Index: openssl/Configure
-diff -u openssl/Configure:1.1.3.1 openssl/Configure:1.6
+diff -u openssl/Configure:1.1.3.1 openssl/Configure:1.7
--- openssl/Configure:1.1.3.1 Mon Feb 16 08:44:22 2009
-+++ openssl/Configure Fri Sep 4 10:43:21 2009
++++ openssl/Configure Mon Oct 5 13:16:50 2009
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
# see INSTALL for instructions.
-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [enable-montasm] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-+my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [enable-montasm] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
++my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [enable-montasm] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
# Options:
#
-@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
+@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@
# --prefix prefix for the OpenSSL include, lib and bin directories
# (Default: the OPENSSLDIR directory)
#
+# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name.
-+# (Default: none)
++# (No default)
++#
++# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only
++# (No default)
+#
# --install_prefix Additional prefix for package builders (empty by
# default). This needn't be set in advance, you can
# just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install".
-@@ -329,7 +332,7 @@
+@@ -329,7 +335,7 @@
"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL::linux_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
#### IA-32 targets...
"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_out_asm}",
####
"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-@@ -580,6 +583,9 @@
+@@ -337,7 +343,7 @@
+ "linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+ "linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+ "linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+-"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK BF_PTR2 DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
++"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK BF_PTR2 DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+ #### SPARC Linux setups
+ # Ray Miller <ray.miller@computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently
+ # assisted with debugging of following two configs.
+@@ -580,6 +586,10 @@
my $idx_ranlib = $idx++;
my $idx_arflags = $idx++;
+# PKCS#11 engine patch
+my $pk11_libname="";
++my $pk11_flavor="";
+
my $prefix="";
my $openssldir="";
my $exe_ext="";
-@@ -812,6 +818,10 @@
+@@ -812,6 +822,14 @@
{
$flags.=$_." ";
}
+ {
+ $pk11_libname=$1;
+ }
++ elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/)
++ {
++ $pk11_flavor=$1;
++ }
elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
{
$prefix=$1;
-@@ -943,6 +953,13 @@
+@@ -943,6 +961,22 @@
exit 0;
}
+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
+ exit 1;
+ }
++
++if (! $pk11_flavor
++ || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only"))
++ {
++ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n";
++ print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n";
++ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
++ exit 1;
++ }
+
if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
$target = "Cygwin".$1;
}
-@@ -1103,6 +1120,8 @@
+@@ -1057,6 +1091,25 @@
+ print "\n";
+ }
+
++if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator")
++ {
++ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
++ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
++ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
++ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so";
++ print " no-hw-pkcs11so [pk11-flavor]";
++ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
++ }
++else
++ {
++ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
++ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
++ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
++ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca";
++ print " no-hw-pkcs11ca [pk11-flavor]";
++ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
++}
++
+ my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds;
+
+ $IsMK1MF=1 if ($target eq "mingw" && $^O ne "cygwin" && !is_msys());
+@@ -1103,6 +1156,8 @@
if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; }
else { $no_user_cflags=1; }
# Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through
# the script "config" or manually.
if (!$no_krb5)
-@@ -1456,6 +1475,7 @@
+@@ -1456,6 +1511,7 @@
s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/;
s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
Index: openssl/README.pkcs11
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.5
---- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 11:08:12 2009
-+++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Fri Sep 4 10:43:21 2009
-@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.6
+--- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 13:17:23 2009
++++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Mon Oct 5 13:16:50 2009
+@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
++ISC modified
++============
++
++The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and
++sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the
++PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second
++is a stripped down version which provides only the useful
++function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device
++protected key store and key loading).
++
++As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor,
++external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example
++of the first, AEP Keyper of the second.
++
++Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in
++config/Configure.
++
+PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8j
+=========================================
+
/* These default values were supplied by
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.1.3.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.4
+diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.1.3.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.5
--- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.1.3.1 Wed Sep 17 17:10:59 2008
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Fri Sep 4 10:43:22 2009
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Mon Oct 5 13:16:50 2009
@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@
eng_table.c eng_pkey.c eng_fat.c eng_all.c \
tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \
tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c \
- eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c
+ eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c \
-+ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c
++ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c
LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \
eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \
tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \
tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o \
- eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o
+ eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o \
-+ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o
++ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o
SRC= $(LIBSRC)
-@@ -286,6 +288,54 @@
+@@ -286,6 +288,102 @@
eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h
eng_table.o: eng_table.c
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so_pub.c
tb_cipher.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
tb_cipher.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
tb_cipher.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4
---- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 11:08:14 2009
+--- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 13:17:24 2009
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTOKI_H */
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.1.3.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.2
+diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.1.3.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.3
--- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.1.3.1 Wed Jun 4 18:01:39 2008
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Wed Oct 15 15:39:48 2008
-@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Mon Oct 5 13:16:50 2009
+@@ -110,6 +110,14 @@
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)
ENGINE_load_capi();
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11
-+ ENGINE_load_pk11();
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
++ ENGINE_load_pk11ca();
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
++ ENGINE_load_pk11so();
++#endif
+#endif
#endif
}
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
+diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c:1.1.3.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c:1.2
+--- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c:1.1.3.1 Sat Aug 6 10:34:35 2005
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c Mon Oct 5 13:16:50 2009
+@@ -408,7 +408,11 @@
+ !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_ADD",
+ load_dir, 0) ||
+ !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LOAD", NULL, 0))
++ {
++ if (iterator)
++ ENGINE_free(iterator);
+ goto notfound;
++ }
+ return iterator;
+ }
+ notfound:
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h
-diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.1.3.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.2
+diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.1.3.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.3
--- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.1.3.1 Wed Jun 4 18:01:40 2008
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Wed Oct 15 15:39:48 2008
-@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Mon Oct 5 13:16:50 2009
+@@ -337,6 +337,12 @@
void ENGINE_load_ubsec(void);
#endif
void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
-+void ENGINE_load_pk11(void);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
++void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void);
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
++void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void);
++#endif
void ENGINE_load_padlock(void);
void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11-kp.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11-kp.c:1.20
---- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 11:08:14 2009
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11-kp.c Tue Sep 1 06:02:18 2009
-@@ -0,0 +1,1611 @@
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.26
+--- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 13:17:24 2009
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Mon Oct 5 13:16:50 2009
+@@ -0,0 +1,3927 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ *
+ */
+
-+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#error RSA is disabled
-+#endif
-+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++#include <openssl/dsa.h>
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++#include <openssl/dh.h>
++#endif
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
++#include <openssl/aes.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+typedef int pid_t;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
+
+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
-+#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#define OPENSSL_NO_DH
++/* #undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++/*
++ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
++ * information.
++ */
++#if defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)
++#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+#endif
+
++/*
++ * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither
++ * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes,
++ * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then
++ * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's
++ * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's.
++ */
++#define SOLARIS_AES_CTR
++
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
+#include "cryptoki.h"
+#include "cryptoki.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#endif
++#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
+
++#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
++/*
++ * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine
++ * initialization.
++ */
++static int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef;
++static int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef;
++static int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef;
++#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
++
++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++/*
++ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
++ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
++ */
++static int *hw_cnids;
++static int *hw_dnids;
++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
+
+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
+
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++#endif
+
+/* Local helper functions */
+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh);
+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
+
++/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
++static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
++#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
++static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln);
++static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void);
++#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
++static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
++static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
++static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
++ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
++static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
++static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
++ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
++static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
++static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
++ const int **nids, int nid);
++static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
++ const int **nids, int nid);
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
++ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
++static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
++ int key_len);
++static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
++static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
++static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
++ size_t count);
++static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
++static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
++static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
++
+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
++static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
++ int *local_cipher_nids);
++static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
++ int *local_digest_nids);
++static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
++ int id);
++static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
++ int id);
+
+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
+
++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
++static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++/* Index for the supported ciphers */
++enum pk11_cipher_id {
++ PK11_DES_CBC,
++ PK11_DES3_CBC,
++ PK11_DES_ECB,
++ PK11_DES3_ECB,
++ PK11_RC4,
++ PK11_AES_128_CBC,
++ PK11_AES_192_CBC,
++ PK11_AES_256_CBC,
++ PK11_AES_128_ECB,
++ PK11_AES_192_ECB,
++ PK11_AES_256_ECB,
++ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
++#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
++ PK11_AES_128_CTR,
++ PK11_AES_192_CTR,
++ PK11_AES_256_CTR,
++#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
++ PK11_CIPHER_MAX
++};
++
++/* Index for the supported digests */
++enum pk11_digest_id {
++ PK11_MD5,
++ PK11_SHA1,
++ PK11_SHA224,
++ PK11_SHA256,
++ PK11_SHA384,
++ PK11_SHA512,
++ PK11_DIGEST_MAX
++};
++
+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sess_hdl, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type) \
+ { \
+ if (uselock) \
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
+ }
+
++static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
++static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
++static int cipher_count = 0;
++static int digest_count = 0;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
-+ */
-+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
-+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
-+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
++typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
+ {
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
-+ "SO_PATH",
-+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_PIN,
-+ "PIN",
-+ "Specifies the pin code",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SLOT,
-+ "SLOT",
-+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
-+ },
-+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
++ enum pk11_cipher_id id;
++ int nid;
++ int iv_len;
++ int min_key_len;
++ int max_key_len;
++ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
++ } PK11_CIPHER;
+
-+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
++static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
+ {
-+ pk11_rand_seed,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_cleanup,
-+ pk11_rand_add,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_status
++ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8,
++ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, },
++ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24,
++ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, },
++ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8,
++ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, },
++ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
++ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, },
++ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256,
++ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, },
++ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16,
++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
++ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24,
++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
++ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32,
++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
++ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16,
++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
++ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
++ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32,
++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
++ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16,
++ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
++#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
++ /* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */
++ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 16, 16,
++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
++ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 24, 24,
++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
++ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 32, 32,
++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
++#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+ };
+
++typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
++ {
++ enum pk11_digest_id id;
++ int nid;
++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
++ } PK11_DIGEST;
+
-+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
-+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support";
-+
-+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
-+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
++static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
++ {
++ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, },
++ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, },
++ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, },
++ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, },
++ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, },
++ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, },
++ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, },
++ };
+
+/*
-+ * These is the static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
-+ * symbol names to bind to.
++ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
++ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
++ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
+ */
-+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
-+
-+static CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
-+char *pk11_pin = NULL;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
-+static int pk11_pid = 0;
-+
-+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
-+
-+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
++typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL);
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ session_cache[type].lock =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL);
-+ }
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
+
-+ return (1);
+
-+malloc_err:
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+#else
-+ return (1);
-+#endif
-+ }
++/*
++ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
++ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
++ *
++ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
++ */
+
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
++/* DES CBC EVP */
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
-+ }
++ NID_des_cbc,
++ 8, 8, 8,
++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++ NULL
++ };
+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
++/* 3DES CBC EVP */
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
++ {
++ NID_des_ede3_cbc,
++ 8, 24, 8,
++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++ NULL
++ };
+
+/*
-+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
++ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
++ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
+ */
-+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
+ {
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_have_random)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
-+ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++ NID_des_ecb,
++ 8, 8, 8,
++ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ NULL,
++ NULL,
++ NULL
++ };
+
-+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
-+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
+ {
-+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++ NID_des_ede3_ecb,
++ 8, 24, 8,
++ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ NULL,
++ NULL,
++ NULL
++ };
+
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+
-+#else
-+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
+ {
-+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
-+
-+ if (!ret)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(ret))
-+ {
-+ ENGINE_free(ret);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
++ NID_aes_128_cbc,
++ 16, 16, 16,
++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++ NULL
++ };
+
-+void
-+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
+ {
-+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
++ NID_aes_192_cbc,
++ 16, 24, 16,
++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++ NULL
++ };
+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
-+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
-+ */
-+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
-+ if (!pk11_dso)
-+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
-+ if (!e_pk11)
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
-+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
-+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
-+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
-+
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ ERR_clear_error();
-+ }
-+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
++ {
++ NID_aes_256_cbc,
++ 16, 32, 16,
++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++ NULL
++ };
+
+/*
-+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
-+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
++ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
++ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
+ */
-+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ }
++ NID_aes_128_ecb,
++ 16, 16, 0,
++ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ NULL,
++ NULL,
++ NULL
++ };
+
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+ }
++ NID_aes_192_ecb,
++ 16, 24, 0,
++ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ NULL,
++ NULL,
++ NULL
++ };
+
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
++ NID_aes_256_ecb,
++ 16, 32, 0,
++ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ NULL,
++ NULL,
++ NULL
++ };
+
-+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
-+ }
++#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
++/*
++ * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are
++ * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures
++ * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword.
++ */
++static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
++ {
++ NID_undef,
++ 16, 16, 16,
++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++ NULL
++ };
+
-+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
-+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
++static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
++ NID_undef,
++ 16, 24, 16,
++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++ NULL
++ };
+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
++static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
++ {
++ NID_undef,
++ 16, 32, 16,
++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++ NULL
++ };
++#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
++ {
++ NID_bf_cbc,
++ 8, 16, 8,
++ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++ NULL
++ };
+
-+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
-+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
++ NID_rc4,
++ 1, 16, 0,
++ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
++ pk11_cipher_init,
++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ NULL,
++ NULL,
++ NULL
++ };
+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
++static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
++ {
++ NID_md5,
++ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
++ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++ 0,
++ pk11_digest_init,
++ pk11_digest_update,
++ pk11_digest_final,
++ pk11_digest_copy,
++ pk11_digest_cleanup,
++ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++ MD5_CBLOCK,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ };
+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+#endif
-+ }
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
++ {
++ NID_sha1,
++ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
++ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++ 0,
++ pk11_digest_init,
++ pk11_digest_update,
++ pk11_digest_final,
++ pk11_digest_copy,
++ pk11_digest_cleanup,
++ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++ SHA_CBLOCK,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ };
+
-+/*
-+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
-+ * accessible to all threads.
-+ */
-+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
++ NID_sha224,
++ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
++ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++ 0,
++ pk11_digest_init,
++ pk11_digest_update,
++ pk11_digest_final,
++ pk11_digest_copy,
++ pk11_digest_cleanup,
++ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
++ SHA256_CBLOCK,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ };
+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
++ {
++ NID_sha256,
++ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
++ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++ 0,
++ pk11_digest_init,
++ pk11_digest_update,
++ pk11_digest_final,
++ pk11_digest_copy,
++ pk11_digest_cleanup,
++ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++ SHA256_CBLOCK,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ };
+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+#endif
-+ }
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
++ {
++ NID_sha384,
++ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
++ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++ 0,
++ pk11_digest_init,
++ pk11_digest_update,
++ pk11_digest_final,
++ pk11_digest_copy,
++ pk11_digest_cleanup,
++ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
++ SHA512_CBLOCK,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ };
+
-+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
-+{
-+ return (pk11_library_init(e));
-+}
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
++ {
++ NID_sha512,
++ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
++ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++ 0,
++ pk11_digest_init,
++ pk11_digest_update,
++ pk11_digest_final,
++ pk11_digest_copy,
++ pk11_digest_cleanup,
++ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++ SHA512_CBLOCK,
++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++ };
+
+/*
+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
-+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
-+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
-+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
++ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
++#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
++#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
++#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
++static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
+ {
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
-+ CK_INFO info;
-+ int any_slot_found;
-+ int i;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
-+#endif
-+
-+ /*
-+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called
-+ * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one
-+ * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more
-+ * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen
-+ * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a
-+ * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be
-+ * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes
-+ * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID
-+ * check so that we properly initialize the engine again.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_library_initialized)
+ {
-+ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ /*
-+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
-+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
-+ * engine first.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
++ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
++ "SO_PATH",
++ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
++ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
++ },
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
-+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
-+ if (!p)
++ PK11_CMD_PIN,
++ "PIN",
++ "Specifies the pin code",
++ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
++ },
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ PK11_CMD_SLOT,
++ "SLOT",
++ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
++ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
++ },
++ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
++ };
+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ rv = p(&pFuncList);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
++static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
++ {
++ pk11_rand_seed,
++ pk11_rand_bytes,
++ pk11_rand_cleanup,
++ pk11_rand_add,
++ pk11_rand_bytes,
++ pk11_rand_status
++ };
+
-+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
-+#endif
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
++#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
++#endif
++static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
++static const char *engine_pk11_name =
++ "PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)";
+
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
-+ goto err;
++CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
++static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
+
-+ /*
-+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
-+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
-+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
-+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
-+ * because no slot was present.
