--- /dev/null
+From be309f8eae8b474a4a617eaae01324da996fc719 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 18:51:30 +0200
+Subject: af_unix: Fix UAF read of tail->len in unix_stream_data_wait()
+
+From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+
+commit be309f8eae8b474a4a617eaae01324da996fc719 upstream.
+
+unix_stream_data_wait() does skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue) without
+holding any lock that prevents SKBs on that queue from being dequeued and
+freed.
+This has been the case since commit 79f632c71bea ("unix/stream: fix
+peeking with an offset larger than data in queue").
+The first consequence of this is that the pointer comparison
+`tail != last` can be false even if `last` semantically refers to an
+already-freed SKB while `tail` is a new SKB allocated at the same address;
+which can cause unix_stream_data_wait() to wrongly keep blocking after new
+data has arrived, but only in a weird scenario where a peeking recv() and
+a normal recv() on the same socket are racing, which is probably not a
+real problem.
+
+But since commit 2b514574f7e8 ("net: af_unix: implement splice for stream
+af_unix sockets"), `tail` is actually dereferenced, which can cause UAF in
+the following race scenario (where test_setup() runs single-threaded,
+and afterwards, test_thread1() and test_thread2() run concurrently in
+two threads:
+```
+static int socks[2];
+void test_setup(void) {
+ socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, socks);
+ send(socks[1], "A", 1, 0);
+ int peekoff = 1;
+ setsockopt(socks[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEEK_OFF, &peekoff, sizeof(peekoff));
+}
+void test_thread1(void) {
+ char dummy;
+ recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, MSG_PEEK);
+}
+void test_thread2(void) {
+ char dummy;
+ recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, 0);
+ shutdown(socks[1], SHUT_WR);
+}
+```
+
+when racing like this:
+```
+thread1 thread2
+unix_stream_read_generic
+ mutex_lock(&u->iolock)
+ skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)
+ skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue)
+ mutex_unlock(&u->iolock)
+ unix_stream_read_generic
+ unix_state_lock(sk)
+ skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)
+ unix_state_unlock(sk)
+ unix_stream_data_wait
+ unix_state_lock(sk)
+ tail = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue)
+ spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock)
+ __skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue)
+ spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock)
+ consume_skb(skb) [frees the SKB]
+ `tail != last`: false
+ `tail`: true
+ `tail->len != last_len` ***UAF***
+```
+
+Fix the UAF by removing the read of tail->len; checking tail->len would
+only make sense if SKBs in the receive queue of a UNIX socket could grow,
+which can no longer happen.
+
+Kuniyuki explained:
+
+> When commit 869e7c62486e ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage
+> support") added sendpage() support, data could be appended to the last
+> skb in the receiver's queue.
+>
+> That's why we needed to check if the length of the last skb was changed
+> while waiting for new data in unix_stream_data_wait().
+>
+> However, commit a0dbf5f818f9 ("af_unix: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") and
+> commit 57d44a354a43 ("unix: Convert unix_stream_sendpage() to use
+> MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") refactored sendmsg(), and now data is always added
+> to a new skb.
+
+That means this fix is not suitable for kernels before 6.5.
+
+Fixes: 2b514574f7e8 ("net: af_unix: implement splice for stream af_unix sockets")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.5.x
+Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518-b4-unix-recv-wait-hotfix-v2-1-83e29ce8ad31@google.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/unix/af_unix.c | 11 ++---------
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
++++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
+@@ -2570,8 +2570,7 @@ static int unix_read_skb(struct sock *sk
+ * Sleep until more data has arrived. But check for races..
+ */
+ static long unix_stream_data_wait(struct sock *sk, long timeo,
+- struct sk_buff *last, unsigned int last_len,
+- bool freezable)
++ struct sk_buff *last, bool freezable)
+ {
+ unsigned int state = TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | freezable * TASK_FREEZABLE;
+ struct sk_buff *tail;
+@@ -2584,7 +2583,6 @@ static long unix_stream_data_wait(struct
+
+ tail = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
+ if (tail != last ||
+- (tail && tail->len != last_len) ||
+ sk->sk_err ||
+ (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) ||
+ signal_pending(current) ||
+@@ -2779,7 +2777,6 @@ static int unix_stream_read_generic(stru
+ int flags = state->flags;
+ bool check_creds = false;
+ struct scm_cookie scm;
+- unsigned int last_len;
+ struct unix_sock *u;
+ int copied = 0;
+ int err = 0;
+@@ -2825,7 +2822,6 @@ redo:
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ last = skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
+- last_len = last ? last->len : 0;
+
+ again:
+ #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB)
+@@ -2859,8 +2855,7 @@ again:
+
+ mutex_unlock(&u->iolock);
+
+- timeo = unix_stream_data_wait(sk, timeo, last,
+- last_len, freezable);
++ timeo = unix_stream_data_wait(sk, timeo, last, freezable);
+
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
+@@ -2877,7 +2872,6 @@ unlock:
+ while (skip >= unix_skb_len(skb)) {
+ skip -= unix_skb_len(skb);
+ last = skb;
+- last_len = skb->len;
+ skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
+ if (!skb)
+ goto again;
+@@ -2950,7 +2944,6 @@ unlock:
+
+ skip = 0;
+ last = skb;
+- last_len = skb->len;
+ unix_state_lock(sk);
+ skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
+ if (skb)
--- /dev/null
+From ebc8de716c9ec2be384abdc2dd866da26c6580d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcin Szycik <marcin.szycik@intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 11:24:10 -0700
+Subject: ice: fix setting promisc mode while adding VID filter
+
+From: Marcin Szycik <marcin.szycik@intel.com>
+
+commit ebc8de716c9ec2be384abdc2dd866da26c6580d1 upstream.
