/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE,
-+ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They
-+ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism
-+ * information. */
-+#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000
-+#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000
-+#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000
-+#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000
-+#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000
-+#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000
-+
-+#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */
-+
-+typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a
-+ * Cryptoki function */
-+/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV;
-+
-+#define CKR_OK 0x00000000
-+#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001
-+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002
-+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003
-+
-+/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */
-+
-+/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006
-+
-+/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS,
-+ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */
-+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007
-+#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008
-+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009
-+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A
-+
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013
-+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020
-+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021
-+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030
-+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031
-+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032
-+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040
-+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051
-+
-+/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054
-+
-+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060
-+
-+/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */
-+
-+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062
-+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063
-+
-+/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED,
-+ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED,
-+ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064
-+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065
-+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066
-+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067
-+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068
-+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069
-+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A
-+
-+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070
-+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071
-+
-+/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID
-+ * were removed for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082
-+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090
-+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091
-+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0
-+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1
-+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2
-+
-+/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3
-+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4
-+
-+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0
-+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1
-+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3
-+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4
-+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5
-+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6
-+
-+/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and
-+ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7
-+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8
-+
-+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0
-+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1
-+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0
-+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1
-+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0
-+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1
-+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2
-+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0
-+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1
-+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2
-+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100
-+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101
-+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102
-+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103
-+
-+/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES
-+ * are new to v2.01 */
-+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104
-+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105
-+
-+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110
-+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112
-+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113
-+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114
-+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115
-+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.11 */
-+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150
-+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160
-+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170
-+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.01 */
-+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190
-+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191
-+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0
-+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1
-+
-+/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE 0x000001B0
-+#define CKR_NEXT_OTP 0x000001B1
-+
-+/* This is new to v2.20 */
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200
-+
-+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+
-+/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_NOTIFICATION event,
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec
-+ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the
-+ * Cryptoki functions */
-+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST;
-+
-+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR;
-+
-+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a
-+ * mutex object */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a
-+ * mutex object */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a
-+ * mutex */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to
-+ * C_Initialize */
-+typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS {
-+ CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex;
-+ CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex;
-+ CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex;
-+ CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex;
-+ CK_FLAGS flags;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved;
-+} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS;
-+
-+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001
-+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002
-+
-+typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* additional flags for parameters to functions */
-+
-+/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */
-+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message
-+ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when
-+ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption
-+ * scheme. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following MGFs are defined */
-+/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512
-+ * are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004
-+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source
-+ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block
-+ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */
-+#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */
-+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
-+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
-+ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen;
-+} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */
-+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
-+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
-+ CK_ULONG sLen;
-+} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */
-+#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001
-+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002
-+
-+/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms,
-+ * where each party contributes one key pair.
-+ */
-+typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */
-+typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
-+} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE;
-+typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined
-+ (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */
-+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003
-+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004
-+
-+/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party
-+ * contributes one key pair */
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation
-+ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
-+} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */
-+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BBOOL isSender;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and
-+ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just
-+ * holds the effective keysize */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC
-+ * mechanism */
-+typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS {
-+ /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */
-+
-+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */
-+} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
-+ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
-+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */
-+} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and
-+ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */
-+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
-+} CK_RC5_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC
-+ * mechanism */
-+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */
-+ CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */
-+} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
-+ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
-+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */
-+} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block
-+ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of
-+ * the MAC */
-+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[8];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[16];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen;
-+ CK_ULONG ulQLen;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ;
-+} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA;
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA;
-+} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector;
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSaltLen;
-+ CK_ULONG ulIteration;
-+} CK_PBE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */
-+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */
-+} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen;
-+} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;
-+} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer;
-+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT;
-+
-+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
-+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport;
-+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
-+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel;
-+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput;
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen;
-+} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen;
-+} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
-+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion;
-+} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel;
-+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput;
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen;
-+} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIV;
-+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber;
-+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport;
-+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
-+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism;
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen;
-+} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulLen;
-+} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA;
-+
-+typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \
-+ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the
-+ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit
-+ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the
-+ * derived key */
-+/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to
-+ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate
-+ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
-+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001
-+
-+
-+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the
-+ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5
-+ * PBKDF2. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
-+#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001
-+
-+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the
-+ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */
-+typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS {
-+ CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen;
-+ CK_ULONG iterations;
-+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen;
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen;
-+} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE;
-+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */
-+
-+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM {
-+ CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
-+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen;
-+} CK_OTP_PARAM;
-+
-+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount;
-+} CK_OTP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO {
-+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount;
-+} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO;
-+
-+typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CK_OTP_VALUE 0
-+#define CK_OTP_PIN 1
-+#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE 2
-+#define CK_OTP_TIME 3
-+#define CK_OTP_COUNTER 4
-+#define CK_OTP_FLAGS 5
-+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH 6
-+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT 7
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKF_NEXT_OTP 0x00000001
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME 0x00000002
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER 0x00000004
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN 0x00000010
-+#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020
-+
-+/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */
-+typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
-+} CK_KIP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
-+ CK_BYTE cb[16];
-+} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
-+ CK_BYTE cb[16];
-+} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[16];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[16];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+#endif
-Index: openssl/util/libeay.num
-diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.7.6.1.4.1.2.1.4.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.7.2.3
---- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.7.6.1.4.1.2.1.4.1 Wed Mar 4 13:46:38 2015
-+++ openssl/util/libeay.num Wed Mar 4 13:57:56 2015
-@@ -3731,4 +3731,6 @@
- pqueue_size 4114 EXIST::FUNCTION:
- OPENSSL_uni2asc 4115 EXIST:NETWARE:FUNCTION:
- OPENSSL_asc2uni 4116 EXIST:NETWARE:FUNCTION:
-+ENGINE_load_pk11ca 4117 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE
-+ENGINE_load_pk11so 4117 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE
- ASN1_TYPE_cmp 4428 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl
-diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.8.6.1.10.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.8.2.1
---- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.8.6.1.10.1 Wed Mar 4 13:46:38 2015
-+++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Wed Mar 4 13:57:57 2015
-@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@
- no-ecdh - No ECDH
- no-engine - No engine
- no-hw - No hw
-+ no-hw-pkcs11ca - No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor
-+ no-hw-pkcs11so - No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor
- nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm
- nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare
- nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare
-@@ -242,6 +244,8 @@
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ECDH" if $no_ecdh;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw;
-+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA" if $no_hw_pkcs11ca;
-+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO" if $no_hw_pkcs11so;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips;
- $cflags.= " -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt;
- $cflags.= " -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2;
-@@ -316,6 +320,9 @@
- $dir=$val;
- }
-
-+ if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION")
-+ { $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";}
-+
- if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES")
- { $cflags .= " $val";}
-
-@@ -1295,6 +1302,8 @@
- "no-ecdh" => \$no_ecdh,
- "no-engine" => \$no_engine,
- "no-hw" => \$no_hw,
-+ "no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca,
-+ "no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so,
- "just-ssl" =>
- [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast,
- \$no_md2, \$no_sha, \$no_mdc2, \$no_dsa, \$no_dh,
-Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl
-diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.6.6.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.6
---- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.6.6.1 Sun Jan 15 15:45:40 2012
-+++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl Mon Jun 13 14:25:25 2011
-@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
- # External "algorithms"
- "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM",
- # Engines
-- "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP",
-+ "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO",
- # RFC3779 support
- "RFC3779",
- # TLS extension support
-@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
- my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2;
- my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5;
- my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw; my $no_camellia;
-+my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so;
- my $no_seed;
- my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated;
- my $no_rfc3779; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng; my $no_jpake;
-@@ -214,6 +215,8 @@
- elsif (/^no-cms$/) { $no_cms=1; }
- elsif (/^no-capieng$/) { $no_capieng=1; }
- elsif (/^no-jpake$/) { $no_jpake=1; }
-+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; }
-+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; }
- }
-
-
-@@ -1155,6 +1158,8 @@
- if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; }
-+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; }
-+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; }
-Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
-diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.6.6.1.2.1.4.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.6.2.2
---- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.6.6.1.2.1.4.1 Thu Jul 3 12:12:38 2014
-+++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl Thu Jul 3 12:32:04 2014
-@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
- my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT';
- $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib
- $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox';
-- $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
-+ $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
- $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref";
- }
- elsif ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/)
+++ /dev/null
-Index: openssl/Configure
-diff -u openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/Configure:1.11.2.2
---- openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 Tue Jan 7 09:25:41 2014
-+++ openssl/Configure Tue Jan 7 09:28:47 2014
-@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
-
- # see INSTALL for instructions.
-
--my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-+my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-
- # Options:
- #
-@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@
- # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can
- # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install".
- #
-+# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name.
-+# (No default)
-+#
-+# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only
-+# (No default)
-+#
- # --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected
- # to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in
- # include/. A value is required.
-@@ -344,7 +350,7 @@
- "linux-armv4", "gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
- #### IA-32 targets...
- "linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
- "linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
- ####
- "linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-@@ -352,7 +358,7 @@
- "linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
- "linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
- "linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-+"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
- "linux-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
- #### SPARC Linux setups
- # Ray Miller <ray.miller@computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently
-@@ -623,6 +629,10 @@
- my $idx_arflags = $idx++;
- my $idx_multilib = $idx++;
-
-+# PKCS#11 engine patch
-+my $pk11_libname="";
-+my $pk11_flavor="";
-+
- my $prefix="";
- my $libdir="";
- my $openssldir="";
-@@ -825,6 +835,14 @@
- {
- $flags.=$_." ";
- }
-+ elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/)
-+ {
-+ $pk11_libname=$1;
-+ }
-+ elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/)
-+ {
-+ $pk11_flavor=$1;
-+ }
- elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
- {
- $prefix=$1;
-@@ -962,6 +980,22 @@
- exit 0;
- }
-
-+if (! $pk11_libname)
-+ {
-+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n";
-+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
-+ exit 1;
-+ }
-+
-+if (! $pk11_flavor
-+ || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only"))
-+ {
-+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n";
-+ print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n";
-+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
-+ exit 1;
-+ }
-+
- if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
- $target = "Cygwin".$1;
- }
-@@ -1039,6 +1073,25 @@
- $exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO";
- }
-
-+if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator")
-+ {
-+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
-+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
-+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
-+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so";
-+ print " no-hw-pkcs11so [pk11-flavor]";
-+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
-+ }
-+else
-+ {
-+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
-+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
-+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
-+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca";
-+ print " no-hw-pkcs11ca [pk11-flavor]";
-+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
-+}
-+
- my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds;
-
- $exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/);
-@@ -1126,6 +1179,8 @@
- if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; }
- else { $no_user_cflags=1; }
-
-+$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags";
-+
- # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through
- # the script "config" or manually.
- if (!$no_krb5)
-@@ -1495,6 +1550,7 @@
- s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/;
- s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
- s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
-+ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/;
- s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
- s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
- s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
-Index: openssl/Makefile.org
-diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.14.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.6.2.1
---- openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.14.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:07 2015
-+++ openssl/Makefile.org Wed Dec 23 17:43:50 2015
-@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
- INSTALL_PREFIX=
- INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
-
-+# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option.
-+PK11_LIB_LOCATION=
-+
- # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
- OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
-
-Index: openssl/README.pkcs11
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.7.4.1
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:10 2015
-+++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
-+ISC modified
-+============
-+
-+The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility.
-+
-+The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and
-+sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the
-+PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second
-+is a stripped down version which provides only the useful
-+function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device
-+protected key store and key loading).
-+
-+As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor,
-+external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example
-+of the first, AEP Keyper of the second.
-+
-+Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in
-+config/Configure.
-+
-+It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine.
-+The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared
-+(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine
-+(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs).
-+
-+PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l
-+=========================================
-+
-+[Nov 19, 2009]
-+
-+Contents:
-+
-+Overview
-+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch
-+FAQs
-+Feedback
-+
-+Overview
-+========
-+
-+This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11
-+engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against
-+OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system
-+must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the
-+PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below.
-+
-+Patch can be applied like this:
-+
-+ # NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris
-+ tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz
-+ # now download the patch to the current directory
-+ # ...
-+ cd openssl-0.9.8l
-+ # NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system)
-+ patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19
-+
-+It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the
-+symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share
-+except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA.
-+
-+According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support
-+following mechanisms:
-+
-+ RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4,
-+ AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB,
-+ AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224,
-+ SHA256, SHA384, SHA512
-+
-+Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP
-+functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may
-+see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an
-+example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety
-+problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested).
-+
-+You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the
-+configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the
-+config script:
-+
-+ $ ./config
-+ Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2
-+ Configuring for solaris-x86-cc
-+ You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.
-+ See README.pkcs11 for more information.
-+
-+Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run
-+configure script like this:
-+
-+ ./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so
-+
-+To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run
-+"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the
-+output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary
-+and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits.
-+
-+The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against
-+PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and
-+OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project
-+(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more
-+information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the
-+system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself
-+and has functional PKCS#11 library.
-+
-+The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are
-+copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information.
-+
-+Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems,
-+Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more
-+information).
-+
-+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch
-+=======================================
-+
-+2009-11-19
-+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l
-+
-+- bugs and RFEs:
-+
-+ 6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores
-+ 6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split
-+ 6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the
-+ PKCS#11 engine
-+
-+2009-03-11
-+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j
-+
-+- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a
-+ tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied.
-+
-+- fixed bugs:
-+
-+ 6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4
-+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if
-+ meta slot is disabled
-+
-+2008-12-02
-+- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal)
-+
-+ 6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine
-+ 6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true
-+ 6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean
-+ 6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take
-+ it seriously
-+ 6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean
-+ 6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11
-+ engine code
-+ 6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API
-+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if
-+ meta slot is disabled
-+
-+2008-08-01
-+- fixed bug
-+
-+ 6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers
-+ and digests
-+
-+- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic
-+
-+2008-07-29
-+- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version
-+- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version:
-+
-+ 6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users
-+
-+- fixed bugs in the engine code:
-+
-+ 6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for
-+ asymmetric key operations
-+ 6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called
-+ atomically
-+ 6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys
-+ 6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners
-+ 6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in
-+ suboptimal way
-+ 6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more
-+ resilient to destroy failures
-+ 6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free()
-+ 6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys
-+ 6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine
-+ 6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size
-+ of big numbers leading to failures
-+ 6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of
-+ -1
-+ 6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references
-+ 6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not
-+ checked
-+ 6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to
-+ structure reuse
-+ 6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of
-+ OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH}
-+ defines but fails miserably
-+ 6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss
-+ 6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing
-+ generate_params parameter
-+ 6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes
-+ 6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the
-+ PKCS#11 engine
-+ 6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish()
-+
-+- new features and enhancements:
-+
-+ 6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512
-+ 6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes
-+ 6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric
-+ ciphers and digests
-+
-+2007-10-15
-+- update for 0.9.8f version
-+- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
-+
-+2007-10-02
-+- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
-+- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys"
-+
-+2007-09-26
-+- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes
-+ significant performance drop
-+- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine
-+
-+2007-05-25
-+- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers
-+
-+2007-05-19
-+- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code
-+
-+FAQs
-+====
-+
-+(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error:
-+
-+../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init':
-+hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork'
-+
-+Answer:
-+
-+ - don't use "no-threads" when configuring
-+ - if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by
-+ default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the
-+ architecture that Configure printed, for example:
-+
-+Configured for linux-elf.
-+
-+ - then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes),
-+ and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string.
-+ If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With
-+ "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after
-+ "-D_REENTRANT", like this:
-+
-+....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:.....
-+
-+(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for
-+pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch.
-+
-+Answer:
-+
-+ Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32
-+ (as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there.
-+
-+
-+Feedback
-+========
-+
-+Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was
-+created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris.
-+
-+Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp.
-+
-Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h
-diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.4.1
---- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:17 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h Wed Dec 23 17:44:01 2015
-@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
-
- #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS
-+# define OPENSSL_THREADS
-+#endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
- # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
- #endif
-@@ -61,6 +64,8 @@
- # endif
- #endif
-
-+#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
-+
- /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
-
- /* Generate 80386 code? */
-@@ -107,7 +112,7 @@
- * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
- * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
- */
--#undef RC4_CHUNK
-+#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long
- #endif
- #endif
-
-@@ -115,7 +120,7 @@
- /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
- * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
- #ifndef DES_LONG
--#define DES_LONG unsigned long
-+#define DES_LONG unsigned int
- #endif
- #endif
-
-@@ -126,9 +131,9 @@
- /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
-
- /* Only one for the following should be defined */
--#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
-+#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
- #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
--#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT
-+#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
- #endif
-
- #if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H)
-@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@
-
- #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
- #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
--#undef BF_PTR
-+#define BF_PTR2
- #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
-
- #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
-@@ -170,7 +175,7 @@
- /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
- * Very mucy CPU dependant */
- #ifndef DES_UNROLL
--#undef DES_UNROLL
-+#define DES_UNROLL
- #endif
-
- /* These default values were supplied by
-Index: openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
-diff -u openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1.30.1 openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.4.1
---- openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1.30.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:30 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c Wed Dec 23 17:44:14 2015
-@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@
- if (file == NULL) {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
- ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
-- if (errno == ENOENT)
-+ if ((errno == ENOENT) || ((*mode == 'r') && (errno == EACCES)))
- BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE);
- else
- BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.4.1
---- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:54 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Wed Dec 23 17:44:39 2015
-@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@
- eng_table.c eng_pkey.c eng_fat.c eng_all.c \
- tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \
- tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \
-- eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c
-+ eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \
-+ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c
- LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \
- eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \
- tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \
- tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \
-- eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o
-+ eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \
-+ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o
-
- SRC= $(LIBSRC)
-
-@@ -266,6 +268,83 @@
- eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
- eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h
- eng_table.o: eng_table.c
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dh.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11.c
-+hw_pk11.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11ca.h pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11ca.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/md5.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so.h pkcs11.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: hw_pk11so_pub.c pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
- tb_asnmth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
- tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
- tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+/*
-+ * CDDL HEADER START
-+ *
-+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
-+ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only
-+ * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance
-+ * with the License.
-+ *
-+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
-+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
-+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
-+ * and limitations under the License.
-+ *
-+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
-+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
-+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
-+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
-+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
-+ *
-+ * CDDL HEADER END
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef _CRYPTOKI_H
-+#define _CRYPTOKI_H
-+
-+/* ident "@(#)cryptoki.h 1.2 05/06/08 SMI" */
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+extern "C" {
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_PTR
-+#define CK_PTR *
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION
-+#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#include <unistd.h> /* For NULL */
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint
-+ */
-+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#define CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#ifndef TRUE
-+#define TRUE 1
-+#endif /* TRUE */
-+#ifndef FALSE
-+#define FALSE 0
-+#endif /* FALSE */
-+#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */
-+
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+
-+/* Solaris specific functions */
-+
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+
-+/*
-+ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all
-+ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of
-+ * providing operations on the requested mechanism
-+ */
-+CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession);
-+
-+/*
-+ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given
-+ * mechanism from the rawkey data.
-+ */
-+CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len,
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj);
-+
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif /* _CRYPTOKI_H */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.4.1
---- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:54 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Wed Dec 23 17:44:39 2015
-@@ -114,6 +114,14 @@
- # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)
- ENGINE_load_capi();
- # endif
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
-+ ENGINE_load_pk11ca();
-+# endif
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
-+ ENGINE_load_pk11so();
-+# endif
-+# endif
- #endif
- }
-
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.4.1
---- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:55 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Wed Dec 23 17:44:40 2015
-@@ -406,6 +406,12 @@
- # endif
- void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
- void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
-+void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void);
-+# endif
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
-+void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void);
-+# endif
-
- /*
- * Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.30.4.2
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,4116 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#endif
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+#include <openssl/aes.h>
-+#include <openssl/des.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <signal.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <dlfcn.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Debug mutexes */
-+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */
-+#define DEBUG_MUTEX
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+#define __USE_UNIX98
-+#endif
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
-+
-+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
-+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
-+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
-+/* #undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+/*
-+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun)
-+#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither
-+ * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes,
-+ * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then
-+ * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's
-+ * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's.
-+ */
-+#define SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+/*
-+ * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine
-+ * initialization.
-+ */
-+static int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef;
-+static int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef;
-+static int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+/*
-+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
-+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
-+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
-+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
-+ */
-+static int *hw_cnids;
-+static int *hw_dnids;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
-+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
-+
-+/*
-+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
-+ * logging into the token.
-+ */
-+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-+
-+/*
-+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
-+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
-+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
-+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
-+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
-+ * PK11_SESSION object.
-+ *
-+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
-+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
-+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
-+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
-+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
-+ *
-+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
-+ * They are also used for active list protection.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
-+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
-+ * list) for given algorithm type
-+ */
-+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
-+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
-+ * without losing the secret key objects.
-+ */
-+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+/* ENGINE level stuff */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-+
-+/* RAND stuff */
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
-+
-+/* These functions are also used in other files */
-+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+
-+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
-+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Local helper functions */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent);
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
-+
-+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
-+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln);
-+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
-+#else
-+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
-+#endif
-+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+ const int **nids, int nid);
-+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+ const int **nids, int nid);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+ int key_len);
-+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
-+ size_t count);
-+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
-+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
-+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-+
-+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ int *local_cipher_nids);
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
-+ int *local_digest_nids);
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
-+ int id);
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
-+ int id);
-+
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
-+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+/* Index for the supported ciphers */
-+enum pk11_cipher_id {
-+ PK11_DES_CBC,
-+ PK11_DES3_CBC,
-+ PK11_DES_ECB,
-+ PK11_DES3_ECB,
-+ PK11_RC4,
-+ PK11_AES_128_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_192_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_256_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_128_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_192_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_256_ECB,
-+ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ PK11_AES_128_CTR,
-+ PK11_AES_192_CTR,
-+ PK11_AES_256_CTR,
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+ PK11_CIPHER_MAX
-+};
-+
-+/* Index for the supported digests */
-+enum pk11_digest_id {
-+ PK11_MD5,
-+ PK11_SHA1,
-+ PK11_SHA224,
-+ PK11_SHA256,
-+ PK11_SHA384,
-+ PK11_SHA512,
-+ PK11_DIGEST_MAX
-+};
-+
-+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \
-+ { \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \
-+ { \
-+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \
-+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \
-+ } \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ }
-+
-+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-+static int cipher_count = 0;
-+static int digest_count = 0;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
-+ {
-+ enum pk11_cipher_id id;
-+ int nid;
-+ int iv_len;
-+ int min_key_len;
-+ int max_key_len;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
-+ } PK11_CIPHER;
-+
-+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
-+ {
-+ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8,
-+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8,
-+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256,
-+ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ /* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */
-+ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+ };
-+
-+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
-+ {
-+ enum pk11_digest_id id;
-+ int nid;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
-+ } PK11_DIGEST;
-+
-+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
-+ {
-+ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, },
-+ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, },
-+ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, },
-+ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, },
-+ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, },
-+ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, },
-+ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, },
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
-+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
-+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
-+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
-+ *
-+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
-+ */
-+
-+/* DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_cbc,
-+ 8, 8, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ede3_cbc,
-+ 8, 24, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
-+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ecb,
-+ 8, 8, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ede3_ecb,
-+ 8, 24, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_cbc,
-+ 16, 16, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_cbc,
-+ 16, 24, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_cbc,
-+ 16, 32, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
-+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_ecb,
-+ 16, 16, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_ecb,
-+ 16, 24, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_ecb,
-+ 16, 32, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+/*
-+ * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are
-+ * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures
-+ * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword.
-+ */
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_undef,
-+ 16, 16, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_undef,
-+ 16, 24, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_undef,
-+ 16, 32, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_bf_cbc,
-+ 8, 16, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
-+ {
-+ NID_rc4,
-+ 1, 16, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
-+ {
-+ NID_md5,
-+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
-+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ MD5_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha1,
-+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha224,
-+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
-+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha256,
-+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha384,
-+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
-+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha512,
-+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
-+ */
-+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
-+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
-+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
-+ {
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
-+ "SO_PATH",
-+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_PIN,
-+ "PIN",
-+ "Specifies the pin code",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SLOT,
-+ "SLOT",
-+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
-+ },
-+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_seed,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_cleanup,
-+ pk11_rand_add,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_status
-+ };
-+
-+
-+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
-+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
-+#endif
-+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
-+static const char *engine_pk11_name =
-+ "PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)";
-+
-+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
-+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
-+
-+/*
-+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
-+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
-+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
-+ */
-+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
-+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
-+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
-+char *pk11_pin = NULL;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
-+static int pk11_pid = 0;
-+
-+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
-+
-+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
-+
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ session_cache[type].lock =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+#else
-+ return (1);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+
-+ if (token_lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock);
-+ token_lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
-+ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
-+ */
-+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
-+ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ if (pk11_have_random)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+/*
-+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
-+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
-+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
-+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
-+ */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-+ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
-+ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
-+ if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE)
-+ pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
-+ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
-+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-+#error "dynamic engine not supported"
-+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
-+ {
-+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
-+
-+#else
-+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
-+
-+ if (!ret)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(ret))
-+ {
-+ ENGINE_free(ret);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+void
-+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
-+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
-+ */
-+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
-+ if (!pk11_dso)
-+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
-+ if (!e_pk11)
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
-+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
-+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
-+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
-+
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ ERR_clear_error();
-+ }
-+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
-+
-+/*
-+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
-+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
-+ */
-+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ }
-+
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+
-+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
-+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
-+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
-+ * accessible to all threads.
-+ */
-+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
-+{
-+ return (pk11_library_init(e));
-+}
-+
-+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args =
-+ {
-+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */
-+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
-+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
-+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
-+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
-+ CK_INFO info;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+ int any_slot_found;
-+ int i;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which
-+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still
-+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine
-+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is
-+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application
-+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork()
-+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can
-+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional
-+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In
-+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly
-+ * initialize the engine again.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_library_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ /*
-+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
-+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
-+ * engine first.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ /*
-+ * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all
-+ * NIDs there.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
-+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
-+ if (!p)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ rv = p(&pFuncList);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
-+
-+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
-+#endif
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
-+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
-+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
-+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
-+ * because no slot was present.
-+ */
-+ if (any_slot_found == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
-+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
-+ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
-+ */
-+ /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */
-+ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
-+ != CKR_OK) {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
-+ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ digest_count = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
-+ pk11_pid = getpid();
-+ /*
-+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
-+ * will do the cleanup.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
-+ goto err;
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
-+ /*
-+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
-+ * for asymmetric ciphers.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ active_list[i] = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
-+ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
-+ * library.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
-+
-+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* free all active lists */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ pk11_free_active_list(i);
-+
-+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects.
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ pFuncList = NULL;
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ pk11_pid = 0;
-+ /*
-+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
-+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
-+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
-+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
-+ * the engine before calling fork().
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
-+ {
-+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
-+
-+ switch (cmd)
-+ {
-+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (initialized)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
-+ case PK11_CMD_PIN:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
-+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
-+ {
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
-+ * the calling functions do not care anyway
-+ */
-+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
-+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
-+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
-+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
-+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
-+ */
-+PK11_SESSION *
-+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
-+#endif
-+ static pid_t pid = 0;
-+ pid_t new_pid;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
-+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
-+ * here, with no PID information.
-+ */
-+ if (pid == 0)
-+ pid = getpid();
-+
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp = freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
-+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
-+ * structure from the freelist.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
-+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
-+ * mark them as unused.
-+ */
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
-+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
-+ */
-+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
-+ {
-+ pid = new_pid;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
-+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
-+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
-+ * head of the list).
-+ */
-+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp1->next;
-+ /*
-+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
-+ * sessions and destroy all objects.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
-+ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
-+
-+ /* Initialize the process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
-+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
-+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
-+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
-+ * re-initialization.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
-+ * the caller cope with the situation.
-+ */
-+ freelist = sp;
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->pid == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
-+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (sp != NULL)
-+ sp->next = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (sp);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+void
-+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
-+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
-+ * next time we will ask for a new session.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
-+ return;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp->next = freelist;
-+ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ int type;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
-+ * return 0 on exit.
-+ */
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
-+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
-+ * return an error on return.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
-+ pid_t mypid = getpid();
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ int ret = 1;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ myslot = SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are probably a child process so force the
-+ * reinitialize of the session
-+ */
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
-+ return (0);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ }
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->pid = getpid();
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
-+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
-+ */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e'
-+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We
-+ * must free those as well.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
-+ *
-+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
-+ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
-+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
-+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
-+ */
-+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
-+
-+static int
-+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
-+ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
-+ return (ciphers[i].id);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
-+ {
-+ if (cipher_count > 0)
-+ *nids = cipher_nids;
-+ else
-+ *nids = NULL;
-+ return (cipher_count);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
-+ {
-+ if (digest_count > 0)
-+ *nids = digest_nids;
-+ else
-+ *nids = NULL;
-+ return (digest_count);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
-+ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
-+ * pk11_init_symetric() is called.
-+ */
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
-+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
-+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
-+ {
-+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
-+ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
-+ /*
-+ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
-+ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
-+ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
-+ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
-+ * add code so that the counter length can be set via
-+ * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
-+ */
-+ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+ }
-+ else
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+ {
-+ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
-+ {
-+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
-+ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
-+ else
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+ int index;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
-+
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
-+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
-+ /*
-+ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
-+ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
-+ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
-+ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
-+ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
-+ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
-+ * code serves as a sanity check.
-+ *
-+ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
-+ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
-+ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
-+ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
-+ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
-+ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
-+ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
-+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-+
-+ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
-+ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
-+ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
-+ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
-+ {
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
-+ * needs to be created.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
-+ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
-+ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
-+ {
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* now initialize the context with a new key */
-+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
-+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
-+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
-+ * that it needs not be recreated.
-+ *
-+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
-+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
-+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
-+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
-+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
-+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
-+ */
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
-+#else
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
-+#endif
-+ {
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ unsigned long outl = inl;
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
-+
-+ if (!inl)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
-+ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
-+ * the same size of input.
-+ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
-+ * correctly aligned buffers.
-+ */
-+ if (inl != outl)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
-+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
-+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
-+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
-+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
-+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
-+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
-+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
-+ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
-+
-+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
-+ * rid of the context.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
-+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
-+ else
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
-+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
-+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
-+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+ const int **nids, int nid)
-+ {
-+ if (!cipher)
-+ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
-+
-+ switch (nid)
-+ {
-+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_bf_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_rc4:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_rc4;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ /*
-+ * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs
-+ * here are not constants.
-+ */
-+ if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr)
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
-+ else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr)
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
-+ else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
-+ else
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+ *cipher = NULL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ return (*cipher != NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+ const int **nids, int nid)
-+ {
-+ if (!digest)
-+ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
-+
-+ switch (nid)
-+ {
-+ case NID_md5:
-+ *digest = &pk11_md5;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha1:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha1;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha224:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha224;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha256:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha256;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha384:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha384;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha512:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha512;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ *digest = NULL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ return (*digest != NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
-+ unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
-+ * can use the key handles. Here is why:
-+ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
-+ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
-+ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
-+ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
-+ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
-+ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
-+ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
-+ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
-+ * terminate the active operation.
-+ */
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX)
-+ {
-+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
-+ memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len);
-+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES) ||
-+ (key_type == CKK_DES2) ||
-+ (key_type == CKK_DES3))
-+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]);
-+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) ||
-+ (key_type == CKK_DES3))
-+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]);
-+ if (key_type == CKK_DES3)
-+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]);
-+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf;
-+ }
-+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Save the key information used in this session.