-+ */
-+ if (any_slot_found == 0)
-+ return (1);
++/*
++ * These is the static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
++ * symbol names to bind to.
++ */
++static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
+
-+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
-+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
++static CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
++static CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;
++static CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
++static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
++static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
++char *pk11_pin = NULL;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
++static int pk11_pid = 0;
+
-+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
-+ pk11_pid = getpid();
-+ /*
-+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
-+ * will do the cleanup.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
-+ goto err;
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
-+ /*
-+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
-+ * for asymmetric ciphers.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ active_list[i] = NULL;
++static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
+
++/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
++static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
++ {
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
-+ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
-+ }
-+#endif
++ int type;
+
-+ return (1);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
++ goto malloc_err;
++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
++ goto malloc_err;
++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
-+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
-+ * library.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
-+
-+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* free all active lists */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ pk11_free_active_list(i);
-+
-+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects.
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
++ goto malloc_err;
++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
-+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
++ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
++ session_cache[type].lock =
++ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
++ goto malloc_err;
++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL);
+ }
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ pFuncList = NULL;
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ pk11_pid = 0;
-+ /*
-+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
-+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
-+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
-+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
-+ * the engine before calling fork().
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
+
+ return (1);
+
-+err:
++malloc_err:
++ pk11_free_all_locks();
++ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
++#else
++ return (1);
++#endif
+ }
+
-+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
++static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
+ {
-+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ int type;
+
-+ switch (cmd)
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
+ {
-+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
++ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
++ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
++ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
++ {
++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
++ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
++ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
++ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
++ {
++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
++ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
++ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
++ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
-+ if (initialized)
++ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++ {
++ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
-+ return (0);
++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
++ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
++ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
+ }
-+
-+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
-+ case PK11_CMD_PIN:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
++#endif
++ }
+
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
++/*
++ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
++ */
++static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
++ {
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
++ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
+ return (0);
-+ }
+
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
++ return (0);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
++ {
++ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
-+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ default:
-+ break;
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
++ {
++ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
++ return (0);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
++ {
++ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
++ return (0);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++ if (pk11_have_random)
++ {
++ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
++ return (0);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ }
++ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
++ return (0);
+
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++/*
++ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
++ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
++ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
++ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
++ */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
++ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
++ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
++ if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE)
++ pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec;
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
++ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
++ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
-+ {
-+ return;
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
++/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
++#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
++#error "dynamic engine not supported"
++static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
++ return (0);
+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return;
++ if (!bind_pk11(e))
++ return (0);
+
-+ /*
-+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
-+ * the calling functions do not care anyway
-+ */
-+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+
-+ return;
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
-+ }
++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
++#else
++static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
++ if (!ret)
++ return (NULL);
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ if (!bind_pk11(ret))
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (0);
++ ENGINE_free(ret);
++ return (NULL);
+ }
+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (1);
++ return (ret);
+ }
+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
++void
++ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
+
-+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
-+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ switch (optype)
++ /*
++ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
++ * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
++ */
++ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
++ if (!pk11_dso)
++ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
++
++ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ break;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++ return;
+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
-+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
-+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
-+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
-+ */
-+PK11_SESSION *
-+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
-+#endif
-+ CK_RV rv;
+
-+ switch (optype)
++ e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
++ if (!e_pk11)
+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (NULL);
++ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
++ pk11_dso = NULL;
++ return;
+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp = freelist;
+
+ /*
-+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
-+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
-+ * structure from the freelist.
++ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
++ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
++ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
++ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
-+ }
-+ else
++ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
+ {
-+ freelist = sp->next;
++ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
++ pk11_dso = NULL;
++ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
++ return;
+ }
+
-+ if (sp->pid != 0 && sp->pid != getpid())
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
-+ * PK11_SESSION objects.
-+ */
-+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp1->next;
-+ /*
-+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
-+ * sessions and destroy all objects.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
-+ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
++ ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
+
-+ /* Initialize the process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
++ ERR_clear_error();
++ }
++#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
+
-+ /*
-+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
-+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
-+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
-+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
-+ goto err;
++/*
++ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
++ * the function symbol names to bind to.
++ */
++static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
++ {
++ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
++ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
+
-+ /* It is an inherited session and needs re-initialization. */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (sp->pid == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
++ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
++ }
+
-+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
-+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
++static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
++ {
++ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
++ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
+
-+err:
-+ if (sp != NULL)
-+ sp->next = NULL;
++ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
++ }
+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
++static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
++ {
++ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+
-+ return (sp);
++ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
+ }
+
-+
-+void
-+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
++static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
+ {
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
++ int i;
+
-+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
++ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+ return;
+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return;
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++ {
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock);
+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp->next = freelist;
-+ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+ }
+
-+
-+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
++/* release all engine specific mutexes */
++static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ int type;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ int i;
+
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
++ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++ return;
+
-+ /*
-+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
-+ * return 0 on exit.
-+ */
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ {
-+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
-+ ret = 0;
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++#endif
+ }
+
+/*
-+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
-+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
-+ * return an error on return.
++ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
++ * accessible to all threads.
+ */
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++static void pk11_fork_child(void)
+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
-+ pid_t mypid = getpid();
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ int ret = 1;
++ int i;
+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++ return;
+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
++ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ {
-+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+#endif
-+ return (ret);
+ }
+
++/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
++static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
++{
++ return (pk11_library_init(e));
++}
+
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++/*
++ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
++ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
++ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
++ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
++ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
++ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
++ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
++ CK_INFO info;
++ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
++ int any_slot_found;
++ int i;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
++#endif
+
-+ switch (optype)
++ /*
++ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called
++ * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one
++ * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more
++ * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen
++ * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a
++ * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be
++ * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes
++ * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID
++ * check so that we properly initialize the engine again.
++ */
++ if (pk11_library_initialized)
+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
++ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
++ {
++ return (1);
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ /*
++ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
++ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
++ * engine first.
++ */
++ pk11_free_all_locks();
++ }
+ }
+
-+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are probably a child process so force the
-+ * reinitialize of the session
-+ */
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
-+ return (0);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ }
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ sp->pid = getpid();
++#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
++ /*
++ * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all
++ * NIDs there.
++ */
++ if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0)
++ goto err;
++#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
-+ if (optype == OP_RSA)
++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
++ goto err;
++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
++ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
++ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
++ if (!p)
+ {
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
++ rv = p(&pFuncList);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
++ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
++ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
++ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
++ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
++ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
++#endif
++ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
++ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
++ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
++#endif
++ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
++ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
++ goto err;
+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ /*
++ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
++ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
++ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
++ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
++ * because no slot was present.
++ */
++ if (any_slot_found == 0)
++ return (1);
++
++ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DELETE(sp->session,
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
++ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
++ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
++ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
-+ return (ret);
++ /*
++ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
++ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
++ */
++ /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */
++ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
++ != CKR_OK) {
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
++ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ digest_count = 0;
+ }
+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
-+ }
-+
++ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
++ pk11_pid = getpid();
+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
++ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
++ * will do the cleanup.
+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
++ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
++ goto err;
++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
++ /*
++ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
++ * for asymmetric ciphers.
++ */
++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++ active_list[i] = NULL;
+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
++ {
++ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
++ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
++ goto err;
+ }
++ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+
-+ return (ret);
++ return (1);
++
++err:
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh)
++/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
++ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
++ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
++ if (pk11_pin) {
++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
++ }
++ pk11_pin = NULL;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
-+
+/*
-+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_RSA_X_509
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
-+ *
-+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
-+ * public key slot.
-+ *
-+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
-+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
-+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
-+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
-+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
++ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
++ * library.
+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
+ {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
-+
-+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 0;
++ int i;
+
-+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
++ if (pk11_pin) {
++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
++ }
++ pk11_pin = NULL;
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ return (0);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
++ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
++ goto err;
+
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ /* free all active lists */
++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++ pk11_free_active_list(i);
+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
++ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
++ /*
++ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
++ * may have side-effects.
++ */
++#if 0
++ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
++#endif
+
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
++ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
+ {
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ /* Check if slot has random support. */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
-+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ break;
-+ }
++ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
+ }
++ pk11_dso = NULL;
++ pFuncList = NULL;
++ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
++ pk11_pid = 0;
++ /*
++ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
++ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
++ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
++ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
++ * the engine before calling fork().
++ */
++ pk11_free_all_locks();
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
++ return (1);
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++err:
++ return (0);
++ }
+
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
-+ &mech_info);
++/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
++ {
++ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN)))
++ switch (cmd)
++ {
++ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
++ if (p == NULL)
+ {
-+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa)
++ if (initialized)
+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
-+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ best_slot_sofar);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
++ return (0);
+ }
-+ else
++
++ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
++ case PK11_CMD_PIN:
++ if (pk11_pin) {
++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
++ }
++ pk11_pin = NULL;
++
++ if (p == NULL)
+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
++ return (0);
+ }
-+#else
-+ } /* if */
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ } /* for */
+
-+ if (found_candidate_slot)
-+ {
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
++ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
++ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ return (0);
++ }
++ return (1);
++ case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
++ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif
++ return (1);
++ default:
++ break;
+ }
+
-+ /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ return (0);
++ }
+
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 1;
-+ return (1);
++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
++static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
++ {
++ return;
+ }
+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.25
---- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 11:08:14 2009
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Fri Sep 4 10:43:22 2009
-@@ -0,0 +1,3919 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
++ {
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
++ return;
+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#endif
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+#include <openssl/aes.h>
-+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <signal.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <dlfcn.h>
-+#endif
++ /*
++ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
++ * the calling functions do not care anyway
++ */
++ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
++ return;
++ }
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
++static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
++ {
++ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
++ }
+
-+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
-+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
-+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
-+#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+#if defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)
-+#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#endif
++static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
++ {
++ CK_RV rv;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
-+/*
-+ * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither
-+ * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes,
-+ * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then
-+ * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's
-+ * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's.
-+ */
-+#define SOLARIS_AES_CTR
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
++ return (0);
+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
++ return (0);
++ }
+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+/*
-+ * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine
-+ * initialization.
-+ */
-+int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef;
-+int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef;
-+int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
++ return (1);
++ }
+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
-+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
-+ */
-+int *hw_cnids;
-+int *hw_dnids;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
++static int pk11_rand_status(void)
++ {
++ return (1);
++ }
+
-+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
-+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
++/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
++static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++ {
++ switch (optype)
++ {
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++ case OP_RSA:
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++ }
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++ }
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++ }
++ break;
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++ case OP_DSA:
++ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
++ }
++ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
++ }
++ break;
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++ case OP_DH:
++ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
++ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
++ }
++ break;
++#endif
++ default:
++ break;
++ }
++ }
+
+/*
-+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
-+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
-+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
-+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
-+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
-+ * PK11_SESSION object.
-+ *
-+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
-+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
-+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
-+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
-+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
-+ *
-+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
-+ * They are also used for active list protection.
++ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
++ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
++ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
++ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
+ */
++PK11_SESSION *
++pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++ {
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
++ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
+#endif
++ CK_RV rv;
+
-+/*
-+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
-+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
-+ * list) for given algorithm type
-+ */
-+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
-+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
-+ * without losing the secret key objects.
-+ */
-+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ switch (optype)
++ {
++ case OP_RSA:
++ case OP_DSA:
++ case OP_DH:
++ case OP_RAND:
++ case OP_DIGEST:
++ case OP_CIPHER:
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++#endif
++ break;
++ default:
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++ return (NULL);
++ }
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++ sp = freelist;
+
-+/* ENGINE level stuff */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
++ /*
++ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
++ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
++ * structure from the freelist.
++ */
++ if (sp == NULL)
++ {
++ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
++ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ freelist = sp->next;
++ }
+
-+/* RAND stuff */
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
-+
-+/* These functions are also used in other files */
-+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+
-+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
-+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Local helper functions */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh);
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
-+
-+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
-+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln);
-+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
-+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+ const int **nids, int nid);
-+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+ const int **nids, int nid);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+ int key_len);
-+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
-+ size_t count);
-+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
-+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
-+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
++ if (sp->pid != 0 && sp->pid != getpid())
++ {
++ /*
++ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
++ * PK11_SESSION objects.
++ */
++ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
++ {
++ freelist = sp1->next;
++ /*
++ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
++ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
++ * sessions and destroy all objects.
++ */
++ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
++ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
++ }
+
-+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ int *local_cipher_nids);
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
-+ int *local_digest_nids);
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
-+ int id);
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
-+ int id);
++ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
++ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
+
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
++ /* Initialize the process */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
++ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
++ rv);
++ OPENSSL_free(sp);
++ sp = NULL;
++ goto err;
++ }
+
++ /*
++ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
++ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
++ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
++ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
++ * information.
++ */
+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
-+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
++ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
++ goto err;
+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
++ goto err;
+
-+/* Index for the supported ciphers */
-+enum pk11_cipher_id {
-+ PK11_DES_CBC,
-+ PK11_DES3_CBC,
-+ PK11_DES_ECB,
-+ PK11_DES3_ECB,
-+ PK11_RC4,
-+ PK11_AES_128_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_192_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_256_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_128_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_192_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_256_ECB,
-+ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ PK11_AES_128_CTR,
-+ PK11_AES_192_CTR,
-+ PK11_AES_256_CTR,
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+ PK11_CIPHER_MAX
-+};
++ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
++ rv);
++ OPENSSL_free(sp);
++ sp = NULL;
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+/* Index for the supported digests */
-+enum pk11_digest_id {
-+ PK11_MD5,
-+ PK11_SHA1,
-+ PK11_SHA224,
-+ PK11_SHA256,
-+ PK11_SHA384,
-+ PK11_SHA512,
-+ PK11_DIGEST_MAX
-+};
++ /* It is an inherited session and needs re-initialization. */
++ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
++ {
++ OPENSSL_free(sp);
++ sp = NULL;
++ }
++ }
++ if (sp->pid == 0)
++ {
++ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
++ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
++ {
++ OPENSSL_free(sp);
++ sp = NULL;
++ }
++ }
+
-+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sess_hdl, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type) \
-+ { \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \
-+ { \
-+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sess_hdl, obj_hdl); \
-+ } \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ }
++ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
++ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
+
-+#define TRY_OBJ_DELETE(sess_hdl, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type) \
-+ { \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ (void) pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type); \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
++err:
++ if (sp != NULL)
++ sp->next = NULL;
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++
++ return (sp);
+ }
+
-+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-+static int cipher_count = 0;
-+static int digest_count = 0;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
+
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
++void
++pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+ {
-+ enum pk11_cipher_id id;
-+ int nid;
-+ int iv_len;
-+ int min_key_len;
-+ int max_key_len;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
-+ } PK11_CIPHER;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
++#endif
++ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
+
-+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
-+ {
-+ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8,
-+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8,
-+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256,
-+ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ /* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */
-+ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+ };
++ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
++ return;
+
-+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
-+ {
-+ enum pk11_digest_id id;
-+ int nid;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
-+ } PK11_DIGEST;
++ switch (optype)
++ {
++ case OP_RSA:
++ case OP_DSA:
++ case OP_DH:
++ case OP_RAND:
++ case OP_DIGEST:
++ case OP_CIPHER:
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++#endif
++ break;
++ default:
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++ return;
++ }
+
-+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
-+ {
-+ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, },
-+ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, },
-+ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, },
-+ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, },
-+ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, },
-+ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, },
-+ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, },
-+ };
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++ sp->next = freelist;
++ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ }
+
-+/*
-+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
-+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
-+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
+
++/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
++static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
++ {
++ int ret = 1;
++ int type;
+
-+/*
-+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
-+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
-+ *
-+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
-+ */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
+
-+/* DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_cbc,
-+ 8, 8, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
++ /*
++ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
++ * return 0 on exit.