+
+There are at least two paths through which VSI promiscuous mode can be
+independently configured via ice_fltr_set_vsi_promisc():
+- ice_vlan_rx_add_vid() (netdev op)
+- ice_service_task() -> ... -> ice_set_promisc()
+
+Both paths may try to program promiscuous mode concurrently. One such
+scenario is:
+
+1. Add ice netdev to bond
+2. Add the bond netdev to bridge
+3. ice netdev enters allmulticast mode (IFF_ALLMULTI)
+4. Service task programs promisc mode filter
+5. Bridge -> bond calls ice_vlan_rx_add_vid()
+
+Crucially, ice_vlan_rx_add_vid() fails if ice_fltr_set_vsi_promisc()
+returns any error, including -EEXIST. This causes VLAN filtering setup
+to fail on the bond interface. ice_set_promisc() already handles -EEXIST
+correctly.
+
+Fix by adding the same -EEXIST check to ice_vlan_rx_add_vid(): if the
+promisc filter is already programmed, continue without returning error.
+
+Fixes: 1273f89578f2 ("ice: Fix broken IFF_ALLMULTI handling")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Marcin Szycik <marcin.szycik@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Tested-by: Rinitha S <sx.rinitha@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
+Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515182419.1597859-4-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
+@@ -3808,7 +3808,7 @@ int ice_vlan_rx_add_vid(struct net_devic
+ ret = ice_fltr_set_vsi_promisc(&vsi->back->hw, vsi->idx,
+ ICE_MCAST_VLAN_PROMISC_BITS,
+ vid);
+- if (ret)
++ if (ret && ret != -EEXIST)
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 975b564d195b13ca6ee1ef5e6a9561734898eb17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Grzegorz Nitka <grzegorz.nitka@intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 11:24:13 -0700
+Subject: ice: restore PTP Rx timestamp config after ethtool set-channels
+
+From: Grzegorz Nitka <grzegorz.nitka@intel.com>
+
+commit 975b564d195b13ca6ee1ef5e6a9561734898eb17 upstream.
+
+When ethtool -L changes queue counts, ice_vsi_recfg_qs() closes and
+rebuilds the VSI, reallocating Rx rings. The newly allocated rings have
+ptp_rx cleared, so RX hardware timestamps are no longer attached to skb
+until hwtstamp configuration is applied again.
+
+Restore timestamp mode after ice_vsi_open() in the queue reconfiguration
+path, matching reset/rebuild behavior and ensuring newly rebuilt Rx rings
+have PTP RX timestamping re-enabled.
+
+Testing hints:
+- run ptp4l application in client synchronization mode:
+ ptp4l -i ethX -m -s
+- run PTP traffic
+- change queue number on ethX netdev interface:
+ ethtool -L ethX combined new_queue_size
+- observe ptp4l output
+- expected result: no "received DELAY_REQ without timestamp" messages
+
+Fixes: 77a781155a65 ("ice: enable receive hardware timestamping")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Nitka <grzegorz.nitka@intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Tested-by: Alexander Nowlin <alexander.nowlin@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515182419.1597859-7-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
+@@ -4197,6 +4197,12 @@ int ice_vsi_recfg_qs(struct ice_vsi *vsi
+ }
+ ice_pf_dcb_recfg(pf, locked);
+ ice_vsi_open(vsi);
++ /* Rx rings are reallocated during VSI rebuild and lose their ptp_rx
++ * flag. Restore timestamp mode so newly allocated rings are set up
++ * for hardware Rx timestamping.
++ */
++ if (test_bit(ICE_FLAG_PTP_SUPPORTED, pf->flags))
++ ice_ptp_restore_timestamp_mode(pf);
+ goto done;
+
+ rebuild_err:
--- /dev/null
+From 915fab69823a14c170dbaa3b41978768e0fe62fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 May 2026 16:51:14 -0400
+Subject: ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5
+
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+
+commit 915fab69823a14c170dbaa3b41978768e0fe62fc upstream.
+
+raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header
+fits within the message length:
+
+ iphlen = iph->ihl * 4;
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (iphlen > length)
+ goto error_free;
+
+ if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) {
+ /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */
+ }
+
+It does not, however, reject ihl < 5. For such a packet the
+"if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" branch is skipped, leaving the
+crafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to
+__ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read
+iph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in
+particular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4
+and passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t)
+result to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to
+SIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic.
+
+An IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791:
+"Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in
+32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header
+is 5."). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a
+packet into its own output path.
+
+Reject "iphlen < sizeof(*iph)" alongside the existing
+"iphlen > length" check. This matches the principle that locally
+constructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same
+basic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to.
+
+Once this lands, the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" wrapper around
+the fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the
+patch minimal and backport-friendly. A follow-up can unwrap it.
+
+Note that commit 86f4c90a1c5c ("ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket
+message is big enough to hold an IP header") ensures the message
+buffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain
+the self-reported iph->ihl.
+
+Reachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with
+CAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net
+namespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y. The reproduced AH
+crash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing
+route; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state
+and policy in its netns. Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the
+trigger uses a real netdev.
+
+Reproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with
+memcpy_orig at the crash site. Same shape reproduces inside a
+rootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock
+distro kernel.