-+ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX;
-+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len;
-+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len);
-+ }
-+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
-+err:
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
-+ if (digests[i].nid == nid)
-+ return (digests[i].id);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+ int index;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
-+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ pdp = &digests[index];
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
-+ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
-+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+
-+ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
-+ if (count == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
-+ count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ unsigned long len;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+ len = ctx->digest->md_size;
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
-+ * to the pool
-+ */
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+
-+ /* The copy-from state */
-+ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Initialize the copy-to state */
-+ if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
-+ goto err;
-+ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
-+
-+ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
-+ &ul_state_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (ul_state_len == 0)
-+ {
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
-+ if (pstate == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
-+ &ul_state_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
-+ ul_state_len, 0, 0);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
-+ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = 1;
-+err:
-+ if (pstate != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pstate);
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
-+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+
-+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
-+ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
-+ * that might have been allocated in the token when
-+ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
-+ * will return the session to the cache.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
-+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
-+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
-+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
-+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
-+ * prefix.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+ int key_len)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
-+ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
-+ {
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
-+ }
-+
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * The secret key object is created in the
-+ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key().
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+err:
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_RSA_X_509
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
-+ * CKM_DSA
-+ *
-+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
-+ * public key slot.
-+ *
-+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_DES3_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES_CBC
-+ * CKM_AES_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES3_ECB
-+ * CKM_DES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_CTR
-+ * CKM_RC4
-+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
-+ *
-+ * Digests optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_MD5
-+ * CKM_SHA_1
-+ * CKM_SHA224
-+ * CKM_SHA256
-+ * CKM_SHA384
-+ * CKM_SHA512
-+ *
-+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
-+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
-+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
-+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
-+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
-+ {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ int slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ int slot_n_digest = 0;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
-+ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-+
-+ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-+
-+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 0;
-+
-+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ /* Check if slot has random support. */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
-+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
-+ &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
-+ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER)
-+ {
-+ slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+ * verifying with CKM_DSA.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
-+ &mech_info);
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
-+ * derivation.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ if (!found_candidate_slot &&
-+ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
-+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
-+ pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover;
-+ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
-+ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might
-+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature
-+ * is used.
-+ */
-+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ best_slot_sofar);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to "
-+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+#else
-+ } /* if */
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ } /* for */
-+
-+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
-+ }
-+
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+ current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-+ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
-+ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
-+
-+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
-+
-+ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ current_slot_n_cipher);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ current_slot_n_digest);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n",
-+ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
-+ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
-+ * otherwise leave it where it is.
-+ */
-+ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
-+ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest))
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n",
-+ PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
-+ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
-+ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
-+ sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
-+ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids,
-+ sizeof (local_digest_nids));
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
-+ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 1;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ int *local_cipher_nids, int id)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
-+ {
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids))
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
-+ ciphers[id].nid;
-+ }
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
-+ int id)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
-+ {
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids))
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
-+ digests[id].nid;
-+ }
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */
-+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln)
-+ {
-+ ASN1_OBJECT *o;
-+ int nid;
-+
-+ if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"",
-+ 1, sn, ln)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* will return NID_undef on error */
-+ nid = OBJ_add_object(o);
-+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
-+
-+ return (nid);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we
-+ * have to help ourselves here.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void)
-+ {
-+ /* are we already set? */
-+ if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just
-+ * follow the format of those that exist.
-+ */
-+ if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) ==
-+ NID_undef)
-+ goto err;
-+ ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr;
-+ if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) ==
-+ NID_undef)
-+ goto err;
-+ ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr;
-+ if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) ==
-+ NID_undef)
-+ goto err;
-+ ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr;
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
-+ {
-+ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
-+ ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
-+ {
-+ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type,
-+ current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
-+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
-+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
-+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
-+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
-+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
-+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
-+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
-+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
-+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
-+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
-+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
-+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
-+ *
-+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
-+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
-+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
-+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
-+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
-+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
-+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said
-+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with
-+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code
-+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for
-+ * asymmetric operations.
-+ *
-+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what
-+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can
-+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be
-+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before,
-+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only.
-+ *
-+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find
-+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric
-+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table
-+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays
-+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the
-+ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token
-+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more
-+ * information.
-+ *
-+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined
-+ * the code won't be used.
-+ */
-+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64)
-+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
-+#else
-+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists,
-+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware
-+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms.
-+ */
-+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ void *handle;
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0;
-+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL;
-+ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
-+ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
-+ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
-+ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ /* this means empty tables */
-+ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef;
-+ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also
-+ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the
-+ * search.
-+ */
-+ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
-+ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1;
-+ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int));
-+ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int));
-+ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef
-+ * is zero now.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i)
-+ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef;
-+ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i)
-+ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are
-+ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables.
-+ */
-+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i],
-+ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids);
-+ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i],
-+ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by
-+ * dlclose(3C).
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ (void) dlclose(handle);
-+ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids;
-+ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids);
-+ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e.,
-+ * non-existent).
-+ */
-+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table)
-+ {
-+ int i = 0;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new
-+ * table.
-+ */
-+ if (nid_table == NULL)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * the table is never full, there is always at least one
-+ * NID_undef.
-+ */
-+ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef)
-+ {
-+ if (nid_table[i++] == nid)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.5
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Tue Jun 14 00:43:26 2011
-@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-+
-+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]=
-+{
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"},
-+{ 0, NULL}
-+};
-+
-+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]=
-+{
-+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"},
-+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"},
-+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"},
-+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"},
-+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"},
-+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"},
-+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"},
-+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"},
-+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"},
-+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"},
-+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"},
-+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"},
-+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"},
-+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"},
-+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"},
-+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" },
-+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login() failed on token" },
-+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" },
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" },
-+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" },
-+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" },
-+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen() dialog command" },
-+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" },
-+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" },
-+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" },
-+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" },
-+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" },
-+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" },
-+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork() failed" },
-+{ 0, NULL}
-+};
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */
-+
-+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0;
-+static int pk11_error_init = 1;
-+
-+static void
-+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
-+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
-+
-+ if (pk11_error_init)
-+ {
-+ pk11_error_init = 0;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
-+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_error_init == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
-+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
-+#endif
-+ pk11_error_init = 1;
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+void
-+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
-+{
-+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
-+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
-+ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv)
-+{
-+ char tmp_buf[20];
-+
-+ PK11err(function, reason);
-+ (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
-+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
-+}
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.12.4.1
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H
-+#define HW_PK11_ERR_H
-+
-+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
-+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv);
-+#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
-+
-+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */
-+
-+/* Function codes. */
-+
-+#define PK11_F_INIT 100
-+#define PK11_F_FINISH 101
-+#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102
-+#define PK11_F_CTRL 103
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114
-+#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115
-+#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116
-+#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117
-+#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130
-+#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131
-+#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132
-+#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133
-+#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134
-+#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135
-+#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136
-+#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139
-+#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143
-+#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145
-+#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD 147
-+#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148
-+#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151
-+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152
-+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153
-+#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154
-+#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155
-+#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156
-+#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157
-+#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159
-+#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160
-+#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161
-+#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162
-+#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163
-+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164
-+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165
-+#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166
-+
-+/* Reason codes. */
-+#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100
-+#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101
-+#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102
-+#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103
-+#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104
-+#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105
-+#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106
-+#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107
-+#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108
-+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109
-+#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110
-+#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111
-+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112
-+#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116
-+#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118
-+#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119
-+#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120
-+#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123
-+#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124
-+#define PK11_R_SIGN 125
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131
-+#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132
-+#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133
-+#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138
-+#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139
-+#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140
-+#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141
-+#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142
-+#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143
-+#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144
-+#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148
-+#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156
-+#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157
-+#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158
-+#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159
-+#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160
-+#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162
-+#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164
-+#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165
-+#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166
-+
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167
-+#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169
-+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170
-+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171
-+#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172
-+#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173
-+#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177
-+#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179
-+#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180
-+#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181
-+#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182
-+#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183
-+#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183
-+#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184
-+#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185
-+#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186
-+
-+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */
-+#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32
-+
-+#ifdef NOPTHREADS
-+/*
-+ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the
-+ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global
-+ * per-process lock for the whole engine.
-+ *
-+ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as
-+ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but
-+ * it's safe.
-+ */
-+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11
-+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the
-+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation
-+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list.
-+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object
-+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls.
-+ *
-+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list
-+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request
-+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done.
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION
-+ {
-+ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next;
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */
-+ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */
-+ CK_BBOOL pub_persistent; /* is pub key in keystore? */
-+ CK_BBOOL priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */
-+ union
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
-+ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */
-+ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */
-+ } u_RSA;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
-+ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */
-+ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */
-+ } u_DSA;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */
-+ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */
-+ } u_DH;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */
-+ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
-+ int key_len; /* priv key len */
-+ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */
-+ } u_cipher;
-+ } opdata_u;
-+ } PK11_SESSION;
-+
-+#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key
-+#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key
-+#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub
-+#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv
-+#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_pn_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_pe_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num
-+#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key
-+#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh
-+#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num
-+#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key
-+#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key
-+#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len
-+#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt
-+
-+/*
-+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types:
-+ * 1) asymmetric operations
-+ * 2) random operations
-+ * 3) symmetric and digest operations
-+ *
-+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware
-+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware
-+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support
-+ * only a single group of operations.
-+ *
-+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have
-+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from
-+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots.
-+ *
-+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are
-+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache.
-+ */
-+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM
-+ {
-+ OP_RAND,
-+ OP_RSA,
-+ OP_DSA,
-+ OP_DH,
-+ OP_CIPHER,
-+ OP_DIGEST,
-+ OP_MAX
-+ } PK11_OPTYPE;
-+
-+/*
-+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches
-+ * and locks associated with the lists.
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *head;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *lock;
-+#endif
-+ } PK11_CACHE;
-+
-+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */
-+typedef struct PK11_active_st
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h;
-+ unsigned int refcnt;
-+ struct PK11_active_st *prev;
-+ struct PK11_active_st *next;
-+ } PK11_active;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[];
-+#endif
-+extern PK11_active *active_list[];
-+/*
-+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See
-+ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation.
-+ */
-+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0)
-+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0)
-+#else
-+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
-+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
-+#endif
-+
-+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
-+
-+#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.38.2.3
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
-+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
-+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
-+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* RSA stuff */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa);
-+#else
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa);
-+#endif
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* DSA stuff */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
-+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
-+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
-+ DSA *dsa);
-+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* DH stuff */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
-+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
-+#endif
-+
-+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
-+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
-+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
-+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
-+
-+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private);
-+
-+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
-+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
-+#else
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
-+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
-+ * variable and jump to the specified label.
-+ */
-+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
-+ { \
-+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
-+ { \
-+ var = TRUE; \
-+ if (unlock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ goto label; \
-+ } \
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
-+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
-+ if (entry->h == h)
-+ return (entry);
-+
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
-+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
-+ * failure.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* search for entry in the active list */
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
-+ entry->refcnt++;
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
-+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
-+ if (entry == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ entry->h = h;
-+ entry->refcnt = 1;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
-+ if (active_list[type] == NULL)
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ else /* make the entry first in the list */
-+ {
-+ entry->next = active_list[type];
-+ active_list[type]->prev = entry;
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (entry->refcnt);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+void
-+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *prev_entry;
-+
-+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
-+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ prev_entry->next = entry->next;
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ active_list[type] = entry->next;
-+ /* we were the first but not the only one */
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* sanitization */
-+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ OPENSSL_free(entry);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
-+void
-+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
-+ switch (type)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
-+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
-+ *
-+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
-+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
-+ entry->refcnt--;
-+ if (entry->refcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 RSA method",
-+ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */
-+ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */
-+ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */
-+ NULL, /* app_data */
-+ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */
-+ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */
-+ };
-+
-+RSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_RSA(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_rsa);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 DSA method",
-+ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */
-+ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
-+ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */
-+ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */
-+ 0, /* flags */
-+ NULL /* app_data */
-+ };
-+
-+DSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_DSA(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_dsa);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/*
-+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
-+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
-+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
-+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
-+ * enough.
-+ */
-+#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8
-+
-+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 DH method",
-+ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */
-+ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_DH_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */
-+ 0, /* flags */
-+ NULL, /* app_data */
-+ NULL /* generate_params */
-+ };
-+
-+DH_METHOD *
-+PK11_DH(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_dh);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
-+
-+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
-+#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20
-+#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/*
-+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
-+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
-+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
-+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-+err:
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
-+ * should be catched in the padding functions
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-+err:
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ BIGNUM f;
-+ int j, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *p;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ BN_init(&f);
-+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
-+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
-+ */
-+ if (flen > num)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* make data into a big number */
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
-+ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
-+ */
-+ for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
-+ if (buf[j] != 0)
-+ break;
-+
-+ p = buf + j;
-+ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (r < 0)
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-+
-+err:
-+ BN_clear_free(&f);
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ BIGNUM f;
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *p;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ BN_init(&f);
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-+ if (buf == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
-+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
-+ */
-+ if (flen > num)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
-+ * Needs to skip these 0's here
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
-+ if (buf[i] != 0)
-+ break;
-+
-+ p = buf + i;
-+ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (r < 0)
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-+
-+err:
-+ BN_clear_free(&f);
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
-+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_encrypted;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
-+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
-+ rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ retval = ul_sig_len;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
-+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_decrypted;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
-+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
-+ p_mech, h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_decrypted;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
-+ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
-+ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
-+ * structures.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
-+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
-+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ unsigned long ulsiglen;
-+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
-+
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ ulsiglen = j;
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
-+ *siglen = ulsiglen;
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa)
-+#else
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa)
-+#endif
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i,
-+ (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
-+
-+#define MAXATTR 1024
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *privkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for private keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
-+ * never ask for private components.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_TRUE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
-+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
-+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm
-+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer
-+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However,
-+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect
-+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We
-+ * do not check the return value because even in case
-+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key
-+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and
-+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the
-+ * OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not
-+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for
-+ * consistency reasons.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
-+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we
-+ * must take care of handle management ourselves.
-+ */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
-+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+ /*
-+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
-+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
-+ * in the keystore.
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(privkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ rollback = rollback;
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *pubkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for public keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_FALSE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
-+ * structure. No cache hit is possible.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling
-+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
-+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
-+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
-+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
-+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
-+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
-+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
-+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
-+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
-+ */
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(pubkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
-+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ int i;
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
-+
-+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
-+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
-+ *rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
-+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
-+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto set;
-+ }
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd'
-+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA
-+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for
-+ * searching for the private key handle.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ /*
-+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
-+ * session keys.
-+ */
-+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components
-+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the
-+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a
-+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just
-+ * create a new session key using the private
-+ * components from the RSA structure.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+set:
-+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never
-+ * extract private components from the keystore. In
-+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the
-+ * application to properly cope with that. It is
-+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by
-+ * reference are used we expect it to be used
-+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there
-+ * is no problem. If the application expects the
-+ * private components to be read from the keystore
-+ * then that is not a supported way of usage.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ *rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
-+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
-+ * 'n'/'e' components as well.
-+ */
-+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n);
-+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e);
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0 &&
-+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
-+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ *
-+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
-+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
-+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
-+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
-+ * both data signing and verifying.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making
-+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent
-+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure
-+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the
-+ * public component since with the keys by reference
-+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA
-+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we
-+ * compare the handle as well.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* The DSA function implementation */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static DSA_SIG *
-+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
-+ int i;
-+ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
-+
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
-+ * each is 20 bytes long
-+ */
-+ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
-+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
-+ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
-+
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+
-+ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
-+ if (dlen > i)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto ret;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+
-+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
-+ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ dsa_sig->r = r;
-+ dsa_sig->s = s;
-+
-+ret:
-+ if (dsa_sig == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (r != NULL)
-+ BN_free(r);
-+ if (s != NULL)
-+ BN_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
-+ return (dsa_sig);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
-+ DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int retval = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
-+
-+ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
-+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
-+ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
-+
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+
-+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
-+
-+ if (dlen > i)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto ret;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
-+ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
-+ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
-+ */
-+ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
-+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
-+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
-+ BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ retval = 1;
-+ret:
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
-+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
-+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ int i;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
-+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */
-+ };
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
-+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
-+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
-+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */
-+ };
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
-+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
-+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/* The DH function implementation */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Generate DH key-pair.
-+ *
-+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
-+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
-+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
-+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
-+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG i;
-+ CK_RV rv, rv1;
-+ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
-+
-+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
-+ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
-+ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
-+ */
-+ pub_key_template[1].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
-+ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
-+ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
-+ {
-+ pub_key_template[2].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
-+ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
-+ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
-+ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are
-+ * destroyed before return and thus not cached.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
-+ &mechanism,
-+ pub_key_template,
-+ ul_pub_key_attr_count,
-+ priv_key_template,
-+ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
-+ &h_pub_key,
-+ &h_priv_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
-+ * should be sufficient for reuse.
-+ */
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
-+ {
-+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
-+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
-+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
-+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
-+ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
-+ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
-+ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
-+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
-+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
-+ {
-+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
-+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
-+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
-+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
-+ {
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = 1;
-+
-+err:
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
-+ DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ CK_ULONG seclen;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
-+ {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)},
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int ret = -1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
-+ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+ seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
-+ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
-+ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
-+
-+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
-+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
-+ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
-+ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
-+ &mechanism,
-+ h_key,
-+ priv_key_template,
-+ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
-+ &h_derived_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
-+ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
-+ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
-+ */
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
-+ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
-+ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
-+ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
-+ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
-+ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
-+ * pre-master secret.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
-+ {
-+ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
-+ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+
-+ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (mechanism.pParameter)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
-+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
-+ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ int i;
-+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
-+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ key_template[0].pValue = &class;
-+ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+
-+ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
-+
-+ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
-+ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
-+
-+ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
-+ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dh;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
-+ key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ *
-+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
-+ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
-+ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
-+ * in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * Local function to simplify key template population
-+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
-+ */
-+static int
-+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
-+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG len = 0;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is
-+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers.
-+ */
-+ if (bn != NULL)
-+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-+
-+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ *ul_value_len = len;
-+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
-+ if (*p_value == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static void
-+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
-+ {
-+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
-+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the
-+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got.
-+ * Assume object store locked.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 OK
-+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found
-+ */
-+static int
-+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG objcnt;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+
-+ if (objcnt > 1)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ else if (objcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* from uri stuff */
-+
-+extern char *pk11_pin;
-+
-+static int pk11_get_pin(void);
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_get_pin(void)
-+{
-+ char *pin;
-+
-+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: ");
-+ if (pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
-+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
-+ * multiple threads.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#if 0
-+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been
-+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we
-+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access
-+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for
-+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED
-+ * flag is set.
-+ */
-+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) &&
-+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread
-+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We
-+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with
-+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the
-+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment
-+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
-+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call
-+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We
-+ * lock right before C_Login().
-+ */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE))
-+ {
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
-+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
-+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
-+ * the engine.
-+ *
-+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
-+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
-+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
-+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+ goto err_locked;
-+ }
-+
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If token does not require login we take it as the
-+ * login was done.
-+ */
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err_locked:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the
-+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login()
-+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for
-+ * this.
-+ *
-+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
-+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
-+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
-+ {
-+ static char buf[128];
-+ HANDLE h;
-+ DWORD cc, mode;
-+ int cnt;
-+
-+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
-+ fputs(prompt, stderr);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
-+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
-+
-+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
-+ {
-+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
-+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
-+ break;
-+ fputc('*', stdout);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ }
-+
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
-+ buf[cnt] = '\0';
-+ fputs("\n", stderr);
-+ return buf;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.4
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011
-@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
-+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */
-+
-+#define token_lock pk11ca_token_lock
-+#define find_lock pk11ca_find_lock
-+#define active_list pk11ca_active_list
-+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags
-+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID
-+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11ca_error
-+#define PK11err_add_data PK11CAerr_add_data
-+#define pk11_get_session pk11ca_get_session
-+#define pk11_return_session pk11ca_return_session
-+#define pk11_active_add pk11ca_active_add
-+#define pk11_active_delete pk11ca_active_delete
-+#define pk11_active_remove pk11ca_active_remove
-+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11ca_free_active_list
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv
-+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11ca_load_privkey
-+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11ca_load_pubkey
-+#define PK11_RSA PK11CA_RSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv
-+#define PK11_DSA PK11CA_DSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11ca_destroy_dh_object
-+#define PK11_DH PK11CA_DH
-+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11ca_token_relogin
-+#define pFuncList pk11ca_pFuncList
-+#define pk11_pin pk11ca_pin
-+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11ca
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.7.4.1
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#error RSA is disabled
-+#endif
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <signal.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <dlfcn.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Debug mutexes */
-+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */
-+#define DEBUG_MUTEX
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+#define __USE_UNIX98
-+#endif
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
-+
-+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
-+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
-+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
-+/*#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#define OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11so.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
-+
-+/*
-+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
-+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
-+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
-+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
-+
-+/*
-+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
-+ * logging into the token.
-+ */
-+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-+
-+/*
-+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
-+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
-+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
-+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
-+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
-+ * PK11_SESSION object.
-+ *
-+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
-+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
-+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
-+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
-+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
-+ *
-+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
-+ * They are also used for active list protection.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
-+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
-+ * list) for given algorithm type
-+ */
-+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
-+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
-+ * without losing the secret key objects.
-+ */
-+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+/* ENGINE level stuff */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-+
-+/* RAND stuff */
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
-+
-+/* These functions are also used in other files */
-+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+
-+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
-+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+
-+/* Local helper functions */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent);
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
-+
-+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
-+
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
-+
-+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \
-+ { \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \
-+ { \
-+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \
-+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \
-+ } \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ }
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
-+ */
-+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
-+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
-+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
-+ {
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
-+ "SO_PATH",
-+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_PIN,
-+ "PIN",
-+ "Specifies the pin code",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SLOT,
-+ "SLOT",
-+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
-+ },
-+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_seed,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_cleanup,
-+ pk11_rand_add,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_status
-+ };
-+
-+
-+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
-+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
-+#endif
-+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
-+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)";
-+
-+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
-+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
-+
-+/*
-+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
-+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
-+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
-+ */
-+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
-+
-+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
-+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
-+char *pk11_pin = NULL;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
-+static int pk11_pid = 0;
-+
-+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
-+
-+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
-+
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr);
-+
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr);
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ session_cache[type].lock =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+#else
-+ return (1);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+
-+ if (token_lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock);
-+ token_lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
-+ */
-+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_have_random)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
-+ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
-+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-+#error "dynamic engine not supported"
-+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
-+ {
-+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
-+
-+#else
-+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
-+
-+ if (!ret)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(ret))
-+ {
-+ ENGINE_free(ret);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+void
-+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
-+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
-+ */
-+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
-+ if (!pk11_dso)
-+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
-+ if (!e_pk11)
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
-+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
-+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
-+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
-+
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ ERR_clear_error();
-+ }
-+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
-+
-+/*
-+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
-+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
-+ */
-+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ }
-+
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+
-+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
-+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
-+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
-+ * accessible to all threads.
-+ */
-+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
-+{
-+ return (pk11_library_init(e));
-+}
-+
-+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args =
-+ {
-+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */
-+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
-+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
-+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
-+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
-+ CK_INFO info;
-+ int any_slot_found;
-+ int i;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which
-+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still
-+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine
-+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is
-+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application
-+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork()
-+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can
-+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional
-+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In
-+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly
-+ * initialize the engine again.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_library_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ /*
-+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
-+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
-+ * engine first.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
-+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
-+ if (!p)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ rv = p(&pFuncList);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
-+
-+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
-+#endif
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
-+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
-+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
-+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
-+ * because no slot was present.
-+ */
-+ if (any_slot_found == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
-+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
-+ pk11_pid = getpid();
-+ /*
-+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
-+ * will do the cleanup.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
-+ goto err;
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
-+ /*
-+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
-+ * for asymmetric ciphers.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ active_list[i] = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
-+ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
-+ * library.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
-+
-+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* free all active lists */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ pk11_free_active_list(i);
-+
-+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects.
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ pFuncList = NULL;
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ pk11_pid = 0;
-+ /*
-+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
-+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
-+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
-+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
-+ * the engine before calling fork().
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
-+ {
-+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
-+
-+ switch (cmd)
-+ {
-+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (initialized)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
-+ case PK11_CMD_PIN:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
-+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
-+ {
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
-+ * the calling functions do not care anyway
-+ */
-+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
-+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
-+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
-+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
-+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
-+ */
-+PK11_SESSION *
-+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
-+#endif
-+ static pid_t pid = 0;
-+ pid_t new_pid;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
-+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
-+ * here, with no PID information.
-+ */
-+ if (pid == 0)
-+ pid = getpid();
-+
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp = freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
-+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
-+ * structure from the freelist.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
-+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
-+ * mark them as unused.
-+ */
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
-+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
-+ */
-+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
-+ {
-+ pid = new_pid;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
-+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
-+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
-+ * head of the list).
-+ */
-+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp1->next;
-+ /*
-+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
-+ * sessions and destroy all objects.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
-+ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
-+
-+ /* Initialize the process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
-+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
-+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
-+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
-+ * re-initialization.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
-+ * the caller cope with the situation.
-+ */
-+ freelist = sp;
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->pid == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
-+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (sp != NULL)
-+ sp->next = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (sp);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+void
-+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
-+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
-+ * next time we will ask for a new session.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
-+ return;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp->next = freelist;
-+ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ int type;
-+
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
-+ * return 0 on exit.
-+ */
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
-+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
-+ * return an error on return.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
-+ pid_t mypid = getpid();
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ int ret = 1;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are probably a child process so force the
-+ * reinitialize of the session
-+ */
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
-+ return (0);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ }
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->pid = getpid();
-+
-+ if (optype == OP_RSA)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
-+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
-+ */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e'
-+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We
-+ * must free those as well.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
-+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
-+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
-+ */
-+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
-+ *
-+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
-+ * public key slot.
-+ *
-+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
-+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
-+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
-+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
-+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
-+ {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
-+
-+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 0;
-+
-+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ /* Check if slot has random support. */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
-+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
-+ &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
-+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might
-+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature
-+ * is used.
-+ */
-+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ best_slot_sofar);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to "
-+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+#else
-+ } /* if */
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ } /* for */
-+
-+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 1;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.4
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011
-@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
-+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */
-+
-+#define token_lock pk11so_token_lock
-+#define find_lock pk11so_find_lock
-+#define active_list pk11so_active_list
-+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11so_pubkey_token_flags
-+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID
-+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11so_error
-+#define PK11err_add_data PK11SOerr_add_data
-+#define pk11_get_session pk11so_get_session
-+#define pk11_return_session pk11so_return_session
-+#define pk11_active_add pk11so_active_add
-+#define pk11_active_delete pk11so_active_delete
-+#define pk11_active_remove pk11so_active_remove
-+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11so_free_active_list
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv
-+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11so_load_privkey
-+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11so_load_pubkey
-+#define PK11_RSA PK11SO_RSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv
-+#define PK11_DSA PK11SO_DSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11so_destroy_dh_object
-+#define PK11_DH PK11SO_DH
-+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11so_token_relogin
-+#define pFuncList pk11so_pFuncList
-+#define pk11_pin pk11so_pin
-+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11so
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.8.2.2
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#error RSA is disabled
-+#endif
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
-+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11so.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
-+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
-+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x)
-+#endif
-+
-+/* RSA stuff */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+
-+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
-+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
-+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
-+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
-+
-+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private);
-+
-+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
-+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
-+#else
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
-+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
-+ * variable and jump to the specified label.
-+ */
-+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
-+ { \
-+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
-+ { \
-+ var = TRUE; \
-+ if (unlock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ goto label; \
-+ } \
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
-+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
-+ if (entry->h == h)
-+ return (entry);
-+
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
-+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
-+ * failure.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* search for entry in the active list */
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
-+ entry->refcnt++;
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
-+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
-+ if (entry == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ entry->h = h;
-+ entry->refcnt = 1;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
-+ if (active_list[type] == NULL)
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ else /* make the entry first in the list */
-+ {
-+ entry->next = active_list[type];
-+ active_list[type]->prev = entry;
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (entry->refcnt);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+void
-+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *prev_entry;
-+
-+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
-+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ prev_entry->next = entry->next;
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ active_list[type] = entry->next;
-+ /* we were the first but not the only one */
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* sanitization */
-+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ OPENSSL_free(entry);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
-+void
-+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
-+ switch (type)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
-+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
-+ *
-+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
-+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
-+ entry->refcnt--;
-+ if (entry->refcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa;
-+
-+RSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_RSA(void)
-+ {
-+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa;
-+
-+ if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-+ memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa));
-+ pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method";
-+ pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign;
-+ }
-+ return (&pk11_rsa);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
-+
-+/*
-+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
-+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
-+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ unsigned long ulsiglen;
-+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
-+
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ ulsiglen = j;
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
-+ *siglen = ulsiglen;
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
-+
-+#define MAXATTR 1024
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *privkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for private keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
-+ * never ask for private components.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_TRUE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
-+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
-+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm
-+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer
-+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However,
-+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect
-+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We
-+ * do not check the return value because even in case
-+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key
-+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and
-+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the
-+ * OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not
-+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for
-+ * consistency reasons.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
-+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we
-+ * must take care of handle management ourselves.
-+ */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
-+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+ /*
-+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
-+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
-+ * in the keystore.
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(privkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ rollback = rollback;
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *pubkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for public keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_FALSE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
-+ * structure. No cache hit is possible.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling
-+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
-+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
-+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
-+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
-+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
-+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
-+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
-+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
-+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
-+ */
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(pubkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
-+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ int i;
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
-+
-+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
-+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
-+ *rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
-+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
-+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto set;
-+ }
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd'
-+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA
-+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for
-+ * searching for the private key handle.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ /*
-+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
-+ * session keys.
-+ */
-+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components
-+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the
-+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a
-+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just
-+ * create a new session key using the private
-+ * components from the RSA structure.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+set:
-+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never
-+ * extract private components from the keystore. In
-+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the
-+ * application to properly cope with that. It is
-+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by
-+ * reference are used we expect it to be used
-+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there
-+ * is no problem. If the application expects the
-+ * private components to be read from the keystore
-+ * then that is not a supported way of usage.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ *rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
-+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
-+ * 'n'/'e' components as well.
-+ */
-+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n);
-+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e);
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0 &&
-+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
-+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ *
-+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
-+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
-+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
-+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
-+ * both data signing and verifying.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making
-+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent
-+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure
-+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the
-+ * public component since with the keys by reference
-+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA
-+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we
-+ * compare the handle as well.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Local function to simplify key template population
-+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
-+ */
-+static int
-+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
-+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG len = 0;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is
-+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers.
-+ */
-+ if (bn != NULL)
-+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-+
-+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ *ul_value_len = len;
-+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
-+ if (*p_value == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static void
-+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
-+ {
-+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
-+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the
-+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got.
-+ * Assume object store locked.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 OK
-+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found
-+ */
-+static int
-+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG objcnt;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+
-+ if (objcnt > 1)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ else if (objcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* from uri stuff */
-+
-+extern char *pk11_pin;
-+
-+static int pk11_get_pin(void);
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_get_pin(void)
-+{
-+ char *pin;
-+
-+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: ");
-+ if (pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
-+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
-+ * multiple threads.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#if 0
-+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been
-+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we
-+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access
-+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for
-+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED
-+ * flag is set.
-+ */
-+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) &&
-+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread
-+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We
-+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with
-+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the
-+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment
-+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
-+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call
-+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We
-+ * lock right before C_Login().
-+ */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE))
-+ {
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
-+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
-+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
-+ * the engine.