++ */
++ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++ {
++ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
++ ret = 0;
++ }
+
-+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ede3_cbc,
-+ 8, 24, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
++ return (ret);
++ }
+
+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
++ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
++ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
++ * return an error on return.
+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
++static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+ {
-+ NID_des_ecb,
-+ 8, 8, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
++ CK_RV rv;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
++ pid_t mypid = getpid();
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
++#endif
++ int ret = 1;
+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ede3_ecb,
-+ 8, 24, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
++ switch (optype)
++ {
++ case OP_RSA:
++ case OP_DSA:
++ case OP_DH:
++ case OP_RAND:
++ case OP_DIGEST:
++ case OP_CIPHER:
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++#endif
++ break;
++ default:
++ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++ return (0);
++ }
+
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
++ {
++ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
++ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
++ ret = 0;
++ }
++ }
++ freelist = sp->next;
++ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
++ OPENSSL_free(sp);
++ }
+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_cbc,
-+ 16, 16, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ return (ret);
++ }
+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_cbc,
-+ 16, 24, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
++static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_cbc,
-+ 16, 32, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
+
-+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
-+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_ecb,
-+ 16, 16, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
++ switch (optype)
++ {
++ case OP_RSA:
++ case OP_DSA:
++ case OP_DH:
++ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
++ break;
++ case OP_RAND:
++ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
++ break;
++ case OP_DIGEST:
++ case OP_CIPHER:
++ myslot = SLOTID;
++ break;
++ default:
++ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++ return (0);
++ }
+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_ecb,
-+ 16, 24, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
++ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
++ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
++ {
++ /*
++ * We are probably a child process so force the
++ * reinitialize of the session
++ */
++ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
++ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
++ return (0);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
++ }
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
++ return (0);
++ }
+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_ecb,
-+ 16, 32, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
++ sp->pid = getpid();
+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+/*
-+ * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are
-+ * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures
-+ * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword.
-+ */
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_undef,
-+ 16, 16, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
++ switch (optype)
++ {
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++ case OP_RSA:
++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++ break;
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++ case OP_DSA:
++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
++ break;
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++ case OP_DH:
++ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
++ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
++ break;
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++ case OP_CIPHER:
++ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
++ break;
++ default:
++ break;
++ }
+
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_undef,
-+ 16, 24, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
++ return (1);
++ }
+
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+ {
-+ NID_undef,
-+ 16, 32, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
++ int ret = 0;
+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_bf_cbc,
-+ 8, 16, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ {
++ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
++ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++ }
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++ }
++ }
+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
-+ {
-+ NID_rc4,
-+ 1, 16, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
++ return (ret);
++ }
+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
++/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+ {
-+ NID_md5,
-+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
-+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ MD5_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
++ int ret = 0;
+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha1,
-+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha224,
-+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
-+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha256,
-+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha384,
-+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
-+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ {
++ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0)
++ {
++ TRY_OBJ_DELETE(sp->session,
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
++ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session,
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
++ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
++ }
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++ }
++ }
+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha512,
-+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
++ return (ret);
++ }
+
+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
++ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
++ * objects in the free list.
+ */
-+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
-+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
-+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
-+ {
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
-+ "SO_PATH",
-+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_PIN,
-+ "PIN",
-+ "Specifies the pin code",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SLOT,
-+ "SLOT",
-+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
-+ },
-+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+ {
-+ pk11_rand_seed,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_cleanup,
-+ pk11_rand_add,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_status
-+ };
-+
-+
-+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
-+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support";
-+
-+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
-+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
++ int ret = 1;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
+
-+/*
-+ * These is the static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
-+ * symbol names to bind to.
-+ */
-+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
++ if (session != NULL)
++ local_free_session = session;
++ else
++ {
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
++ uselock = FALSE;
++ }
+
-+static CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
-+char *pk11_pin = NULL;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
-+static int pk11_pid = 0;
++ /*
++ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
++ */
++ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
++ {
++ local_free_session = sp->next;
+
-+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
++ /*
++ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
++ * destroy operations fails.
++ */
++ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
++ {
++ ret = 0;
++ continue;
++ }
++ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
++ {
++ ret = 0;
++ continue;
++ }
++ }
+
-+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
-+ {
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
++ if (session == NULL)
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
++#else
++ if (session == NULL)
++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++ return (ret);
++ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++ {
++ int ret = 0;
+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ session_cache[type].lock =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL);
++ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
++ ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
++ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
++ }
+ }
+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+#else
-+ return (1);
-+#endif
++ return (ret);
+ }
+
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
++/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int type;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
-+ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++ int ret = 0;
+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
++ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
++ ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
++ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+ }
+ }
-+#endif
++
++ return (ret);
+ }
+
+/*
-+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
++ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
++ * objects in the free list.
+ */
-+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
++int
++pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
-+ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
-+ return (0);
++ int ret = 1;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
+
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ if (pk11_have_random)
++ if (session != NULL)
++ local_free_session = session;
++ else
+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
-+ return (0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
++ uselock = FALSE;
+ }
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+/*
-+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
-+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
-+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
-+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
-+ */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-+ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
-+ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
-+ if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE)
-+ pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
-+ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++ /*
++ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
++ */
++ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
++ {
++ local_free_session = sp->next;
+
-+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
-+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
-+ {
-+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
-+ return (0);
++ /*
++ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
++ * destroy operations fails.
++ */
++ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
++ {
++ ret = 0;
++ continue;
++ }
++ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
++ {
++ ret = 0;
++ continue;
++ }
++ }
+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(e))
-+ return (0);
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ if (session == NULL)
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
++#else
++ if (session == NULL)
++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
+
-+ return (1);
++ return (ret);
+ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
-+
-+#else
-+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+ {
-+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
-+
-+ if (!ret)
-+ return (NULL);
++ int ret = 0;
+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(ret))
++ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ ENGINE_free(ret);
-+ return (NULL);
++ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->opdata_dh_key,
++ ret, uselock, OP_DH);
++ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
++ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
++ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
++ }
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
-+void
-+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
++/*
++ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
++ *
++ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
++ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
++ */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+ {
-+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
-+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
-+ */
-+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
-+ if (!pk11_dso)
-+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
++ int ret = 1;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
++ if (session != NULL)
++ local_free_session = session;
++ else
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ return;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
++ uselock = FALSE;
+ }
+
-+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
-+ if (!e_pk11)
++ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ return;
-+ }
++ local_free_session = sp->next;
+
-+ /*
-+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
-+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
-+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
-+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
-+ {
-+ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ return;
++ /*
++ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
++ * destroy operations fails.
++ */
++ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
++ {
++ ret = 0;
++ continue;
++ }
+ }
+
-+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
-+
-+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+ ERR_clear_error();
-+ }
-+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
-+
-+/*
-+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
-+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
-+ */
-+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ if (session == NULL)
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
++#else
++ if (session == NULL)
++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
+
-+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
++ return (ret);
+ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
++static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh)
+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
++ CK_RV rv;
++ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
++ rv);
++ return (0);
++ }
+
-+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+
-+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
-+ }
++/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
+
-+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
-+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
++static int
++cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+ int i;
+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock);
-+ }
-+#endif
++ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
++ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
++ return (ciphers[i].id);
++ return (-1);
+ }
+
-+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
-+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
++static int
++pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+#endif
++ if (cipher_count > 0)
++ *nids = cipher_nids;
++ else
++ *nids = NULL;
++ return (cipher_count);
+ }
+
-+/*
-+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
-+ * accessible to all threads.
-+ */
-+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
++static int
++pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+#endif
++ if (digest_count > 0)
++ *nids = digest_nids;
++ else
++ *nids = NULL;
++ return (digest_count);
+ }
+
-+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
-+{
-+ return (pk11_library_init(e));
-+}
-+
+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
-+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
-+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
-+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
++ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
++static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
++ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
+ {
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
-+ CK_INFO info;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+ int any_slot_found;
-+ int i;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
-+#endif
++ CK_RV rv;
++#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
++ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
++#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+ /*
-+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called
-+ * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one
-+ * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more
-+ * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen
-+ * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a
-+ * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be
-+ * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes
-+ * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID
-+ * check so that we properly initialize the engine again.
++ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
++ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
++ * pk11_init_symetric() is called.
+ */
-+ if (pk11_library_initialized)
++ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0);
++ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
++ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
++
++#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
++ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
++ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
++ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
+ {
-+ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ else
++ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
++ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
++ /*
++ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
++ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
++ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
++ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
++ * add code so that the counter length can be set via
++ * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
++ */
++ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
++ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++ }
++ else
++#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
++ {
++ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
+ {
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ /*
-+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
-+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
-+ * engine first.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
++ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
++ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
+ }
+ }
+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
++ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
++ if (ctx->encrypt)
++ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
++ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
++ else
++ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
++ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
++ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ /*
-+ * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all
-+ * NIDs there.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
++ return (1);
++ }
+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int
++pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
++ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
++ {
++ CK_MECHANISM mech;
++ int index;
++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
+
-+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
-+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
-+ if (!p)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ state->sp = NULL;
+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ rv = p(&pFuncList);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
++ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
++ return (0);
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
++ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
++ /*
++ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
++ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
++ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
++ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
++ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
++ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
++ * code serves as a sanity check.
++ *
++ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
++ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
++ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
++ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
++ */
++ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
++ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
++ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
++ return (0);
++ }
+
-+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
-+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
-+#endif
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
-+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
-+#endif
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
++ return (0);
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
++ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
++ mech.pParameter = NULL;
++ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
-+ goto err;
++ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
++ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
+
+ /*
-+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
-+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
-+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
-+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
-+ * because no slot was present.
++ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
++ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
++ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
+ */
-+ if (any_slot_found == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
++ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
+ {
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
-+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
++ state->sp = sp;
++ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
++ return (0);
+
-+ /*
-+ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
-+ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
-+ */
-+ /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */
-+ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
-+ != CKR_OK) {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
-+ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ digest_count = 0;
-+ }
++ return (1);
++ }
+
-+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
-+ pk11_pid = getpid();
-+ /*
-+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
-+ * will do the cleanup.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
-+ goto err;
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
+ /*
-+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
-+ * for asymmetric ciphers.
++ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
++ * needs to be created.
+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ active_list[i] = NULL;
++ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ {
++ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
++ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
++ }
+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
++ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
+ {
-+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
-+ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
++ /*
++ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
++ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
++ */
++ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
-+ goto err;
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
++ return (0);
+ }
-+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
+ }
-+#endif
+
-+ return (1);
++ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ {
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
++ return (0);
++ }
+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ /* now initialize the context with a new key */
++ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
++ return (0);
++
++ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
++ state->sp = sp;
+
-+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/*
-+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
-+ * library.
++ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
++ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
++ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
++ * that it needs not be recreated.
++ *
++ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
++ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
++ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
++ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
++ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
++static int
++pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
++ CK_RV rv;
+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
++ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
-+ goto err;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
-+
-+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* free all active lists */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ pk11_free_active_list(i);
-+
-+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects.
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
++ return (0);
+ }
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ pFuncList = NULL;
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ pk11_pid = 0;
-+ /*
-+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
-+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
-+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
-+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
-+ * the engine before calling fork().
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
+
+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
+ }
+
-+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
++/*
++ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
++ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
++ */
++static int
++pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
++ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
+ {
-+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++ CK_RV rv;
++ unsigned long outl = inl;
+
-+ switch (cmd)
-+ {
-+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
++ return (0);
+
-+ if (initialized)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
+
-+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
-+ case PK11_CMD_PIN:
-+ if (pk11_pin) {
-+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
-+ }
-+ pk11_pin = NULL;
++ if (!inl)
++ return (1);
+
-+ if (p == NULL)
++ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
++ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
++ return (0);
++
++ if (ctx->encrypt)
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
++ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
++ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
+ return (0);
+ }
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
++ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
+
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
++ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
+ return (0);
+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
-+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ return (1);
-+ default:
-+ break;
+ }
+
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
-+ {
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
+ /*
-+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
-+ * the calling functions do not care anyway
++ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
++ * the same size of input.
++ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
++ * correctly aligned buffers.
+ */
-+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
++ if (inl != outl)
++ return (0);
+
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
++/*
++ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
++ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
++ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
++ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
++ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
++ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
++ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
++ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
++ */
++static int
++pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
++ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
++ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (0);
++ /*
++ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
++ * rid of the context.
++ */
++ if (ctx->encrypt)
++ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
++ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
++ else
++ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
++ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
++ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
++ return (0);
++ }
++
++ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
++ state->sp = NULL;
+ }
+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+ return (1);
+ }
+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
++/*
++ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
++ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
++ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int
++pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
++ const int **nids, int nid)
+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++ if (!cipher)
++ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
+
-+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
-+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ switch (optype)
++ switch (nid)
+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
++ case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
++ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
+ break;
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
++ case NID_des_cbc:
++ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
+ break;
-+#endif
-+ default:
++ case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
++ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
-+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
-+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
-+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
-+ */
-+PK11_SESSION *
-+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
-+#endif
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
++ case NID_des_ecb:
++ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
++ break;
++ case NID_aes_128_cbc:
++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
++ break;
++ case NID_aes_192_cbc:
++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
++ break;
++ case NID_aes_256_cbc:
++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
++ break;
++ case NID_aes_128_ecb:
++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
++ break;
++ case NID_aes_192_ecb:
++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
++ break;
++ case NID_aes_256_ecb:
++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
++ break;
++ case NID_bf_cbc:
++ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
++ break;
++ case NID_rc4:
++ *cipher = &pk11_rc4;
+ break;
+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (NULL);
++#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
++ /*
++ * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs
++ * here are not constants.
++ */
++ if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr)
++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
++ else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr)
++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
++ else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
++ else
++#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
++ *cipher = NULL;
++ break;
+ }
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp = freelist;
++ return (*cipher != NULL);
++ }
+
-+ /*
-+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
-+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
-+ * structure from the freelist.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ }
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int
++pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
++ const int **nids, int nid)
++ {
++ if (!digest)
++ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
+
-+ if (sp->pid != 0 && sp->pid != getpid())
++ switch (nid)
+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
-+ * PK11_SESSION objects.
-+ */
-+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp1->next;
-+ /*
-+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
-+ * sessions and destroy all objects.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
-+ }
++ case NID_md5:
++ *digest = &pk11_md5;
++ break;
++ case NID_sha1:
++ *digest = &pk11_sha1;
++ break;
++ case NID_sha224:
++ *digest = &pk11_sha224;
++ break;
++ case NID_sha256:
++ *digest = &pk11_sha256;
++ break;
++ case NID_sha384:
++ *digest = &pk11_sha384;
++ break;
++ case NID_sha512:
++ *digest = &pk11_sha512;
++ break;
++ default:
++ *digest = NULL;
++ break;
++ }
++ return (*digest != NULL);
++ }
+
-+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
-+ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
+
-+ /* Initialize the process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
++ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
++ {
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
+
-+ /*
-+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
-+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
-+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
-+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
-+ goto err;
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
++ {
++ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
++ {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (false)},
++ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
++ };
+
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ /*
++ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
++ * can use the key handles. Here is why:
++ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
++ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
++ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
++ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
++ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
++ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
++ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
++ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
++ * terminate the active operation.
++ */
++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
++ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
++ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
++ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
++ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
+
-+ /* It is an inherited session and needs re-initialization. */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (sp->pid == 0)
++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ }
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
++ rv);
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
-+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
-+
++ /*
++ * Save the key information used in this session.
++ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
++ */
++ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ?
++ PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len;
++ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
+err:
-+ if (sp != NULL)
-+ sp->next = NULL;
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
+
-+ return (sp);
++ return (h_key);
+ }
+
++static int
++md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
++ {
++ int i;
+
-+void
-+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
++ if (digests[i].nid == nid)
++ return (digests[i].id);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++static int
++pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_MECHANISM mech;
++ int index;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++ PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+
-+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
-+ return;
++ state->sp = NULL;
+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp->next = freelist;
-+ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ }
++ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
++ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
++ return (0);
+
++ pdp = &digests[index];
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
++ return (0);
+
-+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ int type;
++ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
++ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
++ mech.pParameter = NULL;
++ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
+
-+ /*
-+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
-+ * return 0 on exit.
-+ */
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
-+ ret = 0;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ return (ret);
++ state->sp = sp;
++
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
-+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
-+ * return an error on return.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++static int
++pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
-+ pid_t mypid = getpid();
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+#endif
-+ int ret = 1;
++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+#endif
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
++ if (count == 0)
++ return (1);
+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
++ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
++ return (0);
++
++ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
++ count);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
++ state->sp = NULL;
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ return (ret);
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++static int
++pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
++ unsigned long len;
++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
++ len = ctx->digest->md_size;
+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ myslot = SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
++ return (0);
++
++ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
+
-+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are probably a child process so force the
-+ * reinitialize of the session
-+ */
-+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
-+ return (0);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ }
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
++ state->sp = NULL;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ sp->pid = getpid();
++ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
++ return (0);
+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
++ /*
++ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
++ * to the pool
++ */
++ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
++ state->sp = NULL;
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++static int
++pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
+ {
++ CK_RV rv;
+ int ret = 0;
++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
++ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
++ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
++ /* The copy-from state */
++ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
++ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
++ goto err;
+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
++ /* Initialize the copy-to state */
++ if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
++ goto err;
++ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
+
-+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
++ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
++ &ul_state_len);
+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DELETE(sp->session,
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session,
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
-+ }
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
++ rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (ul_state_len == 0)
++ {
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
++ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
++ if (pstate == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
++ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
++ &ul_state_len);
+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
++ rv);
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
++ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
++ ul_state_len, 0, 0);
+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
++ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
++ ret = 1;
++err:
++ if (pstate != NULL)
++ OPENSSL_free(pstate);
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
++static int
++pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
++ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ }
++ /*
++ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
++ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
++ * that might have been allocated in the token when
++ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
++ * will return the session to the cache.
++ */
++ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ return (ret);
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++/*
++ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
++ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
++ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
++ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
++ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
++ * prefix.
++ */
++static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
++ int key_len)
+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
++ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
++ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
++ return (0);
+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
++/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
++static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
++ int ret = 0;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
+
+ if (session != NULL)
+ local_free_session = session;
+ else
+ {
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
+#else
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
++ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
+ }
+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+ {
+ local_free_session = sp->next;
+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
++ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
++ /*
++ * The secret key object is created in the
++ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key
++ */
++ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
++ sp->opdata_cipher_key) == 0)
++ goto err;
++ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ }
+ }
++ ret = 1;
++err:
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+ if (session == NULL)
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
+#else
+ if (session == NULL)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->opdata_dh_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DH);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
+
+/*
-+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
++ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
+ *
-+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
-+ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
++ * CKM_RSA_X_509
++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
++ * CKM_DSA
++ *
++ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
++ * public key slot.
++ *
++ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
++ *
++ * CKM_DES3_CBC
++ * CKM_DES_CBC
++ * CKM_AES_CBC
++ * CKM_DES3_ECB
++ * CKM_DES_ECB
++ * CKM_AES_ECB
++ * CKM_AES_CTR
++ * CKM_RC4
++ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
++ *
++ * Digests optionally supported
++ *
++ * CKM_MD5
++ * CKM_SHA_1
++ * CKM_SHA224
++ * CKM_SHA256
++ * CKM_SHA384
++ * CKM_SHA512
++ *
++ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
++ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
++ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
++ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
++ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
++static int
++pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
++ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
++ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
++ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
++ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
++ unsigned int i;
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
++ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
++ int slot_n_cipher = 0;
++ int slot_n_digest = 0;
++ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
++ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
++ int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
++ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
++ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
++
++ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
++ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
++ *any_slot_found = 0;
++
++ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
-+ uselock = FALSE;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
++ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
++ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
++ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++ if (pSlotList == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ return (0);
++ }
+
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
++ /* Get the slot list for processing */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
-+ rv);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
++ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
+
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
++ {
++ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
-+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ /* Check if slot has random support. */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ continue;
+
-+static int
-+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+ {
-+ int i;
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
-+ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
-+ return (ciphers[i].id);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
++ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
++ {
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
++ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
++ break;
++ }
++ }
+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
-+ {
-+ if (cipher_count > 0)
-+ *nids = cipher_nids;
-+ else
-+ *nids = NULL;
-+ return (cipher_count);
-+ }
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
-+ {
-+ if (digest_count > 0)
-+ *nids = digest_nids;
-+ else
-+ *nids = NULL;
-+ return (digest_count);
-+ }
++ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
++ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
++ {
++ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
++ CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE;
++ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
++ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
++ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
-+/*
-+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ continue;
+
-+ /*
-+ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
-+ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
-+ * pk11_init_symetric() is called.
-+ */
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
-+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
-+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
-+ {
-+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
-+ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ /*
-+ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
-+ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
-+ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
-+ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
-+ * add code so that the counter length can be set via
-+ * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
++ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
++ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
+ */
-+ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+ }
-+ else
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+ {
-+ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
++ &mech_info);
++
++ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
++ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
+ {
-+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
-+ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
++ /*
++ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
++ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
++ */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
++ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
++
++ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
++ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
++ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
++ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
++ {
++ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
++ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER)
++ {
++ slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE;
++ }
++ }
+ }
-+ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
-+ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
-+ else
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++ /*
++ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
++ * verifying with CKM_DSA.
++ */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
++ &mech_info);
++ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
++ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
++ {
++ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
++ }
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++ /*
++ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
++ * derivation.
++ */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
++ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+ int index;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
++ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
++ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
++ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
++ {
++ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
++ }
++ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
-+ state->sp = NULL;
++ if (!found_candidate_slot &&
++ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
++ {
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
++ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
++ pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover;
++ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
++ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
++ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
++ PK11_DBG);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
++ best_slot_sofar);
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
++ }
++#else
++ } /* if */
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ } /* for */
+
-+ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
-+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
-+ return (0);
++ if (found_candidate_slot)
++ {
++ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
++ }
+
-+ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
-+ /*
-+ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
-+ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
-+ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
-+ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
-+ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
-+ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
-+ * code serves as a sanity check.
-+ *
-+ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
-+ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
-+ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
-+ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
-+ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
-+ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
++ best_slot_sofar = 0;
+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
-+ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
-+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
++ SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
++ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
++ {
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
-+ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
++ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
++ current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
++ current_slot_n_digest = 0;
++ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
++ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
+
-+ /*
-+ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
-+ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
-+ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
-+ {
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+ return (0);
++ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
++ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
++ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
+
-+ /*
-+ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
-+ * needs to be created.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
-+ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
-+ }
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
++ current_slot_n_cipher);
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
++ current_slot_n_digest);
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n",
++ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
-+ {
+ /*
-+ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
-+ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
++ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
++ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
++ * otherwise leave it where it is.
+ */
-+ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
++ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
++ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest))
+ {
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n",
++ PK11_DBG, current_slot);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
++ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
++ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
++ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
++ sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
++ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids,
++ sizeof (local_digest_nids));
+ }
+ }
+
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+ /* now initialize the context with a new key */
-+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+ return (0);
++ if (pSlotList != NULL)
++ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
-+ state->sp = sp;
++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
++ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
++ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
++ *any_slot_found = 1;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
-+/*
-+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
-+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
-+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
-+ * that it needs not be recreated.
-+ *
-+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
-+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
-+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
-+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
-+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
++static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++ int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
++ int *local_cipher_nids, int id)
+ {
++ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+ CK_RV rv;
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
++
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ return;
+ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
++ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++ if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids))
++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ {
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
++ ciphers[id].nid;
++ }
++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ else
++ {
++ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
++ }
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ }
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ else
++ {
++ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
+ }
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+ return (1);
++ return;
+ }
+
-+/*
-+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
-+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
++static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
++ int id)
+ {
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+ CK_RV rv;
-+ unsigned long outl = inl;
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
-+
-+ if (!inl)
-+ return (1);
+
-+ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
-+ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
-+ return (0);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
+
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ return;
++ }
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
++ {
++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++ if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids))
++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+ return (0);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
++ digests[id].nid;
++ }
++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ else
++ {
++ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
+ }
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+ }
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+ else
+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
+ }
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+ /*
-+ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
-+ * the same size of input.
-+ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
-+ * correctly aligned buffers.
-+ */
-+ if (inl != outl)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
++ return;
+ }
+
-+/*
-+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
-+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
-+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
-+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
-+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
-+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
-+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
-+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
++#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
++/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */
++static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln)
+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
-+ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
++ ASN1_OBJECT *o;
++ int nid;
+
-+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
++ if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"",
++ 1, sn, ln)) == NULL)
+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
-+ * rid of the context.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
-+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
-+ else
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
-+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ return (1);
++ /* will return NID_undef on error */
++ nid = OBJ_add_object(o);
++ ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
++
++ return (nid);
+ }
+
+/*
-+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
-+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
-+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
++ * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we
++ * have to help ourselves here.
+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+ const int **nids, int nid)
++static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void)
+ {
-+ if (!cipher)
-+ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
++ /* are we already set? */
++ if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef)
++ return (1);
+
-+ switch (nid)
++ /*
++ * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just
++ * follow the format of those that exist.
++ */
++ if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) ==
++ NID_undef)
++ goto err;
++ ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr;
++ if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) ==
++ NID_undef)
++ goto err;
++ ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr;
++ if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) ==
++ NID_undef)
++ goto err;
++ ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr;
++ return (1);
++
++err:
++ PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED);
++ return (0);
++ }
++#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
++
++/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
++static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
++ {
++ int i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
+ {
-+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_bf_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_rc4:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_rc4;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+ /*
-+ * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs
-+ * here are not constants.
-+ */
-+ if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr)
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
-+ else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr)
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
-+ else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
-+ else
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+ *cipher = NULL;
-+ break;
++ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
++ ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher,
++ local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id);
+ }
-+ return (*cipher != NULL);
+ }
+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+ const int **nids, int nid)
++/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
++static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
+ {
-+ if (!digest)
-+ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
++ int i;
+
-+ switch (nid)
++ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
+ {
-+ case NID_md5:
-+ *digest = &pk11_md5;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha1:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha1;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha224:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha224;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha256:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha256;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha384:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha384;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha512:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha512;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ *digest = NULL;
-+ break;
++ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type,
++ current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id);
+ }
-+ return (*digest != NULL);
+ }
+
++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++/*
++ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
++ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
++ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
++ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
++ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
++ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
++ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
++ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
++ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
++ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
++ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
++ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
++ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
++ *
++ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
++ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
++ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
++ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
++ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
++ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
++ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said
++ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with
++ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code
++ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for
++ * asymmetric operations.
++ *
++ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what
++ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can
++ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be
++ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before,
++ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only.
++ *
++ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find
++ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric
++ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table
++ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays
++ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the
++ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token
++ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more
++ * information.
++ *
++ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined
++ * the code won't be used.
++ */
++#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64)
++static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
++#else
++static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
++#endif
+
-+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
++/*
++ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists,
++ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware
++ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms.
++ */
++static int check_hw_mechanisms(void)
+ {
++ int i;
+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
++ void *handle;
++ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
++ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
++ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
++ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0;
++ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL;
++ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
++ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL;
++ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size;
+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n",
++ PK11_DBG);
++#endif
++ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL)
+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (false)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
-+ * can use the key handles. Here is why:
-+ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
-+ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
-+ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
-+ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
-+ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
-+ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
-+ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
-+ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
-+ * terminate the active operation.
-+ */
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
-+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle,
++ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
-+ rv);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ /*
-+ * Save the key information used in this session.
-+ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
-+ */
-+ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ?
-+ PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len;
-+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
-+err:
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+ {
-+ int i;
++ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
++ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
-+ if (digests[i].nid == nid)
-+ return (digests[i].id);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
++ rv = pflist->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
++ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
++ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+ int index;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
++ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
-+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ pdp = &digests[index];
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
-+ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
-+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */
++ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+
-+ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
-+ if (count == 0)
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif
++ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
++ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
++ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
++ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ return (0);
++ }
++ /* this means empty tables */
++ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef;
++ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef;
+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
-+ count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ unsigned long len;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+ len = ctx->digest->md_size;
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
-+ * to the pool
-+ */
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+
-+ /* The copy-from state */
-+ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Initialize the copy-to state */
-+ if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
-+ goto err;
-+ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
-+
-+ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
-+ &ul_state_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (ul_state_len == 0)
++ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
++ if (pSlotList == NULL)
+ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
-+ if (pstate == NULL)
++ /* Get the slot list for processing */
++ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
-+ &ul_state_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ /*
++ * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also
++ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the
++ * search.
++ */
++ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
++ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1;
++ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int));
++ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int));
++ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+ rv);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
-+ ul_state_len, 0, 0);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
-+ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ /*
++ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef
++ * is zero now.
++ */
++ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i)
++ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef;
++ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i)
++ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef;
+
-+ ret = 1;
-+err:
-+ if (pstate != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pstate);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel);
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n",
++ PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
++ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
++ {
++ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK)
++ continue;
+
-+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
-+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
-+ {
+ /*
-+ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
-+ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
-+ * that might have been allocated in the token when
-+ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
-+ * will return the session to the cache.
++ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are
++ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables.
+ */
-+ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
-+ return (0);
++ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i],
++ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids);
++ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i],
++ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids);
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
++ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by
++ * dlclose(3C).
++ */
++#if 0
++ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL);
++#endif
++ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
++ (void) dlclose(handle);
++ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids;
++ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids;
++
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+ return (1);
++
++err:
++ if (pSlotList != NULL)
++ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
++ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL)
++ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids);
++ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL)
++ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids);
++
++ return (0);
+ }
+
+/*
-+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
-+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
-+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
-+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
-+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
-+ * prefix.
++ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e.,
++ * non-existent).
+ */
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+ int key_len)
++static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table)
+ {
-+ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
-+ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
-+ {
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++ int i = 0;
+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
-+#else
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
-+ }
++ /*
++ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new
++ * table.
++ */
++ if (nid_table == NULL)
++ return (1);
+
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
++ /*
++ * the table is never full, there is always at least one
++ * NID_undef.
++ */
++ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef)
+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ if (nid_table[i++] == nid)
+ {
-+ /*
-+ * The secret key object is created in the
-+ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ return (1);
+ }
+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+err:
-+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
-+#else
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+#endif
+
-+ return (ret);
++ return (0);
+ }
++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.4
+--- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 13:17:24 2009
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Wed Dec 17 16:14:26 2008
+@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ */
+
++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */
+/*
-+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
-+ * CKM_RSA_X_509
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
-+ * CKM_DSA
++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
++ * Afchine Madjlessi.
++ */
++/*
++ * ====================================================================
++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
-+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
-+ * public key slot.
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
+ *
-+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
-+ * CKM_DES3_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES_CBC
-+ * CKM_AES_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES3_ECB
-+ * CKM_DES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_CTR
-+ * CKM_RC4
-+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
++ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
++ * distribution.