+
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Suggested-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/77ec2b5e8111961c2c39883c92e8aa2709039c17.1778614451.git.michael.bommarito@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/raw.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
+@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static int raw_send_hdrinc(struct sock *
+ * in, reject the frame as invalid
+ */
+ err = -EINVAL;
+- if (iphlen > length)
++ if (iphlen > length || iphlen < sizeof(*iph))
+ goto error_free;
+
+ if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) {
--- /dev/null
+From d4ea0dfd75011b78cebf3808f98ac4c4f51a6fb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 17 May 2026 20:30:59 +0200
+Subject: ipv6: ioam: add NULL check for idev in ipv6_hop_ioam()
+
+From: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@gmail.com>
+
+commit d4ea0dfd75011b78cebf3808f98ac4c4f51a6fb9 upstream.
+
+Reported by Sashiko:
+
+The function ipv6_hop_ioam() accesses
+__in6_dev_get(skb->dev)->cnf.ioam6_enabled without validating the returned
+idev pointer. Because addrconf_ifdown() can concurrently clear dev->ip6_ptr
+via RCU, __in6_dev_get() can return NULL during interface teardown, which
+could cause a NULL pointer dereference when processing an IOAM Hop-by-Hop
+option.
+
+Let's add a check and use SKB_DROP_REASON_IPV6DISABLED accordingly.
+
+Fixes: 9ee11f0fff20 ("ipv6: ioam: Data plane support for Pre-allocated Trace")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260517183059.29140-1-justin.iurman@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/exthdrs.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
+@@ -912,16 +912,27 @@ static bool ipv6_hop_ra(struct sk_buff *
+
+ static bool ipv6_hop_ioam(struct sk_buff *skb, int optoff)
+ {
++ enum skb_drop_reason drop_reason;
+ struct ioam6_trace_hdr *trace;
+ struct ioam6_namespace *ns;
++ struct inet6_dev *idev;
+ struct ioam6_hdr *hdr;
+
++ drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_IP_INHDR;
++
+ /* Bad alignment (must be 4n-aligned) */
+ if (optoff & 3)
+ goto drop;
+
++ /* Does the device still have IPv6 configuration? */
++ idev = __in6_dev_get(skb->dev);
++ if (!idev) {
++ drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_IPV6DISABLED;
++ goto drop;
++ }
++
+ /* Ignore if IOAM is not enabled on ingress */
+- if (!READ_ONCE(__in6_dev_get(skb->dev)->cnf.ioam6_enabled))
++ if (!READ_ONCE(idev->cnf.ioam6_enabled))
+ goto ignore;
+
+ /* Truncated Option header */
+@@ -974,7 +985,7 @@ ignore:
+ return true;
+
+ drop:
+- kfree_skb_reason(skb, SKB_DROP_REASON_IP_INHDR);
++ kfree_skb_reason(skb, drop_reason);
+ return false;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 5d49b568c188dc77199d8d2b959c91da8cc27cf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 11:24:14 -0700
+Subject: ixgbevf: fix use-after-free in VEPA multicast source pruning
+
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+
+commit 5d49b568c188dc77199d8d2b959c91da8cc27cf1 upstream.
+
+ixgbevf_clean_rx_irq() prunes frames whose source MAC matches the VF's
+own address (VEPA multicast workaround) by freeing the skb and
+continuing to the next descriptor:
+
+ dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb);
+ continue;
+
+The skb pointer is declared outside the while loop and persists across
+iterations. Because the continue skips the "skb = NULL" reset at the
+bottom of the loop, the next iteration enters the "else if (skb)" path
+and calls ixgbevf_add_rx_frag() on the freed skb, dereferencing
+skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags - a use-after-free in NAPI softirq context.
+
+The sibling driver iavf already handles this correctly by nulling the
+pointer before continuing. Apply the same pattern here.
+
+I do not have ixgbevf hardware; the bug was found by static analysis
+(scan_drop_continue_loops.py + semgrep drop_continue_in_loop, multi-tool
+corroboration with the highest score in the scan). The UAF was confirmed
+under KASAN by loading a test module that reproduces the exact code
+pattern (alloc skb, kfree_skb, then read skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags):
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ixgbevf_uaf_test_init+0x100/0x1000
+ Read of size 8 at addr 000000006163ae78 by task insmod/30
+ freed 208-byte region [000000006163adc0, 000000006163ae90)
+
+QEMU emulates igb (82576) but not ixgbe (82599), and the igbvf VF
+driver does not include the VEPA source pruning path, so a full
+end-to-end reproduction with emulated hardware was not possible.
+
+Fixes: bad17234ba70 ("ixgbevf: Change receive model to use double buffered page based receives")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515182419.1597859-8-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/ixgbevf_main.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/ixgbevf_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/ixgbevf_main.c
+@@ -1224,6 +1224,7 @@ static int ixgbevf_clean_rx_irq(struct i
+ ether_addr_equal(rx_ring->netdev->dev_addr,
+ eth_hdr(skb)->h_source)) {
+ dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb);
++ skb = NULL;
+ continue;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 979c017803c40829b03acd9e5236e354b7622360 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 14:34:47 -0400
+Subject: l2tp: use list_del_rcu in l2tp_session_unhash
+
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+
+commit 979c017803c40829b03acd9e5236e354b7622360 upstream.