-+ *
-+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
-+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
-+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
-+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+ goto err_locked;
-+ }
-+
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If token does not require login we take it as the
-+ * login was done.
-+ */
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err_locked:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the
-+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login()
-+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for
-+ * this.
-+ *
-+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
-+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
-+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
-+ {
-+ static char buf[128];
-+ HANDLE h;
-+ DWORD cc, mode;
-+ int cnt;
-+
-+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
-+ fputs(prompt, stderr);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
-+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
-+
-+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
-+ {
-+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
-+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
-+ break;
-+ fputc('*', stdout);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ }
-+
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
-+ buf[cnt] = '\0';
-+ fputs("\n", stderr);
-+ return buf;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
-@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
-+/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */
-+
-+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
-+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
-+
-+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
-+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
-+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
-+ * referencing the derived work.
-+
-+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
-+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
-+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
-+ * warranty of any kind.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef _PKCS11_H_
-+#define _PKCS11_H_ 1
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+extern "C" {
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by
-+ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These
-+ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them
-+ * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend
-+ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also
-+ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or
-+ * dynamically).
-+ *
-+ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention
-+ * for Cryptoki structures should be set. The Cryptoki
-+ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte
-+ * aligned.
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
-+ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following
-+ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
-+ *
-+ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+ *
-+ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including
-+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
-+ *
-+ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using
-+ * the following preprocessor directive before including
-+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
-+ *
-+ * #pragma pack(1)
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this. You might
-+ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything.
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * Now for the macros:
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an
-+ * object. It can be used like this:
-+ *
-+ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
-+ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_PTR *
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_PTR far *
-+ *
-+ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_PTR *
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
-+ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a
-+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the
-+ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in
-+ * a Cryptoki library:
-+ *
-+ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
-+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
-+ * )
-+ * {
-+ * ...
-+ * }
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a
-+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
-+ * might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType name
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
-+ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a
-+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the
-+ * following fashion:
-+ *
-+ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
-+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
-+ * );
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a
-+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
-+ * might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType name
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro
-+ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or
-+ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a
-+ * function name. It should be used in the following fashion:
-+ *
-+ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function
-+ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV.
-+ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args);
-+ *
-+ * or
-+ *
-+ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a
-+ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning
-+ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type
-+ * // funcPtrType.
-+ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args);
-+ * funcPtrType funcPtr;
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access
-+ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might
-+ * be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __export _far _pascal (* name)
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType (* name)
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
-+ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of
-+ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback.
-+ * It should be used in the following fashion:
-+ *
-+ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args);
-+ *
-+ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback
-+ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also
-+ * be used like this:
-+ *
-+ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args);
-+ * myCallbackType myCallback;
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32
-+ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType (* name)
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType _far _pascal (* name)
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType (* name)
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer.
-+ *
-+ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well),
-+ * this should best be defined by
-+ *
-+ * #ifndef NULL_PTR
-+ * #define NULL_PTR 0
-+ * #endif
-+ */
-+
-+
-+/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the
-+ * file pkcs11t.h. */
-+#include "pkcs11t.h"
-+
-+#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y
-+
-+
-+/* ==============================================================
-+ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points.
-+ * ==============================================================
-+ */
-+
-+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
-+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
-+ extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name)
-+
-+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
-+ * function prototypes. */
-+#include "pkcs11f.h"
-+
-+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+
-+/* ==============================================================
-+ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for
-+ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is
-+ * a pointer to that kind of function.
-+ * ==============================================================
-+ */
-+
-+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
-+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
-+ typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name))
-+
-+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
-+ * function prototypes. */
-+#include "pkcs11f.h"
-+
-+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+
-+/* ==============================================================
-+ * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST
-+ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version
-+ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in
-+ * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in
-+ * pkcs11t.h.
-+ * ==============================================================
-+ */
-+
-+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
-+ __PASTE(CK_,name) name;
-+
-+struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST {
-+
-+ CK_VERSION version; /* Cryptoki version */
-+
-+/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */
-+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
-+ * function prototypes. */
-+#include "pkcs11f.h"
-+
-+};
-+
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+
-+#undef __PASTE
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
-@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@
-+/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */
-+
-+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
-+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
-+
-+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
-+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
-+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
-+ * referencing the derived work.
-+
-+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
-+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
-+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
-+ * warranty of any kind.
-+ */
-+
-+/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */
-+/* Cryptoki function prototypes. Because this information is */
-+/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */
-+/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */
-+/* should not be altered. */
-+
-+/* General-purpose */
-+
-+/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets
-+ * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR
-+ * and dereferenced */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the
-+ * Cryptoki library. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to
-+ * function list */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Slot and token management */
-+
-+/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in
-+ * the system. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */
-+ CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token
-+ * in the system. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types
-+ * supported by a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular
-+ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Session management */
-+
-+/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a
-+ * token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */
-+ CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a
-+ * token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation
-+ * in a session. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
-+ * operation in a session. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */
-+ CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Object management */
-+
-+/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the
-+ * copy. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object
-+ * attributes. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object
-+ * attributes */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session
-+ * objects that match a template. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session
-+ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object
-+ * handles. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session
-+ * objects. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Encryption and decryption */
-+
-+/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Message digesting */
-+
-+/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting
-+ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of
-+ * the data already digested. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Signing and MACing */
-+
-+/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption)
-+ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to
-+ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the
-+ *signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single
-+ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the
-+ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
-+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
-+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation,
-+ * returning the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where
-+ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the
-+ * data can be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Verifying signatures and MACs */
-+
-+/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the
-+ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot
-+ * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
-+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext
-+ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification
-+ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data,
-+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification
-+ * operation, checking the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification
-+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part
-+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
-+
-+/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting
-+ * and encryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
-+ * digesting operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
-+ * encryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
-+ * verify operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Key management */
-+
-+/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key
-+ * object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair,
-+ * creating new key objects. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session
-+ * handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen
-+ * mech. */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template
-+ * for pub.
-+ * key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub.
-+ * attrs. */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template
-+ * for priv.
-+ * key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv.
-+ * attrs. */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub.
-+ * key
-+ * handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets
-+ * priv. key
-+ * handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new
-+ * key object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */
-+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key
-+ * object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */
-+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Random number generation */
-+
-+/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's
-+ * random number generator. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Parallel function management */
-+
-+/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an
-+ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an
-+ * application. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function
-+ * running in parallel. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */
-+
-+/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion,
-+ * removal, etc.) to occur. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */
-+);
-+#endif
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2
---- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008
-@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@
-+/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */
-+
-+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
-+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
-+
-+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
-+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
-+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
-+ * referencing the derived work.
-+
-+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
-+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
-+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
-+ * warranty of any kind.
-+ */
-+
-+/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that
-+ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that
-+ * must be set before including this file. */
-+
-+#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_
-+#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1
-+
-+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2
-+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20
-+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3
-+
-+#define CK_TRUE 1
-+#define CK_FALSE 0
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#ifndef FALSE
-+#define FALSE CK_FALSE
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef TRUE
-+#define TRUE CK_TRUE
-+#endif
-+#endif
-+
-+/* an unsigned 8-bit value */
-+typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE;
-+
-+/* an unsigned 8-bit character */
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR;
-+
-+/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR;
-+
-+/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL;
-+
-+/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */
-+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG;
-+
-+/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */
-+/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef long int CK_LONG;
-+
-+/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS;
-+
-+
-+/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */
-+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL)
-+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0
-+
-+
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
-+typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR;
-+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR;
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR;
-+typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR;
-+
-+/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */
-+typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */
-+/* handle or object handle */
-+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_VERSION {
-+ CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */
-+ CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */
-+} CK_VERSION;
-+
-+typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_INFO {
-+ /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from
-+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
-+ CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* Cryptoki interface ver */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */
-+
-+ /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */
-+} CK_INFO;
-+
-+typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that
-+ * Cryptoki provides to an application */
-+/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG
-+ * for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION;
-+#define CKN_SURRENDER 0
-+
-+/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED 1
-+
-+
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID;
-+
-+typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */
-+typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO {
-+ /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from
-+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags;
-+
-+ /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */
-+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */
-+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */
-+} CK_SLOT_INFO;
-+
-+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */
-+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/
-+#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */
-+
-+typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */
-+typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO {
-+ /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from
-+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */
-+
-+ /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount,
-+ * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been
-+ * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */
-+
-+ /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */
-+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */
-+ CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */
-+} CK_TOKEN_INFO;
-+
-+/* The flags parameter is defined as follows:
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random #
-+ * generator */
-+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is
-+ * write-
-+ * protected */
-+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must
-+ * login */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's
-+ * PIN is set */
-+
-+/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set,
-+ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic
-+ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys
-+ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */
-+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020
-+
-+/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means
-+ * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that
-+ * clock is returned in the token info structure */
-+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040
-+
-+/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is
-+ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login
-+ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */
-+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100
-+
-+/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true,
-+ * that means that a single session with the token can perform
-+ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and
-+ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt
-+ * and sign) */
-+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200
-+
-+/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
-+ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an
-+ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11.
-+ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause
-+ * the token to be reinitialized. */
-+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400
-+
-+/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is
-+ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for
-+ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and
-+ onwards. */
-+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
-+ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once
-+ * since the last successful authentication. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
-+ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not
-+ * possible. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token
-+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
-+ * expired by the card. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
-+ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since
-+ * the last successful authentication. */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO
-+ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible.
-+ */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token
-+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
-+ * expired by the card. */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000
-+
-+typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that
-+ * identifies a session */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE;
-+
-+typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */
-+/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE;
-+/* Security Officer */
-+#define CKU_SO 0
-+/* Normal user */
-+#define CKU_USER 1
-+/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */
-+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2
-+
-+/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */
-+/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE;
-+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0
-+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1
-+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2
-+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3
-+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */
-+typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
-+ CK_STATE state;
-+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */
-+
-+ /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */
-+} CK_SESSION_INFO;
-+
-+/* The flags are defined in the following table:
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */
-+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */
-+
-+typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an
-+ * object */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE;
-+
-+typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or
-+ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined
-+ * as follows: */
-+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS;
-+
-+/* The following classes of objects are defined: */
-+/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */
-+/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */
-+/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000
-+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001
-+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002
-+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003
-+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004
-+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005
-+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006
-+#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007
-+
-+/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKO_OTP_KEY 0x00000008
-+
-+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a
-+ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object
-+ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The following hardware feature types are defined */
-+/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001
-+#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002
-+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003
-+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */
-+/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE;
-+
-+/* the following key types are defined: */
-+#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000
-+#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001
-+#define CKK_DH 0x00000002
-+
-+/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */
-+/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */
-+#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003
-+#define CKK_EC 0x00000003
-+#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004
-+#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005
-+
-+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010
-+#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011
-+#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012
-+#define CKK_DES 0x00000013
-+#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014
-+#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015
-+
-+/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016
-+#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017
-+/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */
-+#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018
-+#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018
-+#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019
-+#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A
-+#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B
-+#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C
-+#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D
-+#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E
-+#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F
-+
-+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020
-+#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021
-+
-+/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKK_SECURID 0x00000022
-+#define CKK_HOTP 0x00000023
-+#define CKK_ACTI 0x00000024
-+
-+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025
-+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026
-+
-+
-+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+
-+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate
-+ * type */
-+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG
-+ * for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The following certificate types are defined: */
-+/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */
-+/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000
-+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001
-+#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002
-+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+
-+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute
-+ * type */
-+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which
-+ consists of an array of values. */
-+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1
-+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL 0
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL 1
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY 3
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1
-+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */
-+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED 0
-+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL 1
-+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY 2
-+
-+/* The following attribute types are defined: */
-+#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000
-+#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001
-+#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002
-+#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003
-+#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010
-+#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011
-+
-+/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012
-+
-+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080
-+#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081
-+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082
-+
-+/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new
-+ * for v2.10 */
-+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083
-+#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084
-+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085
-+
-+/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086
-+
-+/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ...
-+ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087
-+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088
-+#define CKA_URL 0x00000089
-+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A
-+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B
-+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090
-+
-+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100
-+#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101
-+#define CKA_ID 0x00000102
-+#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103
-+#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104
-+#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105
-+#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106
-+#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107
-+#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108
-+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109
-+#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A
-+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B
-+#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C
-+#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110
-+#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111
-+#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120
-+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121
-+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122
-+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123
-+#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124
-+#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125
-+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126
-+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127
-+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128
-+#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130
-+#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131
-+#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132
-+
-+/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133
-+#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134
-+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS
-+/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */
-+
-+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160
-+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161
-+
-+/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
-+ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS,
-+ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162
-+#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163
-+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164
-+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165
-+
-+/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166
-+
-+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170
-+
-+/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11,
-+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */
-+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180
-+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180
-+
-+#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181
-+
-+/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS,
-+ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */
-+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200
-+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201
-+
-+/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ...
-+ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202
-+
-+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210
-+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211)
-+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212)
-+
-+/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */
-+#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT 0x00000220
-+#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH 0x00000221
-+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL 0x00000222
-+#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE 0x00000223
-+#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224
-+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT 0x00000225
-+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT 0x00000226
-+#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT 0x00000227
-+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER 0x0000022E
-+#define CKA_OTP_TIME 0x0000022F
-+#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022A
-+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022B
-+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO 0x0000022C
-+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE 0x0000022D
-+
-+
-+/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET
-+ * are new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300
-+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301
-+#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302
-+
-+/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400
-+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401
-+#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402
-+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403
-+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404
-+#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405
-+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406
-+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480
-+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481
-+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482
-+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500
-+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501
-+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502
-+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503
-+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600)
-+
-+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length
-+ * and value of an attribute */
-+typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE {
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
-+
-+ /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */
-+} CK_ATTRIBUTE;
-+
-+typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */
-+typedef struct CK_DATE{
-+ CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */
-+ CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */
-+ CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */
-+} CK_DATE;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism
-+ * type */
-+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE;
-+
-+/* the following mechanism types are defined: */
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001
-+#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002
-+#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003
-+
-+/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS
-+ * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */
-+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004
-+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005
-+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006
-+
-+/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009
-+
-+/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31,
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A
-+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B
-+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D
-+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E
-+
-+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010
-+#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011
-+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012
-+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020
-+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021
-+
-+/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE,
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for
-+ * v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032
-+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040
-+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041
-+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042
-+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043
-+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044
-+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045
-+
-+/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046
-+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047
-+
-+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100
-+#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101
-+#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102
-+#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103
-+
-+/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104
-+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105
-+
-+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110
-+#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111
-+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120
-+#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121
-+#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122
-+#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123
-+
-+/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124
-+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125
-+
-+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130
-+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131
-+#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132
-+#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133
-+#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134
-+
-+/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN,
-+ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC,
-+ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135
-+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136
-+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140
-+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141
-+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142
-+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143
-+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144
-+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145
-+
-+/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150
-+#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151
-+#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152
-+#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153
-+
-+#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200
-+
-+/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201
-+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202
-+
-+#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210
-+
-+/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211
-+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212
-+
-+#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221
-+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222
-+
-+/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC,
-+ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC,
-+ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250
-+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251
-+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252
-+
-+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255
-+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256
-+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257
-+
-+#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260
-+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261
-+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262
-+#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270
-+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271
-+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272
-+
-+/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN 0x00000280
-+#define CKM_SECURID 0x00000282
-+
-+/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN 0x00000290
-+#define CKM_HOTP 0x00000291
-+
-+/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKM_ACTI 0x000002A0
-+#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN 0x000002A1
-+
-+/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */
-+/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */
-+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300
-+#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301
-+#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302
-+#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303
-+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304
-+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305
-+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310
-+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311
-+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312
-+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313
-+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314
-+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315
-+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320
-+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320
-+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321
-+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321
-+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322
-+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322
-+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323
-+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323
-+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324
-+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324
-+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325
-+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325
-+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330
-+#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331
-+#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332
-+#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333
-+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334
-+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335
-+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340
-+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341
-+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342
-+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343
-+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344
-+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345
-+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350
-+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360
-+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362
-+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363
-+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364
-+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365
-+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370
-+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371
-+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372
-+
-+/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN,
-+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and
-+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373
-+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374
-+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375
-+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376
-+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377
-+
-+/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378
-+
-+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380
-+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381
-+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390
-+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391
-+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393
-+#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394
-+#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395
-+
-+/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396
-+
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB
-+
-+/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0
-+
-+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0
-+
-+/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0
-+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1
-+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2
-+#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3
-+#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4
-+#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5
-+
-+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400
-+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401
-+
-+/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500
-+
-+/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */
-+#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE 0x00000510
-+#define CKM_KIP_WRAP 0x00000511
-+#define CKM_KIP_MAC 0x00000512
-+
-+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558
-+
-+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560
-+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561
-+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562
-+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563
-+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564
-+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565
-+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566
-+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567
-+
-+/* Fortezza mechanisms */
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a
-+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010
-+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011
-+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020
-+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030
-+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031
-+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032
-+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033
-+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034
-+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035
-+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036
-+
-+/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11,
-+ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */
-+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040
-+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040
-+
-+#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041
-+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042
-+
-+/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE
-+ * are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050
-+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051
-+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052
-+
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065
-+#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070
-+
-+/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC,
-+ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN,
-+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are
-+ * new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080
-+#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081
-+#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082
-+#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083
-+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084
-+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085
-+
-+/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086
-+
-+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090
-+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091
-+#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092
-+#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093
-+
-+
-+/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100
-+#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101
-+#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102
-+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103
-+#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104
-+#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105
-+
-+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000
-+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002
-+
-+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular
-+ * mechanism */
-+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pParameter;
-+
-+ /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */
-+} CK_MECHANISM;
-+
-+typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular
-+ * mechanism */
-+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO {
-+ CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize;
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize;
-+ CK_FLAGS flags;
-+} CK_MECHANISM_INFO;
-+
-+/* The flags are defined as follows:
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */
-+#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */
-+
-+/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN,
-+ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER,
-+ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP,
-+ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not
-+ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */
-+#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100
-+#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200
-+#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400
-+#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800
-+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000
-+#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000
-+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000
-+#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000
-+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000
-+#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000
-+#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000
-+#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000
-+
-+/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE,
-+ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They
-+ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism
-+ * information. */
-+#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000
-+#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000
-+#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000
-+#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000
-+#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000
-+#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000
-+
-+#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */
-+
-+typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a
-+ * Cryptoki function */
-+/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV;
-+
-+#define CKR_OK 0x00000000
-+#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001
-+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002
-+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003
-+
-+/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */
-+
-+/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006
-+
-+/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS,
-+ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */
-+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007
-+#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008
-+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009
-+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A
-+
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013
-+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020
-+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021
-+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030
-+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031
-+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032
-+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040
-+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051
-+
-+/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054
-+
-+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060
-+
-+/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */
-+
-+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062
-+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063
-+
-+/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED,
-+ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED,
-+ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064
-+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065
-+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066
-+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067
-+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068
-+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069
-+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A
-+
-+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070
-+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071
-+
-+/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID
-+ * were removed for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082
-+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090
-+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091
-+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0
-+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1
-+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2
-+
-+/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3
-+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4
-+
-+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0
-+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1
-+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3
-+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4
-+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5
-+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6
-+
-+/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and
-+ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7
-+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8
-+
-+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0
-+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1
-+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0
-+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1
-+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0
-+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1
-+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2
-+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0
-+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1
-+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2
-+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100
-+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101
-+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102
-+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103
-+
-+/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES
-+ * are new to v2.01 */
-+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104
-+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105
-+
-+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110
-+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112
-+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113
-+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114
-+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115
-+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.11 */
-+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150
-+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160
-+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170
-+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.01 */
-+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190
-+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191
-+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0
-+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1
-+
-+/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE 0x000001B0
-+#define CKR_NEXT_OTP 0x000001B1
-+
-+/* This is new to v2.20 */
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200
-+
-+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+
-+/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_NOTIFICATION event,
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec
-+ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the
-+ * Cryptoki functions */
-+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST;
-+
-+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR;
-+
-+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a
-+ * mutex object */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a
-+ * mutex object */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a
-+ * mutex */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to
-+ * C_Initialize */
-+typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS {
-+ CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex;
-+ CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex;
-+ CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex;
-+ CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex;
-+ CK_FLAGS flags;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved;
-+} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS;
-+
-+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001
-+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002
-+
-+typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* additional flags for parameters to functions */
-+
-+/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */
-+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message
-+ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when
-+ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption
-+ * scheme. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following MGFs are defined */
-+/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512
-+ * are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004
-+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source
-+ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block
-+ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */
-+#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */
-+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
-+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
-+ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen;
-+} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */
-+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
-+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
-+ CK_ULONG sLen;
-+} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */
-+#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001
-+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002
-+
-+/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms,
-+ * where each party contributes one key pair.
-+ */
-+typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */
-+typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
-+} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE;
-+typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined
-+ (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */
-+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003
-+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004
-+
-+/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party
-+ * contributes one key pair */
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation
-+ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
-+} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */
-+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BBOOL isSender;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and
-+ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just
-+ * holds the effective keysize */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC
-+ * mechanism */
-+typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS {
-+ /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */
-+
-+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */
-+} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
-+ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
-+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */
-+} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and
-+ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */
-+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
-+} CK_RC5_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC
-+ * mechanism */
-+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */
-+ CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */
-+} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
-+ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
-+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */
-+} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block
-+ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of
-+ * the MAC */
-+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[8];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[16];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen;
-+ CK_ULONG ulQLen;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ;
-+} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA;
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA;
-+} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector;
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSaltLen;
-+ CK_ULONG ulIteration;
-+} CK_PBE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */
-+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */
-+} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen;
-+} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;
-+} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer;
-+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT;
-+
-+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
-+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport;
-+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
-+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel;
-+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput;
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen;
-+} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen;
-+} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
-+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion;
-+} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel;
-+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput;
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen;
-+} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIV;
-+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber;
-+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport;
-+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
-+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism;
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen;
-+} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulLen;
-+} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA;
-+
-+typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \
-+ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the
-+ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit
-+ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the
-+ * derived key */
-+/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to
-+ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate
-+ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
-+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001
-+
-+
-+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the
-+ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5
-+ * PBKDF2. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
-+#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001
-+
-+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the
-+ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */
-+typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS {
-+ CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen;
-+ CK_ULONG iterations;
-+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen;
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen;
-+} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE;
-+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */
-+
-+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM {
-+ CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
-+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen;
-+} CK_OTP_PARAM;
-+
-+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount;
-+} CK_OTP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO {
-+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount;
-+} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO;
-+
-+typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CK_OTP_VALUE 0
-+#define CK_OTP_PIN 1
-+#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE 2
-+#define CK_OTP_TIME 3
-+#define CK_OTP_COUNTER 4
-+#define CK_OTP_FLAGS 5
-+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH 6
-+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT 7
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKF_NEXT_OTP 0x00000001
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME 0x00000002
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER 0x00000004
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN 0x00000010
-+#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020
-+
-+/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */
-+typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
-+} CK_KIP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
-+ CK_BYTE cb[16];
-+} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
-+ CK_BYTE cb[16];
-+} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[16];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[16];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+#endif
-Index: openssl/util/libeay.num
-diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.6.1.4.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.9.2.4
---- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.6.1.4.1.4.1.2.1 Wed Dec 23 17:27:04 2015
-+++ openssl/util/libeay.num Wed Dec 23 17:45:51 2015
-@@ -4198,3 +4198,5 @@
- OPENSSL_strncasecmp 4566 EXIST::FUNCTION:
- OPENSSL_gmtime 4567 EXIST::FUNCTION:
- OPENSSL_gmtime_adj 4568 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-+ENGINE_load_pk11ca 4569 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE
-+ENGINE_load_pk11so 4569 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE
-Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl
-diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.14.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.4.1
---- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.14.1 Wed Mar 4 14:03:25 2015
-+++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Wed Mar 4 14:04:40 2015
-@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@
- no-ecdh - No ECDH
- no-engine - No engine
- no-hw - No hw
-+ no-hw-pkcs11ca - No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor
-+ no-hw-pkcs11so - No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor
- nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm
- nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare
- nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare
-@@ -270,6 +272,8 @@
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_GOST" if $no_gost;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw;
-+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA" if $no_hw_pkcs11ca;
-+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO" if $no_hw_pkcs11so;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake;
- $cflags.= " -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt;
- $cflags.= " -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2;
-@@ -335,6 +339,9 @@
- $dir=$val;
- }
-
-+ if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION")
-+ { $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";}
-+
- if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES")
- { $cflags .= " $val";}
-
-@@ -1061,6 +1068,8 @@
- "no-gost" => \$no_gost,
- "no-engine" => \$no_engine,
- "no-hw" => \$no_hw,
-+ "no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca,
-+ "no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so,
- "just-ssl" =>
- [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast,
- \$no_md2, \$no_sha, \$no_mdc2, \$no_dsa, \$no_dh,
-Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl
-diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.8
---- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1 Sun Jan 15 16:09:52 2012
-+++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl Sun Jan 15 16:30:10 2012
-@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
- # External "algorithms"
- "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM",
- # Engines
-- "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP",
-+ "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO",
- # RFC3779
- "RFC3779",
- # TLS
-@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
- my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2;
- my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5;
- my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw;
-+my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so;
- my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated;
- my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng;
- my $no_jpake; my $no_ssl2;
-@@ -218,6 +219,8 @@
- elsif (/^no-ssl2$/) { $no_ssl2=1; }
- elsif (/^no-capieng$/) { $no_capieng=1; }
- elsif (/^no-jpake$/) { $no_jpake=1; }
-+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; }
-+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; }
- }
-
-
-@@ -1165,6 +1168,8 @@
- if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; }
-+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; }
-+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; }
-Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
-diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.16.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.4.1
---- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:27:05 2015
-+++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl Wed Dec 23 17:45:51 2015
-@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
- my $f = $shlib?' /MD':' /MT';
- $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib
- $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox';
-- $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
-+ $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
- $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref";
-
- *::perlasm_compile_target = sub {
+++ /dev/null
-Index: openssl/Configure
-diff -u openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/Configure:1.19
---- openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:46 2016
-+++ openssl/Configure Mon Jun 13 15:20:23 2016
-@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
-
- # see INSTALL for instructions.
-
--my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-+my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-
- # Options:
- #
-@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@
- # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can
- # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install".
- #
-+# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name.
-+# (No default)
-+#
-+# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only
-+# (No default)
-+#
- # --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected
- # to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in
- # include/. A value is required.
-@@ -355,24 +361,23 @@
- ####
- # *-generic* is endian-neutral target, but ./config is free to
- # throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate...
--"linux-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
- # It's believed that majority of ARM toolchains predefine appropriate -march.
- # If you compiler does not, do complement config command line with one!
--"linux-armv4", "gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-armv4", "gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
- #### IA-32 targets...
--"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
-+"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
- ####
--"linux-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
--"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
--"linux-x86_64-clang","clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
--"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-+"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-+"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-+"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
- #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs
- # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see
- # /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of
-@@ -668,6 +673,10 @@
- my $idx_arflags = $idx++;
- my $idx_multilib = $idx++;
-
-+# PKCS#11 engine patch
-+my $pk11_libname="";
-+my $pk11_flavor="";
-+
- my $prefix="";
- my $libdir="";
- my $openssldir="";
-@@ -895,6 +904,14 @@
- $_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei;
- $flags.=$_." ";
- }
-+ elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/)
-+ {
-+ $pk11_libname=$1;
-+ }
-+ elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/)
-+ {
-+ $pk11_flavor=$1;
-+ }
- elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
- {
- $prefix=$1;
-@@ -1062,6 +1079,22 @@
- exit 0;
- }
-
-+if (! $pk11_libname)
-+ {
-+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n";
-+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
-+ exit 1;
-+ }
-+
-+if (! $pk11_flavor
-+ || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only"))
-+ {
-+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n";
-+ print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n";
-+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
-+ exit 1;
-+ }
-+
- if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
- $target = "Cygwin".$1;
- }
-@@ -1139,6 +1172,25 @@
- $exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO";
- }
-
-+if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator")
-+ {
-+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
-+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
-+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
-+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so";
-+ print " no-hw-pkcs11so [pk11-flavor]";
-+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
-+ }
-+else
-+ {
-+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
-+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
-+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
-+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca";
-+ print " no-hw-pkcs11ca [pk11-flavor]";
-+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
-+}
-+
- my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds;
-
- $exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/);
-@@ -1228,6 +1280,8 @@
- if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; }
- else { $no_user_cflags=1; }
-
-+$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags";
-+
- # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through
- # the script "config" or manually.
- if (!$no_krb5)
-@@ -1626,6 +1680,7 @@
- s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/;
- s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
- s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
-+ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/;
- s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
- s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
- s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
-Index: openssl/Makefile.org
-diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.10.1.2.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.12
---- openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.10.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:47 2016
-+++ openssl/Makefile.org Mon Jun 13 15:20:23 2016
-@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
- INSTALL_PREFIX=
- INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
-
-+# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option.
-+PK11_LIB_LOCATION=
-+
- # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
- OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
-
-Index: openssl/README.pkcs11
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.8
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:28 2016
-+++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Fri Oct 4 14:16:43 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
-+ISC modified
-+============
-+
-+The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility.
-+
-+The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and
-+sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the
-+PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second
-+is a stripped down version which provides only the useful
-+function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device
-+protected key store and key loading).
-+
-+As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor,
-+external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example
-+of the first, AEP Keyper of the second.
-+
-+Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in
-+config/Configure.
-+
-+It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine.
-+The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared
-+(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine
-+(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs).
-+
-+PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l
-+=========================================
-+
-+[Nov 19, 2009]
-+
-+Contents:
-+
-+Overview
-+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch
-+FAQs
-+Feedback
-+
-+Overview
-+========
-+
-+This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11
-+engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against
-+OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system
-+must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the
-+PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below.
-+
-+Patch can be applied like this:
-+
-+ # NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris
-+ tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz
-+ # now download the patch to the current directory
-+ # ...
-+ cd openssl-0.9.8l
-+ # NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system)
-+ patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19
-+
-+It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the
-+symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share
-+except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA.
-+
-+According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support
-+following mechanisms:
-+
-+ RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4,
-+ AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB,
-+ AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224,
-+ SHA256, SHA384, SHA512
-+
-+Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP
-+functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may
-+see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an
-+example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety
-+problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested).
-+
-+You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the
-+configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the
-+config script:
-+
-+ $ ./config
-+ Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2
-+ Configuring for solaris-x86-cc
-+ You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.
-+ See README.pkcs11 for more information.
-+
-+Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run
-+configure script like this:
-+
-+ ./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so
-+
-+To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run
-+"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the
-+output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary
-+and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits.
-+
-+The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against
-+PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and
-+OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project
-+(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more
-+information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the
-+system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself
-+and has functional PKCS#11 library.
-+
-+The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are
-+copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information.
-+
-+Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems,
-+Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more
-+information).
-+
-+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch
-+=======================================
-+
-+2009-11-19
-+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l
-+
-+- bugs and RFEs:
-+
-+ 6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores
-+ 6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split
-+ 6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the
-+ PKCS#11 engine
-+
-+2009-03-11
-+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j
-+
-+- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a
-+ tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied.