+ *
-+ * Digests optionally supported
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
++ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
-+ * CKM_MD5
-+ * CKM_SHA_1
-+ * CKM_SHA224
-+ * CKM_SHA256
-+ * CKM_SHA384
-+ * CKM_SHA512
++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
++ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
++ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
++ *
++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
++ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
++ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
++ *
++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
++ * acknowledgment:
++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ * ====================================================================
++ *
++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
-+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
-+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
-+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
-+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
-+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
-+ {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ int slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ int slot_n_digest = 0;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
-+ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-+
-+ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
+
-+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 0;
-+
-+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
++static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]=
++{
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"},
++{ 0, NULL}
++};
+
-+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]=
++{
++{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"},
++{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"},
++{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"},
++{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"},
++{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"},
++{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"},
++{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"},
++{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"},
++{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"},
++{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"},
++{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"},
++{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"},
++{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"},
++{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"},
++{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"},
++{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"},
++{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"},
++{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"},
++{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"},
++{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"},
++{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"},
++{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"},
++{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"},
++{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"},
++{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
++{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"},
++{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"},
++{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
++{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"},
++{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"},
++{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"},
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"},
++{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"},
++{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"},
++{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"},
++{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"},
++{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"},
++{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"},
++{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"},
++{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"},
++{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"},
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"},
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"},
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"},
++{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"},
++{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"},
++{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"},
++{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"},
++{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"},
++{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"},
++{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"},
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_PIN, "invalid PIN"},
++{ PK11_R_TOO_MANY_OBJECTS, "too many objects"},
++{ PK11_R_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, "object not found"},
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"},
++{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"},
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"},
++{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" },
++{ 0, NULL}
++};
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */
+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
++static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0;
++static int pk11_error_init = 1;
+
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
++static void
++ERR_load_pk11_strings(void)
++ {
++ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
++ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
++
++ if (pk11_error_init)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
++ pk11_error_init = 0;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
++ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
++ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
++#endif
+ }
++}
+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++static void
++ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void)
++ {
++ if (pk11_error_init == 0)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ return (0);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
++ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
++ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
++#endif
++ pk11_error_init = 1;
+ }
++}
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
++void
++ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
++{
++ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
++ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
++ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
++}
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ /* Check if slot has random support. */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
++void
++PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv)
++{
++ char tmp_buf[20];
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ PK11err(function, reason);
++ (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
++ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
++}
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.9
+--- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 13:17:24 2009
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Wed Dec 17 15:01:45 2008
+@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ */
+
-+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
-+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h */
++/*
++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
++ *
++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
++ * Afchine Madjlessi.
++ */
++/*
++ * ====================================================================
++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ *
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
++ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
++ * distribution.
++ *
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
++ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
++ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
++ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
++ *
++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
++ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
++ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
++ *
++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
++ * acknowledgment:
++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ * ====================================================================
++ *
++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
++ *
++ */
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H
++#define HW_PK11_ERR_H
+
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
++void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
++void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv);
++#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
++/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++/* Function codes. */
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
-+ &mech_info);
++#define PK11_F_INIT 100
++#define PK11_F_FINISH 101
++#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102
++#define PK11_F_CTRL 103
++#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104
++#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105
++#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106
++#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107
++#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108
++#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109
++#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110
++#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111
++#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112
++#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113
++#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114
++#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115
++#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116
++#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117
++#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118
++#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119
++#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120
++#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121
++#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122
++#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123
++#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124
++#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125
++#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126
++#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127
++#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128
++#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129
++#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130
++#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131
++#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132
++#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133
++#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134
++#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135
++#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136
++#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137
++#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138
++#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139
++#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140
++#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141
++#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142
++#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143
++#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144
++#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145
++#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146
++#define PK11_F_LOAD 147
++#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148
++#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149
++#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150
++#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151
++#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152
++#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153
++#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154
++#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155
++#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156
++#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157
++#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158
+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
-+ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
++/* Reason codes. */
++#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100
++#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101
++#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102
++#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103
++#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104
++#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105
++#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106
++#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107
++#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108
++#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109
++#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110
++#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111
++#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112
++#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113
++#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114
++#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115
++#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116
++#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118
++#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119
++#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120
++#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121
++#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122
++#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123
++#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124
++#define PK11_R_SIGN 125
++#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126
++#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127
++#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128
++#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129
++#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130
++#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131
++#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132
++#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133
++#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134
++#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135
++#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136
++#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137
++#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138
++#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139
++#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140
++#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141
++#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142
++#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143
++#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144
++#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145
++#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146
++#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147
++#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148
++#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149
++#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150
++#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151
++#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152
++#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153
++#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154
++#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155
++#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156
++#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157
++#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158
++#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159
++#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160
++#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161
++#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162
++#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163
++#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164
++#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165
++#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166
++#define PK11_R_INVALID_PIN 167
++#define PK11_R_TOO_MANY_OBJECTS 168
++#define PK11_R_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND 169
+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER)
-+ {
-+ slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */
++#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32
++
++#ifdef NOPTHREADS
++/*
++ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the
++ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global
++ * per-process lock for the whole engine.
++ *
++ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as
++ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but
++ * it's safe.
++ */
++#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC
++#endif
+
++/*
++ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11
++ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the
++ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation
++ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list.
++ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object
++ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls.
++ *
++ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list
++ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request
++ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done.
++ */
++typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION
++ {
++ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next;
++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */
++ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */
++ union
++ {
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++ struct
++ {
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
++ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
++ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */
++ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */
++ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
++ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */
++ } u_RSA;
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+ * verifying with CKM_DSA.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
-+ &mech_info);
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
++ struct
+ {
-+ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
++ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
++ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */
++ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
++ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */
++ } u_DSA;
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
-+ * derivation.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
++ struct
+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ if (!found_candidate_slot &&
-+ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */
++ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */
++ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */
++ } u_DH;
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++ struct
+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
-+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
-+ pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover;
-+ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
-+ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ best_slot_sofar);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+#else
-+ } /* if */
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ } /* for */
-+
-+ if (found_candidate_slot)
-+ {
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
-+ }
-+
-+ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+ best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+ current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-+ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
-+ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
-+
-+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */
++ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
++ int key_len; /* priv key len */
++ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */
++ } u_cipher;
++ } opdata_u;
++ } PK11_SESSION;
+
-+ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
++#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key
++#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key
++#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub
++#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv
++#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num
++#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num
++#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num
++#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key
++#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key
++#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub
++#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num
++#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv
++#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num
++#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key
++#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh
++#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num
++#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key
++#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key
++#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len
++#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ current_slot_n_cipher);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ current_slot_n_digest);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n",
-+ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++/*
++ * We have 3 different groups of operation types:
++ * 1) asymmetric operations
++ * 2) random operations
++ * 3) symmetric and digest operations
++ *
++ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware
++ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware
++ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support
++ * only a single group of operations.
++ *
++ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have
++ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from
++ * different groups may be initialized in different slots.
++ *
++ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are
++ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache.
++ */
++typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM
++ {
++ OP_RAND,
++ OP_RSA,
++ OP_DSA,
++ OP_DH,
++ OP_CIPHER,
++ OP_DIGEST,
++ OP_MAX
++ } PK11_OPTYPE;
+
-+ /*
-+ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
-+ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
-+ * otherwise leave it where it is.
-+ */
-+ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
-+ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest))
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n",
-+ PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
-+ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
-+ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
-+ sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
-+ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids,
-+ sizeof (local_digest_nids));
-+ }
-+ }
++/*
++ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches
++ * and locks associated with the lists.
++ */
++typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE
++ {
++ PK11_SESSION *head;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ pthread_mutex_t *lock;
++#endif
++ } PK11_CACHE;
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
-+ fprintf(stderr,
-+ "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */
++typedef struct PK11_active_st
++ {
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h;
++ unsigned int refcnt;
++ struct PK11_active_st *prev;
++ struct PK11_active_st *next;
++ } PK11_active;
+
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[];
++#endif
++extern PK11_active *active_list[];
+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
-+ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type])
++#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type])
++#else
++#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
++#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
++#endif
+
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 1;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ int *local_cipher_nids, int id)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_RV rv;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
++extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
++extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
++extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return;
-+ }
++#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.32
+--- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 13:17:24 2009
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Mon Oct 5 13:16:55 2009
+@@ -0,0 +1,3140 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ */
+
-+ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
-+ {
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids))
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
-+ ciphers[id].nid;
-+ }
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
++/*
++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
++ *
++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
++ * Afchine Madjlessi.
++ */
++/*
++ * ====================================================================
++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ *
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
++ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
++ * distribution.
++ *
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
++ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
++ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
++ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
++ *
++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
++ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
++ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
++ *
++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
++ * acknowledgment:
++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ * ====================================================================
++ *
++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
++ *
++ */
+
-+ return;
-+ }
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
+
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
-+ int id)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_RV rv;
++#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <cryptlib.h>
++#include <openssl/engine.h>
++#include <openssl/dso.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++#include <openssl/pem.h>
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++#include <openssl/rsa.h>
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++#include <openssl/dsa.h>
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++#include <openssl/dh.h>
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/objects.h>
++#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++#define NOPTHREADS
++typedef int pid_t;
++#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
++static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
++#ifndef NULL_PTR
++#define NULL_PTR NULL
++#endif
++#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
++#else
++#include <unistd.h>
++#endif
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return;
-+ }
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++#include <pthread.h>
++#endif
+
-+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
-+ {
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids))
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
-+ digests[id].nid;
-+ }
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
+
-+ return;
-+ }
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
++#else
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#endif
++#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
++#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */
-+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln)
-+ {
-+ ASN1_OBJECT *o;
-+ int nid;
++#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
++#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x)
++#endif
+
-+ if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"",
-+ 1, sn, ln)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++/* RSA stuff */
++static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
++static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
++static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
++static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
++static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
++static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
++static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
++ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
++static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
++ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
++ const RSA *rsa);
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+
-+ /* will return NID_undef on error */
-+ nid = OBJ_add_object(o);
-+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
++static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
++static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
++static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
++static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+
-+ return (nid);
-+ }
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
++ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
++ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
-+/*
-+ * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we
-+ * have to help ourselves here.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void)
-+ {
-+ /* are we already set? */
-+ if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef)
-+ return (1);
++static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
++static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
++#endif
+
-+ /*
-+ * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just
-+ * follow the format of those that exist.
-+ */
-+ if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) ==
-+ NID_undef)
-+ goto err;
-+ ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr;
-+ if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) ==
-+ NID_undef)
-+ goto err;
-+ ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr;
-+ if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) ==
-+ NID_undef)
-+ goto err;
-+ ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr;
-+ return (1);
++/* DSA stuff */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
++static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
++static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
++ DSA *dsa);
++static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
++ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+
-+err:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
++ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
++ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
-+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
-+ {
-+ int i;
++static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
++static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
++#endif
+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
-+ {
-+ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
-+ ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id);
-+ }
-+ }
++/* DH stuff */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
++static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
++static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
++static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
++ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
+
-+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
-+ {
-+ int i;
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
++ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
-+ {
-+ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type,
-+ current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id);
-+ }
++static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
++#endif
++
++static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
++ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
++static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
++
++/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
++#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
++static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
++#else
++static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
++ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
++ * variable and jump to the specified label.
++ */
++#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
++ { \
++ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
++ { \
++ var = TRUE; \
++ if (unlock) \
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
++ goto label; \
++ } \
+ }
+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
-+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
-+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
-+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
-+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
-+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
-+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
-+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
-+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
-+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
-+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
-+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
-+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
-+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
-+ *
-+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
-+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
-+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
-+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
-+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
-+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
-+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said
-+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with
-+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code
-+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for
-+ * asymmetric operations.
-+ *
-+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what
-+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can
-+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be
-+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before,
-+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only.
-+ *
-+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find
-+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric
-+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table
-+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays
-+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the
-+ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token
-+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more
-+ * information.
++ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
++ * entry otherwise return NULL.
+ *
-+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined
-+ * the code won't be used.
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
+ */
-+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64)
-+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
-+#else
-+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
-+#endif
++static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++ {
++ PK11_active *entry;
++
++ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
++ if (entry->h == h)
++ return (entry);
++
++ return (NULL);
++ }
+
+/*
-+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists,
-+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware
-+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms.
++ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
++ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
++ * failure.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
+ */
-+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void)
++int
++pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+ {
-+ int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ void *handle;
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0;
-+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL;
-+ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size;
++ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL)
++ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
++ return (-1);
+ }
+
-+ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL)
++ /* search for entry in the active list */
++ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
++ entry->refcnt++;
++ else
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
++ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
++ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
++ if (entry == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ entry->h = h;
++ entry->refcnt = 1;
++ entry->prev = NULL;
++ entry->next = NULL;
++ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
++ if (active_list[type] == NULL)
++ active_list[type] = entry;
++ else /* make the entry first in the list */
++ {
++ entry->next = active_list[type];
++ active_list[type]->prev = entry;
++ active_list[type] = entry;
++ }
+ }
+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ return (entry->refcnt);
++ }
+
-+ rv = pflist->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
++/*
++ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++void
++pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++ {
++ PK11_active *prev_entry;
++
++ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
++ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
-+ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
++ prev_entry->next = entry->next;
++ if (entry->next != NULL)
++ entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
+ }
-+
-+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
++ else
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
-+ goto err;
++ active_list[type] = entry->next;
++ /* we were the first but not the only one */
++ if (entry->next != NULL)
++ entry->next->prev = NULL;
+ }
+
-+ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif
-+ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
-+ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
-+ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ /* this means empty tables */
-+ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef;
-+ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++ /* sanitization */
++ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ entry->prev = NULL;
++ entry->next = NULL;
++ OPENSSL_free(entry);
++ }
+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
++/* Free all entries from the active list. */
++void
++pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
++ {
++ PK11_active *entry;
++
++ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
++ switch (type)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
++ case OP_RSA:
++ case OP_DSA:
++ case OP_DH:
++ break;
++ default:
++ return;
+ }
+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
++ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
++ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
++ }
++
++/*
++ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
++ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
++ *
++ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
++ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++int
++pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++ {
++ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
++
++ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
-+ goto err;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
++ return (-1);
+ }
+
-+ /*
-+ * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also
-+ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the
-+ * search.
-+ */
-+ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
-+ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1;
-+ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int));
-+ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int));
-+ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL)
++ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
++ entry->refcnt--;
++ if (entry->refcnt == 0)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
++ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef
-+ * is zero now.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i)
-+ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef;
-+ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i)
-+ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef;
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n",
-+ PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ return (0);
++ }
+
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
++static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
++ {
++ "PKCS#11 RSA method",
++ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */
++ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */
++ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */
++ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */
++ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */
++ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
++ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */
++ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */
++ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */
++ NULL, /* app_data */
++ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */
++ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */
++ };
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++RSA_METHOD *
++PK11_RSA(void)
++ {
++ return (&pk11_rsa);
++ }
++#endif
+
-+ /*
-+ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are
-+ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables.
-+ */
-+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i],
-+ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids);
-+ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i],
-+ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids);
-+ }
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
++static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
++ {
++ "PKCS#11 DSA method",
++ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */
++ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
++ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */
++ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
++ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
++ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */
++ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */
++ 0, /* flags */
++ NULL /* app_data */
++ };
+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by
-+ * dlclose(3C).
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL);
++DSA_METHOD *
++PK11_DSA(void)
++ {
++ return (&pk11_dsa);
++ }
+#endif
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ (void) dlclose(handle);
-+ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids;
-+ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids;
+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++/*
++ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
++ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
++ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
++ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
++ * enough.
++ */
++#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8
+
-+err:
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids);
-+ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids);
++/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
++static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
++ {
++ "PKCS#11 DH method",
++ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */
++ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */
++ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
++ pk11_DH_init, /* init */
++ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */
++ 0, /* flags */
++ NULL, /* app_data */
++ NULL /* generate_params */
++ };
+
-+ return (0);
++DH_METHOD *
++PK11_DH(void)
++ {
++ return (&pk11_dh);
+ }
++#endif
++
++/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
++#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
+
++/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
++#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20
++#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40
++
++static CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
++static CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/*
-+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e.,
-+ * non-existent).
++ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
++ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
++ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
++ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
+ */
-+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table)
++static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
-+ int i = 0;
++ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
++ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
-+ /*
-+ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new
-+ * table.
-+ */
-+ if (nid_table == NULL)
-+ return (1);
++ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
++ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
++ {
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ /*
-+ * the table is never full, there is always at least one
-+ * NID_undef.
-+ */
-+ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef)
++ switch (padding)
+ {
-+ if (nid_table[i++] == nid)
-+ {
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
++ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
++ break;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
++ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
++ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
++ break;
++#endif
++ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
++ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
++ break;
++ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
++ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
++ break;
++ default:
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
++ goto err;
+ }
++ if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
-+ return (0);
++ /* PK11 functions are called here */
++ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
++err:
++ if (buf != NULL)
++ {
++ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
++ OPENSSL_free(buf);
++ }
++ return (r);
+ }
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.4
---- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 11:08:14 2009
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Wed Dec 17 16:14:26 2008
-@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
++ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
++ * should be catched in the padding functions
+ */
++static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
++ {
++ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
++ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
++ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
++ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
++ {
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]=
-+{
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"},
-+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"},
-+{ 0, NULL}
-+};
++ switch (padding)
++ {
++ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
++ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
++ break;
++ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
++ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
++ break;
++ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
++ default:
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
-+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]=
-+{
-+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"},
-+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"},
-+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"},
-+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"},
-+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"},
-+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"},
-+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"},
-+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"},
-+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"},
-+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"},
-+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"},
-+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"},
-+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"},
-+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"},
-+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"},
-+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PIN, "invalid PIN"},
-+{ PK11_R_TOO_MANY_OBJECTS, "too many objects"},
-+{ PK11_R_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, "object not found"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"},
-+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"},
-+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"},
-+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" },
-+{ 0, NULL}
-+};
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */
-+
-+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0;
-+static int pk11_error_init = 1;
++ /* PK11 functions are called here */
++ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
++err:
++ if (buf != NULL)
++ {
++ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
++ OPENSSL_free(buf);
++ }
++ return (r);
++ }
+
-+static void
-+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void)
++/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
++static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
-+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
-+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
++ BIGNUM f;
++ int j, num = 0, r = -1;
++ unsigned char *p;
++ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
-+ if (pk11_error_init)
++ BN_init(&f);
++
++ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
++
++ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
-+ pk11_error_init = 0;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
-+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
-+#endif
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
+ }
-+}
+
-+static void
-+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_error_init == 0)
++ /*
++ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
++ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
++ */
++ if (flen > num)
+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
-+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
-+#endif
-+ pk11_error_init = 1;
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
++ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
++ goto err;
+ }
-+}
+
-+void
-+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
-+{
-+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
-+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
-+ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
-+}
++ /* make data into a big number */
++ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
++ goto err;
+
-+void
-+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv)
-+{
-+ char tmp_buf[20];
++ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
++ {
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
++ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ PK11err(function, reason);
-+ (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
-+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
-+}
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.9
---- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 11:08:14 2009
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Wed Dec 17 15:01:45 2008
-@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
++ /* PK11 functions are called here */
++ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
++ /*
++ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
++ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
++ */
++ for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
++ if (buf[j] != 0)
++ break;
+
-+#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H
-+#define HW_PK11_ERR_H
++ p = buf + j;
++ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
-+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
-+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv);
-+#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
++ switch (padding)
++ {
++ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
++ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
++ break;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
++ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
++ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
++ break;
++#endif
++ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
++ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
++ break;
++ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
++ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
++ break;
++ default:
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (r < 0)
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
-+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */
++err:
++ BN_clear_free(&f);
++ if (buf != NULL)
++ {
++ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
++ OPENSSL_free(buf);
++ }
++ return (r);
++ }
+
-+/* Function codes. */
++/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
++static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
++ {
++ BIGNUM f;
++ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
++ unsigned char *p;
++ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
-+#define PK11_F_INIT 100
-+#define PK11_F_FINISH 101
-+#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102
-+#define PK11_F_CTRL 103
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114
-+#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115
-+#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116
-+#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117
-+#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123
-+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127
-+#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129
-+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130
-+#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131
-+#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132
-+#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133
-+#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134
-+#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135
-+#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136
-+#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139
-+#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143
-+#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145
-+#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146
-+#define PK11_F_LOAD 147
-+#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148
-+#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149
-+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150
-+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151
-+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152
-+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153
-+#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154
-+#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155
-+#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156
-+#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157
-+#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158
++ BN_init(&f);
++ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
++ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
++ if (buf == NULL)
++ {
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
++ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
++ */
++ if (flen > num)
++ {
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
++ goto err;
++
++ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
++ {
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
++ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ /* PK11 functions are called here */
++ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
++
++ /*
++ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
++ * Needs to skip these 0's here
++ */
++ for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
++ if (buf[i] != 0)
++ break;
++
++ p = buf + i;
++ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
++
++ switch (padding)
++ {
++ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
++ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
++ break;
++ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
++ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
++ break;
++ default:
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (r < 0)
++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
++
++err:
++ BN_clear_free(&f);
++ if (buf != NULL)
++ {
++ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
++ OPENSSL_free(buf);
++ }
++ return (r);
++ }
++
++/*
++ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
++ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
++ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
++ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
++ {
++ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
++ int retval = -1;
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++ return (-1);
++
++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++
++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
++ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
++ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
++ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
++ sp->session);
++
++ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
++ h_pub_key);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
++ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
++ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
++ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ retval = bytes_encrypted;
++ }
++
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (retval);
++ }
++
++
++/*
++ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
++ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
++ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
++ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
++ {
++ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
++ int retval = -1;
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++ return (-1);
++
++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++
++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
++ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
++ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
++ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, sp->session);
++
++ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
++ h_priv_key);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
++ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
++ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
++ rv);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ retval = ul_sig_len;
++ }
++
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (retval);
++ }
++
++
++/*
++ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
++ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
++ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
++ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
++ {
++ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
++ int retval = -1;
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++ return (-1);
++
++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++
++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
++ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
++ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
++ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, sp->session);
++
++ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
++ h_priv_key);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
++ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
++ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
++ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ retval = bytes_decrypted;
++ }
++
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (retval);
++ }
++
++
++/*
++ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
++ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
++ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
++ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
++ {
++ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
++ int retval = -1;
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++ return (-1);
++
++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++
++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
++ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
++ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
++ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
++ sp->session);
++
++ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
++ p_mech, h_pub_key);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
++ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
++ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
++ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ retval = bytes_decrypted;
++ }
++
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (retval);
++ }
++
++static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
++ {
++ /*
++ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
++ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
++ */
++ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
++
++ return (1);
++ }
++
++static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
++ {
++ /*
++ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
++ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
++ * structures.
++ */
++ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
++ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
++ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
++ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
++ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
++ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
++
++ return (1);
++ }
++
++/*
++ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
++ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
++ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
++ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
++ {
++ X509_SIG sig;
++ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
++ int i, j = 0;
++ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
++ X509_ALGOR algor;
++ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++ int ret = 0;
++ unsigned long ulsiglen;
+
-+/* Reason codes. */
-+#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100
-+#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101
-+#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102
-+#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103
-+#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104
-+#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105
-+#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106
-+#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107
-+#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108
-+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109
-+#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110
-+#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111
-+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112
-+#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115
-+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116
-+#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118
-+#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119
-+#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120
-+#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123
-+#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124
-+#define PK11_R_SIGN 125
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130
-+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131
-+#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132
-+#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133
-+#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137
-+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138
-+#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139
-+#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140
-+#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141
-+#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142
-+#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143
-+#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144
-+#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148
-+#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153
-+#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154
-+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155
-+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156
-+#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157
-+#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158
-+#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159
-+#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160
-+#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162
-+#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164
-+#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165
-+#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166
-+#define PK11_R_INVALID_PIN 167
-+#define PK11_R_TOO_MANY_OBJECTS 168
-+#define PK11_R_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND 169
++ /* Encode the digest */
++ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
++ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
++ {
++ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
++ s = (unsigned char *)m;
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ sig.algor = &algor;
++ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
++ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
++ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
++ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
++ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
++ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
++
++ sig.digest = &digest;
++ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
++ sig.digest->length = m_len;
++
++ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
++ }
++
++ j = RSA_size(rsa);
++ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
++ {
++ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
++ if (s == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ p = s;
++ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
++ }
++
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++ goto err;
++
++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++
++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
++ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
++ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
++ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
++ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, sp->session);
++
++ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ ulsiglen = j;
++ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
++ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
++ *siglen = ulsiglen;
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ ret = 1;
++ }
++
++err:
++ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
++ {
++ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
++ OPENSSL_free(s);
++ }
++
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (ret);
++ }
++
++static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
++ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
++ const RSA *rsa)
++ {
++ X509_SIG sig;
++ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
++ int i, j = 0;
++ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
++ X509_ALGOR algor;
++ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++ int ret = 0;
++
++ /* Encode the digest */
++ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
++ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
++ {
++ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
++ s = (unsigned char *)m;
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ sig.algor = &algor;
++ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
++ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
++ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
++ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
++ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
++ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
++ sig.digest = &digest;
++ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
++ sig.digest->length = m_len;
++ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
++ }
++
++ j = RSA_size(rsa);
++ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */
-+#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32
++ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
++ {
++ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
++ if (s == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ p = s;
++ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
++ }
+
-+#ifdef NOPTHREADS
-+/*
-+ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the
-+ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global
-+ * per-process lock for the whole engine.
-+ *
-+ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as
-+ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but
-+ * it's safe.
-+ */
-+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC
-+#endif
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++ goto err;
+
-+/*
-+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11
-+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the
-+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation
-+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list.
-+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object
-+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls.
-+ *
-+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list
-+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request
-+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done.
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION
-+ {
-+ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next;
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */
-+ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */
-+ union
++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++
++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
++ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
++ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
++ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
++ sp->session);
++
++ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
-+ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */
-+ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */
-+ } u_RSA;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ struct
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
-+ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */
-+ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */
-+ } u_DSA;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ struct
++ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
++ h_pub_key);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */
-+ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */
-+ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */
-+ } u_DH;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ struct
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
++ rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, sigbuf,
++ (CK_ULONG)siglen);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */
-+ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
-+ int key_len; /* priv key len */
-+ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */
-+ } u_cipher;
-+ } opdata_u;
-+ } PK11_SESSION;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ ret = 1;
++ }
+
-+#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key
-+#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key
-+#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub
-+#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv
-+#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num
-+#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub
-+#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv
-+#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num
-+#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key
-+#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh
-+#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num
-+#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key
-+#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key
-+#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len
-+#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt
++err:
++ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
++ {
++ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
++ OPENSSL_free(s);
++ }
+
-+/*
-+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types:
-+ * 1) asymmetric operations
-+ * 2) random operations
-+ * 3) symmetric and digest operations
-+ *
-+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware
-+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware
-+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support
-+ * only a single group of operations.
-+ *
-+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have
-+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from
-+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots.
-+ *
-+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are
-+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache.
-+ */
-+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM
-+ {
-+ OP_RAND,
-+ OP_RSA,
-+ OP_DSA,
-+ OP_DH,
-+ OP_CIPHER,
-+ OP_DIGEST,
-+ OP_MAX
-+ } PK11_OPTYPE;
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (ret);
++ }
+
-+/*
-+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches
-+ * and locks associated with the lists.
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE
++static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
++
++/* load RSA private key from a file */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *head;
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+ pthread_mutex_t *lock;
-+#endif
-+ } PK11_CACHE;
++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++ FILE *privkey;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ RSA *rsa;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++ /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_ULONG objcnt = 0;
++ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
++ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][1024];
++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
++ extern char *pk11_pin;
++
++ /* we look for private keys only */
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
++ {
++ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
++ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
++ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
++ };
++
++ /* these attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA structure */
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
++ {
++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], 1024}, /* n */
++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], 1024}, /* e */
++ };
++
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++ return (NULL);
++
++ /*
++ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
++ */
++ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
++ {
++ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
++ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
++
++ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++ {
++ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "));
++
++ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ }
++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(sp->session, CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
++ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_PIN, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session,
++ search_templ, 3)) != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &ks_key, 1, &objcnt);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */
-+typedef struct PK11_active_st
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h;
-+ unsigned int refcnt;
-+ struct PK11_active_st *prev;
-+ struct PK11_active_st *next;
-+ } PK11_active;
++ if (objcnt > 1)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_TOO_MANY_OBJECTS);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[];
-+#endif
-+extern PK11_active *active_list[];
++ if (objcnt != 1)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type])
-+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type])
-+#else
-+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
-+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
-+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
-+#endif
++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
-+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++ if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
++ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
++ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
++ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
++ if (pkey == NULL)
++ goto err;
+
-+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
++ rsa = RSA_new_method(e);
++ if (rsa == NULL) {
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++ pkey = NULL;
++ goto err;
++ }
++ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+
-+#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub-kp.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub-kp.c:1.21
---- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 11:08:14 2009
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub-kp.c Tue Sep 1 06:02:18 2009
-@@ -0,0 +1,896 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
++ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++ pkey = NULL;
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
++ /*
++ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
++ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
++ */
++ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
++ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
+
-+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
++ }
++ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
++ {
++ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ (void) fclose(privkey);
++ if (pkey != NULL)
++ {
++ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
++ if (rsa != NULL)
++ {
++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#error RSA is disabled
-+#endif
++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
++ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
++ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
++ sp->session);
++ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ {
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++ pkey = NULL;
++ }
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++ pkey = NULL;
++ }
++ }
++ }
+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
++err:
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (pkey);
++ }
+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
++/* load RSA public key from a file */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
++ {
++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++ FILE *pubkey;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ RSA *rsa;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++ /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_ULONG objcnt = 0;
++ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
++ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][1024];
++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
++ extern char *pk11_pin;
+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
-+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
++ /* we look for public keys only */
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
++ {
++ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
++ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
++ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
++ };
+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
++ /* these attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA structure */
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
++ {
++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], 1024}, /* n */
++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], 1024}, /* e */
++ };
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++ return (NULL);
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#define OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#endif
++ /*
++ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
++ */
++ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
++ {
++ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
++ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
++#define ALLWAYS_LOGIN
++#ifdef ALLWAYS_LOGIN
++ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++ {
++ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "));
+
-+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
-+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x)
++ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ }
++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(sp->session, CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
++ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_PIN, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+#endif
+
-+/* RSA stuff */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ if (pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, search_templ, 3) != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &ks_key, 1, &objcnt);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++ if (objcnt > 1)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, PK11_R_TOO_MANY_OBJECTS);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
++ if (objcnt != 1)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, PK11_R_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
-+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
-+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
-+#else
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
-+#endif
++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
++ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
++ if (pkey == NULL)
++ goto err;
+
-+/*
-+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
-+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
-+ * variable and jump to the specified label.