+
+An unprivileged local user can pin a host CPU indefinitely in
+l2tp_session_get_by_ifname() by issuing L2TP_CMD_SESSION_GET on
+L2TP_ATTR_IFNAME concurrently with L2TP_CMD_SESSION_CREATE and
+L2TP_CMD_SESSION_DELETE on the same tunnel. All three commands take
+GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, so CAP_NET_ADMIN in the netns user namespace
+suffices; on any host that has l2tp_core loaded the trigger is
+reachable from a standard `unshare -Urn` sandbox.
+
+l2tp_session_unhash() removes a session from tunnel->session_list
+with list_del_init(), but that list is walked by
+l2tp_session_get_by_ifname() with list_for_each_entry_rcu() under
+rcu_read_lock_bh(). list_del_init() leaves the deleted entry's
+next/prev self-pointing; a reader that has loaded the entry and
+then advances pos->list.next reads &session->list, container_of()s
+back to the same session, and list_for_each_entry_rcu() never
+reaches the list head. The CPU stays in strcmp() inside the
+walker, with BH and preemption disabled, so RCU grace periods on
+the host stall behind it and the wedged thread cannot be killed
+(SIGKILL is delivered on syscall return).
+
+Use list_del_rcu() to match the existing list_add_rcu() in
+l2tp_session_register(); the deleted session remains visible to
+in-flight walkers with consistent next/prev pointers until
+kfree_rcu() in l2tp_session_free() releases it. tunnel->session_list
+has exactly one list_del_init() call site; the list_del_init
+(&session->clist) at l2tp_core.c:533 operates on the per-collision
+list, which is not walked under RCU. list_empty(&session->list) is
+not used anywhere in net/l2tp/ after the unhash point, so dropping
+the post-delete self-init is safe; the fix has no userspace-visible
+behavior change.
+
+Fixes: 89b768ec2dfef ("l2tp: use rcu list add/del when updating lists")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.11+
+Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518183447.64078-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
++++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
+@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ static void l2tp_session_unhash(struct l
+ spin_lock_bh(&pn->l2tp_session_idr_lock);
+
+ /* Remove from the per-tunnel list */
+- list_del_init(&session->list);
++ list_del_rcu(&session->list);
+
+ /* Remove from per-net IDR */
+ if (tunnel->version == L2TP_HDR_VER_3) {
--- /dev/null
+From 4a9b16541ad3faf8bccb398532bf3f8b6bbf1188 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 14:05:06 -0400
+Subject: lsm: hold cred_guard_mutex for lsm_set_self_attr()
+
+From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+
+commit 4a9b16541ad3faf8bccb398532bf3f8b6bbf1188 upstream.
+
+Just as proc_pid_attr_write() already does before calling the LSM
+hook. This only matters for SELinux and AppArmor which check
+whether the process is being ptraced and if so, whether to
+allow the transition.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ security/lsm_syscalls.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/security/lsm_syscalls.c
++++ b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
+@@ -55,7 +55,14 @@ u64 lsm_name_to_attr(const char *name)
+ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(lsm_set_self_attr, unsigned int, attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *,
+ ctx, u32, size, u32, flags)
+ {
+- return security_setselfattr(attr, ctx, size, flags);
++ int rc;
++
++ rc = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
++ if (rc < 0)
++ return rc;
++ rc = security_setselfattr(attr, ctx, size, flags);
++ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
++ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /**
--- /dev/null
+From c0bf0a4f3f1f5f57aa83e1400ba4f56f0abfd542 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sam Daly <sam@samdaly.ie>
+Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 18:42:53 +0200
+Subject: octeontx2-af: CGX: add bounds check to cgx_speed_mbps index
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Sam Daly <sam@samdaly.ie>
+
+commit c0bf0a4f3f1f5f57aa83e1400ba4f56f0abfd542 upstream.
+
+cgx_speed_mbps has 13 elements but RESP_LINKSTAT_SPEED can yield values
+0-15. If it returns a value >= 13, this causes an out-of-bounds array
+access. Add a bounds check and default to speed 0 if the index is out of
+range.
+
+Fixes: 61071a871ea6 ("octeontx2-af: Forward CGX link notifications to PFs")
+Cc: Sunil Goutham <sgoutham@marvell.com>
+Cc: Linu Cherian <lcherian@marvell.com>
+Cc: Geetha sowjanya <gakula@marvell.com>
+Cc: hariprasad <hkelam@marvell.com>
+Cc: Subbaraya Sundeep <sbhatta@marvell.com>
+Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew+netdev@lunn.ch>
+Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sam Daly <sam@samdaly.ie>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026051352-refined-demise-e88d@gregkh
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/cgx.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/cgx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/cgx.c
+@@ -1286,13 +1286,18 @@ static inline void link_status_user_form
+ struct cgx_link_user_info *linfo,
+ struct cgx *cgx, u8 lmac_id)
+ {
++ unsigned int speed;
++
+ linfo->link_up = FIELD_GET(RESP_LINKSTAT_UP, lstat);
+ linfo->full_duplex = FIELD_GET(RESP_LINKSTAT_FDUPLEX, lstat);
+- linfo->speed = cgx_speed_mbps[FIELD_GET(RESP_LINKSTAT_SPEED, lstat)];
+ linfo->an = FIELD_GET(RESP_LINKSTAT_AN, lstat);
+ linfo->fec = FIELD_GET(RESP_LINKSTAT_FEC, lstat);
+ linfo->lmac_type_id = FIELD_GET(RESP_LINKSTAT_LMAC_TYPE, lstat);
+
++ speed = FIELD_GET(RESP_LINKSTAT_SPEED, lstat);
++ linfo->speed = speed < ARRAY_SIZE(cgx_speed_mbps) ?