-+
-+- fixed bugs:
-+
-+ 6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4
-+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if
-+ meta slot is disabled
-+
-+2008-12-02
-+- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal)
-+
-+ 6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine
-+ 6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true
-+ 6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean
-+ 6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take
-+ it seriously
-+ 6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean
-+ 6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11
-+ engine code
-+ 6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API
-+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if
-+ meta slot is disabled
-+
-+2008-08-01
-+- fixed bug
-+
-+ 6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers
-+ and digests
-+
-+- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic
-+
-+2008-07-29
-+- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version
-+- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version:
-+
-+ 6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users
-+
-+- fixed bugs in the engine code:
-+
-+ 6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for
-+ asymmetric key operations
-+ 6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called
-+ atomically
-+ 6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys
-+ 6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners
-+ 6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in
-+ suboptimal way
-+ 6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more
-+ resilient to destroy failures
-+ 6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free()
-+ 6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys
-+ 6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine
-+ 6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size
-+ of big numbers leading to failures
-+ 6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of
-+ -1
-+ 6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references
-+ 6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not
-+ checked
-+ 6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to
-+ structure reuse
-+ 6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of
-+ OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH}
-+ defines but fails miserably
-+ 6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss
-+ 6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing
-+ generate_params parameter
-+ 6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes
-+ 6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the
-+ PKCS#11 engine
-+ 6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish()
-+
-+- new features and enhancements:
-+
-+ 6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512
-+ 6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes
-+ 6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric
-+ ciphers and digests
-+
-+2007-10-15
-+- update for 0.9.8f version
-+- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
-+
-+2007-10-02
-+- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
-+- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys"
-+
-+2007-09-26
-+- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes
-+ significant performance drop
-+- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine
-+
-+2007-05-25
-+- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers
-+
-+2007-05-19
-+- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code
-+
-+FAQs
-+====
-+
-+(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error:
-+
-+../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init':
-+hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork'
-+
-+Answer:
-+
-+ - don't use "no-threads" when configuring
-+ - if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by
-+ default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the
-+ architecture that Configure printed, for example:
-+
-+Configured for linux-elf.
-+
-+ - then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes),
-+ and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string.
-+ If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With
-+ "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after
-+ "-D_REENTRANT", like this:
-+
-+....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:.....
-+
-+(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for
-+pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch.
-+
-+Answer:
-+
-+ Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32
-+ (as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there.
-+
-+
-+Feedback
-+========
-+
-+Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was
-+created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris.
-+
-+Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp.
-+
-Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h
-diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.6.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.10
---- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.6.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:49 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h Mon Jun 13 15:20:26 2016
-@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@
-
- #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS
-+# define OPENSSL_THREADS
-+#endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
- # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
- #endif
-@@ -94,6 +97,8 @@
- # endif
- #endif
-
-+#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
-+
- /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
-
- /* Generate 80386 code? */
-@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@
- * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
- * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
- */
--#undef RC4_CHUNK
-+#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long
- #endif
- #endif
-
-@@ -148,7 +153,7 @@
- /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
- * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
- #ifndef DES_LONG
--#define DES_LONG unsigned long
-+#define DES_LONG unsigned int
- #endif
- #endif
-
-@@ -159,9 +164,9 @@
- /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
-
- /* Only one for the following should be defined */
--#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
-+#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
- #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
--#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT
-+#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
- #endif
-
- #if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H)
-@@ -173,7 +178,7 @@
-
- #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
- #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
--#undef BF_PTR
-+#define BF_PTR2
- #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
-
- #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
-@@ -203,7 +208,7 @@
- /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
- * Very mucy CPU dependant */
- #ifndef DES_UNROLL
--#undef DES_UNROLL
-+#define DES_UNROLL
- #endif
-
- /* These default values were supplied by
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.10
---- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 18:09:29 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Wed Dec 23 18:27:10 2015
-@@ -22,13 +22,15 @@
- tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \
- tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \
- eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \
-- eng_rsax.c eng_rdrand.c
-+ eng_rsax.c eng_rdrand.c \
-+ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c
- LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \
- eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \
- tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \
- tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \
- eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \
-- eng_rsax.o eng_rdrand.o
-+ eng_rsax.o eng_rdrand.o \
-+ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o
-
- SRC= $(LIBSRC)
-
-@@ -296,6 +298,83 @@
- eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
- eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h
- eng_table.o: eng_table.c
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dh.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11.c
-+hw_pk11.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11ca.h pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11ca.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/md5.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so.h pkcs11.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: hw_pk11so_pub.c pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
- tb_asnmth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
- tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
- tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+/*
-+ * CDDL HEADER START
-+ *
-+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
-+ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only
-+ * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance
-+ * with the License.
-+ *
-+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
-+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
-+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
-+ * and limitations under the License.
-+ *
-+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
-+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
-+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
-+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
-+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
-+ *
-+ * CDDL HEADER END
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef _CRYPTOKI_H
-+#define _CRYPTOKI_H
-+
-+/* ident "@(#)cryptoki.h 1.2 05/06/08 SMI" */
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+extern "C" {
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_PTR
-+#define CK_PTR *
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION
-+#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#include <unistd.h> /* For NULL */
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint
-+ */
-+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#define CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#ifndef TRUE
-+#define TRUE 1
-+#endif /* TRUE */
-+#ifndef FALSE
-+#define FALSE 0
-+#endif /* FALSE */
-+#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */
-+
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+
-+/* Solaris specific functions */
-+
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+
-+/*
-+ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all
-+ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of
-+ * providing operations on the requested mechanism
-+ */
-+CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession);
-+
-+/*
-+ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given
-+ * mechanism from the rawkey data.
-+ */
-+CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len,
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj);
-+
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif /* _CRYPTOKI_H */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.8
---- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:52 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Mon Jun 13 15:20:31 2016
-@@ -122,6 +122,14 @@
- # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)
- ENGINE_load_capi();
- # endif
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
-+ ENGINE_load_pk11ca();
-+# endif
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
-+ ENGINE_load_pk11so();
-+# endif
-+# endif
- #endif
- ENGINE_register_all_complete();
- }
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.7
---- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 18:09:30 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Wed Dec 23 18:27:11 2015
-@@ -416,6 +416,12 @@
- void ENGINE_load_rsax(void);
- void ENGINE_load_rdrand(void);
- void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
-+void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void);
-+# endif
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
-+void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void);
-+# endif
-
- /*
- * Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.33
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Fri Oct 4 14:07:41 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,4010 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#endif
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+#include <openssl/aes.h>
-+#include <openssl/des.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <signal.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <dlfcn.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Debug mutexes */
-+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */
-+#define DEBUG_MUTEX
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+#define __USE_UNIX98
-+#endif
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
-+
-+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
-+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
-+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
-+/* #undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+/*
-+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun)
-+#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
-+
-+/*
-+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
-+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
-+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
-+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
-+ */
-+static int *hw_cnids;
-+static int *hw_dnids;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
-+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
-+
-+/*
-+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
-+ * logging into the token.
-+ */
-+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-+
-+/*
-+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
-+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
-+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
-+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
-+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
-+ * PK11_SESSION object.
-+ *
-+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
-+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
-+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
-+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
-+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
-+ *
-+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
-+ * They are also used for active list protection.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
-+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
-+ * list) for given algorithm type
-+ */
-+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
-+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
-+ * without losing the secret key objects.
-+ */
-+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+/* ENGINE level stuff */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-+
-+/* RAND stuff */
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
-+
-+/* These functions are also used in other files */
-+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+
-+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
-+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Local helper functions */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent);
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
-+
-+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
-+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
-+#else
-+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
-+#endif
-+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+ const int **nids, int nid);
-+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+ const int **nids, int nid);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+ int key_len);
-+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
-+ size_t count);
-+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
-+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
-+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-+
-+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ int *local_cipher_nids);
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
-+ int *local_digest_nids);
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
-+ int id);
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
-+ int id);
-+
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
-+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+/* Index for the supported ciphers */
-+enum pk11_cipher_id {
-+ PK11_DES_CBC,
-+ PK11_DES3_CBC,
-+ PK11_DES_ECB,
-+ PK11_DES3_ECB,
-+ PK11_RC4,
-+ PK11_AES_128_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_192_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_256_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_128_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_192_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_256_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_128_CTR,
-+ PK11_AES_192_CTR,
-+ PK11_AES_256_CTR,
-+ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
-+ PK11_CIPHER_MAX
-+};
-+
-+/* Index for the supported digests */
-+enum pk11_digest_id {
-+ PK11_MD5,
-+ PK11_SHA1,
-+ PK11_SHA224,
-+ PK11_SHA256,
-+ PK11_SHA384,
-+ PK11_SHA512,
-+ PK11_DIGEST_MAX
-+};
-+
-+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \
-+ { \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \
-+ { \
-+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \
-+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \
-+ } \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ }
-+
-+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-+static int cipher_count = 0;
-+static int digest_count = 0;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
-+ {
-+ enum pk11_cipher_id id;
-+ int nid;
-+ int iv_len;
-+ int min_key_len;
-+ int max_key_len;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
-+ } PK11_CIPHER;
-+
-+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
-+ {
-+ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8,
-+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8,
-+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256,
-+ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_aes_192_ctr, 16, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_aes_256_ctr, 16, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
-+ };
-+
-+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
-+ {
-+ enum pk11_digest_id id;
-+ int nid;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
-+ } PK11_DIGEST;
-+
-+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
-+ {
-+ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, },
-+ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, },
-+ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, },
-+ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, },
-+ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, },
-+ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, },
-+ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, },
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
-+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
-+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
-+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
-+ *
-+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
-+ */
-+
-+/* DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_cbc,
-+ 8, 8, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ede3_cbc,
-+ 8, 24, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
-+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ecb,
-+ 8, 8, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ede3_ecb,
-+ 8, 24, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_cbc,
-+ 16, 16, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_cbc,
-+ 16, 24, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_cbc,
-+ 16, 32, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
-+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_ecb,
-+ 16, 16, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_ecb,
-+ 16, 24, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_ecb,
-+ 16, 32, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_ctr,
-+ 16, 16, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_ctr,
-+ 16, 24, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_ctr,
-+ 16, 32, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_bf_cbc,
-+ 8, 16, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
-+ {
-+ NID_rc4,
-+ 1, 16, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
-+ {
-+ NID_md5,
-+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
-+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ MD5_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha1,
-+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha224,
-+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
-+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha256,
-+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha384,
-+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
-+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha512,
-+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
-+ */
-+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
-+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
-+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
-+ {
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
-+ "SO_PATH",
-+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_PIN,
-+ "PIN",
-+ "Specifies the pin code",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SLOT,
-+ "SLOT",
-+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
-+ },
-+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_seed,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_cleanup,
-+ pk11_rand_add,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_status
-+ };
-+
-+
-+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
-+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
-+#endif
-+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
-+static const char *engine_pk11_name =
-+ "PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)";
-+
-+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
-+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
-+
-+/*
-+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
-+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
-+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
-+ */
-+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
-+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
-+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
-+char *pk11_pin = NULL;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
-+static int pk11_pid = 0;
-+
-+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
-+
-+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
-+
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ session_cache[type].lock =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+#else
-+ return (1);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+
-+ if (token_lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock);
-+ token_lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
-+ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
-+ */
-+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
-+ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ if (pk11_have_random)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+/*
-+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
-+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
-+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
-+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
-+ */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-+ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
-+ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
-+ if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE)
-+ pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
-+ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
-+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-+#error "dynamic engine not supported"
-+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
-+ {
-+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
-+
-+#else
-+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
-+
-+ if (!ret)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(ret))
-+ {
-+ ENGINE_free(ret);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+void
-+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
-+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
-+ */
-+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
-+ if (!pk11_dso)
-+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
-+ if (!e_pk11)
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
-+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
-+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
-+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
-+
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ ERR_clear_error();
-+ }
-+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
-+
-+/*
-+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
-+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
-+ */
-+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ }
-+
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+
-+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
-+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
-+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
-+ * accessible to all threads.
-+ */
-+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
-+{
-+ return (pk11_library_init(e));
-+}
-+
-+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args =
-+ {
-+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */
-+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
-+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
-+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
-+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
-+ CK_INFO info;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+ int any_slot_found;
-+ int i;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which
-+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still
-+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine
-+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is
-+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application
-+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork()
-+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can
-+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional
-+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In
-+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly
-+ * initialize the engine again.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_library_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ /*
-+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
-+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
-+ * engine first.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
-+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
-+ if (!p)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ rv = p(&pFuncList);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
-+
-+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
-+#endif
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
-+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
-+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
-+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
-+ * because no slot was present.
-+ */
-+ if (any_slot_found == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
-+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
-+ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
-+ */
-+ /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */
-+ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
-+ != CKR_OK) {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
-+ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ digest_count = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
-+ pk11_pid = getpid();
-+ /*
-+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
-+ * will do the cleanup.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
-+ goto err;
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
-+ /*
-+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
-+ * for asymmetric ciphers.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ active_list[i] = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
-+ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
-+ * library.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
-+
-+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* free all active lists */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ pk11_free_active_list(i);
-+
-+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects.
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ pFuncList = NULL;
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ pk11_pid = 0;
-+ /*
-+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
-+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
-+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
-+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
-+ * the engine before calling fork().
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
-+ {
-+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
-+
-+ switch (cmd)
-+ {
-+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (initialized)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
-+ case PK11_CMD_PIN:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
-+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
-+ {
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
-+ * the calling functions do not care anyway
-+ */
-+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
-+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
-+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
-+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
-+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
-+ */
-+PK11_SESSION *
-+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
-+#endif
-+ static pid_t pid = 0;
-+ pid_t new_pid;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
-+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
-+ * here, with no PID information.
-+ */
-+ if (pid == 0)
-+ pid = getpid();
-+
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp = freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
-+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
-+ * structure from the freelist.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
-+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
-+ * mark them as unused.
-+ */
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
-+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
-+ */
-+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
-+ {
-+ pid = new_pid;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
-+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
-+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
-+ * head of the list).
-+ */
-+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp1->next;
-+ /*
-+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
-+ * sessions and destroy all objects.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
-+ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
-+
-+ /* Initialize the process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
-+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
-+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
-+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
-+ * re-initialization.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
-+ * the caller cope with the situation.
-+ */
-+ freelist = sp;
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->pid == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
-+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (sp != NULL)
-+ sp->next = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (sp);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+void
-+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
-+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
-+ * next time we will ask for a new session.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
-+ return;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp->next = freelist;
-+ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ int type;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
-+ * return 0 on exit.
-+ */
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
-+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
-+ * return an error on return.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
-+ pid_t mypid = getpid();
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ int ret = 1;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ myslot = SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are probably a child process so force the
-+ * reinitialize of the session
-+ */
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
-+ return (0);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ }
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->pid = getpid();
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
-+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
-+ */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e'
-+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We
-+ * must free those as well.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
-+ *
-+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
-+ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
-+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
-+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
-+ */
-+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
-+
-+static int
-+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
-+ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
-+ return (ciphers[i].id);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
-+ {
-+ if (cipher_count > 0)
-+ *nids = cipher_nids;
-+ else
-+ *nids = NULL;
-+ return (cipher_count);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
-+ {
-+ if (digest_count > 0)
-+ *nids = digest_nids;
-+ else
-+ *nids = NULL;
-+ return (digest_count);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
-+ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
-+ * pk11_init_symetric() is called.
-+ */
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
-+
-+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
-+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
-+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
-+ {
-+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
-+ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
-+ /*
-+ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
-+ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
-+ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
-+ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
-+ * add code so that the counter length can be set via
-+ * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
-+ */
-+ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
-+ {
-+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
-+ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
-+ else
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+ int index;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
-+
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
-+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
-+ /*
-+ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
-+ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
-+ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
-+ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
-+ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
-+ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
-+ * code serves as a sanity check.
-+ *
-+ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
-+ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
-+ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
-+ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
-+ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
-+ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
-+ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
-+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-+
-+ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
-+ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
-+ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
-+ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
-+ {
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
-+ * needs to be created.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
-+ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
-+ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
-+ {
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* now initialize the context with a new key */
-+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
-+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
-+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
-+ * that it needs not be recreated.
-+ *
-+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
-+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
-+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
-+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
-+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
-+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
-+ */
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
-+#else
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
-+#endif
-+ {
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ unsigned long outl = inl;
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
-+
-+ if (!inl)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
-+ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
-+ * the same size of input.
-+ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
-+ * correctly aligned buffers.
-+ */
-+ if (inl != outl)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
-+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
-+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
-+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
-+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
-+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
-+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
-+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
-+ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
-+
-+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
-+ * rid of the context.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
-+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
-+ else
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
-+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
-+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
-+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+ const int **nids, int nid)
-+ {
-+ if (!cipher)
-+ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
-+
-+ switch (nid)
-+ {
-+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_bf_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_rc4:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_rc4;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_ctr:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_ctr:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_ctr:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ *cipher = NULL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ return (*cipher != NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+ const int **nids, int nid)
-+ {
-+ if (!digest)
-+ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
-+
-+ switch (nid)
-+ {
-+ case NID_md5:
-+ *digest = &pk11_md5;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha1:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha1;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha224:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha224;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha256:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha256;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha384:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha384;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha512:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha512;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ *digest = NULL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ return (*digest != NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
-+ unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
-+ * can use the key handles. Here is why:
-+ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
-+ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
-+ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
-+ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
-+ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
-+ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
-+ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
-+ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
-+ * terminate the active operation.
-+ */
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX)
-+ {
-+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
-+ memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len);
-+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES) ||
-+ (key_type == CKK_DES2) ||
-+ (key_type == CKK_DES3))
-+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]);
-+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) ||
-+ (key_type == CKK_DES3))
-+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]);
-+ if (key_type == CKK_DES3)
-+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]);
-+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf;
-+ }
-+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Save the key information used in this session.
-+ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX;
-+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len;
-+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len);
-+ }
-+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
-+err:
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
-+ if (digests[i].nid == nid)
-+ return (digests[i].id);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+ int index;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
-+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ pdp = &digests[index];
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
-+ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
-+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+
-+ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
-+ if (count == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
-+ count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ unsigned long len;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+ len = ctx->digest->md_size;
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
-+ * to the pool
-+ */
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+
-+ /* The copy-from state */
-+ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Initialize the copy-to state */
-+ if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
-+ goto err;
-+ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
-+
-+ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
-+ &ul_state_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (ul_state_len == 0)
-+ {
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
-+ if (pstate == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
-+ &ul_state_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
-+ ul_state_len, 0, 0);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
-+ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = 1;
-+err:
-+ if (pstate != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pstate);
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
-+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+
-+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
-+ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
-+ * that might have been allocated in the token when
-+ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
-+ * will return the session to the cache.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
-+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
-+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
-+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
-+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
-+ * prefix.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+ int key_len)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
-+ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
-+ {
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
-+ }
-+
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * The secret key object is created in the
-+ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key().
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+err:
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_RSA_X_509
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
-+ * CKM_DSA
-+ *
-+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
-+ * public key slot.
-+ *
-+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_DES3_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES_CBC
-+ * CKM_AES_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES3_ECB
-+ * CKM_DES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_CTR
-+ * CKM_RC4
-+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
-+ *
-+ * Digests optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_MD5
-+ * CKM_SHA_1
-+ * CKM_SHA224
-+ * CKM_SHA256
-+ * CKM_SHA384
-+ * CKM_SHA512
-+ *
-+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
-+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
-+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
-+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
-+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
-+ {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ int slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ int slot_n_digest = 0;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
-+ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-+
-+ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-+
-+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 0;
-+
-+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ /* Check if slot has random support. */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
-+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
-+ &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
-+ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER)
-+ {
-+ slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+ * verifying with CKM_DSA.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
-+ &mech_info);
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
-+ * derivation.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ if (!found_candidate_slot &&
-+ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
-+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
-+ pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover;
-+ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
-+ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might
-+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature
-+ * is used.
-+ */
-+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ best_slot_sofar);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to "
-+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+#else
-+ } /* if */
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ } /* for */
-+
-+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
-+ }
-+
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+ current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-+ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
-+ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
-+
-+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
-+
-+ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ current_slot_n_cipher);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ current_slot_n_digest);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n",
-+ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
-+ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
-+ * otherwise leave it where it is.
-+ */
-+ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
-+ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest))
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n",
-+ PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
-+ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
-+ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
-+ sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
-+ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids,
-+ sizeof (local_digest_nids));
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
-+ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 1;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ int *local_cipher_nids, int id)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
-+ {
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids))
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
-+ ciphers[id].nid;
-+ }
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
-+ int id)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
-+ {
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids))
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
-+ digests[id].nid;
-+ }
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
-+ {
-+ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
-+ ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
-+ {
-+ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type,
-+ current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
-+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
-+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
-+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
-+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
-+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
-+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
-+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
-+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
-+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
-+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
-+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
-+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
-+ *
-+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
-+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
-+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
-+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
-+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
-+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
-+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said
-+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with
-+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code
-+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for
-+ * asymmetric operations.
-+ *
-+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what
-+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can
-+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be
-+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before,
-+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only.
-+ *
-+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find
-+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric
-+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table
-+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays
-+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the
-+ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token
-+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more
-+ * information.
-+ *
-+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined
-+ * the code won't be used.
-+ */
-+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64)
-+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
-+#else
-+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists,
-+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware
-+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms.
-+ */
-+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ void *handle;
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0;
-+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL;
-+ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
-+ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
-+ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
-+ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ /* this means empty tables */
-+ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef;
-+ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also
-+ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the
-+ * search.
-+ */
-+ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
-+ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1;
-+ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int));
-+ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int));
-+ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef
-+ * is zero now.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i)
-+ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef;
-+ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i)
-+ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are
-+ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables.
-+ */
-+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i],
-+ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids);
-+ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i],
-+ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by
-+ * dlclose(3C).
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ (void) dlclose(handle);
-+ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids;
-+ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids);
-+ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e.,
-+ * non-existent).
-+ */
-+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table)
-+ {
-+ int i = 0;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new
-+ * table.
-+ */
-+ if (nid_table == NULL)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * the table is never full, there is always at least one
-+ * NID_undef.
-+ */
-+ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef)
-+ {
-+ if (nid_table[i++] == nid)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.5
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Tue Jun 14 00:43:26 2011
-@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-+
-+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]=
-+{
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"},
-+{ 0, NULL}
-+};
-+
-+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]=
-+{
-+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"},
-+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"},
-+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"},
-+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"},
-+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"},
-+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"},
-+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"},
-+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"},
-+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"},
-+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"},
-+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"},
-+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"},
-+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"},
-+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"},
-+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"},
-+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" },
-+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login() failed on token" },
-+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" },
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" },
-+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" },
-+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" },
-+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen() dialog command" },
-+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" },
-+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" },
-+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" },
-+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" },
-+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" },
-+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" },
-+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork() failed" },
-+{ 0, NULL}
-+};
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */
-+
-+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0;
-+static int pk11_error_init = 1;
-+
-+static void
-+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
-+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
-+
-+ if (pk11_error_init)
-+ {
-+ pk11_error_init = 0;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
-+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_error_init == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
-+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
-+#endif
-+ pk11_error_init = 1;
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+void
-+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
-+{
-+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
-+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
-+ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv)
-+{
-+ char tmp_buf[20];
-+
-+ PK11err(function, reason);
-+ (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
-+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
-+}
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.13
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Fri Oct 4 14:04:20 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H
-+#define HW_PK11_ERR_H
-+
-+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
-+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv);
-+#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
-+
-+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */
-+
-+/* Function codes. */
-+
-+#define PK11_F_INIT 100
-+#define PK11_F_FINISH 101
-+#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102
-+#define PK11_F_CTRL 103
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114
-+#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115
-+#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116
-+#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117
-+#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130
-+#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131
-+#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132
-+#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133
-+#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134
-+#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135
-+#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136
-+#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139
-+#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143
-+#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145
-+#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD 147
-+#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148
-+#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151
-+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152
-+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153
-+#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154
-+#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155
-+#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156
-+#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157
-+#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159
-+#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160
-+#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161
-+#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162
-+#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163
-+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164
-+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165
-+#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166
-+
-+/* Reason codes. */
-+#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100
-+#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101
-+#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102
-+#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103
-+#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104
-+#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105
-+#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106
-+#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107
-+#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108
-+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109
-+#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110
-+#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111
-+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112
-+#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116
-+#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118
-+#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119
-+#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120
-+#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123
-+#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124
-+#define PK11_R_SIGN 125
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131
-+#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132
-+#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133
-+#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138
-+#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139
-+#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140
-+#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141
-+#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142
-+#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143
-+#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144
-+#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148
-+#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156
-+#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157
-+#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158
-+#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159
-+#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160
-+#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162
-+#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164
-+#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165
-+#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166
-+
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167
-+#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169
-+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170
-+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171
-+#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172
-+#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173
-+#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177
-+#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179
-+#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180
-+#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181
-+#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182
-+#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183
-+#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183
-+#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184
-+#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185
-+#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186
-+
-+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */
-+#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32
-+
-+#ifdef NOPTHREADS
-+/*
-+ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the
-+ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global
-+ * per-process lock for the whole engine.
-+ *
-+ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as
-+ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but
-+ * it's safe.
-+ */
-+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11
-+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the
-+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation
-+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list.
-+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object
-+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls.
-+ *
-+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list
-+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request
-+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done.
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION
-+ {
-+ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next;
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */
-+ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */
-+ CK_BBOOL pub_persistent; /* is pub key in keystore? */
-+ CK_BBOOL priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */
-+ union
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
-+ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */
-+ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */
-+ } u_RSA;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
-+ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */
-+ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */
-+ } u_DSA;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */
-+ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */
-+ } u_DH;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */
-+ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
-+ int key_len; /* priv key len */
-+ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */
-+ } u_cipher;
-+ } opdata_u;
-+ } PK11_SESSION;
-+
-+#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key
-+#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key
-+#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub
-+#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv
-+#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_pn_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_pe_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num
-+#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key
-+#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh
-+#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num
-+#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key
-+#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key
-+#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len
-+#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt
-+
-+/*
-+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types:
-+ * 1) asymmetric operations
-+ * 2) random operations
-+ * 3) symmetric and digest operations
-+ *
-+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware
-+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware
-+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support
-+ * only a single group of operations.
-+ *
-+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have
-+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from
-+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots.
-+ *
-+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are
-+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache.
-+ */
-+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM
-+ {
-+ OP_RAND,
-+ OP_RSA,
-+ OP_DSA,
-+ OP_DH,
-+ OP_CIPHER,
-+ OP_DIGEST,
-+ OP_MAX
-+ } PK11_OPTYPE;
-+
-+/*
-+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches
-+ * and locks associated with the lists.
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *head;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *lock;
-+#endif
-+ } PK11_CACHE;
-+
-+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */
-+typedef struct PK11_active_st
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h;
-+ unsigned int refcnt;
-+ struct PK11_active_st *prev;
-+ struct PK11_active_st *next;
-+ } PK11_active;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[];
-+#endif
-+extern PK11_active *active_list[];
-+/*
-+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See
-+ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation.
-+ */
-+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0)
-+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0)
-+#else
-+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
-+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
-+#endif
-+
-+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
-+
-+#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.42
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:27:06 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
-+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
-+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
-+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* RSA stuff */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa);
-+#else
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa);
-+#endif
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* DSA stuff */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
-+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
-+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
-+ DSA *dsa);
-+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* DH stuff */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
-+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
-+#endif
-+
-+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
-+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
-+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
-+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
-+
-+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private);
-+
-+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
-+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
-+#else
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
-+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
-+ * variable and jump to the specified label.
-+ */
-+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
-+ { \
-+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
-+ { \
-+ var = TRUE; \
-+ if (unlock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ goto label; \
-+ } \
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
-+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
-+ if (entry->h == h)
-+ return (entry);
-+
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
-+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
-+ * failure.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* search for entry in the active list */
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
-+ entry->refcnt++;
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
-+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
-+ if (entry == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ entry->h = h;
-+ entry->refcnt = 1;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
-+ if (active_list[type] == NULL)
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ else /* make the entry first in the list */
-+ {
-+ entry->next = active_list[type];
-+ active_list[type]->prev = entry;
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (entry->refcnt);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+void
-+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *prev_entry;
-+
-+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
-+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ prev_entry->next = entry->next;
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ active_list[type] = entry->next;
-+ /* we were the first but not the only one */
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* sanitization */
-+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ OPENSSL_free(entry);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
-+void
-+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
-+ switch (type)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
-+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
-+ *
-+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
-+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
-+ entry->refcnt--;
-+ if (entry->refcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 RSA method",
-+ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */
-+ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */
-+ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */
-+ NULL, /* app_data */
-+ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */
-+ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */
-+ };
-+
-+RSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_RSA(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_rsa);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 DSA method",
-+ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */
-+ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
-+ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */
-+ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */
-+ 0, /* flags */
-+ NULL /* app_data */
-+ };
-+
-+DSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_DSA(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_dsa);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/*
-+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
-+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
-+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
-+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
-+ * enough.
-+ */
-+#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8
-+
-+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 DH method",
-+ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */
-+ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_DH_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */
-+ 0, /* flags */
-+ NULL, /* app_data */
-+ NULL /* generate_params */
-+ };
-+
-+DH_METHOD *
-+PK11_DH(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_dh);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
-+
-+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
-+#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20
-+#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/*
-+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
-+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
-+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
-+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-+err:
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
-+ * should be catched in the padding functions
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-+err:
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ BIGNUM f;
-+ int j, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *p;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ BN_init(&f);
-+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
-+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
-+ */
-+ if (flen > num)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* make data into a big number */
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
-+ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
-+ */
-+ for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
-+ if (buf[j] != 0)
-+ break;
-+
-+ p = buf + j;
-+ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (r < 0)
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-+
-+err:
-+ BN_clear_free(&f);
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ BIGNUM f;
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *p;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ BN_init(&f);
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-+ if (buf == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
-+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
-+ */
-+ if (flen > num)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
-+ * Needs to skip these 0's here
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
-+ if (buf[i] != 0)
-+ break;
-+
-+ p = buf + i;
-+ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (r < 0)
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-+
-+err:
-+ BN_clear_free(&f);
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
-+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_encrypted;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
-+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
-+ rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ retval = ul_sig_len;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
-+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_decrypted;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
-+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
-+ p_mech, h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_decrypted;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
-+ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
-+ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
-+ * structures.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
-+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
-+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ unsigned long ulsiglen;
-+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
-+
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ ulsiglen = j;
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
-+ *siglen = ulsiglen;
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa)
-+#else
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa)
-+#endif
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i,
-+ (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
-+
-+#define MAXATTR 1024
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *privkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for private keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
-+ * never ask for private components.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_TRUE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
-+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
-+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm
-+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer
-+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However,
-+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect
-+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We
-+ * do not check the return value because even in case
-+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key
-+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and
-+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the
-+ * OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not
-+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for
-+ * consistency reasons.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
-+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we
-+ * must take care of handle management ourselves.
-+ */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
-+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+ /*
-+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
-+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
-+ * in the keystore.
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(privkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ rollback = rollback;
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *pubkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for public keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_FALSE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
-+ * structure. No cache hit is possible.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling
-+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
-+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
-+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
-+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
-+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
-+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
-+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
-+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
-+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
-+ */
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(pubkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
-+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ int i;
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
-+
-+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
-+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
-+ *rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
-+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
-+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto set;
-+ }
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd'
-+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA
-+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for
-+ * searching for the private key handle.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ /*
-+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
-+ * session keys.