-+ */
-+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
-+ { \
-+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
-+ { \
-+ var = TRUE; \
-+ if (unlock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ goto label; \
-+ } \
-+ }
++ rsa = RSA_new_method(e);
++ if (rsa == NULL) {
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++ pkey = NULL;
++ goto err;
++ }
++ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+
-+/*
-+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
-+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
++ if (pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
++ get_templ, 2) != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
-+ if (entry->h == h)
-+ return (entry);
++ /*
++ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
++ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
++ */
++ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
+
-+ return (NULL);
++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
++ }
++ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
++ {
++ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ (void) fclose(pubkey);
++ if (pkey != NULL)
++ {
++ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
++ if (rsa != NULL)
++ {
++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++
++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
++ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
++ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
++ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ {
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++ pkey = NULL;
++ }
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++ pkey = NULL;
++ }
++ }
++ }
++
++err:
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (pkey);
+ }
+
+/*
-+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
-+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
-+ * failure.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
++ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
++ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
++ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-+
-+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ CK_ULONG found;
++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
++ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
+
-+ /* search for entry in the active list */
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
-+ entry->refcnt++;
-+ else
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
+ {
-+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
-+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
-+ if (entry == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ entry->h = h;
-+ entry->refcnt = 1;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
-+ if (active_list[type] == NULL)
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ else /* make the entry first in the list */
-+ {
-+ entry->next = active_list[type];
-+ active_list[type]->prev = entry;
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ }
-+ }
++ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
++ {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &true, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
++ };
+
-+ return (entry->refcnt);
-+ }
++ int i;
+
-+/*
-+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+void
-+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *prev_entry;
++ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
++ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
-+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
-+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
++ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
++ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
++ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
++ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
+ {
-+ prev_entry->next = entry->next;
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto malloc_err;
+ }
-+ else
++
++ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
++
++ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
++ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
++ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
++ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
+ {
-+ active_list[type] = entry->next;
-+ /* we were the first but not the only one */
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = NULL;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto malloc_err;
+ }
+
-+ /* sanitization */
-+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ OPENSSL_free(entry);
-+ }
++ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
+
-+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
-+void
-+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
++ ul_key_attr_count);
+
-+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
-+ switch (type)
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT,
++ rv);
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ }
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
-+/*
-+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
-+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
-+ *
-+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
-+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
-+ entry->refcnt--;
-+ if (entry->refcnt == 0)
++ if (found == 0)
+ {
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ return (1);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+ }
+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
++ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ rollback = TRUE;
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
++ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
++ *rsa_n_num = NULL;
++ rollback = TRUE;
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa;
++ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
++ if (key_ptr != NULL)
++ *key_ptr = rsa;
+
-+RSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_RSA(void)
-+ {
-+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa;
++err:
++ if (rollback)
++ {
++ /*
++ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
++ * since we are doing rollback.
++ */
++ if (found == 0)
++ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
++ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ }
+
-+ if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL)
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++malloc_err:
++ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
+ {
-+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-+ memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa));
-+ pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method";
-+ pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign;
++ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
++ {
++ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
++ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
++ }
+ }
-+ return (&pk11_rsa);
-+ }
+
-+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
++ return (h_key);
++ }
+
+/*
-+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
-+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
-+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
++ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
++ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
++ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ unsigned long ulsiglen;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ int i;
++ CK_ULONG found;
++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
++ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
++ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
++ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
++ {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &false, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
++ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
++ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
++ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
++ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
++ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
++ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
++ };
+
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
++ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
++ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ goto set;
++ }
++
++ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
++ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
++ /* Put the private key components into the template */
++ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto malloc_err;
+ }
+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
++ ul_key_attr_count);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, sp->session);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
++ if (found == 0)
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
++ }
+
-+ ulsiglen = j;
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
-+ *siglen = ulsiglen;
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++set:
++ if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
++ {
++ if (rsa->d == NULL)
++ *rsa_d_num = NULL;
++ else if ((*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ rollback = TRUE;
+ goto err;
+ }
-+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
++ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
++ if (key_ptr != NULL)
++ *key_ptr = rsa;
++
+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
++ if (rollback)
+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
++ /*
++ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
++ * since we are doing rollback.
++ */
++ if (found == 0 &&
++ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
++ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
++ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ }
+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
-+
-+/* load RSA private key from a file */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *privkey;
-+ RSA *rsa;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG objcnt = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][1024];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+ extern char *pk11_pin;
-+
-+ /* we look for private keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+ /* these attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA structure */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], 1024}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], 1024}, /* e */
-+ };
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
++malloc_err:
+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
++ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
++ * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
+ */
-+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
++ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
+ {
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
-+
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "));
-+
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(sp->session, CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
-+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_PIN, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session,
-+ search_templ, 3)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &ks_key, 1, &objcnt);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (objcnt > 1)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_TOO_MANY_OBJECTS);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (objcnt != 1)
++ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND);
-+ goto err;
++ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
++ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
++ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
++ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+ }
++ }
+
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
-+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
-+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
-+ if (pkey == NULL)
-+ goto err;
++ return (h_key);
++ }
+
-+ rsa = RSA_new_method(e);
-+ if (rsa == NULL) {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ goto err;
++/*
++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
++ */
++static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
++ {
++ /*
++ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
++ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
++ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
++ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
++ */
++ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0))
++ {
++ /*
++ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
++ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
++ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
++ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
++ */
++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
++ return (0);
+ }
-+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
-+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Note: these flags are critical! */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
-+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
++ return (1);
++ }
+
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+ }
-+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
++/*
++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
++ */
++static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
++ {
++ /*
++ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
++ * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing private exponent of RSA
++ * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should
++ * be sufficient.
++ */
++ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, rsa->d) != 0) ||
++ ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0))
+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(privkey);
++ /*
++ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
++ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
++ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
++ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
++ */
++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
++ return (0);
+ }
++ return (1);
++ }
++#endif
+
-+err:
-+ if (sp != NULL)
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++/* The DSA function implementation */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
++ {
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+/* load RSA public key from a file */
+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
++static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *pubkey;
-+ RSA *rsa;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG objcnt = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][1024];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+ extern char *pk11_pin;
++ return (1);
++ }
+
-+ /* we look for public keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
+
-+ /* these attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA structure */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], 1024}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], 1024}, /* e */
-+ };
++static DSA_SIG *
++pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
++ {
++ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
++ int i;
++ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
++
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+
+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
++ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
++ * each is 20 bytes long
+ */
-+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
++ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
++ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
++ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
++
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++
++ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
+ {
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
++ goto ret;
++ }
+
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
++ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
++ if (dlen > i)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
++ goto ret;
++ }
+
-+#define ALLWAYS_LOGIN
-+#ifdef ALLWAYS_LOGIN
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "));
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
++ goto ret;
+
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(sp->session, CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
-+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_PIN, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+#endif
++ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
++
++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
++ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
++ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
++ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
++ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
++
++ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ if (pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, search_templ, 3) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &ks_key, 1, &objcnt);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
++ goto ret;
+ }
+
-+ if (objcnt > 1)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, PK11_R_TOO_MANY_OBJECTS);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
++ (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret,
++ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
+
-+ if (objcnt != 1)
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, PK11_R_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND);
-+ goto err;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
++ goto ret;
+ }
-+
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
-+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
-+ if (pkey == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ rsa = RSA_new_method(e);
-+ if (rsa == NULL) {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ goto err;
+ }
-+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+
-+ if (pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
++ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto ret;
++ }
+
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
++ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto ret;
+ }
-+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
++
++ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(pubkey);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto ret;
+ }
+
-+err:
-+ if (sp != NULL)
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
-+ }
++ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
++ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto ret;
++ }
+
-+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
-+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-+ {
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ dsa_sig->r = r;
++ dsa_sig->s = s;
+
-+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY);
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
-+ (void) pk11_active_add(h_key, OP_RSA);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
++ret:
++ if (dsa_sig == NULL)
+ {
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ *rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ else if ((*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
++ if (r != NULL)
++ BN_free(r);
++ if (s != NULL)
++ BN_free(s);
+ }
-+ return (h_key);
++
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
++ return (dsa_sig);
+ }
+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
++static int
++pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
++ DSA *dsa)
+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
-+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0))
++ int i;
++ CK_RV rv;
++ int retval = 0;
++ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
++
++ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
++ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
++ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
++
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++
++ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
++ goto ret;
+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing private exponent of RSA
-+ * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should
-+ * be sufficient.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, rsa->d) != 0) ||
-+ ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0))
++ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
++ goto ret;
+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
+
-+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
-+ {
-+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
++ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
++
++ if (dlen > i)
+ {
-+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
++ goto ret;
+ }
-+ }
+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
-+ {
-+ static char buf[128];
-+ HANDLE h;
-+ DWORD cc, mode;
-+ int cnt;
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
++ goto ret;
+
-+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
-+ fputs(prompt, stderr);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
-+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
-+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
++ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
+
-+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
++ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
++ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
++ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
++
++ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
-+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
-+ break;
-+ fputc('*', stdout);
-+ fflush(stderr);
-+ fflush(stdout);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
++ h_pub_key);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
++ rv);
++ goto ret;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
++ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
++ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
++ */
++ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
++ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
++ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
++ BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
++
++ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
++ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
++ goto ret;
++ }
+ }
+
-+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
-+ buf[cnt] = '\0';
-+ fputs("\n", stderr);
-+ return buf;
++ retval = 1;
++ret:
++
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
++ return (retval);
+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
-Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c
-diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.31
---- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 11:08:14 2009
-+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Fri Aug 28 06:31:09 2009
-@@ -0,0 +1,3137 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
++
+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
++ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
++ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
+ */
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
++ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++ {
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ CK_ULONG found;
++ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++ int i;
+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
++ {
++ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
++ {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
++ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
++ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
++ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */
++ };
+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
++ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
++ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#define NOPTHREADS
-+typedef int pid_t;
-+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
-+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#define NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
-+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
-+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
-+#else
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
++ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto malloc_err;
++ }
+
-+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+#endif
++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
++ ul_key_attr_count);
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT,
++ rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
-+#else
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
-+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
-+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x)
-+#endif
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* RSA stuff */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++ if (found == 0)
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ }
+
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-+#endif
++ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
++ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ rollback = TRUE;
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+/* DSA stuff */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
-+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
-+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
-+ DSA *dsa);
-+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
++ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
++ if (key_ptr != NULL)
++ *key_ptr = dsa;
+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++err:
++ if (rollback)
++ {
++ /*
++ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
++ * since we are doing rollback.
++ */
++ if (found == 0)
++ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
++ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ }
+
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-+#endif
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+
-+/* DH stuff */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
-+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
-+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
++malloc_err:
++ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
++ {
++ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
++ {
++ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
++ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
++ }
++ }
++
++ return (h_key);
++ }
++
++/*
++ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
++ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
++ */
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
++ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++ {
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
++ int i;
++ CK_ULONG found;
++ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++
++ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
++ {
++ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
++ {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &false, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
++ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
++ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
++ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */
++ };
++
++ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
++ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
++
++ /* Put the private key components into the template */
++ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
++ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto malloc_err;
++ }
+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
-+ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
++ ul_key_attr_count);
+
-+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
-+#endif
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
-+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
-+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
-+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
-+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
-+#else
-+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
-+#endif
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+/*
-+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
-+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
-+ * variable and jump to the specified label.
-+ */
-+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
-+ { \
-+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
-+ { \
-+ var = TRUE; \
-+ if (unlock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ goto label; \
-+ } \
-+ }
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
-+/*
-+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
-+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
-+ if (entry->h == h)
-+ return (entry);
++ if (found == 0)
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
++ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ }
+
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
++ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
++ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ rollback = TRUE;
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+/*
-+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
-+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
-+ * failure.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
-+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
++ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
++ if (key_ptr != NULL)
++ *key_ptr = dsa;
+
-+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++err:
++ if (rollback)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
++ /*
++ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
++ * since we are doing rollback.
++ */
++ if (found == 0)
++ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
++ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ }
+
-+ /* search for entry in the active list */
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
-+ entry->refcnt++;
-+ else
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++
++malloc_err:
++ /*
++ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
++ * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
++ */
++ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
+ {
-+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
-+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
-+ if (entry == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ entry->h = h;
-+ entry->refcnt = 1;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
-+ if (active_list[type] == NULL)
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
-+ else /* make the entry first in the list */
++ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+ {
-+ entry->next = active_list[type];
-+ active_list[type]->prev = entry;
-+ active_list[type] = entry;
++ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
++ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
++ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
++ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
-+ return (entry->refcnt);
++ return (h_key);
+ }
+
+/*
-+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
-+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
-+void
-+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
+ {
-+ PK11_active *prev_entry;
-+
-+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
-+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ prev_entry->next = entry->next;
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
-+ }
-+ else
++ /*
++ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
++ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
++ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
++ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
++ */
++ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
+ {
-+ active_list[type] = entry->next;
-+ /* we were the first but not the only one */
-+ if (entry->next != NULL)
-+ entry->next->prev = NULL;
++ /*
++ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
++ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
++ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
++ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
++ */
++ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
++ return (0);
+ }
-+
-+ /* sanitization */
-+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ entry->prev = NULL;
-+ entry->next = NULL;
-+ OPENSSL_free(entry);
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
-+void
-+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
++/*
++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
++ */
++static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry;
-+
-+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
-+ switch (type)
++ /*
++ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
++ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
++ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
++ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
++ */
++ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return;
++ /*
++ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
++ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
++ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
++ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
++ */
++ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
++ return (0);
+ }
++ return (1);
++ }
++#endif
+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
-+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++/* The DH function implementation */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
++ {
++ return (1);
++ }
++
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
++ {
++ return (1);
+ }
+
+/*
-+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
-+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
-+ *
-+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
-+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
++ * Generate DH key-pair.
+ *
-+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
-+ * held.
++ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
++ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
++ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
++ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
++ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
+ */
-+int
-+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
+ {
-+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
++ CK_ULONG i;
++ CK_RV rv, rv1;
++ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
+
-+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
++ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++
++ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
++ {CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof (false)},
++ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
++ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
++ };
+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
-+ entry->refcnt--;
-+ if (entry->refcnt == 0)
++ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
+ {
-+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++ {CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof (false)},
++ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &false, sizeof (false)},
++ {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof (true)}
++ };
+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
++ {
++ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
++ };
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 RSA method",
-+ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */
-+ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */
-+ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */
-+ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */
-+ NULL, /* app_data */
-+ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */
-+ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */
-+ };
++ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
++ {
++ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
++ };
+
-+RSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_RSA(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_rsa);
-+ }
-+#endif
++ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
++ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
++ {
++ /*
++ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
++ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
++ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
++ */
++ pub_key_template[1].pValue =
++ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
++ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
++ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 DSA method",
-+ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */
-+ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
-+ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */
-+ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */
-+ 0, /* flags */
-+ NULL /* app_data */
-+ };
++ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
++ }
++ else
++ goto err;
+
-+DSA_METHOD *
-+PK11_DSA(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_dsa);
-+ }
-+#endif
++ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
++ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
++ {
++ pub_key_template[2].pValue =
++ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
++ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
++ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/*
-+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
-+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
-+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
-+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
-+ * enough.
-+ */
-+#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8
++ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
++ }
++ else
++ goto err;
+
-+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
-+ {
-+ "PKCS#11 DH method",
-+ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */
-+ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */
-+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
-+ pk11_DH_init, /* init */
-+ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */
-+ 0, /* flags */
-+ NULL, /* app_data */
-+ NULL /* generate_params */
-+ };
++ /*
++ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
++ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are
++ * destroyed before return and thus not cached.
++ */
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
++ goto err;
+
-+DH_METHOD *
-+PK11_DH(void)
-+ {
-+ return (&pk11_dh);
-+ }
-+#endif
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
++ &mechanism,
++ pub_key_template,
++ ul_pub_key_attr_count,
++ priv_key_template,
++ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
++ &h_pub_key,
++ &h_priv_key);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
++ /*
++ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
++ * should be sufficient for reuse.