++ cgx_speed_mbps[speed] : 0;
++
+ if (linfo->lmac_type_id >= LMAC_MODE_MAX) {
+ dev_err(&cgx->pdev->dev, "Unknown lmac_type_id %d reported by firmware on cgx port%d:%d",
+ linfo->lmac_type_id, cgx->cgx_id, lmac_id);
--- /dev/null
+From 2bccfb8476ca5f3548afbd623dc7a6980d4e77de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
+Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 15:03:23 +0800
+Subject: qed: fix double free in qed_cxt_tables_alloc()
+
+From: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
+
+commit 2bccfb8476ca5f3548afbd623dc7a6980d4e77de upstream.
+
+If one of the later PF or VF CID bitmap allocations fails,
+qed_cid_map_alloc() jumps to cid_map_fail and frees the previously
+allocated CID bitmaps before returning an error. qed_cxt_tables_alloc()
+then calls qed_cxt_mngr_free(), which invokes qed_cid_map_free()
+again.
+
+Fix this by setting each CID bitmap pointer to NULL after bitmap_free()
+to avoid double free.
+
+The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
+developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
+v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
+available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still
+present in v7.1-rc3.
+
+Runtime reproduction was not attempted because exercising the failing
+allocation path requires device-specific setup.
+
+Fixes: fe56b9e6a8d9 ("qed: Add module with basic common support")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260520070323.2762379-1-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_cxt.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_cxt.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_cxt.c
+@@ -1038,11 +1038,13 @@ static void qed_cid_map_free(struct qed_
+
+ for (type = 0; type < MAX_CONN_TYPES; type++) {
+ bitmap_free(p_mngr->acquired[type].cid_map);
++ p_mngr->acquired[type].cid_map = NULL;
+ p_mngr->acquired[type].max_count = 0;
+ p_mngr->acquired[type].start_cid = 0;
+
+ for (vf = 0; vf < MAX_NUM_VFS; vf++) {
+ bitmap_free(p_mngr->acquired_vf[type][vf].cid_map);
++ p_mngr->acquired_vf[type][vf].cid_map = NULL;
+ p_mngr->acquired_vf[type][vf].max_count = 0;
+ p_mngr->acquired_vf[type][vf].start_cid = 0;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 9fc75b71fdd38465c76c6f6a884cdd4ae3c72d90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 19 May 2026 23:07:26 +0200
+Subject: rbd: eliminate a race in lock_dwork draining on unmap
+
+From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+
+commit 9fc75b71fdd38465c76c6f6a884cdd4ae3c72d90 upstream.
+
+Given how rbd_lock_add_request() and rbd_img_exclusive_lock() are
+written, lock_dwork may be (re)queued more than it's actually needed:
+for example in case a new I/O request comes in while we are in the
+middle of rbd_acquire_lock() on behalf of another I/O request. This is
+expected and with rbd_release_lock() preemptively canceling lock_dwork
+is benign under normal operation.
+
+A more problematic example is maybe_kick_acquire():
+
+ if (have_requests || delayed_work_pending(&rbd_dev->lock_dwork)) {
+ dout("%s rbd_dev %p kicking lock_dwork\n", __func__, rbd_dev);
+ mod_delayed_work(rbd_dev->task_wq, &rbd_dev->lock_dwork, 0);
+ }
+
+It's not unrealistic for lock_dwork to get canceled right after
+delayed_work_pending() returns true and for mod_delayed_work() to
+requeue it right there anyway. This is a classic TOCTOU race.
+
+When it comes to unmapping the image, there is an implicit assumption
+of no self-initiated exclusive lock activity past the point of return
+from rbd_dev_image_unlock() which unlocks the lock if it happens to be
+held. This unlock is assumed to be final and lock_dwork (as well as
+all other exclusive lock tasks, really) isn't expected to get queued
+again. However, lock_dwork is canceled only in cancel_tasks_sync()
+(i.e. later in the unmap sequence) and on top of that the cancellation
+can get in effect nullified by maybe_kick_acquire(). This may result
+in rbd_acquire_lock() executing after rbd_dev_device_release() and
+rbd_dev_image_release() run and free and/or reset a bunch of things.
+One of the possible failure modes then is a violated
+
+ rbd_assert(rbd_image_format_valid(rbd_dev->image_format));
+
+in rbd_dev_header_info() which is called via rbd_dev_refresh() from
+rbd_post_acquire_action().
+
+Redo exclusive lock task draining to provide saner semantics and try
+to meet the assumptions around rbd_dev_image_unlock().
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/block/rbd.c | 20 ++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/block/rbd.c
++++ b/drivers/block/rbd.c
+@@ -4565,24 +4565,12 @@ out:
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+-static void cancel_tasks_sync(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev)
+-{
+- dout("%s rbd_dev %p\n", __func__, rbd_dev);
+-
+- cancel_work_sync(&rbd_dev->acquired_lock_work);
+- cancel_work_sync(&rbd_dev->released_lock_work);
+- cancel_delayed_work_sync(&rbd_dev->lock_dwork);
+- cancel_work_sync(&rbd_dev->unlock_work);
+-}
+-
+ /*
+ * header_rwsem must not be held to avoid a deadlock with
+ * rbd_dev_refresh() when flushing notifies.