-+ */
-+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components
-+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the
-+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a
-+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just
-+ * create a new session key using the private
-+ * components from the RSA structure.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+set:
-+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never
-+ * extract private components from the keystore. In
-+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the
-+ * application to properly cope with that. It is
-+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by
-+ * reference are used we expect it to be used
-+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there
-+ * is no problem. If the application expects the
-+ * private components to be read from the keystore
-+ * then that is not a supported way of usage.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ *rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
-+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
-+ * 'n'/'e' components as well.
-+ */
-+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n);
-+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e);
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0 &&
-+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
-+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ *
-+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
-+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
-+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
-+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
-+ * both data signing and verifying.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making
-+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent
-+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure
-+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the
-+ * public component since with the keys by reference
-+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA
-+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we
-+ * compare the handle as well.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* The DSA function implementation */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static DSA_SIG *
-+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
-+ int i;
-+ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
-+
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
-+ * each is 20 bytes long
-+ */
-+ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
-+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
-+ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
-+
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+
-+ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
-+ if (dlen > i)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto ret;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+
-+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
-+ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ dsa_sig->r = r;
-+ dsa_sig->s = s;
-+
-+ret:
-+ if (dsa_sig == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (r != NULL)
-+ BN_free(r);
-+ if (s != NULL)
-+ BN_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
-+ return (dsa_sig);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
-+ DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int retval = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
-+
-+ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
-+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
-+ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
-+
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+
-+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
-+
-+ if (dlen > i)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto ret;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
-+ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
-+ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
-+ */
-+ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
-+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
-+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
-+ BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ retval = 1;
-+ret:
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
-+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
-+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ int i;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
-+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */
-+ };
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
-+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
-+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
-+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */
-+ };
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
-+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
-+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/* The DH function implementation */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Generate DH key-pair.
-+ *
-+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
-+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
-+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
-+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
-+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG i;
-+ CK_RV rv, rv1;
-+ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
-+
-+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
-+ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
-+ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
-+ */
-+ pub_key_template[1].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
-+ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
-+ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
-+ {
-+ pub_key_template[2].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
-+ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
-+ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
-+ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are
-+ * destroyed before return and thus not cached.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
-+ &mechanism,
-+ pub_key_template,
-+ ul_pub_key_attr_count,
-+ priv_key_template,
-+ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
-+ &h_pub_key,
-+ &h_priv_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
-+ * should be sufficient for reuse.
-+ */
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
-+ {
-+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
-+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
-+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
-+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
-+ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
-+ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
-+ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
-+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
-+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
-+ {
-+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
-+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
-+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
-+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
-+ {
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = 1;
-+
-+err:
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
-+ DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ CK_ULONG seclen;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
-+ {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)},
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int ret = -1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
-+ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+ seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
-+ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
-+ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
-+
-+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
-+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
-+ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
-+ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
-+ &mechanism,
-+ h_key,
-+ priv_key_template,
-+ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
-+ &h_derived_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
-+ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
-+ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
-+ */
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
-+ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
-+ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
-+ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
-+ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
-+ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
-+ * pre-master secret.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
-+ {
-+ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
-+ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+
-+ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (mechanism.pParameter)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
-+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
-+ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ int i;
-+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
-+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ key_template[0].pValue = &class;
-+ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+
-+ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
-+
-+ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
-+ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
-+
-+ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
-+ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dh;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
-+ key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ *
-+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
-+ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
-+ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
-+ * in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * Local function to simplify key template population
-+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
-+ */
-+static int
-+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
-+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG len = 0;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is
-+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers.
-+ */
-+ if (bn != NULL)
-+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-+
-+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ *ul_value_len = len;
-+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
-+ if (*p_value == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static void
-+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
-+ {
-+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
-+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the
-+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got.
-+ * Assume object store locked.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 OK
-+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found
-+ */
-+static int
-+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG objcnt;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+
-+ if (objcnt > 1)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ else if (objcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* from uri stuff */
-+
-+extern char *pk11_pin;
-+
-+static int pk11_get_pin(void);
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_get_pin(void)
-+{
-+ char *pin;
-+
-+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: ");
-+ if (pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
-+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
-+ * multiple threads.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#if 0
-+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been
-+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we
-+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access
-+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for
-+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED
-+ * flag is set.
-+ */
-+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) &&
-+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread
-+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We
-+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with
-+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the
-+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment
-+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
-+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call
-+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We
-+ * lock right before C_Login().
-+ */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE))
-+ {
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
-+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
-+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
-+ * the engine.
-+ *
-+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
-+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
-+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
-+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+ goto err_locked;
-+ }
-+
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If token does not require login we take it as the
-+ * login was done.
-+ */
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err_locked:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the
-+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login()
-+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for
-+ * this.
-+ *
-+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
-+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
-+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
-+ {
-+ static char buf[128];
-+ HANDLE h;
-+ DWORD cc, mode;
-+ int cnt;
-+
-+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
-+ fputs(prompt, stderr);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
-+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
-+
-+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
-+ {
-+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
-+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
-+ break;
-+ fputc('*', stdout);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ }
-+
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
-+ buf[cnt] = '\0';
-+ fputs("\n", stderr);
-+ return buf;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.4
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011
-@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
-+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */
-+
-+#define token_lock pk11ca_token_lock
-+#define find_lock pk11ca_find_lock
-+#define active_list pk11ca_active_list
-+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags
-+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID
-+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11ca_error
-+#define PK11err_add_data PK11CAerr_add_data
-+#define pk11_get_session pk11ca_get_session
-+#define pk11_return_session pk11ca_return_session
-+#define pk11_active_add pk11ca_active_add
-+#define pk11_active_delete pk11ca_active_delete
-+#define pk11_active_remove pk11ca_active_remove
-+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11ca_free_active_list
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv
-+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11ca_load_privkey
-+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11ca_load_pubkey
-+#define PK11_RSA PK11CA_RSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv
-+#define PK11_DSA PK11CA_DSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11ca_destroy_dh_object
-+#define PK11_DH PK11CA_DH
-+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11ca_token_relogin
-+#define pFuncList pk11ca_pFuncList
-+#define pk11_pin pk11ca_pin
-+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11ca
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.8
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:16 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#error RSA is disabled
-+#endif
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <signal.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <dlfcn.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Debug mutexes */
-+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */
-+#define DEBUG_MUTEX
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+#define __USE_UNIX98
-+#endif
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
-+
-+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
-+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
-+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
-+/*#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#define OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11so.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
-+
-+/*
-+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
-+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
-+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
-+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
-+
-+/*
-+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
-+ * logging into the token.
-+ */
-+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-+
-+/*
-+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
-+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
-+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
-+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
-+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
-+ * PK11_SESSION object.
-+ *
-+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
-+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
-+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
-+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
-+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
-+ *
-+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
-+ * They are also used for active list protection.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
-+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
-+ * list) for given algorithm type
-+ */
-+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
-+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
-+ * without losing the secret key objects.
-+ */
-+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+/* ENGINE level stuff */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-+
-+/* RAND stuff */
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
-+
-+/* These functions are also used in other files */
-+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+
-+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
-+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+
-+/* Local helper functions */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent);
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
-+
-+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
-+
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
-+
-+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \
-+ { \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \
-+ { \
-+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \
-+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \
-+ } \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ }
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
-+ */
-+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
-+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
-+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
-+ {
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
-+ "SO_PATH",
-+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_PIN,
-+ "PIN",
-+ "Specifies the pin code",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SLOT,
-+ "SLOT",
-+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
-+ },
-+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_seed,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_cleanup,
-+ pk11_rand_add,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_status
-+ };
-+
-+
-+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
-+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
-+#endif
-+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
-+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)";
-+
-+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
-+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
-+
-+/*
-+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
-+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
-+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
-+ */
-+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
-+
-+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
-+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
-+char *pk11_pin = NULL;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
-+static int pk11_pid = 0;
-+
-+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
-+
-+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
-+
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr);
-+
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr);
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ session_cache[type].lock =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+#else
-+ return (1);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+
-+ if (token_lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock);
-+ token_lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
-+ */
-+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_have_random)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
-+ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
-+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-+#error "dynamic engine not supported"
-+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
-+ {
-+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
-+
-+#else
-+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
-+
-+ if (!ret)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(ret))
-+ {
-+ ENGINE_free(ret);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+void
-+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
-+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
-+ */
-+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
-+ if (!pk11_dso)
-+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
-+ if (!e_pk11)
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
-+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
-+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
-+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
-+
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ ERR_clear_error();
-+ }
-+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
-+
-+/*
-+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
-+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
-+ */
-+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ }
-+
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+
-+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
-+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
-+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
-+ * accessible to all threads.
-+ */
-+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
-+{
-+ return (pk11_library_init(e));
-+}
-+
-+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args =
-+ {
-+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */
-+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
-+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
-+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
-+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
-+ CK_INFO info;
-+ int any_slot_found;
-+ int i;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which
-+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still
-+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine
-+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is
-+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application
-+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork()
-+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can
-+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional
-+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In
-+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly
-+ * initialize the engine again.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_library_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ /*
-+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
-+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
-+ * engine first.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
-+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
-+ if (!p)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ rv = p(&pFuncList);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
-+
-+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
-+#endif
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
-+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
-+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
-+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
-+ * because no slot was present.
-+ */
-+ if (any_slot_found == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
-+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
-+ pk11_pid = getpid();
-+ /*
-+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
-+ * will do the cleanup.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
-+ goto err;
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
-+ /*
-+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
-+ * for asymmetric ciphers.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ active_list[i] = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
-+ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
-+ * library.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
-+
-+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* free all active lists */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ pk11_free_active_list(i);
-+
-+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects.
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ pFuncList = NULL;
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ pk11_pid = 0;
-+ /*
-+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
-+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
-+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
-+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
-+ * the engine before calling fork().
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
-+ {
-+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
-+
-+ switch (cmd)
-+ {
-+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (initialized)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
-+ case PK11_CMD_PIN:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
-+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
-+ {
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
-+ * the calling functions do not care anyway
-+ */
-+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
-+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
-+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
-+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
-+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
-+ */
-+PK11_SESSION *
-+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
-+#endif
-+ static pid_t pid = 0;
-+ pid_t new_pid;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
-+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
-+ * here, with no PID information.
-+ */
-+ if (pid == 0)
-+ pid = getpid();
-+
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp = freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
-+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
-+ * structure from the freelist.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
-+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
-+ * mark them as unused.
-+ */
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
-+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
-+ */
-+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
-+ {
-+ pid = new_pid;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
-+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
-+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
-+ * head of the list).
-+ */
-+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp1->next;
-+ /*
-+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
-+ * sessions and destroy all objects.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
-+ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
-+
-+ /* Initialize the process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
-+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
-+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
-+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
-+ * re-initialization.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
-+ * the caller cope with the situation.
-+ */
-+ freelist = sp;
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->pid == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
-+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (sp != NULL)
-+ sp->next = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (sp);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+void
-+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
-+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
-+ * next time we will ask for a new session.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
-+ return;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp->next = freelist;
-+ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ int type;
-+
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
-+ * return 0 on exit.
-+ */
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
-+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
-+ * return an error on return.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
-+ pid_t mypid = getpid();
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ int ret = 1;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are probably a child process so force the
-+ * reinitialize of the session
-+ */
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
-+ return (0);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ }
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->pid = getpid();
-+
-+ if (optype == OP_RSA)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
-+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
-+ */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e'
-+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We
-+ * must free those as well.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
-+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
-+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
-+ */
-+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
-+ *
-+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
-+ * public key slot.
-+ *
-+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
-+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
-+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
-+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
-+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
-+ {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
-+
-+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 0;
-+
-+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ /* Check if slot has random support. */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
-+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
-+ &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
-+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might
-+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature
-+ * is used.
-+ */
-+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ best_slot_sofar);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to "
-+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+#else
-+ } /* if */
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ } /* for */
-+
-+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 1;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.4
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011
-@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
-+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */
-+
-+#define token_lock pk11so_token_lock
-+#define find_lock pk11so_find_lock
-+#define active_list pk11so_active_list
-+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11so_pubkey_token_flags
-+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID
-+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11so_error
-+#define PK11err_add_data PK11SOerr_add_data
-+#define pk11_get_session pk11so_get_session
-+#define pk11_return_session pk11so_return_session
-+#define pk11_active_add pk11so_active_add
-+#define pk11_active_delete pk11so_active_delete
-+#define pk11_active_remove pk11so_active_remove
-+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11so_free_active_list
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv
-+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11so_load_privkey
-+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11so_load_pubkey
-+#define PK11_RSA PK11SO_RSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv
-+#define PK11_DSA PK11SO_DSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11so_destroy_dh_object
-+#define PK11_DH PK11SO_DH
-+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11so_token_relogin
-+#define pFuncList pk11so_pFuncList
-+#define pk11_pin pk11so_pin
-+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11so
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.10
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:38 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#error RSA is disabled
-+#endif
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
-+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11so.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
-+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
-+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x)
-+#endif
-+
-+/* RSA stuff */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+
-+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
-+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
-+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
-+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
-+
-+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private);
-+
-+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
-+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
-+#else
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
-+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
-+ * variable and jump to the specified label.
-+ */
-+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
-+ { \
-+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
-+ { \
-+ var = TRUE; \
-+ if (unlock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ goto label; \
-+ } \
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
-+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
-+ if (entry->h == h)
-+ return (entry);
-+
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
-+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
-+ * failure.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* search for entry in the active list */
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
-+ entry->refcnt++;
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
-+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
-+ if (entry == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ entry->h = h;
-+ entry->refcnt = 1;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
-+ if (active_list[type] == NULL)
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ else /* make the entry first in the list */
-+ {
-+ entry->next = active_list[type];
-+ active_list[type]->prev = entry;
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (entry->refcnt);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+void
-+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *prev_entry;
-+
-+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
-+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ prev_entry->next = entry->next;
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ active_list[type] = entry->next;
-+ /* we were the first but not the only one */
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* sanitization */
-+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ OPENSSL_free(entry);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
-+void
-+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
-+ switch (type)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
-+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
-+ *
-+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
-+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
-+ entry->refcnt--;
-+ if (entry->refcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa;
-+
-+RSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_RSA(void)
-+ {
-+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa;
-+
-+ if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-+ memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa));
-+ pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method";
-+ pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign;
-+ }
-+ return (&pk11_rsa);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
-+
-+/*
-+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
-+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
-+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ unsigned long ulsiglen;
-+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
-+
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ ulsiglen = j;
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
-+ *siglen = ulsiglen;
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
-+
-+#define MAXATTR 1024
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *privkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for private keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
-+ * never ask for private components.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_TRUE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
-+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
-+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm
-+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer
-+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However,
-+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect
-+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We
-+ * do not check the return value because even in case
-+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key
-+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and
-+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the
-+ * OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not
-+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for
-+ * consistency reasons.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
-+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we
-+ * must take care of handle management ourselves.
-+ */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
-+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+ /*
-+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
-+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
-+ * in the keystore.
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(privkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ rollback = rollback;
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *pubkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for public keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_FALSE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
-+ * structure. No cache hit is possible.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling
-+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
-+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
-+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
-+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
-+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
-+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
-+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
-+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
-+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
-+ */
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(pubkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
-+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ int i;
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
-+
-+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
-+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
-+ *rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
-+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
-+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto set;
-+ }
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd'
-+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA
-+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for
-+ * searching for the private key handle.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ /*
-+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
-+ * session keys.
-+ */
-+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components
-+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the
-+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a
-+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just
-+ * create a new session key using the private
-+ * components from the RSA structure.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+set:
-+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never
-+ * extract private components from the keystore. In
-+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the
-+ * application to properly cope with that. It is
-+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by
-+ * reference are used we expect it to be used
-+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there
-+ * is no problem. If the application expects the
-+ * private components to be read from the keystore
-+ * then that is not a supported way of usage.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ *rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
-+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
-+ * 'n'/'e' components as well.
-+ */
-+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n);
-+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e);
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0 &&
-+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
-+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ *
-+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
-+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
-+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
-+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
-+ * both data signing and verifying.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making
-+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent
-+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure
-+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the
-+ * public component since with the keys by reference
-+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA
-+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we
-+ * compare the handle as well.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Local function to simplify key template population
-+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
-+ */
-+static int
-+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
-+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG len = 0;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is
-+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers.
-+ */
-+ if (bn != NULL)
-+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-+
-+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ *ul_value_len = len;
-+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
-+ if (*p_value == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static void
-+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
-+ {
-+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
-+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the
-+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got.
-+ * Assume object store locked.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 OK
-+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found
-+ */
-+static int
-+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG objcnt;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+
-+ if (objcnt > 1)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ else if (objcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* from uri stuff */
-+
-+extern char *pk11_pin;
-+
-+static int pk11_get_pin(void);
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_get_pin(void)
-+{
-+ char *pin;
-+
-+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: ");
-+ if (pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
-+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
-+ * multiple threads.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#if 0
-+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been
-+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we
-+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access
-+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for
-+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED
-+ * flag is set.
-+ */
-+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) &&
-+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread
-+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We
-+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with
-+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the
-+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment
-+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
-+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call
-+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We
-+ * lock right before C_Login().
-+ */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE))
-+ {
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
-+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
-+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
-+ * the engine.
-+ *
-+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
-+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
-+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
-+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+ goto err_locked;
-+ }
-+
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If token does not require login we take it as the
-+ * login was done.
-+ */
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err_locked:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the
-+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login()
-+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for
-+ * this.
-+ *
-+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
-+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
-+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
-+ {
-+ static char buf[128];
-+ HANDLE h;
-+ DWORD cc, mode;
-+ int cnt;
-+
-+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
-+ fputs(prompt, stderr);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
-+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
-+
-+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
-+ {
-+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
-+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
-+ break;
-+ fputc('*', stdout);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ }
-+
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
-+ buf[cnt] = '\0';
-+ fputs("\n", stderr);
-+ return buf;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
-@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
-+/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */
-+
-+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
-+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
-+
-+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
-+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
-+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
-+ * referencing the derived work.
-+
-+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
-+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
-+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
-+ * warranty of any kind.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef _PKCS11_H_
-+#define _PKCS11_H_ 1
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+extern "C" {
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by
-+ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These
-+ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them
-+ * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend
-+ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also
-+ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or
-+ * dynamically).
-+ *
-+ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention
-+ * for Cryptoki structures should be set. The Cryptoki
-+ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte
-+ * aligned.
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
-+ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following
-+ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
-+ *
-+ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+ *
-+ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including
-+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
-+ *
-+ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using
-+ * the following preprocessor directive before including
-+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
-+ *
-+ * #pragma pack(1)
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this. You might
-+ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything.
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * Now for the macros:
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an
-+ * object. It can be used like this:
-+ *
-+ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
-+ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_PTR *
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_PTR far *
-+ *
-+ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_PTR *
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
-+ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a
-+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the
-+ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in
-+ * a Cryptoki library:
-+ *
-+ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
-+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
-+ * )
-+ * {
-+ * ...
-+ * }
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a
-+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
-+ * might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType name
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
-+ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a
-+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the
-+ * following fashion:
-+ *
-+ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
-+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
-+ * );
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a
-+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
-+ * might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType name
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro
-+ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or
-+ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a
-+ * function name. It should be used in the following fashion:
-+ *
-+ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function
-+ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV.
-+ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args);
-+ *
-+ * or
-+ *
-+ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a
-+ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning
-+ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type
-+ * // funcPtrType.
-+ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args);
-+ * funcPtrType funcPtr;
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access
-+ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might
-+ * be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __export _far _pascal (* name)
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType (* name)
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
-+ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of
-+ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback.
-+ * It should be used in the following fashion:
-+ *
-+ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args);
-+ *
-+ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback
-+ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also
-+ * be used like this:
-+ *
-+ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args);
-+ * myCallbackType myCallback;
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32
-+ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType (* name)
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType _far _pascal (* name)
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType (* name)
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer.
-+ *
-+ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well),
-+ * this should best be defined by
-+ *
-+ * #ifndef NULL_PTR
-+ * #define NULL_PTR 0
-+ * #endif
-+ */
-+
-+
-+/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the
-+ * file pkcs11t.h. */
-+#include "pkcs11t.h"
-+
-+#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y
-+
-+
-+/* ==============================================================
-+ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points.
-+ * ==============================================================
-+ */
-+
-+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
-+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
-+ extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name)
-+
-+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
-+ * function prototypes. */
-+#include "pkcs11f.h"
-+
-+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+
-+/* ==============================================================
-+ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for
-+ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is
-+ * a pointer to that kind of function.
-+ * ==============================================================
-+ */
-+
-+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
-+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
-+ typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name))
-+
-+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
-+ * function prototypes. */
-+#include "pkcs11f.h"
-+
-+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+
-+/* ==============================================================
-+ * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST
-+ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version
-+ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in
-+ * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in
-+ * pkcs11t.h.
-+ * ==============================================================
-+ */
-+
-+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
-+ __PASTE(CK_,name) name;
-+
-+struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST {
-+
-+ CK_VERSION version; /* Cryptoki version */
-+
-+/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */
-+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
-+ * function prototypes. */
-+#include "pkcs11f.h"
-+
-+};
-+
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+
-+#undef __PASTE
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
-@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@
-+/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */
-+
-+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
-+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
-+
-+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
-+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
-+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
-+ * referencing the derived work.
-+
-+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
-+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
-+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
-+ * warranty of any kind.
-+ */
-+
-+/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */
-+/* Cryptoki function prototypes. Because this information is */
-+/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */
-+/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */
-+/* should not be altered. */
-+
-+/* General-purpose */
-+
-+/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets
-+ * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR
-+ * and dereferenced */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the
-+ * Cryptoki library. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to
-+ * function list */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Slot and token management */
-+
-+/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in
-+ * the system. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */
-+ CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token
-+ * in the system. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types
-+ * supported by a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular
-+ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Session management */
-+
-+/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a
-+ * token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */
-+ CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a
-+ * token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation
-+ * in a session. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
-+ * operation in a session. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */
-+ CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Object management */
-+
-+/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the
-+ * copy. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object
-+ * attributes. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object
-+ * attributes */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session
-+ * objects that match a template. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session
-+ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object
-+ * handles. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session
-+ * objects. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Encryption and decryption */
-+
-+/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Message digesting */
-+
-+/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting
-+ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of
-+ * the data already digested. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Signing and MACing */
-+
-+/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption)
-+ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to
-+ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the
-+ *signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single
-+ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the
-+ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
-+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
-+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation,
-+ * returning the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where
-+ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the
-+ * data can be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Verifying signatures and MACs */
-+
-+/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the
-+ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot
-+ * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
-+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext
-+ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification
-+ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data,
-+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification
-+ * operation, checking the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification
-+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part
-+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
-+
-+/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting
-+ * and encryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
-+ * digesting operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
-+ * encryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
-+ * verify operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Key management */
-+
-+/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key
-+ * object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair,
-+ * creating new key objects. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session
-+ * handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen
-+ * mech. */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template
-+ * for pub.
-+ * key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub.
-+ * attrs. */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template
-+ * for priv.
-+ * key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv.
-+ * attrs. */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub.
-+ * key
-+ * handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets
-+ * priv. key
-+ * handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new
-+ * key object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */
-+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key
-+ * object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */
-+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Random number generation */
-+
-+/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's
-+ * random number generator. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Parallel function management */
-+
-+/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an
-+ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an
-+ * application. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function
-+ * running in parallel. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */
-+
-+/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion,
-+ * removal, etc.) to occur. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */
-+);
-+#endif
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008
-@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@
-+/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */
-+
-+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
-+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
-+
-+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
-+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
-+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
-+ * referencing the derived work.
-+
-+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
-+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
-+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
-+ * warranty of any kind.
-+ */
-+
-+/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that
-+ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that
-+ * must be set before including this file. */
-+
-+#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_
-+#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1
-+
-+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2
-+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20
-+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3
-+
-+#define CK_TRUE 1
-+#define CK_FALSE 0
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#ifndef FALSE
-+#define FALSE CK_FALSE
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef TRUE
-+#define TRUE CK_TRUE
-+#endif
-+#endif
-+
-+/* an unsigned 8-bit value */
-+typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE;
-+
-+/* an unsigned 8-bit character */
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR;
-+
-+/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR;
-+
-+/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL;
-+
-+/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */
-+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG;
-+
-+/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */
-+/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef long int CK_LONG;
-+
-+/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS;
-+
-+
-+/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */
-+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL)
-+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0
-+
-+
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
-+typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR;
-+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR;
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR;
-+typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR;
-+
-+/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */
-+typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */
-+/* handle or object handle */
-+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_VERSION {
-+ CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */
-+ CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */
-+} CK_VERSION;
-+
-+typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_INFO {
-+ /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from
-+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
-+ CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* Cryptoki interface ver */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */
-+
-+ /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */
-+} CK_INFO;
-+
-+typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that
-+ * Cryptoki provides to an application */
-+/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG
-+ * for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION;
-+#define CKN_SURRENDER 0
-+
-+/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED 1
-+
-+
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID;
-+
-+typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */
-+typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO {
-+ /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from
-+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags;
-+
-+ /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */
-+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */
-+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */
-+} CK_SLOT_INFO;
-+
-+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */
-+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/
-+#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */
-+
-+typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */
-+typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO {
-+ /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from
-+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */
-+
-+ /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount,
-+ * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been
-+ * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */
-+
-+ /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */
-+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */
-+ CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */
-+} CK_TOKEN_INFO;
-+
-+/* The flags parameter is defined as follows:
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random #
-+ * generator */
-+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is
-+ * write-
-+ * protected */
-+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must
-+ * login */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's
-+ * PIN is set */
-+
-+/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set,
-+ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic
-+ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys
-+ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */
-+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020
-+
-+/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means
-+ * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that
-+ * clock is returned in the token info structure */
-+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040
-+
-+/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is
-+ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login
-+ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */
-+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100
-+
-+/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true,
-+ * that means that a single session with the token can perform
-+ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and
-+ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt
-+ * and sign) */
-+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200
-+
-+/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
-+ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an
-+ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11.
-+ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause
-+ * the token to be reinitialized. */
-+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400
-+
-+/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is
-+ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for
-+ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and
-+ onwards. */
-+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
-+ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once
-+ * since the last successful authentication. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
-+ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not
-+ * possible. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token
-+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
-+ * expired by the card. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
-+ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since
-+ * the last successful authentication. */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO
-+ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible.
-+ */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token
-+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
-+ * expired by the card. */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000
-+
-+typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that
-+ * identifies a session */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE;
-+
-+typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */
-+/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE;
-+/* Security Officer */
-+#define CKU_SO 0
-+/* Normal user */
-+#define CKU_USER 1
-+/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */
-+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2
-+
-+/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */
-+/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE;
-+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0
-+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1
-+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2
-+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3
-+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */
-+typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
-+ CK_STATE state;
-+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */
-+
-+ /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */
-+} CK_SESSION_INFO;
-+
-+/* The flags are defined in the following table:
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */
-+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */
-+
-+typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an
-+ * object */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE;
-+
-+typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or
-+ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined
-+ * as follows: */
-+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS;
-+
-+/* The following classes of objects are defined: */
-+/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */
-+/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */
-+/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000
-+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001
-+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002
-+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003
-+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004
-+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005
-+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006
-+#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007
-+
-+/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKO_OTP_KEY 0x00000008
-+
-+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a
-+ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object
-+ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The following hardware feature types are defined */
-+/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001
-+#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002
-+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003
-+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */
-+/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE;
-+
-+/* the following key types are defined: */
-+#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000
-+#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001
-+#define CKK_DH 0x00000002
-+
-+/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */
-+/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */
-+#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003
-+#define CKK_EC 0x00000003
-+#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004
-+#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005
-+
-+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010
-+#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011
-+#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012
-+#define CKK_DES 0x00000013
-+#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014
-+#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015
-+
-+/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016
-+#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017
-+/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */
-+#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018
-+#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018
-+#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019
-+#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A
-+#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B
-+#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C
-+#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D
-+#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E
-+#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F
-+
-+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020
-+#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021
-+
-+/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKK_SECURID 0x00000022
-+#define CKK_HOTP 0x00000023
-+#define CKK_ACTI 0x00000024
-+
-+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025
-+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026
-+
-+
-+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+
-+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate
-+ * type */
-+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG
-+ * for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The following certificate types are defined: */
-+/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */
-+/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000
-+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001
-+#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002
-+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+
-+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute
-+ * type */
-+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which
-+ consists of an array of values. */
-+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1
-+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL 0
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL 1
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY 3
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1
-+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */
-+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED 0
-+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL 1
-+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY 2
-+
-+/* The following attribute types are defined: */
-+#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000
-+#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001
-+#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002
-+#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003
-+#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010
-+#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011
-+
-+/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012
-+
-+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080
-+#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081
-+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082
-+
-+/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new
-+ * for v2.10 */
-+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083
-+#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084
-+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085
-+
-+/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086
-+
-+/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ...
-+ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087
-+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088
-+#define CKA_URL 0x00000089
-+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A
-+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B
-+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090
-+
-+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100
-+#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101
-+#define CKA_ID 0x00000102
-+#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103
-+#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104
-+#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105
-+#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106
-+#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107
-+#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108
-+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109
-+#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A
-+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B
-+#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C
-+#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110
-+#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111
-+#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120
-+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121
-+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122
-+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123
-+#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124
-+#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125
-+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126
-+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127
-+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128
-+#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130
-+#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131
-+#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132
-+
-+/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133
-+#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134
-+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS
-+/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */
-+
-+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160
-+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161
-+
-+/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
-+ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS,
-+ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162
-+#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163
-+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164
-+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165
-+
-+/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166
-+
-+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170
-+
-+/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11,
-+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */
-+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180
-+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180
-+
-+#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181
-+
-+/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS,
-+ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */
-+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200
-+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201
-+
-+/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ...
-+ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202
-+
-+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210
-+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211)
-+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212)
-+
-+/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */
-+#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT 0x00000220
-+#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH 0x00000221
-+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL 0x00000222
-+#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE 0x00000223
-+#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224
-+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT 0x00000225
-+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT 0x00000226
-+#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT 0x00000227
-+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER 0x0000022E
-+#define CKA_OTP_TIME 0x0000022F
-+#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022A
-+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022B
-+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO 0x0000022C
-+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE 0x0000022D
-+
-+
-+/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET
-+ * are new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300
-+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301
-+#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302
-+
-+/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400
-+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401
-+#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402
-+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403
-+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404
-+#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405
-+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406
-+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480
-+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481
-+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482
-+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500
-+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501
-+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502
-+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503
-+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600)
-+
-+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length
-+ * and value of an attribute */
-+typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE {
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
-+
-+ /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */
-+} CK_ATTRIBUTE;
-+
-+typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */
-+typedef struct CK_DATE{
-+ CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */
-+ CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */
-+ CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */
-+} CK_DATE;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism
-+ * type */
-+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE;
-+
-+/* the following mechanism types are defined: */
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001
-+#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002
-+#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003
-+
-+/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS
-+ * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */
-+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004
-+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005
-+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006
-+
-+/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009
-+
-+/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31,
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A
-+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B
-+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D
-+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E
-+
-+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010
-+#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011
-+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012
-+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020
-+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021
-+
-+/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE,
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for
-+ * v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032
-+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040
-+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041
-+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042
-+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043
-+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044
-+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045
-+
-+/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046
-+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047
-+
-+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100
-+#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101
-+#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102
-+#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103
-+
-+/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104
-+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105
-+
-+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110
-+#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111
-+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120
-+#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121
-+#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122
-+#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123
-+
-+/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124
-+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125
-+
-+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130
-+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131
-+#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132
-+#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133
-+#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134
-+
-+/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN,
-+ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC,
-+ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135
-+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136
-+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140
-+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141
-+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142
-+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143
-+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144
-+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145
-+
-+/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150
-+#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151
-+#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152
-+#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153
-+
-+#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200
-+
-+/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201
-+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202
-+
-+#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210
-+
-+/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211
-+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212
-+
-+#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221
-+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222
-+
-+/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC,
-+ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC,
-+ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250
-+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251
-+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252
-+
-+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255
-+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256
-+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257
-+
-+#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260
-+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261
-+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262
-+#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270
-+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271
-+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272
-+
-+/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN 0x00000280
-+#define CKM_SECURID 0x00000282
-+
-+/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN 0x00000290
-+#define CKM_HOTP 0x00000291
-+
-+/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKM_ACTI 0x000002A0
-+#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN 0x000002A1
-+
-+/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */
-+/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */
-+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300
-+#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301
-+#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302
-+#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303
-+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304
-+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305
-+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310
-+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311
-+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312
-+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313
-+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314
-+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315
-+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320
-+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320
-+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321
-+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321
-+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322
-+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322
-+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323
-+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323
-+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324
-+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324
-+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325
-+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325
-+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330
-+#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331
-+#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332
-+#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333
-+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334
-+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335
-+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340
-+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341
-+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342
-+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343
-+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344
-+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345
-+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350
-+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360
-+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362
-+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363
-+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364
-+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365
-+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370
-+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371
-+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372
-+
-+/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN,
-+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and
-+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373
-+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374
-+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375
-+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376
-+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377
-+
-+/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378
-+
-+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380
-+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381
-+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390
-+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391
-+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393
-+#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394
-+#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395
-+
-+/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396
-+
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB
-+
-+/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0
-+
-+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0
-+
-+/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0
-+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1
-+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2
-+#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3
-+#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4
-+#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5
-+
-+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400
-+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401
-+
-+/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500
-+
-+/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */
-+#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE 0x00000510
-+#define CKM_KIP_WRAP 0x00000511
-+#define CKM_KIP_MAC 0x00000512
-+
-+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558
-+
-+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560
-+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561
-+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562
-+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563
-+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564
-+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565
-+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566
-+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567
-+
-+/* Fortezza mechanisms */
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a
-+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010
-+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011
-+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020
-+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030
-+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031
-+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032
-+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033
-+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034
-+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035
-+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036
-+
-+/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11,
-+ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */
-+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040
-+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040
-+
-+#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041
-+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042
-+
-+/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE
-+ * are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050
-+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051
-+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052
-+
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065
-+#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070
-+
-+/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC,
-+ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN,
-+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are
-+ * new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080
-+#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081
-+#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082
-+#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083
-+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084
-+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085
-+
-+/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086
-+
-+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090
-+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091
-+#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092
-+#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093
-+
-+
-+/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100
-+#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101
-+#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102
-+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103
-+#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104
-+#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105
-+
-+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000
-+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002
-+
-+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular
-+ * mechanism */
-+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pParameter;
-+
-+ /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */
-+} CK_MECHANISM;
-+
-+typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular
-+ * mechanism */
-+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO {
-+ CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize;
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize;
-+ CK_FLAGS flags;
-+} CK_MECHANISM_INFO;
-+
-+/* The flags are defined as follows:
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */
-+#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */
-+
-+/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN,
-+ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER,
-+ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP,
-+ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not
-+ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */
-+#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100
-+#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200
-+#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400
-+#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800
-+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000
-+#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000
-+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000
-+#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000
-+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000
-+#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000
-+#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000
-+#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000
-+
-+/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE,
-+ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They
-+ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism
-+ * information. */
-+#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000
-+#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000
-+#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000
-+#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000
-+#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000
-+#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000
-+
-+#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */
-+
-+typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a
-+ * Cryptoki function */
-+/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV;
-+
-+#define CKR_OK 0x00000000
-+#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001
-+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002
-+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003
-+
-+/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */
-+
-+/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006
-+
-+/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS,
-+ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */
-+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007
-+#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008
-+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009
-+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A
-+
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013
-+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020
-+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021
-+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030
-+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031
-+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032
-+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040
-+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051
-+
-+/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054
-+
-+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060
-+
-+/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */
-+
-+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062
-+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063
-+
-+/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED,
-+ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED,
-+ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064
-+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065
-+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066
-+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067
-+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068
-+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069
-+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A
-+
-+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070
-+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071
-+
-+/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID
-+ * were removed for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082
-+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090
-+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091
-+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0
-+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1
-+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2
-+
-+/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3
-+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4
-+
-+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0
-+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1
-+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3
-+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4
-+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5
-+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6
-+
-+/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and
-+ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7
-+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8
-+
-+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0
-+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1
-+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0
-+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1
-+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0
-+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1
-+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2
-+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0
-+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1
-+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2
-+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100
-+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101
-+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102
-+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103
-+
-+/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES
-+ * are new to v2.01 */
-+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104
-+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105
-+
-+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110
-+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112
-+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113
-+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114
-+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115
-+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.11 */
-+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150
-+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160
-+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170
-+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.01 */
-+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190
-+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191
-+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0
-+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1
-+
-+/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE 0x000001B0
-+#define CKR_NEXT_OTP 0x000001B1
-+
-+/* This is new to v2.20 */
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200
-+
-+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+
-+/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_NOTIFICATION event,
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec
-+ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the
-+ * Cryptoki functions */
-+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST;
-+
-+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR;
-+
-+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a
-+ * mutex object */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a
-+ * mutex object */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a
-+ * mutex */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to
-+ * C_Initialize */
-+typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS {
-+ CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex;
-+ CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex;
-+ CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex;
-+ CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex;
-+ CK_FLAGS flags;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved;
-+} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS;
-+
-+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001
-+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002
-+
-+typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* additional flags for parameters to functions */
-+
-+/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */
-+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message
-+ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when
-+ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption
-+ * scheme. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following MGFs are defined */
-+/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512
-+ * are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004
-+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source
-+ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block
-+ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */
-+#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */
-+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
-+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
-+ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen;
-+} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */
-+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
-+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
-+ CK_ULONG sLen;
-+} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */
-+#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001
-+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002
-+
-+/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms,
-+ * where each party contributes one key pair.
-+ */
-+typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */
-+typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
-+} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE;
-+typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined
-+ (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */
-+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003
-+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004
-+
-+/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party
-+ * contributes one key pair */
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation
-+ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
-+} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */
-+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BBOOL isSender;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and
-+ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just
-+ * holds the effective keysize */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC
-+ * mechanism */
-+typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS {
-+ /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */
-+
-+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */
-+} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
-+ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
-+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */
-+} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and
-+ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */
-+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
-+} CK_RC5_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC
-+ * mechanism */
-+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */
-+ CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */
-+} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
-+ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
-+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */
-+} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block
-+ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of
-+ * the MAC */
-+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[8];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[16];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen;
-+ CK_ULONG ulQLen;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ;
-+} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA;
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA;
-+} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector;
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSaltLen;
-+ CK_ULONG ulIteration;
-+} CK_PBE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */
-+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */
-+} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen;
-+} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;
-+} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer;
-+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT;
-+
-+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
-+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport;
-+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
-+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel;
-+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput;
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen;
-+} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen;
-+} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
-+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion;
-+} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel;
-+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput;
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen;
-+} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIV;
-+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber;
-+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport;
-+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
-+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism;
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen;
-+} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulLen;
-+} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA;
-+
-+typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \
-+ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the
-+ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit
-+ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the
-+ * derived key */
-+/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to
-+ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate
-+ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
-+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001
-+
-+
-+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the
-+ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5
-+ * PBKDF2. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
-+#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001
-+
-+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the
-+ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */
-+typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS {
-+ CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen;
-+ CK_ULONG iterations;
-+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen;
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen;
-+} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE;
-+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */
-+
-+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM {
-+ CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
-+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen;
-+} CK_OTP_PARAM;
-+
-+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount;
-+} CK_OTP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO {
-+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount;
-+} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO;
-+
-+typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CK_OTP_VALUE 0
-+#define CK_OTP_PIN 1
-+#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE 2
-+#define CK_OTP_TIME 3
-+#define CK_OTP_COUNTER 4
-+#define CK_OTP_FLAGS 5
-+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH 6
-+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT 7
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKF_NEXT_OTP 0x00000001
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME 0x00000002
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER 0x00000004
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN 0x00000010
-+#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020
-+
-+/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */
-+typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
-+} CK_KIP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
-+ CK_BYTE cb[16];
-+} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
-+ CK_BYTE cb[16];
-+} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[16];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[16];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+#endif
-Index: openssl/util/libeay.num
-diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.15
---- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.4.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:04 2016
-+++ openssl/util/libeay.num Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016
-@@ -4316,3 +4316,5 @@
- BIO_s_datagram_sctp 4680 EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM,SCTP
- BIO_dgram_is_sctp 4681 EXIST::FUNCTION:SCTP
- BIO_dgram_sctp_notification_cb 4682 EXIST::FUNCTION:SCTP
-+ENGINE_load_pk11ca 4683 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE
-+ENGINE_load_pk11so 4683 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE
-Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl
-diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.14
---- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:05 2016
-+++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016
-@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@
- no-ecdh - No ECDH
- no-engine - No engine
- no-hw - No hw
-+ no-hw-pkcs11ca - No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor
-+ no-hw-pkcs11so - No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor
- nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm
- nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare
- nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare
-@@ -278,6 +280,8 @@
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_GOST" if $no_gost;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw;
-+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA" if $no_hw_pkcs11ca;
-+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO" if $no_hw_pkcs11so;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC2M" if $no_ec2m;
-@@ -347,6 +351,9 @@
- $dir=$val;
- }
-
-+ if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION")
-+ { $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";}
-+
- if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES")
- { $cflags .= " $val";}
-
-@@ -1136,6 +1143,8 @@
- "no-gost" => \$no_gost,
- "no-engine" => \$no_engine,
- "no-hw" => \$no_hw,
-+ "no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca,
-+ "no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so,
- "no-rsax" => 0,
- "just-ssl" =>
- [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast,
-Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl
-diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.6.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.12
---- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.6.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:05 2016
-+++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016
-@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
- # External "algorithms"
- "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM",
- # Engines
-- "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP",
-+ "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO",
- # RFC3779
- "RFC3779",
- # TLS
-@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@
- my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2;
- my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5;
- my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw;
-+my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so;
- my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated;
- my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng;
- my $no_jpake; my $no_srp; my $no_ssl2; my $no_ec2m; my $no_nistp_gcc;
-@@ -248,6 +249,8 @@
- elsif (/^no-sctp$/) { $no_sctp=1; }
- elsif (/^no-srtp$/) { $no_srtp=1; }
- elsif (/^no-unit-test$/){ $no_unit_test=1; }
-+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; }
-+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; }
- }
-
-
-@@ -1202,6 +1205,8 @@
- if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; }
-+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; }
-+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; }
-Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
-diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.12
---- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:05 2016
-+++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016
-@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
- my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT';
- $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib
- $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox';
-- $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
-+ $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
- $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref";
-
- *::perlasm_compile_target = sub {
+++ /dev/null
-Index: openssl/Configure
-diff -u openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/Configure:1.17.2.3
---- openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:41:03 2016
-+++ openssl/Configure Mon Jun 13 15:51:06 2016
-@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
-
- # see INSTALL for instructions.
-
--my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-+my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-
- # Options:
- #
-@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@
- # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can
- # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install".
- #
-+# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name.
-+# (No default)
-+#
-+# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only
-+# (No default)
-+#
- # --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected
- # to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in
- # include/. A value is required.
-@@ -402,31 +408,30 @@
- #
- # ./Configure linux-armv4 -march=armv6 -D__ARM_MAX_ARCH__=8
- #
--"linux-armv4", "gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-aarch64","gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-armv4", "gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-aarch64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
- # Configure script adds minimally required -march for assembly support,
- # if no -march was specified at command line. mips32 and mips64 below
- # refer to contemporary MIPS Architecture specifications, MIPS32 and
- # MIPS64, rather than to kernel bitness.
--"linux-mips32", "gcc:-mabi=32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
--"linux64-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=64 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-+"linux-mips32", "gcc:-mabi=32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=n32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
-+"linux64-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=64 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
- #### IA-32 targets...
--"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
-+"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
- ####
--"linux-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
--"linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::",
-+"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-+"linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::",
- "linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
--"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
--"debug-linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
--"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
--"linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
--"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-+"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-+"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Weverything $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-+"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-+"linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
-+"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
- #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs
- # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see
- # /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of
-@@ -724,6 +729,10 @@
- my $idx_arflags = $idx++;
- my $idx_multilib = $idx++;
-
-+# PKCS#11 engine patch
-+my $pk11_libname="";
-+my $pk11_flavor="";
-+
- my $prefix="";
- my $libdir="";
- my $openssldir="";
-@@ -944,7 +953,15 @@
- }
- elsif (/^[-+]/)
- {
-- if (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
-+ if (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/)
-+ {
-+ $pk11_libname=$1;
-+ }
-+ elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/)
-+ {
-+ $pk11_flavor=$1;
-+ }
-+ elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
- {
- $prefix=$1;
- }
-@@ -1115,6 +1132,22 @@
- exit 0;
- }
-
-+if (! $pk11_libname)
-+ {
-+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n";
-+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
-+ exit 1;
-+ }
-+
-+if (! $pk11_flavor
-+ || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only"))
-+ {
-+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n";
-+ print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n";
-+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
-+ exit 1;
-+ }
-+
- if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
- $target = "Cygwin".$1;
- }
-@@ -1192,6 +1225,25 @@
- $exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO";
- }
-
-+if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator")
-+ {
-+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
-+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
-+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
-+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so";
-+ print " no-hw-pkcs11so [pk11-flavor]";
-+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
-+ }
-+else
-+ {
-+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
-+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
-+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
-+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca";
-+ print " no-hw-pkcs11ca [pk11-flavor]";
-+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
-+}
-+
- my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds;
-
- $exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/);
-@@ -1289,6 +1341,8 @@
- if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; }
- else { $no_user_cflags=1; }
-
-+$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags";
-+
- # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through
- # the script "config" or manually.
- if (!$no_krb5)
-@@ -1698,6 +1752,7 @@
- s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/;
- s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
- s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
-+ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/;
- s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
- s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
- s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
-Index: openssl/Makefile.org
-diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.8.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.10.2.3
---- openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.8.1.2.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:41:03 2016
-+++ openssl/Makefile.org Mon Jun 13 15:51:08 2016
-@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
- INSTALL_PREFIX=
- INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
-
-+# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option.
-+PK11_LIB_LOCATION=
-+
- # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
- OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
-
-Index: openssl/README.pkcs11
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.8
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:24 2016
-+++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Fri Oct 4 14:16:43 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
-+ISC modified
-+============
-+
-+The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility.
-+
-+The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and
-+sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the
-+PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second
-+is a stripped down version which provides only the useful
-+function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device
-+protected key store and key loading).
-+
-+As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor,
-+external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example
-+of the first, AEP Keyper of the second.
-+
-+Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in
-+config/Configure.
-+
-+It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine.
-+The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared
-+(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine
-+(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs).
-+
-+PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l
-+=========================================
-+
-+[Nov 19, 2009]
-+
-+Contents:
-+
-+Overview
-+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch
-+FAQs
-+Feedback
-+
-+Overview
-+========
-+
-+This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11
-+engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against
-+OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system
-+must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the
-+PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below.
-+
-+Patch can be applied like this:
-+
-+ # NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris
-+ tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz
-+ # now download the patch to the current directory
-+ # ...
-+ cd openssl-0.9.8l
-+ # NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system)
-+ patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19
-+
-+It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the
-+symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share
-+except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA.
-+
-+According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support
-+following mechanisms:
-+
-+ RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4,
-+ AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB,
-+ AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224,
-+ SHA256, SHA384, SHA512
-+
-+Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP
-+functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may
-+see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an
-+example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety
-+problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested).
-+
-+You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the
-+configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the
-+config script:
-+
-+ $ ./config
-+ Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2
-+ Configuring for solaris-x86-cc
-+ You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.
-+ See README.pkcs11 for more information.
-+
-+Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run
-+configure script like this:
-+
-+ ./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so
-+
-+To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run
-+"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the
-+output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary
-+and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits.
-+
-+The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against
-+PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and
-+OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project
-+(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more
-+information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the
-+system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself
-+and has functional PKCS#11 library.
-+
-+The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are
-+copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information.
-+
-+Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems,
-+Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more
-+information).
-+
-+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch
-+=======================================
-+
-+2009-11-19
-+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l
-+
-+- bugs and RFEs:
-+
-+ 6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores
-+ 6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split
-+ 6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the
-+ PKCS#11 engine
-+
-+2009-03-11
-+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j
-+
-+- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a
-+ tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied.
-+
-+- fixed bugs:
-+
-+ 6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4
-+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if
-+ meta slot is disabled
-+
-+2008-12-02
-+- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal)
-+
-+ 6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine
-+ 6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true
-+ 6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean
-+ 6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take
-+ it seriously
-+ 6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean
-+ 6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11
-+ engine code
-+ 6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API
-+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if
-+ meta slot is disabled
-+
-+2008-08-01
-+- fixed bug
-+
-+ 6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers
-+ and digests
-+
-+- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic
-+
-+2008-07-29
-+- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version
-+- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version:
-+
-+ 6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users
-+
-+- fixed bugs in the engine code:
-+
-+ 6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for
-+ asymmetric key operations
-+ 6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called
-+ atomically
-+ 6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys
-+ 6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners
-+ 6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in
-+ suboptimal way
-+ 6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more
-+ resilient to destroy failures
-+ 6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free()
-+ 6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys
-+ 6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine
-+ 6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size
-+ of big numbers leading to failures
-+ 6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of
-+ -1
-+ 6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references
-+ 6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not
-+ checked
-+ 6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to
-+ structure reuse
-+ 6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of
-+ OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH}
-+ defines but fails miserably
-+ 6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss
-+ 6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing
-+ generate_params parameter
-+ 6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes
-+ 6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the
-+ PKCS#11 engine
-+ 6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish()
-+
-+- new features and enhancements:
-+
-+ 6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512
-+ 6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes
-+ 6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric
-+ ciphers and digests
-+
-+2007-10-15
-+- update for 0.9.8f version
-+- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
-+
-+2007-10-02
-+- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
-+- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys"
-+
-+2007-09-26
-+- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes
-+ significant performance drop
-+- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine
-+
-+2007-05-25
-+- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers
-+
-+2007-05-19
-+- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code
-+
-+FAQs
-+====
-+
-+(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error:
-+
-+../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init':
-+hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork'
-+
-+Answer:
-+
-+ - don't use "no-threads" when configuring
-+ - if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by
-+ default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the
-+ architecture that Configure printed, for example:
-+
-+Configured for linux-elf.
-+
-+ - then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes),
-+ and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string.
-+ If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With
-+ "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after
-+ "-D_REENTRANT", like this:
-+
-+....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:.....
-+
-+(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for
-+pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch.
-+
-+Answer:
-+
-+ Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32
-+ (as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there.
-+
-+
-+Feedback
-+========
-+
-+Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was
-+created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris.
-+
-+Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp.
-+
-Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h
-diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.4.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.8.2.3
---- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.4.1.2.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:41:06 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h Mon Jun 13 15:51:23 2016
-@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@
-
- #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS
-+# define OPENSSL_THREADS
-+#endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
- # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
- #endif
-@@ -106,6 +109,8 @@
- # endif
- #endif
-
-+#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
-+
- /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
-
- /* Generate 80386 code? */
-@@ -152,7 +157,7 @@
- * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
- * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
- */
--#undef RC4_CHUNK
-+#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long
- #endif
- #endif
-
-@@ -160,7 +165,7 @@
- /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
- * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
- #ifndef DES_LONG
--#define DES_LONG unsigned long
-+#define DES_LONG unsigned int
- #endif
- #endif
-
-@@ -171,9 +176,9 @@
- /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
-
- /* Only one for the following should be defined */
--#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
-+#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
- #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
--#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT
-+#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
- #endif
-
- #if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H)
-@@ -185,7 +190,7 @@
-
- #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
- #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
--#undef BF_PTR
-+#define BF_PTR2
- #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
-
- #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
-@@ -215,7 +220,7 @@
- /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
- * Very mucy CPU dependant */
- #ifndef DES_UNROLL
--#undef DES_UNROLL
-+#define DES_UNROLL
- #endif
-
- /* These default values were supplied by
-Index: openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
-diff -u openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1.28.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.10.2
---- openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1.28.1.2.1 Wed Dec 23 18:55:13 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c Wed Dec 23 19:28:46 2015
-@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@
- if (file == NULL) {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
- ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
-- if (errno == ENOENT)
-+ if ((errno == ENOENT) || ((*mode == 'r') && (errno == EACCES)))
- BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE);
- else
- BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.14.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.9.6.2
---- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.14.1.2.1 Wed Dec 23 18:55:22 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Wed Dec 23 19:28:56 2015
-@@ -22,13 +22,15 @@
- tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \
- tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \
- eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \
-- eng_rdrand.c
-+ eng_rdrand.c \
-+ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c
- LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \
- eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \
- tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \
- tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \
- eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \
-- eng_rdrand.o
-+ eng_rdrand.o \
-+ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o
-
- SRC= $(LIBSRC)
-
-@@ -282,6 +284,83 @@
- eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
- eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h
- eng_table.o: eng_table.c
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dh.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11.c
-+hw_pk11.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11ca.h pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11ca.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/md5.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so.h pkcs11.h
-+hw_pk11so.o: pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.h
-+hw_pk11so_pub.o: hw_pk11so_pub.c pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
- tb_asnmth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
- tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
- tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:25 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+/*
-+ * CDDL HEADER START
-+ *
-+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
-+ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only
-+ * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance
-+ * with the License.
-+ *
-+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
-+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
-+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
-+ * and limitations under the License.
-+ *
-+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
-+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
-+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
-+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
-+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
-+ *
-+ * CDDL HEADER END
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef _CRYPTOKI_H
-+#define _CRYPTOKI_H
-+
-+/* ident "@(#)cryptoki.h 1.2 05/06/08 SMI" */
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+extern "C" {
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_PTR
-+#define CK_PTR *
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION
-+#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#include <unistd.h> /* For NULL */
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint
-+ */
-+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#define CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#ifndef TRUE
-+#define TRUE 1
-+#endif /* TRUE */
-+#ifndef FALSE
-+#define FALSE 0
-+#endif /* FALSE */
-+#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */
-+
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+
-+/* Solaris specific functions */
-+
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+
-+/*
-+ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all
-+ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of
-+ * providing operations on the requested mechanism
-+ */
-+CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession);
-+
-+/*
-+ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given
-+ * mechanism from the rawkey data.
-+ */
-+CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len,
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj);
-+
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif /* _CRYPTOKI_H */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.14.1.4.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.6.6.2
---- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.14.1.4.1 Mon Jun 13 15:41:32 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Mon Jun 13 15:51:59 2016
-@@ -119,6 +119,14 @@
- # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)
- ENGINE_load_capi();
- # endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
-+ ENGINE_load_pk11ca();
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
-+ ENGINE_load_pk11so();
-+#endif
-+#endif
- #endif
- ENGINE_register_all_complete();
- }
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.14.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.6.6.1
---- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.14.1 Wed Mar 4 14:43:55 2015
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Wed Mar 4 15:22:32 2015
-@@ -405,6 +405,12 @@
- void ENGINE_load_ubsec(void);
- void ENGINE_load_padlock(void);
- void ENGINE_load_capi(void);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
-+void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
-+void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void);
-+#endif
- # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMP
- void ENGINE_load_gmp(void);
- # endif
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.33
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:25 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Fri Oct 4 14:07:41 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,4010 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#endif
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+#include <openssl/aes.h>
-+#include <openssl/des.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <signal.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <dlfcn.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Debug mutexes */
-+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */
-+#define DEBUG_MUTEX
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+#define __USE_UNIX98
-+#endif
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
-+
-+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
-+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
-+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
-+/* #undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+/*
-+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun)
-+#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
-+
-+/*
-+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
-+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
-+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
-+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
-+ */
-+static int *hw_cnids;
-+static int *hw_dnids;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
-+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
-+
-+/*
-+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
-+ * logging into the token.
-+ */
-+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-+
-+/*
-+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
-+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
-+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
-+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
-+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
-+ * PK11_SESSION object.
-+ *
-+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
-+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
-+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
-+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
-+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
-+ *
-+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
-+ * They are also used for active list protection.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
-+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
-+ * list) for given algorithm type
-+ */
-+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
-+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
-+ * without losing the secret key objects.
-+ */
-+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+/* ENGINE level stuff */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-+
-+/* RAND stuff */
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
-+
-+/* These functions are also used in other files */
-+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+
-+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
-+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Local helper functions */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent);
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
-+
-+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
-+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
-+#else
-+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
-+#endif
-+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+ const int **nids, int nid);
-+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+ const int **nids, int nid);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+ int key_len);
-+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
-+ size_t count);
-+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
-+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
-+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-+
-+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ int *local_cipher_nids);
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
-+ int *local_digest_nids);
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
-+ int id);
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
-+ int id);
-+
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
-+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+/* Index for the supported ciphers */
-+enum pk11_cipher_id {
-+ PK11_DES_CBC,
-+ PK11_DES3_CBC,
-+ PK11_DES_ECB,
-+ PK11_DES3_ECB,
-+ PK11_RC4,
-+ PK11_AES_128_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_192_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_256_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_128_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_192_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_256_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_128_CTR,
-+ PK11_AES_192_CTR,
-+ PK11_AES_256_CTR,
-+ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
-+ PK11_CIPHER_MAX
-+};
-+
-+/* Index for the supported digests */
-+enum pk11_digest_id {
-+ PK11_MD5,
-+ PK11_SHA1,
-+ PK11_SHA224,
-+ PK11_SHA256,
-+ PK11_SHA384,
-+ PK11_SHA512,
-+ PK11_DIGEST_MAX
-+};
-+
-+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \
-+ { \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \
-+ { \
-+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \
-+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \
-+ } \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ }
-+
-+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-+static int cipher_count = 0;
-+static int digest_count = 0;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
-+ {
-+ enum pk11_cipher_id id;
-+ int nid;
-+ int iv_len;
-+ int min_key_len;
-+ int max_key_len;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
-+ } PK11_CIPHER;
-+
-+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
-+ {
-+ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8,
-+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8,
-+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256,
-+ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_aes_192_ctr, 16, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_aes_256_ctr, 16, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
-+ };
-+
-+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
-+ {
-+ enum pk11_digest_id id;
-+ int nid;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
-+ } PK11_DIGEST;
-+
-+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
-+ {
-+ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, },
-+ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, },
-+ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, },
-+ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, },
-+ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, },
-+ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, },
-+ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, },
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
-+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
-+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
-+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
-+ *
-+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
-+ */
-+
-+/* DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_cbc,
-+ 8, 8, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ede3_cbc,
-+ 8, 24, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
-+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ecb,
-+ 8, 8, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ede3_ecb,
-+ 8, 24, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_cbc,
-+ 16, 16, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_cbc,
-+ 16, 24, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_cbc,
-+ 16, 32, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
-+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_ecb,
-+ 16, 16, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_ecb,
-+ 16, 24, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_ecb,
-+ 16, 32, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_ctr,
-+ 16, 16, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_ctr,
-+ 16, 24, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_ctr,
-+ 16, 32, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_bf_cbc,
-+ 8, 16, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
-+ {
-+ NID_rc4,
-+ 1, 16, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
-+ {
-+ NID_md5,
-+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
-+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ MD5_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha1,
-+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha224,
-+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
-+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha256,
-+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha384,
-+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
-+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha512,
-+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
-+ */
-+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
-+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
-+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
-+ {
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
-+ "SO_PATH",
-+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_PIN,
-+ "PIN",
-+ "Specifies the pin code",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SLOT,
-+ "SLOT",
-+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
-+ },
-+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_seed,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_cleanup,
-+ pk11_rand_add,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_status
-+ };
-+
-+
-+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
-+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
-+#endif
-+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
-+static const char *engine_pk11_name =
-+ "PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)";
-+
-+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
-+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
-+
-+/*
-+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
-+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
-+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
-+ */
-+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
-+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
-+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
-+char *pk11_pin = NULL;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
-+static int pk11_pid = 0;
-+
-+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
-+
-+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
-+
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ session_cache[type].lock =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+#else
-+ return (1);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+
-+ if (token_lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock);
-+ token_lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
-+ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
-+ */
-+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
-+ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ if (pk11_have_random)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+/*
-+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
-+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
-+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
-+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
-+ */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-+ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
-+ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
-+ if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE)
-+ pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
-+ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
-+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-+#error "dynamic engine not supported"
-+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
-+ {
-+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
-+
-+#else
-+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
-+
-+ if (!ret)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(ret))
-+ {
-+ ENGINE_free(ret);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+void
-+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
-+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
-+ */
-+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
-+ if (!pk11_dso)
-+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
-+ if (!e_pk11)
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
-+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
-+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
-+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
-+
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ ERR_clear_error();
-+ }
-+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
-+
-+/*
-+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
-+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
-+ */
-+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ }
-+
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+
-+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
-+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
-+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
-+ * accessible to all threads.
-+ */
-+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
-+{
-+ return (pk11_library_init(e));
-+}
-+
-+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args =
-+ {
-+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */
-+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
-+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
-+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
-+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
-+ CK_INFO info;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+ int any_slot_found;
-+ int i;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which
-+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still
-+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine
-+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is
-+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application
-+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork()
-+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can
-+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional
-+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In
-+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly
-+ * initialize the engine again.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_library_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ /*
-+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
-+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
-+ * engine first.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
-+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
-+ if (!p)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ rv = p(&pFuncList);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
-+
-+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
-+#endif
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
-+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
-+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
-+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
-+ * because no slot was present.
-+ */
-+ if (any_slot_found == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
-+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
-+ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
-+ */
-+ /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */
-+ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
-+ != CKR_OK) {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
-+ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ digest_count = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
-+ pk11_pid = getpid();
-+ /*
-+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
-+ * will do the cleanup.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
-+ goto err;
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
-+ /*
-+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
-+ * for asymmetric ciphers.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ active_list[i] = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
-+ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
-+ * library.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
-+
-+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* free all active lists */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ pk11_free_active_list(i);
-+
-+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects.
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ pFuncList = NULL;
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ pk11_pid = 0;
-+ /*
-+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
-+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
-+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
-+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
-+ * the engine before calling fork().
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
-+ {
-+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
-+
-+ switch (cmd)
-+ {
-+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (initialized)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
-+ case PK11_CMD_PIN:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
-+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
-+ {
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
-+ * the calling functions do not care anyway
-+ */
-+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
-+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
-+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
-+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
-+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
-+ */
-+PK11_SESSION *
-+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
-+#endif
-+ static pid_t pid = 0;
-+ pid_t new_pid;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
-+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
-+ * here, with no PID information.
-+ */
-+ if (pid == 0)
-+ pid = getpid();
-+
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp = freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
-+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
-+ * structure from the freelist.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
-+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
-+ * mark them as unused.