+ */
+ static void rbd_unregister_watch(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev)
+ {
+- cancel_tasks_sync(rbd_dev);
+-
+ mutex_lock(&rbd_dev->watch_mutex);
+ if (rbd_dev->watch_state == RBD_WATCH_STATE_REGISTERED)
+ __rbd_unregister_watch(rbd_dev);
+@@ -6549,10 +6537,18 @@ out_err:
+
+ static void rbd_dev_image_unlock(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev)
+ {
++ dout("%s rbd_dev %p\n", __func__, rbd_dev);
++
++ disable_delayed_work_sync(&rbd_dev->lock_dwork);
++ disable_work_sync(&rbd_dev->unlock_work);
++
+ down_write(&rbd_dev->lock_rwsem);
+ if (__rbd_is_lock_owner(rbd_dev))
+ __rbd_release_lock(rbd_dev);
+ up_write(&rbd_dev->lock_rwsem);
++
++ flush_work(&rbd_dev->acquired_lock_work);
++ flush_work(&rbd_dev->released_lock_work);
+ }
+
+ /*
--- /dev/null
+From a254b6d13b0edd6272926674d2afc46d46e496b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 22:08:01 -0400
+Subject: ring-buffer: Fix reporting of missed events in iterator
+
+From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+
+commit a254b6d13b0edd6272926674d2afc46d46e496b7 upstream.
+
+When tracing is active while reading the trace file, if the iterator
+reading the buffer detects that the writer has passed the iterator head,
+it will reset and set a "missed events" flag. This flag is passed to the
+output processing to show the user that events were missed:
+
+ CPU:4 [LOST EVENTS]
+
+The problem is that the flag is reset after it is checked in
+ring_buffer_iter_dropped(). But the "trace" file iterates over all the CPU
+ring buffers and it will check if they are dropped when figuring out which
+buffer to print next. This prematurely clears the missed_events flag if
+the CPU buffer with the missed events is not the one that is printed next.
+
+On the iteration where the CPU buffer with the missed events is printed,
+the check if it had missed events would return false and the output does
+not show that events were missed.
+
+Do not reset the missed_events flag when checking if there were missed
+events, but instead clear it when moving the iterator head to the next
+event.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260520220801.4fd09d13@fedora
+Fixes: c9b7a4a72ff64 ("ring-buffer/tracing: Have iterator acknowledge dropped events")
+Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 8 +++-----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
++++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+@@ -5120,6 +5120,7 @@ static void rb_iter_reset(struct ring_bu
+ iter->head_page = cpu_buffer->reader_page;
+ iter->head = cpu_buffer->reader_page->read;
+ iter->next_event = iter->head;
++ iter->missed_events = 0;
+
+ iter->cache_reader_page = iter->head_page;
+ iter->cache_read = cpu_buffer->read;
+@@ -5735,10 +5736,7 @@ ring_buffer_peek(struct trace_buffer *bu
+ */
+ bool ring_buffer_iter_dropped(struct ring_buffer_iter *iter)
+ {
+- bool ret = iter->missed_events != 0;
+-
+- iter->missed_events = 0;
+- return ret;
++ return iter->missed_events != 0;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_iter_dropped);
+
+@@ -5900,7 +5898,7 @@ void ring_buffer_iter_advance(struct rin
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
+-
++ iter->missed_events = 0;
+ rb_advance_iter(iter);
+
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
sched_ext-avoid-uaf-in-scx_root_enable_workfn-init-failure-path.patch
cgroup-cpuset-reset-dl-migration-state-on-can_attach-failure.patch
fs-ntfs3-handle-attr_set_size-errors-when-truncating-files.patch
+l2tp-use-list_del_rcu-in-l2tp_session_unhash.patch
+qed-fix-double-free-in-qed_cxt_tables_alloc.patch
+ring-buffer-fix-reporting-of-missed-events-in-iterator.patch
+ipv6-ioam-add-null-check-for-idev-in-ipv6_hop_ioam.patch
+vsock-vmci-fix-uaf-when-peer-resets-connection-during-handshake.patch
+vsock-virtio-reset-connection-on-receiving-queue-overflow.patch
+wifi-ath11k-clear-shared-srng-pointer-state-on-restart.patch
+ipv4-raw-reject-ip_hdrincl-packets-with-ihl-5.patch
+ixgbevf-fix-use-after-free-in-vepa-multicast-source-pruning.patch
+rbd-eliminate-a-race-in-lock_dwork-draining-on-unmap.patch
+lsm-hold-cred_guard_mutex-for-lsm_set_self_attr.patch
+octeontx2-af-cgx-add-bounds-check-to-cgx_speed_mbps-index.patch
+ice-fix-setting-promisc-mode-while-adding-vid-filter.patch
+ice-restore-ptp-rx-timestamp-config-after-ethtool-set-channels.patch
+wifi-cfg80211-advance-loop-vars-in-cfg80211_merge_profile.patch
+af_unix-fix-uaf-read-of-tail-len-in-unix_stream_data_wait.patch
+wifi-mac80211-consume-only-present-negotiated-ttlm-maps.patch
--- /dev/null
+From a4f0b001782b21663d10df983b4b208195bec66c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 11:06:55 +0200
+Subject: vsock/virtio: reset connection on receiving queue overflow
+
+From: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
+
+commit a4f0b001782b21663d10df983b4b208195bec66c upstream.
+
+When there is no more space to queue an incoming packet, the packet is
+silently dropped. This causes data loss without any notification to
+either peer, since there is no retransmission.
+
+Under normal circumstances, this should never happen. However, it could
+happen if the other peer doesn't respect the credit, or if the skb
+overhead, which we recently began to take into account with commit
+059b7dbd20a6 ("vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue"),
+is too high.