-+ */
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
-+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
-+ */
-+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
-+ {
-+ pid = new_pid;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
-+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
-+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
-+ * head of the list).
-+ */
-+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp1->next;
-+ /*
-+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
-+ * sessions and destroy all objects.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
-+ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
-+
-+ /* Initialize the process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
-+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
-+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
-+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
-+ * re-initialization.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
-+ * the caller cope with the situation.
-+ */
-+ freelist = sp;
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->pid == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
-+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (sp != NULL)
-+ sp->next = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (sp);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+void
-+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
-+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
-+ * next time we will ask for a new session.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
-+ return;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp->next = freelist;
-+ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ int type;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
-+ * return 0 on exit.
-+ */
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
-+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
-+ * return an error on return.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
-+ pid_t mypid = getpid();
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ int ret = 1;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ myslot = SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are probably a child process so force the
-+ * reinitialize of the session
-+ */
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
-+ return (0);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ }
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->pid = getpid();
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
-+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
-+ */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e'
-+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We
-+ * must free those as well.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
-+ *
-+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
-+ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
-+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
-+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
-+ */
-+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
-+
-+static int
-+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
-+ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
-+ return (ciphers[i].id);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
-+ {
-+ if (cipher_count > 0)
-+ *nids = cipher_nids;
-+ else
-+ *nids = NULL;
-+ return (cipher_count);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
-+ {
-+ if (digest_count > 0)
-+ *nids = digest_nids;
-+ else
-+ *nids = NULL;
-+ return (digest_count);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
-+ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
-+ * pk11_init_symetric() is called.
-+ */
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
-+
-+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
-+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
-+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
-+ {
-+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
-+ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
-+ /*
-+ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
-+ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
-+ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
-+ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
-+ * add code so that the counter length can be set via
-+ * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
-+ */
-+ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
-+ {
-+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
-+ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
-+ else
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+ int index;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
-+
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
-+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
-+ /*
-+ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
-+ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
-+ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
-+ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
-+ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
-+ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
-+ * code serves as a sanity check.
-+ *
-+ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
-+ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
-+ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
-+ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
-+ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
-+ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
-+ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
-+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-+
-+ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
-+ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
-+ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
-+ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
-+ {
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
-+ * needs to be created.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
-+ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
-+ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
-+ {
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* now initialize the context with a new key */
-+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
-+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
-+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
-+ * that it needs not be recreated.
-+ *
-+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
-+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
-+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
-+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
-+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
-+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
-+ */
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
-+#else
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
-+#endif
-+ {
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ unsigned long outl = inl;
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
-+
-+ if (!inl)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
-+ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
-+ * the same size of input.
-+ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
-+ * correctly aligned buffers.
-+ */
-+ if (inl != outl)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
-+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
-+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
-+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
-+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
-+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
-+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
-+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
-+ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
-+
-+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
-+ * rid of the context.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
-+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
-+ else
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
-+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
-+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
-+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+ const int **nids, int nid)
-+ {
-+ if (!cipher)
-+ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
-+
-+ switch (nid)
-+ {
-+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_bf_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_rc4:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_rc4;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_ctr:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_ctr:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_ctr:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ *cipher = NULL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ return (*cipher != NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+ const int **nids, int nid)
-+ {
-+ if (!digest)
-+ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
-+
-+ switch (nid)
-+ {
-+ case NID_md5:
-+ *digest = &pk11_md5;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha1:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha1;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha224:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha224;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha256:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha256;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha384:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha384;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha512:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha512;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ *digest = NULL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ return (*digest != NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
-+ unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
-+ * can use the key handles. Here is why:
-+ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
-+ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
-+ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
-+ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
-+ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
-+ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
-+ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
-+ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
-+ * terminate the active operation.
-+ */
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX)
-+ {
-+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
-+ memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len);
-+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES) ||
-+ (key_type == CKK_DES2) ||
-+ (key_type == CKK_DES3))
-+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]);
-+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) ||
-+ (key_type == CKK_DES3))
-+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]);
-+ if (key_type == CKK_DES3)
-+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]);
-+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf;
-+ }
-+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Save the key information used in this session.
-+ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX;
-+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len;
-+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len);
-+ }
-+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
-+err:
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
-+ if (digests[i].nid == nid)
-+ return (digests[i].id);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+ int index;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
-+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ pdp = &digests[index];
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
-+ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
-+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+
-+ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
-+ if (count == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
-+ count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ unsigned long len;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+ len = ctx->digest->md_size;
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
-+ * to the pool
-+ */
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+
-+ /* The copy-from state */
-+ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Initialize the copy-to state */
-+ if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
-+ goto err;
-+ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
-+
-+ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
-+ &ul_state_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (ul_state_len == 0)
-+ {
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
-+ if (pstate == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
-+ &ul_state_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
-+ ul_state_len, 0, 0);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
-+ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = 1;
-+err:
-+ if (pstate != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pstate);
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
-+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+
-+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
-+ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
-+ * that might have been allocated in the token when
-+ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
-+ * will return the session to the cache.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
-+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
-+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
-+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
-+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
-+ * prefix.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+ int key_len)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
-+ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
-+ {
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
-+ }
-+
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * The secret key object is created in the
-+ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key().
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+err:
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_RSA_X_509
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
-+ * CKM_DSA
-+ *
-+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
-+ * public key slot.
-+ *
-+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_DES3_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES_CBC
-+ * CKM_AES_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES3_ECB
-+ * CKM_DES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_CTR
-+ * CKM_RC4
-+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
-+ *
-+ * Digests optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_MD5
-+ * CKM_SHA_1
-+ * CKM_SHA224
-+ * CKM_SHA256
-+ * CKM_SHA384
-+ * CKM_SHA512
-+ *
-+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
-+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
-+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
-+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
-+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
-+ {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ int slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ int slot_n_digest = 0;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
-+ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-+
-+ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-+
-+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 0;
-+
-+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ /* Check if slot has random support. */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
-+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
-+ &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
-+ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER)
-+ {
-+ slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+ * verifying with CKM_DSA.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
-+ &mech_info);
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
-+ * derivation.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ if (!found_candidate_slot &&
-+ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
-+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
-+ pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover;
-+ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
-+ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might
-+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature
-+ * is used.
-+ */
-+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ best_slot_sofar);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to "
-+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+#else
-+ } /* if */
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ } /* for */
-+
-+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
-+ }
-+
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+ current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-+ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
-+ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
-+
-+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
-+
-+ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ current_slot_n_cipher);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ current_slot_n_digest);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n",
-+ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
-+ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
-+ * otherwise leave it where it is.
-+ */
-+ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
-+ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest))
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n",
-+ PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
-+ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
-+ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
-+ sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
-+ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids,
-+ sizeof (local_digest_nids));
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
-+ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 1;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ int *local_cipher_nids, int id)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
-+ {
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids))
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
-+ ciphers[id].nid;
-+ }
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
-+ int id)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
-+ {
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids))
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
-+ digests[id].nid;
-+ }
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
-+ {
-+ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
-+ ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
-+ {
-+ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type,
-+ current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
-+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
-+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
-+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
-+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
-+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
-+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
-+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
-+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
-+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
-+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
-+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
-+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
-+ *
-+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
-+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
-+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
-+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
-+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
-+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
-+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said
-+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with
-+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code
-+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for
-+ * asymmetric operations.
-+ *
-+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what
-+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can
-+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be
-+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before,
-+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only.
-+ *
-+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find
-+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric
-+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table
-+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays
-+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the
-+ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token
-+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more
-+ * information.
-+ *
-+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined
-+ * the code won't be used.
-+ */
-+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64)
-+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
-+#else
-+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists,
-+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware
-+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms.
-+ */
-+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ void *handle;
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0;
-+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL;
-+ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
-+ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
-+ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
-+ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ /* this means empty tables */
-+ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef;
-+ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also
-+ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the
-+ * search.
-+ */
-+ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
-+ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1;
-+ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int));
-+ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int));
-+ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef
-+ * is zero now.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i)
-+ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef;
-+ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i)
-+ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are
-+ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables.
-+ */
-+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i],
-+ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids);
-+ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i],
-+ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by
-+ * dlclose(3C).
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ (void) dlclose(handle);
-+ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids;
-+ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids);
-+ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e.,
-+ * non-existent).
-+ */
-+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table)
-+ {
-+ int i = 0;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new
-+ * table.
-+ */
-+ if (nid_table == NULL)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * the table is never full, there is always at least one
-+ * NID_undef.
-+ */
-+ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef)
-+ {
-+ if (nid_table[i++] == nid)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.5
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Tue Jun 14 00:43:26 2011
-@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-+
-+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]=
-+{
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"},
-+{ 0, NULL}
-+};
-+
-+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]=
-+{
-+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"},
-+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"},
-+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"},
-+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"},
-+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"},
-+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"},
-+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"},
-+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"},
-+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"},
-+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"},
-+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"},
-+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"},
-+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"},
-+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"},
-+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"},
-+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" },
-+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login() failed on token" },
-+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" },
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" },
-+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" },
-+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" },
-+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen() dialog command" },
-+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" },
-+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" },
-+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" },
-+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" },
-+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" },
-+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" },
-+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" },
-+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock() failed" },
-+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork() failed" },
-+{ 0, NULL}
-+};
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */
-+
-+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0;
-+static int pk11_error_init = 1;
-+
-+static void
-+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
-+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
-+
-+ if (pk11_error_init)
-+ {
-+ pk11_error_init = 0;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
-+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_error_init == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
-+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
-+#endif
-+ pk11_error_init = 1;
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+void
-+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
-+{
-+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
-+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
-+ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv)
-+{
-+ char tmp_buf[20];
-+
-+ PK11err(function, reason);
-+ (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
-+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
-+}
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.13
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Fri Oct 4 14:04:20 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H
-+#define HW_PK11_ERR_H
-+
-+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
-+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv);
-+#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
-+
-+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */
-+
-+/* Function codes. */
-+
-+#define PK11_F_INIT 100
-+#define PK11_F_FINISH 101
-+#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102
-+#define PK11_F_CTRL 103
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114
-+#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115
-+#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116
-+#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117
-+#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130
-+#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131
-+#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132
-+#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133
-+#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134
-+#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135
-+#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136
-+#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139
-+#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143
-+#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145
-+#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD 147
-+#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148
-+#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151
-+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152
-+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153
-+#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154
-+#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155
-+#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156
-+#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157
-+#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159
-+#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160
-+#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161
-+#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162
-+#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163
-+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164
-+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165
-+#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166
-+
-+/* Reason codes. */
-+#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100
-+#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101
-+#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102
-+#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103
-+#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104
-+#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105
-+#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106
-+#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107
-+#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108
-+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109
-+#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110
-+#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111
-+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112
-+#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116
-+#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118
-+#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119
-+#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120
-+#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123
-+#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124
-+#define PK11_R_SIGN 125
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131
-+#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132
-+#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133
-+#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138
-+#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139
-+#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140
-+#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141
-+#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142
-+#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143
-+#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144
-+#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148
-+#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156
-+#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157
-+#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158
-+#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159
-+#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160
-+#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162
-+#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164
-+#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165
-+#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166
-+
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167
-+#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169
-+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170
-+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171
-+#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172
-+#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173
-+#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177
-+#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178
-+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179
-+#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180
-+#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181
-+#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182
-+#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183
-+#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183
-+#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184
-+#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185
-+#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186
-+
-+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */
-+#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32
-+
-+#ifdef NOPTHREADS
-+/*
-+ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the
-+ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global
-+ * per-process lock for the whole engine.
-+ *
-+ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as
-+ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but
-+ * it's safe.
-+ */
-+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11
-+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the
-+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation
-+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list.
-+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object
-+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls.
-+ *
-+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list
-+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request
-+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done.
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION
-+ {
-+ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next;
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */
-+ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */
-+ CK_BBOOL pub_persistent; /* is pub key in keystore? */
-+ CK_BBOOL priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */
-+ union
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
-+ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */
-+ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */
-+ } u_RSA;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
-+ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */
-+ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */
-+ } u_DSA;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */
-+ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */
-+ } u_DH;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */
-+ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
-+ int key_len; /* priv key len */
-+ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */
-+ } u_cipher;
-+ } opdata_u;
-+ } PK11_SESSION;
-+
-+#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key
-+#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key
-+#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub
-+#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv
-+#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_pn_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_pe_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num
-+#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key
-+#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh
-+#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num
-+#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key
-+#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key
-+#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len
-+#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt
-+
-+/*
-+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types:
-+ * 1) asymmetric operations
-+ * 2) random operations
-+ * 3) symmetric and digest operations
-+ *
-+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware
-+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware
-+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support
-+ * only a single group of operations.
-+ *
-+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have
-+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from
-+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots.
-+ *
-+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are
-+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache.
-+ */
-+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM
-+ {
-+ OP_RAND,
-+ OP_RSA,
-+ OP_DSA,
-+ OP_DH,
-+ OP_CIPHER,
-+ OP_DIGEST,
-+ OP_MAX
-+ } PK11_OPTYPE;
-+
-+/*
-+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches
-+ * and locks associated with the lists.
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *head;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *lock;
-+#endif
-+ } PK11_CACHE;
-+
-+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */
-+typedef struct PK11_active_st
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h;
-+ unsigned int refcnt;
-+ struct PK11_active_st *prev;
-+ struct PK11_active_st *next;
-+ } PK11_active;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[];
-+#endif
-+extern PK11_active *active_list[];
-+/*
-+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See
-+ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation.
-+ */
-+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0)
-+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0)
-+#else
-+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
-+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
-+#endif
-+
-+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
-+
-+#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.42
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:27:06 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
-+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
-+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
-+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* RSA stuff */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa);
-+#else
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa);
-+#endif
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* DSA stuff */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
-+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
-+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
-+ DSA *dsa);
-+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* DH stuff */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
-+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
-+#endif
-+
-+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
-+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
-+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
-+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
-+
-+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private);
-+
-+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
-+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
-+#else
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
-+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
-+ * variable and jump to the specified label.
-+ */
-+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
-+ { \
-+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
-+ { \
-+ var = TRUE; \
-+ if (unlock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ goto label; \
-+ } \
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
-+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
-+ if (entry->h == h)
-+ return (entry);
-+
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
-+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
-+ * failure.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* search for entry in the active list */
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
-+ entry->refcnt++;
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
-+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
-+ if (entry == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ entry->h = h;
-+ entry->refcnt = 1;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
-+ if (active_list[type] == NULL)
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ else /* make the entry first in the list */
-+ {
-+ entry->next = active_list[type];
-+ active_list[type]->prev = entry;
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (entry->refcnt);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+void
-+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *prev_entry;
-+
-+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
-+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ prev_entry->next = entry->next;
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ active_list[type] = entry->next;
-+ /* we were the first but not the only one */
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* sanitization */
-+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ OPENSSL_free(entry);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
-+void
-+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
-+ switch (type)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
-+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
-+ *
-+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
-+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
-+ entry->refcnt--;
-+ if (entry->refcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 RSA method",
-+ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */
-+ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */
-+ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */
-+ NULL, /* app_data */
-+ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */
-+ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */
-+ };
-+
-+RSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_RSA(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_rsa);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 DSA method",
-+ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */
-+ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
-+ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */
-+ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */
-+ 0, /* flags */
-+ NULL /* app_data */
-+ };
-+
-+DSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_DSA(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_dsa);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/*
-+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
-+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
-+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
-+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
-+ * enough.
-+ */
-+#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8
-+
-+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 DH method",
-+ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */
-+ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_DH_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */
-+ 0, /* flags */
-+ NULL, /* app_data */
-+ NULL /* generate_params */
-+ };
-+
-+DH_METHOD *
-+PK11_DH(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_dh);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
-+
-+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
-+#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20
-+#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/*
-+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
-+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
-+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
-+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-+err:
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
-+ * should be catched in the padding functions
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-+err:
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ BIGNUM f;
-+ int j, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *p;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ BN_init(&f);
-+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
-+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
-+ */
-+ if (flen > num)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* make data into a big number */
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
-+ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
-+ */
-+ for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
-+ if (buf[j] != 0)
-+ break;
-+
-+ p = buf + j;
-+ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (r < 0)
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-+
-+err:
-+ BN_clear_free(&f);
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ BIGNUM f;
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *p;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ BN_init(&f);
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-+ if (buf == NULL)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
-+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
-+ */
-+ if (flen > num)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
-+ * Needs to skip these 0's here
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
-+ if (buf[i] != 0)
-+ break;
-+
-+ p = buf + i;
-+ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
-+
-+ switch (padding)
-+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (r < 0)
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-+
-+err:
-+ BN_clear_free(&f);
-+ if (buf != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
-+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
-+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_encrypted;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
-+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
-+ rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ retval = ul_sig_len;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
-+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_decrypted;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
-+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
-+ p_mech, h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_decrypted;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
-+ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
-+ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
-+ * structures.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
-+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
-+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ unsigned long ulsiglen;
-+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
-+
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ ulsiglen = j;
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
-+ *siglen = ulsiglen;
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa)
-+#else
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa)
-+#endif
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i,
-+ (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
-+
-+#define MAXATTR 1024
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *privkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for private keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
-+ * never ask for private components.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_TRUE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
-+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
-+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm
-+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer
-+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However,
-+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect
-+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We
-+ * do not check the return value because even in case
-+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key
-+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and
-+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the
-+ * OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not
-+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for
-+ * consistency reasons.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
-+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we
-+ * must take care of handle management ourselves.
-+ */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
-+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+ /*
-+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
-+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
-+ * in the keystore.
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(privkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ rollback = rollback;
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *pubkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for public keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_FALSE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
-+ * structure. No cache hit is possible.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling
-+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
-+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
-+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
-+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
-+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
-+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
-+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
-+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
-+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
-+ */
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(pubkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
-+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ int i;
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
-+
-+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
-+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
-+ *rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
-+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
-+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto set;
-+ }
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd'
-+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA
-+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for
-+ * searching for the private key handle.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ /*
-+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
-+ * session keys.
-+ */
-+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components
-+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the
-+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a
-+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just
-+ * create a new session key using the private
-+ * components from the RSA structure.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+set:
-+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never
-+ * extract private components from the keystore. In
-+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the
-+ * application to properly cope with that. It is
-+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by
-+ * reference are used we expect it to be used
-+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there
-+ * is no problem. If the application expects the
-+ * private components to be read from the keystore
-+ * then that is not a supported way of usage.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ *rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
-+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
-+ * 'n'/'e' components as well.
-+ */
-+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n);
-+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e);
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0 &&
-+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
-+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ *
-+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
-+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
-+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
-+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
-+ * both data signing and verifying.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making
-+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent
-+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure
-+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the
-+ * public component since with the keys by reference
-+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA
-+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we
-+ * compare the handle as well.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* The DSA function implementation */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static DSA_SIG *
-+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
-+ int i;
-+ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
-+
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
-+ * each is 20 bytes long
-+ */
-+ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
-+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
-+ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
-+
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+
-+ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
-+ if (dlen > i)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto ret;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+
-+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
-+ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ dsa_sig->r = r;
-+ dsa_sig->s = s;
-+
-+ret:
-+ if (dsa_sig == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (r != NULL)
-+ BN_free(r);
-+ if (s != NULL)
-+ BN_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
-+ return (dsa_sig);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
-+ DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int retval = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
-+
-+ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
-+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
-+ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
-+
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+
-+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
-+
-+ if (dlen > i)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto ret;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
-+ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
-+ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
-+ */
-+ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
-+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
-+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
-+ BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
-+ goto ret;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ retval = 1;
-+ret:
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
-+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
-+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ int i;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
-+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */
-+ };
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
-+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
-+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
-+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */
-+ };
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
-+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
-+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/* The DH function implementation */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Generate DH key-pair.
-+ *
-+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
-+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
-+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
-+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
-+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG i;
-+ CK_RV rv, rv1;
-+ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
-+
-+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
-+ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
-+ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
-+ */
-+ pub_key_template[1].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
-+ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
-+ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
-+ {
-+ pub_key_template[2].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
-+ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
-+ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
-+ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are
-+ * destroyed before return and thus not cached.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
-+ &mechanism,
-+ pub_key_template,
-+ ul_pub_key_attr_count,
-+ priv_key_template,
-+ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
-+ &h_pub_key,
-+ &h_priv_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
-+ * should be sufficient for reuse.
-+ */
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
-+ {
-+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
-+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
-+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
-+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
-+ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
-+ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
-+ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
-+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
-+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
-+ {
-+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
-+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
-+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
-+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
-+ {
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = 1;
-+
-+err:
-+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
-+ DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ CK_ULONG seclen;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
-+ {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)},
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int ret = -1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
-+ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+ seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
-+ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
-+ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
-+
-+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
-+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
-+ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
-+ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
-+ &mechanism,
-+ h_key,
-+ priv_key_template,
-+ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
-+ &h_derived_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
-+ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
-+ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
-+ */
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
-+ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
-+ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
-+ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
-+ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
-+ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
-+ * pre-master secret.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
-+ {
-+ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
-+ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+
-+ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (mechanism.pParameter)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
-+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
-+ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ int i;
-+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
-+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ key_template[0].pValue = &class;
-+ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+
-+ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
-+
-+ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
-+ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
-+
-+ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
-+ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dh;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
-+ key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ *
-+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
-+ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
-+ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
-+ * in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * Local function to simplify key template population
-+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
-+ */
-+static int
-+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
-+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG len = 0;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is
-+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers.
-+ */
-+ if (bn != NULL)
-+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-+
-+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ *ul_value_len = len;
-+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
-+ if (*p_value == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static void
-+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
-+ {
-+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
-+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the
-+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got.
-+ * Assume object store locked.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 OK
-+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found
-+ */
-+static int
-+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG objcnt;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+
-+ if (objcnt > 1)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ else if (objcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* from uri stuff */
-+
-+extern char *pk11_pin;
-+
-+static int pk11_get_pin(void);
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_get_pin(void)
-+{
-+ char *pin;
-+
-+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: ");
-+ if (pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
-+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
-+ * multiple threads.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#if 0
-+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been
-+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we
-+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access
-+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for
-+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED
-+ * flag is set.
-+ */
-+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) &&
-+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread
-+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We
-+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with
-+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the
-+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment
-+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
-+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call
-+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We
-+ * lock right before C_Login().
-+ */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE))
-+ {
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
-+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
-+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
-+ * the engine.
-+ *
-+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
-+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
-+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
-+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+ goto err_locked;
-+ }
-+
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If token does not require login we take it as the
-+ * login was done.
-+ */
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err_locked:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the
-+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login()
-+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for
-+ * this.
-+ *
-+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
-+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
-+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
-+ {
-+ static char buf[128];
-+ HANDLE h;
-+ DWORD cc, mode;
-+ int cnt;
-+
-+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
-+ fputs(prompt, stderr);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
-+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
-+
-+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
-+ {
-+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
-+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
-+ break;
-+ fputc('*', stdout);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ }
-+
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
-+ buf[cnt] = '\0';
-+ fputs("\n", stderr);
-+ return buf;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.4
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011
-@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
-+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */
-+
-+#define token_lock pk11ca_token_lock
-+#define find_lock pk11ca_find_lock
-+#define active_list pk11ca_active_list
-+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags
-+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID
-+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11ca_error
-+#define PK11err_add_data PK11CAerr_add_data
-+#define pk11_get_session pk11ca_get_session
-+#define pk11_return_session pk11ca_return_session
-+#define pk11_active_add pk11ca_active_add
-+#define pk11_active_delete pk11ca_active_delete
-+#define pk11_active_remove pk11ca_active_remove
-+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11ca_free_active_list
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv
-+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11ca_load_privkey
-+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11ca_load_pubkey
-+#define PK11_RSA PK11CA_RSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv
-+#define PK11_DSA PK11CA_DSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11ca_destroy_dh_object
-+#define PK11_DH PK11CA_DH
-+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11ca_token_relogin
-+#define pFuncList pk11ca_pFuncList
-+#define pk11_pin pk11ca_pin
-+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11ca
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.8
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:16 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#error RSA is disabled
-+#endif
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <signal.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <dlfcn.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Debug mutexes */
-+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */
-+#define DEBUG_MUTEX
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+#define __USE_UNIX98
-+#endif
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
-+
-+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
-+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
-+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
-+/*#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#define OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11so.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
-+
-+/*
-+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
-+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
-+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
-+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
-+
-+/*
-+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
-+ * logging into the token.
-+ */
-+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-+
-+/*
-+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
-+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
-+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
-+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
-+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
-+ * PK11_SESSION object.
-+ *
-+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
-+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
-+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
-+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
-+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
-+ *
-+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
-+ * They are also used for active list protection.
-+ */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
-+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
-+ * list) for given algorithm type
-+ */
-+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
-+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
-+ * without losing the secret key objects.
-+ */
-+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+/* ENGINE level stuff */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-+
-+/* RAND stuff */
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
-+
-+/* These functions are also used in other files */
-+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+
-+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
-+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+
-+/* Local helper functions */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent);
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
-+
-+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
-+
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
-+
-+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \
-+ { \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \
-+ { \
-+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \
-+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \
-+ } \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ }
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
-+ */
-+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
-+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
-+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
-+ {
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
-+ "SO_PATH",
-+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_PIN,
-+ "PIN",
-+ "Specifies the pin code",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SLOT,
-+ "SLOT",
-+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
-+ },
-+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_seed,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_cleanup,
-+ pk11_rand_add,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_status
-+ };
-+
-+
-+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
-+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
-+#endif
-+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
-+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)";
-+
-+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
-+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
-+
-+/*
-+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
-+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
-+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
-+ */
-+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
-+
-+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
-+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
-+char *pk11_pin = NULL;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
-+static int pk11_pid = 0;
-+
-+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
-+
-+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
-+
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
-+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr);
-+
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr);
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ session_cache[type].lock =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+#else
-+ return (1);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+
-+ if (token_lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock);
-+ token_lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
-+ */
-+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_have_random)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
-+ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
-+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-+#error "dynamic engine not supported"
-+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
-+ {
-+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
-+
-+#else
-+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
-+
-+ if (!ret)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(ret))
-+ {
-+ ENGINE_free(ret);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+void
-+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
-+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
-+ */
-+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
-+ if (!pk11_dso)
-+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
-+ if (!e_pk11)
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
-+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
-+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
-+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
-+
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ ERR_clear_error();
-+ }
-+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
-+
-+/*
-+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
-+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
-+ */
-+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ }
-+
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+
-+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
-+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
-+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
-+ * accessible to all threads.
-+ */
-+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
-+{
-+ return (pk11_library_init(e));
-+}
-+
-+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args =
-+ {
-+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */
-+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */
-+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
-+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
-+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
-+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
-+ CK_INFO info;
-+ int any_slot_found;
-+ int i;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which
-+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still
-+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine
-+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is
-+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application
-+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork()
-+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can
-+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional
-+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In
-+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly
-+ * initialize the engine again.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_library_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ /*
-+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
-+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
-+ * engine first.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
-+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
-+ if (!p)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ rv = p(&pFuncList);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
-+
-+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
-+#endif
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
-+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
-+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
-+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
-+ * because no slot was present.
-+ */
-+ if (any_slot_found == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
-+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
-+ pk11_pid = getpid();
-+ /*
-+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
-+ * will do the cleanup.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
-+ goto err;
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
-+ /*
-+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
-+ * for asymmetric ciphers.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ active_list[i] = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
-+ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
-+ * library.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
-+
-+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* free all active lists */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ pk11_free_active_list(i);
-+
-+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects.
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ pFuncList = NULL;
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ pk11_pid = 0;
-+ /*
-+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
-+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
-+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
-+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
-+ * the engine before calling fork().
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
-+ {
-+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
-+
-+ switch (cmd)
-+ {
-+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (initialized)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
-+ case PK11_CMD_PIN:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
-+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
-+ {
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
-+ * the calling functions do not care anyway
-+ */
-+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
-+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
-+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
-+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
-+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
-+ */
-+PK11_SESSION *
-+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
-+#endif
-+ static pid_t pid = 0;
-+ pid_t new_pid;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
-+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
-+ * here, with no PID information.
-+ */
-+ if (pid == 0)
-+ pid = getpid();
-+
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp = freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
-+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
-+ * structure from the freelist.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
-+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
-+ * mark them as unused.
-+ */
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
-+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
-+ */
-+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
-+ {
-+ pid = new_pid;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
-+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
-+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
-+ * head of the list).
-+ */
-+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp1->next;
-+ /*
-+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
-+ * sessions and destroy all objects.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
-+ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
-+
-+ /* Initialize the process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
-+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
-+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
-+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
-+ * re-initialization.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
-+ * the caller cope with the situation.
-+ */
-+ freelist = sp;
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->pid == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
-+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (sp != NULL)
-+ sp->next = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (sp);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+void
-+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
-+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
-+ * next time we will ask for a new session.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
-+ return;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp->next = freelist;
-+ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ int type;
-+
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
-+ * return 0 on exit.
-+ */
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
-+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
-+ * return an error on return.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
-+ pid_t mypid = getpid();
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ int ret = 1;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are probably a child process so force the
-+ * reinitialize of the session
-+ */
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
-+ return (0);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ }
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->pid = getpid();
-+
-+ if (optype == OP_RSA)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
-+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
-+ */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e'
-+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We
-+ * must free those as well.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
-+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
-+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
-+ */
-+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
-+ *
-+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
-+ * public key slot.
-+ *
-+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
-+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
-+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
-+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
-+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
-+ {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
-+
-+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 0;
-+
-+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ /* Check if slot has random support. */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
-+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
-+ &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
-+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might
-+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature
-+ * is used.
-+ */
-+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ best_slot_sofar);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to "
-+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+#else
-+ } /* if */
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ } /* for */
-+
-+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 1;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.4
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011
-@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
-+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */
-+
-+#define token_lock pk11so_token_lock
-+#define find_lock pk11so_find_lock
-+#define active_list pk11so_active_list
-+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11so_pubkey_token_flags
-+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID
-+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11so_error
-+#define PK11err_add_data PK11SOerr_add_data
-+#define pk11_get_session pk11so_get_session
-+#define pk11_return_session pk11so_return_session
-+#define pk11_active_add pk11so_active_add
-+#define pk11_active_delete pk11so_active_delete
-+#define pk11_active_remove pk11so_active_remove
-+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11so_free_active_list
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv
-+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11so_load_privkey
-+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11so_load_pubkey
-+#define PK11_RSA PK11SO_RSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub
-+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv
-+#define PK11_DSA PK11SO_DSA
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects
-+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11so_destroy_dh_object
-+#define PK11_DH PK11SO_DH
-+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11so_token_relogin
-+#define pFuncList pk11so_pFuncList
-+#define pk11_pin pk11so_pin
-+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11so
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.10
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:38 2013
-@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#error RSA is disabled
-+#endif
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
-+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11so.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
-+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
-+#endif
-+
-+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
-+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x)
-+#endif
-+
-+/* RSA stuff */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+
-+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
-+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
-+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
-+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
-+
-+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private);
-+
-+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
-+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
-+#else
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
-+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
-+ * variable and jump to the specified label.
-+ */
-+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
-+ { \
-+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
-+ { \
-+ var = TRUE; \
-+ if (unlock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ goto label; \
-+ } \
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
-+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
-+ if (entry->h == h)
-+ return (entry);
-+
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
-+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
-+ * failure.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* search for entry in the active list */
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
-+ entry->refcnt++;
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
-+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
-+ if (entry == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ entry->h = h;
-+ entry->refcnt = 1;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
-+ if (active_list[type] == NULL)
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ else /* make the entry first in the list */
-+ {
-+ entry->next = active_list[type];
-+ active_list[type]->prev = entry;
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (entry->refcnt);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+void
-+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *prev_entry;
-+
-+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
-+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ prev_entry->next = entry->next;
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ active_list[type] = entry->next;
-+ /* we were the first but not the only one */
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* sanitization */
-+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ OPENSSL_free(entry);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
-+void
-+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
-+ switch (type)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
-+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
-+ *
-+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
-+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
-+ entry->refcnt--;
-+ if (entry->refcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa;
-+
-+RSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_RSA(void)
-+ {
-+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa;
-+
-+ if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-+ memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa));
-+ pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method";
-+ pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign;
-+ }
-+ return (&pk11_rsa);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
-+
-+/*
-+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
-+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
-+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ unsigned long ulsiglen;
-+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
-+
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ ulsiglen = j;
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
-+ *siglen = ulsiglen;
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
-+
-+#define MAXATTR 1024
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *privkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for private keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
-+ * never ask for private components.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_TRUE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
-+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
-+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm
-+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer
-+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However,
-+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect
-+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We
-+ * do not check the return value because even in case
-+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key
-+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and
-+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the
-+ * OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not
-+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for
-+ * consistency reasons.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
-+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we
-+ * must take care of handle management ourselves.
-+ */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
-+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+ /*
-+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
-+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
-+ * in the keystore.
-+ */
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1],
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(privkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ rollback = rollback;
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
-+ * PKCS#11 token.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *pubkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+
-+ /* we look for public keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
-+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
-+ */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
-+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
-+ CK_FALSE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition
-+ for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
-+ * if we can't find it.
-+ */
-+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
-+ &ks_key) == 0)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
-+ * structure. No cache hit is possible.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
-+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
-+ */
-+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling
-+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
-+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
-+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
-+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
-+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
-+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
-+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
-+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
-+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
-+ */
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(pubkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This will always destroy the RSA
-+ * object since we have a new RSA
-+ * structure here.
-+ */
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ RSA_free(rsa);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
-+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ int i;
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
-+
-+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
-+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
-+ *rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
-+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
-+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto set;
-+ }
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd'
-+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA
-+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for
-+ * searching for the private key handle.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ /*
-+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
-+ * session keys.
-+ */
-+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components
-+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the
-+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a
-+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just
-+ * create a new session key using the private
-+ * components from the RSA structure.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+set:
-+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never
-+ * extract private components from the keystore. In
-+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the
-+ * application to properly cope with that. It is
-+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by
-+ * reference are used we expect it to be used
-+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there
-+ * is no problem. If the application expects the
-+ * private components to be read from the keystore
-+ * then that is not a supported way of usage.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ *rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
-+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
-+ * 'n'/'e' components as well.
-+ */
-+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n);
-+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e);
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0 &&
-+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
-+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ *
-+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
-+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
-+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
-+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
-+ * both data signing and verifying.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making
-+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent
-+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure
-+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the
-+ * public component since with the keys by reference
-+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA
-+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we
-+ * compare the handle as well.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) ||
-+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Local function to simplify key template population
-+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
-+ */
-+static int
-+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
-+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG len = 0;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is
-+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers.
-+ */
-+ if (bn != NULL)
-+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-+
-+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ *ul_value_len = len;
-+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
-+ if (*p_value == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static void
-+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
-+ {
-+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
-+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the
-+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got.
-+ * Assume object store locked.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 OK
-+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found
-+ */
-+static int
-+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG objcnt;
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
-+
-+ if (objcnt > 1)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
-+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ else if (objcnt == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* from uri stuff */
-+
-+extern char *pk11_pin;
-+
-+static int pk11_get_pin(void);
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_get_pin(void)
-+{
-+ char *pin;
-+
-+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: ");
-+ if (pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
-+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
-+ * multiple threads.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-+ CK_BBOOL is_private)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#if 0
-+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been
-+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we
-+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access
-+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for
-+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED
-+ * flag is set.
-+ */
-+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) &&
-+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread
-+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We
-+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with
-+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the
-+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment
-+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
-+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call
-+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We
-+ * lock right before C_Login().
-+ */
-+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
-+ (is_private == CK_TRUE))
-+ {
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
-+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
-+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
-+ * the engine.
-+ *
-+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
-+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-+ {
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
-+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
-+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+ goto err_locked;
-+ }
-+
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If token does not require login we take it as the
-+ * login was done.
-+ */
-+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err_locked:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the
-+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login()
-+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for
-+ * this.
-+ *
-+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
-+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 1 on success
-+ * 0 on failure
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
-+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
-+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
-+ {
-+ static char buf[128];
-+ HANDLE h;
-+ DWORD cc, mode;
-+ int cnt;
-+
-+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
-+ fputs(prompt, stderr);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
-+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
-+
-+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
-+ {
-+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
-+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
-+ break;
-+ fputc('*', stdout);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ }
-+
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
-+ buf[cnt] = '\0';
-+ fputs("\n", stderr);
-+ return buf;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
-@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
-+/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */
-+
-+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
-+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
-+
-+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
-+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
-+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
-+ * referencing the derived work.
-+
-+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
-+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
-+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
-+ * warranty of any kind.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef _PKCS11_H_
-+#define _PKCS11_H_ 1
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+extern "C" {
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by
-+ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These
-+ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them
-+ * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend
-+ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also
-+ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or
-+ * dynamically).
-+ *
-+ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention
-+ * for Cryptoki structures should be set. The Cryptoki
-+ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte
-+ * aligned.
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
-+ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following
-+ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
-+ *
-+ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+ *
-+ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including
-+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
-+ *
-+ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using
-+ * the following preprocessor directive before including
-+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
-+ *
-+ * #pragma pack(1)
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this. You might
-+ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything.
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * Now for the macros:
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an
-+ * object. It can be used like this:
-+ *
-+ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
-+ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_PTR *
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_PTR far *
-+ *
-+ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_PTR *
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
-+ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a
-+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the
-+ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in
-+ * a Cryptoki library:
-+ *
-+ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
-+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
-+ * )
-+ * {
-+ * ...
-+ * }
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a
-+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
-+ * might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType name
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
-+ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a
-+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the
-+ * following fashion:
-+ *
-+ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
-+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
-+ * );
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a
-+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
-+ * might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType name
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro
-+ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or
-+ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a
-+ * function name. It should be used in the following fashion:
-+ *
-+ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function
-+ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV.
-+ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args);
-+ *
-+ * or
-+ *
-+ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a
-+ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning
-+ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type
-+ * // funcPtrType.
-+ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args);
-+ * funcPtrType funcPtr;
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access
-+ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might
-+ * be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType __export _far _pascal (* name)
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType (* name)
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
-+ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of
-+ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback.
-+ * It should be used in the following fashion:
-+ *
-+ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args);
-+ *
-+ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback
-+ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also
-+ * be used like this:
-+ *
-+ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args);
-+ * myCallbackType myCallback;
-+ *
-+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32
-+ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType (* name)
-+ *
-+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
-+ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType _far _pascal (* name)
-+ *
-+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
-+ *
-+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ * returnType (* name)
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer.
-+ *
-+ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well),
-+ * this should best be defined by
-+ *
-+ * #ifndef NULL_PTR
-+ * #define NULL_PTR 0
-+ * #endif
-+ */
-+
-+
-+/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the
-+ * file pkcs11t.h. */
-+#include "pkcs11t.h"
-+
-+#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y
-+
-+
-+/* ==============================================================
-+ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points.
-+ * ==============================================================
-+ */
-+
-+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
-+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
-+ extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name)
-+
-+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
-+ * function prototypes. */
-+#include "pkcs11f.h"
-+
-+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+
-+/* ==============================================================
-+ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for
-+ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is
-+ * a pointer to that kind of function.
-+ * ==============================================================
-+ */
-+
-+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
-+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
-+ typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name))
-+
-+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
-+ * function prototypes. */
-+#include "pkcs11f.h"
-+
-+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+
-+/* ==============================================================
-+ * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST
-+ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version
-+ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in
-+ * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in
-+ * pkcs11t.h.
-+ * ==============================================================
-+ */
-+
-+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
-+ __PASTE(CK_,name) name;
-+
-+struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST {
-+
-+ CK_VERSION version; /* Cryptoki version */
-+
-+/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */
-+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
-+ * function prototypes. */
-+#include "pkcs11f.h"
-+
-+};
-+
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+
-+#undef __PASTE
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
-@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@
-+/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */
-+
-+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
-+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
-+
-+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
-+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
-+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
-+ * referencing the derived work.
-+
-+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
-+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
-+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
-+ * warranty of any kind.
-+ */
-+
-+/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */
-+/* Cryptoki function prototypes. Because this information is */
-+/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */
-+/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */
-+/* should not be altered. */
-+
-+/* General-purpose */
-+
-+/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets
-+ * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR
-+ * and dereferenced */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the
-+ * Cryptoki library. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to
-+ * function list */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Slot and token management */
-+
-+/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in
-+ * the system. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */
-+ CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token
-+ * in the system. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types
-+ * supported by a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular
-+ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Session management */
-+
-+/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a
-+ * token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */
-+ CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a
-+ * token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation
-+ * in a session. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
-+ * operation in a session. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */
-+ CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Object management */
-+
-+/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the
-+ * copy. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object
-+ * attributes. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object
-+ * attributes */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session
-+ * objects that match a template. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session
-+ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object
-+ * handles. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session
-+ * objects. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Encryption and decryption */
-+
-+/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Message digesting */
-+
-+/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting
-+ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of
-+ * the data already digested. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting
-+ * operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Signing and MACing */
-+
-+/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption)
-+ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to
-+ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the
-+ *signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single
-+ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the
-+ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
-+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
-+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation,
-+ * returning the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where
-+ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the
-+ * data can be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Verifying signatures and MACs */
-+
-+/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the
-+ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot
-+ * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
-+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext
-+ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification
-+ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data,
-+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification
-+ * operation, checking the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification
-+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part
-+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
-+
-+/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting
-+ * and encryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
-+ * digesting operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
-+ * encryption operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
-+ * verify operation. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Key management */
-+
-+/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key
-+ * object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair,
-+ * creating new key objects. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session
-+ * handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen
-+ * mech. */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template
-+ * for pub.
-+ * key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub.
-+ * attrs. */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template
-+ * for priv.
-+ * key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv.
-+ * attrs. */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub.
-+ * key
-+ * handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets
-+ * priv. key
-+ * handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new
-+ * key object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */
-+ CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */
-+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key
-+ * object. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */
-+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Random number generation */
-+
-+/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's
-+ * random number generator. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Parallel function management */
-+
-+/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an
-+ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an
-+ * application. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function
-+ * running in parallel. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
-+);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+
-+/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */
-+
-+/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion,
-+ * removal, etc.) to occur. */
-+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent)
-+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
-+(
-+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */
-+);
-+#endif
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2
---- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008
-@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@
-+/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */
-+
-+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
-+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
-+
-+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
-+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
-+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
-+ * referencing the derived work.
-+
-+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
-+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
-+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
-+ * warranty of any kind.
-+ */
-+
-+/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that
-+ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that
-+ * must be set before including this file. */
-+
-+#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_
-+#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1
-+
-+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2
-+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20
-+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3
-+
-+#define CK_TRUE 1
-+#define CK_FALSE 0
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#ifndef FALSE
-+#define FALSE CK_FALSE
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef TRUE
-+#define TRUE CK_TRUE
-+#endif
-+#endif
-+
-+/* an unsigned 8-bit value */
-+typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE;
-+
-+/* an unsigned 8-bit character */
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR;
-+
-+/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR;
-+
-+/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL;
-+
-+/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */
-+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG;
-+
-+/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */
-+/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef long int CK_LONG;
-+
-+/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS;
-+
-+
-+/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */
-+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL)
-+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0
-+
-+
-+typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
-+typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR;
-+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR;
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR;
-+typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR;
-+
-+/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */
-+typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */
-+/* handle or object handle */
-+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_VERSION {
-+ CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */
-+ CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */
-+} CK_VERSION;
-+
-+typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_INFO {
-+ /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from
-+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
-+ CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* Cryptoki interface ver */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */
-+
-+ /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */
-+} CK_INFO;
-+
-+typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that
-+ * Cryptoki provides to an application */
-+/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG
-+ * for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION;
-+#define CKN_SURRENDER 0
-+
-+/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED 1
-+
-+
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID;
-+
-+typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */
-+typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO {
-+ /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from
-+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags;
-+
-+ /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */
-+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */
-+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */
-+} CK_SLOT_INFO;
-+
-+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */
-+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/
-+#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */
-+
-+typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */
-+typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO {
-+ /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from
-+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */
-+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */
-+
-+ /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount,
-+ * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been
-+ * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */
-+ CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */
-+ CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */
-+
-+ /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */
-+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */
-+ CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */
-+} CK_TOKEN_INFO;
-+
-+/* The flags parameter is defined as follows:
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random #
-+ * generator */
-+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is
-+ * write-
-+ * protected */
-+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must
-+ * login */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's
-+ * PIN is set */
-+
-+/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set,
-+ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic
-+ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys
-+ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */
-+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020
-+
-+/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means
-+ * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that
-+ * clock is returned in the token info structure */
-+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040
-+
-+/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is
-+ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login
-+ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */
-+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100
-+
-+/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true,
-+ * that means that a single session with the token can perform
-+ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and
-+ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt
-+ * and sign) */
-+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200
-+
-+/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
-+ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an
-+ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11.
-+ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause
-+ * the token to be reinitialized. */
-+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400
-+
-+/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is
-+ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for
-+ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and
-+ onwards. */
-+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
-+ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once
-+ * since the last successful authentication. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
-+ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not
-+ * possible. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000
-+
-+/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token
-+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
-+ * expired by the card. */
-+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
-+ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since
-+ * the last successful authentication. */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO
-+ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible.
-+ */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000
-+
-+/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
-+ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token
-+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
-+ * expired by the card. */
-+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000
-+
-+typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that
-+ * identifies a session */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE;
-+
-+typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */
-+/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE;
-+/* Security Officer */
-+#define CKU_SO 0
-+/* Normal user */
-+#define CKU_USER 1
-+/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */
-+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2
-+
-+/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */
-+/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE;
-+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0
-+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1
-+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2
-+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3
-+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */
-+typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
-+ CK_STATE state;
-+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */
-+
-+ /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */
-+} CK_SESSION_INFO;
-+
-+/* The flags are defined in the following table:
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */
-+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */
-+
-+typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an
-+ * object */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE;
-+
-+typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or
-+ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined
-+ * as follows: */
-+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS;
-+
-+/* The following classes of objects are defined: */
-+/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */
-+/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */
-+/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000
-+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001
-+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002
-+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003
-+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004
-+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005
-+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006
-+#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007
-+
-+/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKO_OTP_KEY 0x00000008
-+
-+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a
-+ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object
-+ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The following hardware feature types are defined */
-+/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001
-+#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002
-+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003
-+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */
-+/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE;
-+
-+/* the following key types are defined: */
-+#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000
-+#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001
-+#define CKK_DH 0x00000002
-+
-+/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */
-+/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */
-+#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003
-+#define CKK_EC 0x00000003
-+#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004
-+#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005
-+
-+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010
-+#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011
-+#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012
-+#define CKK_DES 0x00000013
-+#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014
-+#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015
-+
-+/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016
-+#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017
-+/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */
-+#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018
-+#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018
-+#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019
-+#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A
-+#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B
-+#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C
-+#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D
-+#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E
-+#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F
-+
-+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020
-+#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021
-+
-+/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKK_SECURID 0x00000022
-+#define CKK_HOTP 0x00000023
-+#define CKK_ACTI 0x00000024
-+
-+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025
-+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026
-+
-+
-+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+
-+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate
-+ * type */
-+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG
-+ * for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The following certificate types are defined: */
-+/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */
-+/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000
-+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001
-+#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002
-+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+
-+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute
-+ * type */
-+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which
-+ consists of an array of values. */
-+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1
-+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL 0
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL 1
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2
-+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY 3
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1
-+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */
-+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED 0
-+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL 1
-+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY 2
-+
-+/* The following attribute types are defined: */
-+#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000
-+#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001
-+#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002
-+#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003
-+#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010
-+#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011
-+
-+/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012
-+
-+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080
-+#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081
-+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082
-+
-+/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new
-+ * for v2.10 */
-+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083
-+#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084
-+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085
-+
-+/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086
-+
-+/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ...
-+ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087
-+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088
-+#define CKA_URL 0x00000089
-+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A
-+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B
-+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090
-+
-+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100
-+#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101
-+#define CKA_ID 0x00000102
-+#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103
-+#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104
-+#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105
-+#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106
-+#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107
-+#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108
-+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109
-+#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A
-+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B
-+#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C
-+#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110
-+#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111
-+#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120
-+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121
-+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122
-+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123
-+#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124
-+#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125
-+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126
-+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127
-+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128
-+#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130
-+#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131
-+#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132
-+
-+/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133
-+#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134
-+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS
-+/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */
-+
-+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160
-+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161
-+
-+/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
-+ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS,
-+ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162
-+#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163
-+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164
-+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165
-+
-+/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166
-+
-+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170
-+
-+/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11,
-+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */
-+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180
-+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180
-+
-+#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181
-+
-+/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS,
-+ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */
-+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200
-+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201
-+
-+/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ...
-+ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202
-+
-+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210
-+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211)
-+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212)
-+
-+/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */
-+#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT 0x00000220
-+#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH 0x00000221
-+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL 0x00000222
-+#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE 0x00000223
-+#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224
-+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT 0x00000225
-+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT 0x00000226
-+#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT 0x00000227
-+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER 0x0000022E
-+#define CKA_OTP_TIME 0x0000022F
-+#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022A
-+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022B
-+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO 0x0000022C
-+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE 0x0000022D
-+
-+
-+/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET
-+ * are new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300
-+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301
-+#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302
-+
-+/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400
-+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401
-+#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402
-+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403
-+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404
-+#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405
-+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406
-+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480
-+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481
-+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482
-+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500
-+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501
-+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502
-+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503
-+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600)
-+
-+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length
-+ * and value of an attribute */
-+typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE {
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
-+
-+ /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */
-+} CK_ATTRIBUTE;
-+
-+typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */
-+typedef struct CK_DATE{
-+ CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */
-+ CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */
-+ CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */
-+} CK_DATE;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism
-+ * type */
-+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE;
-+
-+/* the following mechanism types are defined: */
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001
-+#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002
-+#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003
-+
-+/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS
-+ * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */
-+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004
-+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005
-+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006
-+
-+/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009
-+
-+/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31,
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A
-+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B
-+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C
-+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D
-+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E
-+
-+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010
-+#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011
-+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012
-+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020
-+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021
-+
-+/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE,
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for
-+ * v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032
-+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040
-+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041
-+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042
-+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043
-+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044
-+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045
-+
-+/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046
-+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047
-+
-+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100
-+#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101
-+#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102
-+#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103
-+
-+/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104
-+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105
-+
-+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110
-+#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111
-+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120
-+#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121
-+#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122
-+#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123
-+
-+/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124
-+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125
-+
-+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130
-+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131
-+#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132
-+#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133
-+#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134
-+
-+/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN,
-+ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC,
-+ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135
-+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136
-+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140
-+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141
-+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142
-+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143
-+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144
-+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145
-+
-+/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150
-+#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151
-+#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152
-+#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153
-+
-+#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200
-+
-+/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201
-+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202
-+
-+#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210
-+
-+/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211
-+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212
-+
-+#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221
-+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222
-+
-+/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC,
-+ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC,
-+ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241
-+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250
-+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251
-+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252
-+
-+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255
-+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256
-+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257
-+
-+#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260
-+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261
-+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262
-+#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270
-+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271
-+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272
-+
-+/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN 0x00000280
-+#define CKM_SECURID 0x00000282
-+
-+/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN 0x00000290
-+#define CKM_HOTP 0x00000291
-+
-+/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKM_ACTI 0x000002A0
-+#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN 0x000002A1
-+
-+/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */
-+/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */
-+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300
-+#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301
-+#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302
-+#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303
-+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304
-+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305
-+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310
-+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311
-+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312
-+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313
-+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314
-+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315
-+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320
-+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320
-+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321
-+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321
-+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322
-+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322
-+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323
-+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323
-+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324
-+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324
-+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325
-+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325
-+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330
-+#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331
-+#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332
-+#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333
-+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334
-+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335
-+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340
-+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341
-+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342
-+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343
-+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344
-+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345
-+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350
-+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360
-+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362
-+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363
-+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364
-+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365
-+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370
-+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371
-+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372
-+
-+/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN,
-+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and
-+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373
-+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374
-+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375
-+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376
-+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377
-+
-+/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378
-+
-+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380
-+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381
-+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390
-+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391
-+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392
-+
-+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393
-+#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394
-+#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395
-+
-+/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396
-+
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4
-+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA
-+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB
-+
-+/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */
-+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0
-+
-+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0
-+
-+/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0
-+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1
-+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2
-+#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3
-+#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4
-+#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5
-+
-+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400
-+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401
-+
-+/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500
-+
-+/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */
-+#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE 0x00000510
-+#define CKM_KIP_WRAP 0x00000511
-+#define CKM_KIP_MAC 0x00000512
-+
-+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557
-+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558
-+
-+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560
-+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561
-+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562
-+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563
-+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564
-+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565
-+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566
-+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567
-+
-+/* Fortezza mechanisms */
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009
-+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a
-+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010
-+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011
-+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020
-+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030
-+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031
-+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032
-+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033
-+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034
-+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035
-+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036
-+
-+/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11,
-+ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */
-+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040
-+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040
-+
-+#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041
-+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042
-+
-+/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE
-+ * are new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050
-+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051
-+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052
-+
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064
-+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065
-+#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070
-+
-+/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC,
-+ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN,
-+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are
-+ * new for v2.11 */
-+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080
-+#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081
-+#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082
-+#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083
-+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084
-+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085
-+
-+/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086
-+
-+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090
-+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091
-+#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092
-+#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093
-+
-+
-+/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100
-+#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101
-+#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102
-+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103
-+#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104
-+#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105
-+
-+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000
-+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001
-+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002
-+
-+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular
-+ * mechanism */
-+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pParameter;
-+
-+ /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */
-+} CK_MECHANISM;
-+
-+typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular
-+ * mechanism */
-+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO {
-+ CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize;
-+ CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize;
-+ CK_FLAGS flags;
-+} CK_MECHANISM_INFO;
-+
-+/* The flags are defined as follows:
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */
-+#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */
-+
-+/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN,
-+ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER,
-+ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP,
-+ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not
-+ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */
-+#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100
-+#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200
-+#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400
-+#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800
-+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000
-+#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000
-+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000
-+#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000
-+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000
-+#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000
-+#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000
-+#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000
-+
-+/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE,
-+ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They
-+ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism
-+ * information. */
-+#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000
-+#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000
-+#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000
-+#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000
-+#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000
-+#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000
-+
-+#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */
-+
-+typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a
-+ * Cryptoki function */
-+/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV;
-+
-+#define CKR_OK 0x00000000
-+#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001
-+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002
-+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003
-+
-+/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */
-+
-+/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006
-+
-+/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS,
-+ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */
-+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007
-+#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008
-+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009
-+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A
-+
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012
-+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013
-+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020
-+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021
-+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030
-+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031
-+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032
-+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040
-+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051
-+
-+/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054
-+
-+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060
-+
-+/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */
-+
-+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062
-+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063
-+
-+/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED,
-+ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED,
-+ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064
-+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065
-+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066
-+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067
-+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068
-+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069
-+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A
-+
-+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070
-+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071
-+
-+/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID
-+ * were removed for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082
-+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090
-+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091
-+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0
-+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1
-+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2
-+
-+/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3
-+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4
-+
-+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0
-+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1
-+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3
-+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4
-+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5
-+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6
-+
-+/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and
-+ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7
-+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8
-+
-+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0
-+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1
-+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0
-+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1
-+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0
-+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1
-+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2
-+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0
-+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1
-+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2
-+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100
-+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101
-+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102
-+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103
-+
-+/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES
-+ * are new to v2.01 */
-+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104
-+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105
-+
-+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110
-+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112
-+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113
-+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114
-+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115
-+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.11 */
-+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.0 */
-+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150
-+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160
-+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170
-+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180
-+
-+/* These are new to v2.01 */
-+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190
-+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191
-+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0
-+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1
-+
-+/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE 0x000001B0
-+#define CKR_NEXT_OTP 0x000001B1
-+
-+/* This is new to v2.20 */
-+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200
-+
-+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
-+
-+
-+/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)(
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
-+ CK_NOTIFICATION event,
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec
-+ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the
-+ * Cryptoki functions */
-+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST;
-+
-+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR;
-+
-+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a
-+ * mutex object */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a
-+ * mutex object */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a
-+ * mutex */
-+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)(
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
-+);
-+
-+
-+/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to
-+ * C_Initialize */
-+typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS {
-+ CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex;
-+ CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex;
-+ CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex;
-+ CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex;
-+ CK_FLAGS flags;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved;
-+} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS;
-+
-+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
-+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
-+ */
-+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001
-+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002
-+
-+typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* additional flags for parameters to functions */
-+
-+/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */
-+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message
-+ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when
-+ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption
-+ * scheme. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following MGFs are defined */
-+/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512
-+ * are new for v2.20 */
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004
-+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source
-+ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block
-+ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */
-+#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */
-+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
-+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
-+ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen;
-+} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */
-+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
-+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
-+ CK_ULONG sLen;
-+} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE;
-+
-+/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */
-+#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001
-+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002
-+
-+/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms,
-+ * where each party contributes one key pair.
-+ */
-+typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */
-+typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
-+} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE;
-+typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined
-+ (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */
-+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003
-+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004
-+
-+/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party
-+ * contributes one key pair */
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
-+ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation
-+ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
-+} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */
-+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BBOOL isSender;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and
-+ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just
-+ * holds the effective keysize */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC
-+ * mechanism */
-+typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS {
-+ /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
-+ * v2.0 */
-+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */
-+
-+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */
-+} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
-+ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
-+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */
-+} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and
-+ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */
-+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
-+} CK_RC5_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC
-+ * mechanism */
-+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */
-+ CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */
-+} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
-+ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
-+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
-+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */
-+} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block
-+ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of
-+ * the MAC */
-+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[8];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[16];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen;
-+ CK_ULONG ulQLen;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ;
-+} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */
-+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA;
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA;
-+} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector;
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSaltLen;
-+ CK_ULONG ulIteration;
-+} CK_PBE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
-+ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */
-+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */
-+ CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */
-+} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen;
-+} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;
-+} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer;
-+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT;
-+
-+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
-+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport;
-+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
-+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel;
-+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput;
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen;
-+} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
-+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen;
-+} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
-+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion;
-+} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
-+ CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel;
-+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput;
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen;
-+} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIV;
-+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
-+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber;
-+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport;
-+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
-+ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
-+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */
-+typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism;
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes;
-+ CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen;
-+} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA {
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulLen;
-+} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA;
-+
-+typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \
-+ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR;
-+
-+
-+/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the
-+ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit
-+ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the
-+ * derived key */
-+/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to
-+ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate
-+ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
-+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001
-+
-+
-+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the
-+ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5
-+ * PBKDF2. */
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE;
-+
-+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
-+#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001
-+
-+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
-+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the
-+ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */
-+typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS {
-+ CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen;
-+ CK_ULONG iterations;
-+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData;
-+ CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen;
-+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword;
-+ CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen;
-+} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+
-+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE;
-+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */
-+
-+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM {
-+ CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type;
-+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
-+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen;
-+} CK_OTP_PARAM;
-+
-+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount;
-+} CK_OTP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO {
-+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
-+ CK_ULONG ulCount;
-+} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO;
-+
-+typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR;
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CK_OTP_VALUE 0
-+#define CK_OTP_PIN 1
-+#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE 2
-+#define CK_OTP_TIME 3
-+#define CK_OTP_COUNTER 4
-+#define CK_OTP_FLAGS 5
-+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH 6
-+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT 7
-+
-+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
-+#define CKF_NEXT_OTP 0x00000001
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME 0x00000002
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER 0x00000004
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008
-+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN 0x00000010
-+#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020
-+
-+/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */
-+typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
-+} CK_KIP_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
-+ CK_BYTE cb[16];
-+} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS {
-+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
-+ CK_BYTE cb[16];
-+} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[16];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
-+typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
-+ CK_BYTE iv[16];
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
-+ CK_ULONG length;
-+} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
-+
-+typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
-+
-+#endif
-Index: openssl/util/libeay.num
-diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.13.2.3
---- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:42:32 2016
-+++ openssl/util/libeay.num Mon Jun 13 15:52:51 2016
-@@ -4415,4 +4415,5 @@
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host 4771 EXIST::FUNCTION:
- EC_GROUP_get_mont_data 4772 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
- i2d_re_X509_tbs 4773 EXIST::FUNCTION:
--EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item 4774 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-+ENGINE_load_pk11ca 4774 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE
-+ENGINE_load_pk11so 4774 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE
-Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl
-diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.12.2.3
---- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:42:33 2016
-+++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Mon Jun 13 15:52:52 2016
-@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@
- no-ecdh - No ECDH
- no-engine - No engine
- no-hw - No hw
-+ no-hw-pkcs11ca - No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor
-+ no-hw-pkcs11so - No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor
- nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm
- nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare
- nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare
-@@ -287,6 +289,8 @@
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_GOST" if $no_gost;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw;
-+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA" if $no_hw_pkcs11ca;
-+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO" if $no_hw_pkcs11so;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake;
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC2M" if $no_ec2m;
-@@ -361,6 +365,9 @@
- $dir=$val;
- }
-
-+ if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION")
-+ { $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";}
-+
- if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES")
- { $cflags .= " $val";}
-
-@@ -1219,6 +1226,8 @@
- "no-gost" => \$no_gost,
- "no-engine" => \$no_engine,
- "no-hw" => \$no_hw,
-+ "no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca,
-+ "no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so,
- "no-rsax" => 0,
- "just-ssl" =>
- [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast,
-Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl
-diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.2.1.4.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.11.2.2
---- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.2.1.4.1 Mon Jun 13 15:42:34 2016
-+++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl Mon Jun 13 15:52:52 2016
-@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
- # External "algorithms"
- "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM",
- # Engines
-- "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP",
-+ "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO",
- # RFC3779
- "RFC3779",
- # TLS
-@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
- my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2;
- my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5;
- my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw;
-+my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so;
- my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated;
- my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng;
- my $no_jpake; my $no_srp; my $no_ssl2; my $no_ec2m; my $no_nistp_gcc;
-@@ -251,6 +252,8 @@
- elsif (/^no-sctp$/) { $no_sctp=1; }
- elsif (/^no-srtp$/) { $no_srtp=1; }
- elsif (/^no-unit-test$/){ $no_unit_test=1; }
-+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; }
-+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; }
- }
-
-
-@@ -1206,6 +1209,8 @@
- if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; }
-+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; }
-+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; }
- if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; }
-Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
-diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.8.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.10.2.3
---- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.8.1.2.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:42:35 2016
-+++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl Mon Jun 13 15:52:53 2016
-@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
- $base_cflags= " $mf_cflag";
- my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT';
- $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox';
-- $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
-+ $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
- $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref";
-
- *::perlasm_compile_target = sub {
projects / thirdparty / bind9.git / commitdiff