+
+Fix this by resetting the connection and setting the local socket error
+to ENOBUFS when virtio_transport_recv_enqueue() can no longer queue a
+packet, so both peers are explicitly notified of the failure rather than
+silently losing data.
+
+Fixes: ae6fcfbf5f03 ("vsock/virtio: discard packets if credit is not respected")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518090656.134588-2-sgarzare@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c
++++ b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c
+@@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ destroy:
+ return err;
+ }
+
+-static void
++static bool
+ virtio_transport_recv_enqueue(struct vsock_sock *vsk,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+@@ -1363,10 +1363,8 @@ virtio_transport_recv_enqueue(struct vso
+ spin_lock_bh(&vvs->rx_lock);
+
+ can_enqueue = virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt(vvs, len);
+- if (!can_enqueue) {
+- free_pkt = true;
++ if (!can_enqueue)
+ goto out;
+- }
+
+ if (le32_to_cpu(hdr->flags) & VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM)
+ vvs->msg_count++;
+@@ -1406,6 +1404,8 @@ out:
+ spin_unlock_bh(&vvs->rx_lock);
+ if (free_pkt)
+ kfree_skb(skb);
++
++ return can_enqueue;
+ }
+
+ static int
+@@ -1418,7 +1418,17 @@ virtio_transport_recv_connected(struct s
+
+ switch (le16_to_cpu(hdr->op)) {
+ case VIRTIO_VSOCK_OP_RW:
+- virtio_transport_recv_enqueue(vsk, skb);
++ if (!virtio_transport_recv_enqueue(vsk, skb)) {
++ /* There is no more space to queue the packet, so let's
++ * close the connection; otherwise, we'll lose data.
++ */
++ (void)virtio_transport_reset(vsk, skb);
++ virtio_transport_do_close(vsk, true);
++ sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS;
++ sk_error_report(sk);
++ vsock_remove_sock(vsk);
++ break;
++ }
+ vsock_data_ready(sk);
+ return err;
+ case VIRTIO_VSOCK_OP_CREDIT_REQUEST:
--- /dev/null
+From 99e22ddf4edb63dc8382bc028af928056d3450cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Minh Nguyen <minhnguyen.080505@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 19 May 2026 17:23:10 +0700
+Subject: vsock/vmci: fix UAF when peer resets connection during handshake
+
+From: Minh Nguyen <minhnguyen.080505@gmail.com>
+
+commit 99e22ddf4edb63dc8382bc028af928056d3450cf upstream.
+
+vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server() returned err = 0 for a peer
+RST in its default switch arm:
+
+ err = pkt->type == VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_RST ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+
+That made vmci_transport_recv_listen() skip vsock_remove_pending(),
+leaving the pending socket on the listener's pending_links with
+sk_state = TCP_CLOSE while destroy: still dropped the explicit
+reference taken before schedule_delayed_work().
+
+One second later vsock_pending_work() observed is_pending=true and
+performed full cleanup: vsock_remove_pending() then the two trailing
+sock_put(sk) calls -- the first reached refcount 0 and __sk_freed
+the socket, and the second wrote into the freed object:
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in refcount_warn_saturate
+ Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800b1cac80 by task kworker
+ Workqueue: events vsock_pending_work
+
+Treat peer RST like any other unexpected packet type (err = -EINVAL).
+All destroy: arms now return err < 0, so vmci_transport_recv_listen()
+removes pending from pending_links synchronously and
+vsock_pending_work() takes the is_pending=false / !rejected branch,
+dropping only its own work reference. This also closes the
+multi-packet race Sashiko reported on v2: pending is removed from
+the list before any subsequent packet can find it.
+
+The pre-existing sk_acceptq_removed() gap on the err < 0 path of
+vmci_transport_recv_listen() that Sashiko also noted is not
+introduced or changed by this patch.
+
+Tested on lts-6.12.79 with KASAN: 52/100 unpatched -> 0/100 patched.
+
+Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Minh Nguyen <minhnguyen.080505@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Bryan Tan <bryan-bt.tan@broadcom.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260519102310.237181-1-minhnguyen.080505@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
++++ b/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
+@@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server(st
+ /* Close and cleanup the connection. */
+ vmci_transport_send_reset(pending, pkt);
+ skerr = EPROTO;
+- err = pkt->type == VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_RST ? 0 : -EINVAL;
++ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto destroy;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From f51e4b3b5574ad8cb5b16b11f8a1452147ece87a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kyle Farnung <kfarnung@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 21:52:12 -0700
+Subject: wifi: ath11k: clear shared SRNG pointer state on restart
+
+From: Kyle Farnung <kfarnung@gmail.com>
+
+commit f51e4b3b5574ad8cb5b16b11f8a1452147ece87a upstream.
+
+LMAC rings reuse the shared rdp/wrp pointer buffers without going
+through the normal SRNG hw-init path that zeros non-LMAC ring
+pointers. After restart, ath11k_hal_srng_clear() can therefore hand
+stale hp/tp state from the previous firmware instance back to the new
+one.
+
+Clear the shared pointer buffers while keeping the allocations in
+place so restart still avoids reallocating SRNG DMA memory, but starts
+with fresh ring-pointer state.
+
+Fixes: 32be3ca4cf78b ("wifi: ath11k: HAL SRNG: don't deinitialize and re-initialize again")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAOPSVF04q6uvVdq8GTRLHBrVMdpt9=o9wVcFMc6f-yhmSBcZqQ@mail.gmail.com/
+Signed-off-by: Kyle Farnung <kfarnung@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Rameshkumar Sundaram <rameshkumar.sundaram@oss.qualcomm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Baochen Qiang <baochen.qiang@oss.qualcomm.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260513-kfarnung-ath11k-srng-clear-pointer-state-v1-1-bc700dd8b333@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson <jeff.johnson@oss.qualcomm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/hal.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/hal.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/hal.c
+@@ -1385,14 +1385,22 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ath11k_hal_srng_deinit);
+
+ void ath11k_hal_srng_clear(struct ath11k_base *ab)
+ {
+- /* No need to memset rdp and wrp memory since each individual
+- * segment would get cleared in ath11k_hal_srng_src_hw_init()
+- * and ath11k_hal_srng_dst_hw_init().
++ /*
++ * Preserve the shared pointer buffers, but clear the previous
++ * firmware instance's hp/tp state before handing them back to FW.
++ * LMAC rings reuse this shared memory without going through the
++ * normal SRNG hw-init path that zeros non-LMAC ring pointers.
+ */
+ memset(ab->hal.srng_list, 0,
+ sizeof(ab->hal.srng_list));
+ memset(ab->hal.shadow_reg_addr, 0,
+ sizeof(ab->hal.shadow_reg_addr));
++ if (ab->hal.rdp.vaddr)
++ memset(ab->hal.rdp.vaddr, 0,
++ sizeof(*ab->hal.rdp.vaddr) * HAL_SRNG_RING_ID_MAX);
++ if (ab->hal.wrp.vaddr)
++ memset(ab->hal.wrp.vaddr, 0,
++ sizeof(*ab->hal.wrp.vaddr) * HAL_SRNG_NUM_LMAC_RINGS);
+ ab->hal.avail_blk_resource = 0;
+ ab->hal.current_blk_index = 0;
+ ab->hal.num_shadow_reg_configured = 0;
--- /dev/null
+From 7666dbb1bacc4ba522b96740cba7283d243d16e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Walker <johnwalker0@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 17:07:20 -0600
+Subject: wifi: cfg80211: advance loop vars in cfg80211_merge_profile()
+
+From: John Walker <johnwalker0@gmail.com>
+
+commit 7666dbb1bacc4ba522b96740cba7283d243d16e1 upstream.
+
+cfg80211_merge_profile() reassembles a Multi-BSSID non-transmitted BSS
+profile that has been split across multiple consecutive MBSSID elements.
+Its while-loop calls
+
+ cfg80211_get_profile_continuation(ie, ielen, mbssid_elem, sub_elem)
+
+but never advances mbssid_elem or sub_elem inside the body. Each
+iteration therefore searches for a continuation that follows the same
+fixed pair; the helper returns the same next_mbssid; and the same
+next_sub bytes are memcpy()'d into merged_ie at a growing offset until
+the buffer fills.
+
+Advance both mbssid_elem and sub_elem to the just-consumed continuation
+so the next call to cfg80211_get_profile_continuation() searches for a
+further continuation beyond it (or returns NULL when none exists).
+
+A specially-crafted malicious beacon can take advantage of this bug
+to cause the kernel to spend an excessive amount of time in
+cfg80211_merge_profile (up to as much as 2ms per beacon received),
+which could theoretically be abused in some way.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: fe806e4992c9 ("cfg80211: support profile split between elements")
+Signed-off-by: John Walker <johnwalker0@gmail.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260507230720.64783-1-johnwalker0@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/wireless/scan.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/wireless/scan.c
++++ b/net/wireless/scan.c
+@@ -2421,6 +2421,9 @@ size_t cfg80211_merge_profile(const u8 *
+ memcpy(merged_ie + copied_len, next_sub->data,
+ next_sub->datalen);
+ copied_len += next_sub->datalen;
++
++ mbssid_elem = next_mbssid;
++ sub_elem = next_sub;
+ }
+
+ return copied_len;
--- /dev/null
+From a6e6ccd5bd07155c2add6c74ce1a5e68ad3b95ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 11:17:18 -0400
+Subject: wifi: mac80211: consume only present negotiated TTLM maps
+
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+
+commit a6e6ccd5bd07155c2add6c74ce1a5e68ad3b95ea upstream.
+
+ieee80211_tid_to_link_map_size_ok() validates negotiated TTLM elements
+against the number of link-map entries indicated by link_map_presence.
+ieee80211_parse_neg_ttlm() must consume the same layout.
+
+The parser advanced its cursor for every TID, including TIDs whose
+presence bit is clear and therefore have no map bytes in the element.
+A sparse map can then make a later present TID read past the validated
+element.
+
+The bad bytes land in neg_ttlm->{up,down}link[tid] but are gated by
+valid_links before being applied to driver state, so a peer cannot
+turn the read into a policy change. Under KUnit + KASAN with an
+exact-sized element allocation the OOB read is reported as a
+slab-out-of-bounds; whether the same trigger fires under the
+production RX path depends on surrounding allocator state.
+
+Advance the cursor only when the current TID has a map present.
+
+Fixes: 8f500fbc6c65 ("wifi: mac80211: process and save negotiated TID to Link mapping request")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
+Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515151719.1317659-2-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/mac80211/mlme.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
+@@ -7290,6 +7290,7 @@ ieee80211_parse_neg_ttlm(struct ieee8021
+ "No active links for TID %d", tid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
++ pos += map_size;
+ } else {
+ map = 0;
+ }
+@@ -7308,7 +7309,6 @@ ieee80211_parse_neg_ttlm(struct ieee8021
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+- pos += map_size;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