++ */
++ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
++ {
++ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
++ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
++ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
++ }
+
-+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
-+#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20
-+#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
++ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
++ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
++ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
-+static CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;
++ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/*
-+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
-+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
-+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
-+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
++ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
++ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
++ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
++ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
++ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
++
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
++ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ switch (padding)
++ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
++ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
++ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
++ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
++ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ }
++
++ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
++ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
++ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
++
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
++ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
-+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-+err:
-+ if (buf != NULL)
++ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
++ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
++ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
++ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
++ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
+
++ ret = 1;
+
-+/*
-+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
-+ * should be catched in the padding functions
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
++err:
+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
++ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
++ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
++ }
+ }
+
-+ switch (padding)
++ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
++ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
++ }
+ }
-+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-+err:
-+ if (buf != NULL)
++ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
++ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
++ {
++ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
++ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
++ }
+ }
-+ return (r);
++
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
++ return (ret);
+ }
+
-+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
++static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
++ DH *dh)
+ {
-+ BIGNUM f;
-+ int j, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *p;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ BN_init(&f);
-+
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
++ unsigned int i;
++ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
++ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
-+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
++ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2;
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
++ };
+
-+ /*
-+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
-+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
-+ */
-+ if (flen > num)
++ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
++ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
++ };
++
++ CK_RV rv;
++ int ret = -1;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++
++ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+ goto err;
-+ }
+
-+ /* make data into a big number */
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
++ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
++ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
++
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
-+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
++ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
++ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
++ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
++ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
-+ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
-+ */
-+ for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
-+ if (buf[j] != 0)
-+ break;
++ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
+
-+ p = buf + j;
-+ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
++ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
++ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
++ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
++ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
+
-+ switch (padding)
++ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
+ goto err;
+ }
-+ if (r < 0)
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
-+err:
-+ BN_clear_free(&f);
-+ if (buf != NULL)
++ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
++ &mechanism,
++ h_key,
++ priv_key_template,
++ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
++ &h_derived_key);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
++ goto err;
+ }
-+ return (r);
-+ }
+
-+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-+ {
-+ BIGNUM f;
-+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-+ unsigned char *p;
-+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
++ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
-+ BN_init(&f);
-+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-+ if (buf == NULL)
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
++ rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ /*
-+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
-+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
-+ */
-+ if (flen > num)
++ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
+ goto err;
+ }
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
++ priv_key_result[0].pValue =
++ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
++ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
++ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
-+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
++ rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
-+ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-+
+ /*
-+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
-+ * Needs to skip these 0's here
++ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
++ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
-+ if (buf[i] != 0)
-+ break;
++ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
++ {
++ /*
++ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
++ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
++ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
++ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
++ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
++ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
++ * pre-master secret.
++ */
++ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
++ {
++ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
++ break;
++ }
+
-+ p = buf + i;
-+ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
++ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
++ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
++ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
++ }
+
-+ switch (padding)
++err:
++
++ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
-+ break;
-+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
++ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
++ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
++ }
++ }
++ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
++ {
++ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
++ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
+ }
-+ if (r < 0)
-+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
-+err:
-+ BN_clear_free(&f);
-+ if (buf != NULL)
++ if (mechanism.pParameter)
+ {
-+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
-+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
++ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
++ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+ }
-+ return (r);
++
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
++ return (ret);
+ }
+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
-+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
++
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
++ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
++ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
++ CK_ULONG found;
++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++ int i;
+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
++ {
++ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
++ {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof (true)},
++ {CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof (false)},
++ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
++ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
++ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
++ };
+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
++ key_template[0].pValue = &class;
++ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
++ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
++ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
++ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto malloc_err;
++ }
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
++ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
++ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
++ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
++ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
++ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto malloc_err;
++ }
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_encrypted;
++ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
++
++ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
++ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
++ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
++ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto malloc_err;
+ }
+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
++ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
+
++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
++ ul_key_attr_count);
+
-+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
-+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, sp->session);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_priv_key);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
++ rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
++ if (found == 0)
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
++ rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
++ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ rollback = TRUE;
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
++ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err);
++ if (key_ptr != NULL)
++ *key_ptr = dh;
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++err:
++ if (rollback)
++ {
++ /*
++ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
++ * since we are doing rollback.
++ */
++ if (found == 0)
++ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
++ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ }
++
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++
++malloc_err:
++ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
++ {
++ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
-+ rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
++ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
++ key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+ }
-+
-+ retval = ul_sig_len;
+ }
+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
++ return (h_key);
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
++ *
++ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
++ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
++ */
++static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
++ {
++ /*
++ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
++ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
++ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
++ * in PK11_SESSION structure.
++ */
++ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
++ {
++ /*
++ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
++ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
++ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
++ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
++ */
++ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE);
++ return (0);
++ }
++ return (1);
++ }
++#endif
+
+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
-+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
++ * Local function to simplify key template population
++ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
++static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
++ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++ CK_ULONG len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
++ if (len == 0)
++ return (1);
+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
++ *ul_value_len = len;
++ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
++ if (*p_value == NULL)
++ return (0);
+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, sp->session);
++ return (1);
++ }
+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
++ {
++ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_priv_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
++ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
++ }
++ }
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
++ {
++ static char buf[128];
++ HANDLE h;
++ DWORD cc, mode;
++ int cnt;
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
++ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
++ fputs(prompt, stderr);
++ fflush(stderr);
++ fflush(stdout);
++ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
++ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
++ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_decrypted;
++ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
++ {
++ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
++ if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
++ break;
++ fputc('*', stdout);
++ fflush(stderr);
++ fflush(stdout);
+ }
+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
++ SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
++ buf[cnt] = '\0';
++ fputs("\n", stderr);
++ return buf;
+ }
-+
-+
++#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.2
+--- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 13:17:24 2009
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h Mon Oct 5 13:17:03 2009
+@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
++/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */
++
++#define find_lock pk11ca_find_lock
++#define active_list pk11ca_active_list
++#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11ca_error
++#define PK11err_add_data PK11CAerr_add_data
++#define pk11_get_session pk11ca_get_session
++#define pk11_return_session pk11ca_return_session
++#define pk11_active_add pk11ca_active_add
++#define pk11_active_delete pk11ca_active_delete
++#define pk11_active_remove pk11ca_active_remove
++#define pk11_free_active_list pk11ca_free_active_list
++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects
++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub
++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv
++#define pk11_load_privkey pk11ca_load_privkey
++#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11ca_load_pubkey
++#define PK11_RSA PK11CA_RSA
++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects
++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub
++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv
++#define PK11_DSA PK11CA_DSA
++#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects
++#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11ca_destroy_dh_object
++#define PK11_DH PK11CA_DH
++#define pFuncList pk11ca_pFuncList
++#define pk11_pin pk11ca_pin
++#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11ca
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.2
+--- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 13:17:24 2009
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c Mon Oct 5 13:17:03 2009
+@@ -0,0 +1,1618 @@
+/*
-+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
-+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
-+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
++ * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
-+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
-+ int retval = -1;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (-1);
+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
++/*
++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
++ *
++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
++ * Afchine Madjlessi.
++ */
++/*
++ * ====================================================================
++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ *
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
++ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
++ * distribution.
++ *
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
++ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
++ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
++ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
++ *
++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
++ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
++ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
++ *
++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
++ * acknowledgment:
++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ * ====================================================================
++ *
++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
++ *
++ */
+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
++/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
-+ p_mech, h_pub_key);
++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++#error RSA is disabled
++#endif
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
++#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <cryptlib.h>
++#include <openssl/engine.h>
++#include <openssl/dso.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++#include <openssl/md5.h>
++#include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/rsa.h>
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/objects.h>
++#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
-+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+ retval = bytes_decrypted;
-+ }
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++typedef int pid_t;
++#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
++#define NOPTHREADS
++#ifndef NULL_PTR
++#define NULL_PTR NULL
++#endif
++#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
++#else
++#include <signal.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <dlfcn.h>
++#endif
+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (retval);
-+ }
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++#include <pthread.h>
++#endif
+
-+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
-+ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
++#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
++/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
++/*#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
-+ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
-+ * structures.
-+ */
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
-+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
-+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++#define OPENSSL_NO_DH
++#endif
+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
++#else
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#endif
++#include "hw_pk11so.h"
++#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
++
++/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
++static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
+
+/*
-+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
-+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
-+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
++ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
++ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
++ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
++ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
++ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
++ * PK11_SESSION object.
++ *
++ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
++ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
++ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
++ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
++ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
++ *
++ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
++ * They are also used for active list protection.
+ */
-+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ unsigned long ulsiglen;
-+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
++#endif
+
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
++/*
++ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
++ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
++ * list) for given algorithm type
++ */
++PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++/*
++ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
++ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
++ * without losing the secret key objects.
++ */
++static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
++/* ENGINE level stuff */
++static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
++static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
++static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
++static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
++static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
++/* RAND stuff */
++static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
++static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
++static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
++static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
++static int pk11_rand_status(void);
+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++/* These functions are also used in other files */
++PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, sp->session);
++/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
++extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
++extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
++int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++/* Local helper functions */
++static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
++static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh);
++static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
++static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
++static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
+
-+ ulsiglen = j;
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
-+ *siglen = ulsiglen;
++static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
++static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
++static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
++#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sess_hdl, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type) \
++ { \
++ if (uselock) \
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
++ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \
++ { \
++ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sess_hdl, obj_hdl); \
++ } \
++ if (uselock) \
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
++ }
+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
++#define TRY_OBJ_DELETE(sess_hdl, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type) \
++ { \
++ if (uselock) \
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
++ (void) pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type); \
++ if (uselock) \
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
+ }
+
-+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
-+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-+ const RSA *rsa)
-+ {
-+ X509_SIG sig;
-+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
-+ int i, j = 0;
-+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
-+ X509_ALGOR algor;
-+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ int ret = 0;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
+
-+ /* Encode the digest */
-+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
-+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
-+ {
-+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
-+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ }
-+ else
++/*
++ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
++ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
++ */
++#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
++#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
++#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
++static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
++ {
+ {
-+ sig.algor = &algor;
-+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
-+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-+ sig.digest = &digest;
-+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
-+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
-+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
-+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
++ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
++ "SO_PATH",
++ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
++ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
++ },
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
++ PK11_CMD_PIN,
++ "PIN",
++ "Specifies the pin code",
++ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
++ },
+ {
-+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ p = s;
-+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
++ PK11_CMD_SLOT,
++ "SLOT",
++ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
++ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
++ },
++ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
++ };
+
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
-+ sp->session);
++static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
++ {
++ pk11_rand_seed,
++ pk11_rand_bytes,
++ pk11_rand_cleanup,
++ pk11_rand_add,
++ pk11_rand_bytes,
++ pk11_rand_status
++ };
+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, sigbuf,
-+ (CK_ULONG)siglen);
++/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
++#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
++#endif
++static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
++static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)";
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+ }
++CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
++static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
+
-+err:
-+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
-+ OPENSSL_free(s);
-+ }
++/*
++ * These is the static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
++ * symbol names to bind to.
++ */
++static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
++static CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
++static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
++static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
++char *pk11_pin = NULL;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
++static int pk11_pid = 0;
+
-+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
++static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
+
-+/* load RSA private key from a file */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
++/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
++static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *privkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG objcnt = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][1024];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+ extern char *pk11_pin;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ int type;
+
-+ /* we look for private keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
++ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
++ goto malloc_err;
++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL);
+
-+ /* these attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA structure */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
++ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], 1024}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], 1024}, /* e */
-+ };
++ session_cache[type].lock =
++ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
++ goto malloc_err;
++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL);
++ }
++
++ return (1);
++
++malloc_err:
++ pk11_free_all_locks();
++ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ return (0);
++#else
++ return (1);
++#endif
++ }
+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
++static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
++ {
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ int type;
+
-+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
-+ */
-+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
++ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-+
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "));
++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
++ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
++ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
++ }
+
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(sp->session, CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
-+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
++ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++ {
++ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_PIN, rv);
-+ goto err;
++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
++ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
++ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
+ }
++ }
++#endif
++ }
+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session,
-+ search_templ, 3)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++/*
++ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
++ */
++static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
++ {
++ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
++ return (0);
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &ks_key, 1, &objcnt);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name))
++ return (0);
+
-+ if (objcnt > 1)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_TOO_MANY_OBJECTS);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
++ {
++ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
++ return (0);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ }
+
-+ if (objcnt != 1)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ if (pk11_have_random)
++ {
++ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
++ return (0);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ }
++ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
++ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
++ return (0);
+
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
++ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
+
-+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
-+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
-+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ return (1);
++ }
+
-+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
-+ if (pkey == NULL)
-+ goto err;
++/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
++#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
++#error "dynamic engine not supported"
++static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
++ {
++ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
++ return (0);
+
-+ rsa = RSA_new_method(e);
-+ if (rsa == NULL) {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
++ if (!bind_pk11(e))
++ return (0);
+
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ return (1);
++ }
+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
-+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+ }
-+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(privkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++#else
++static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
++ {
++ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
-+ sp->session);
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
++ if (!ret)
++ return (NULL);
++
++ if (!bind_pk11(ret))
++ {
++ ENGINE_free(ret);
++ return (NULL);
+ }
+
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
++ return (ret);
+ }
+
-+/* load RSA public key from a file */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
++void
++ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+ FILE *pubkey;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ RSA *rsa;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG objcnt = 0;
-+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
-+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][1024];
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-+ extern char *pk11_pin;
++ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
+
-+ /* we look for public keys only */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
-+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
-+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
++ /*
++ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
++ * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
++ */
++ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
++ if (!pk11_dso)
++ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
+
-+ /* these attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA structure */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
++ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+ {
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], 1024}, /* n */
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], 1024}, /* e */
-+ };
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++ return;
++ }
+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
-+ return (NULL);
++ e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
++ if (!e_pk11)
++ {
++ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
++ pk11_dso = NULL;
++ return;
++ }
+
+ /*
-+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
++ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
++ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
++ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
++ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
+ */
-+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
++ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
+ {
-+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
-+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
++ DSO_free(pk11_dso);
++ pk11_dso = NULL;
++ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
++ return;
++ }
+
-+#define ALLWAYS_LOGIN
-+#ifdef ALLWAYS_LOGIN
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "));
++ ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
+
-+ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(sp->session, CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
-+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_PIN, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+#endif
++ ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
++ ERR_clear_error();
++ }
++#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ if (pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, search_templ, 3) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &ks_key, 1, &objcnt);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++/*
++ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
++ * the function symbol names to bind to.
++ */
++static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+
-+ if (objcnt > 1)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, PK11_R_TOO_MANY_OBJECTS);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
++ {
++ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
++ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
+
-+ if (objcnt != 1)
-+ {
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, PK11_R_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
++ }
+
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
++ {
++ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
++ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
+
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
-+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
-+ if (pkey == NULL)
-+ goto err;
++ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
++ }
+
-+ rsa = RSA_new_method(e);
-+ if (rsa == NULL) {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
++static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
++ {
++ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+
-+ if (pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
-+ get_templ, 2) != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
++ }
+
-+ /*
-+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
-+ * everything else is 0 or NULL.
-+ */
-+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
++/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
++static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
++ {
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ int i;
+
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
-+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-+ }
-+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (void) fclose(pubkey);
-+ if (pkey != NULL)
-+ {
-+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-+ if (rsa != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++ return;
+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
-+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+ pkey = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++ {
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock);
+ }
++#endif
++ }
+
-+err:
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
-+ return (pkey);
++/* release all engine specific mutexes */
++static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
++ {
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ int i;
++
++ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++ return;
++
++ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
++ {
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
++ }
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++#endif
+ }
+
+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
++ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
++ * accessible to all threads.
+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
-+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++static void pk11_fork_child(void)
+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ int i;
+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
++ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++ return;
++
++ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &true, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
++ }
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++#endif
++ }
++
++/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
++static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
++{
++ return (pk11_library_init(e));
++}
+
++/*
++ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
++ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
++ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
++ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
++ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
++ {
++ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
++ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
++ CK_INFO info;
++ int any_slot_found;
+ int i;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
++#endif
+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
++ /*
++ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called
++ * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one
++ * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more
++ * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen
++ * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a
++ * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be
++ * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes
++ * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID
++ * check so that we properly initialize the engine again.
++ */
++ if (pk11_library_initialized)
++ {
++ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
++ {
++ return (1);
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ /*
++ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
++ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
++ * engine first.
++ */
++ pk11_free_all_locks();
++ }
++ }
+
-+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
++ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
-+
-+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
-+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
-+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
++ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
++ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
++ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
++ if (!p)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
-+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
++ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
++ rv = p(&pFuncList);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT,
-+ rv);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
++ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
++ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
++ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
++ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
++ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
++#endif
++ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
++ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
++ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
++#endif
++ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ if (found == 0)
++ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
++ goto err;
++
++ /*
++ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
++ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
++ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
++ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
++ * because no slot was present.
++ */
++ if (any_slot_found == 0)
++ return (1);
++
++ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
++ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
-+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
++ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
++ pk11_pid = getpid();
++ /*
++ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
++ * will do the cleanup.
++ */
++ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
++ goto err;
++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
++ /*
++ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
++ * for asymmetric ciphers.
++ */
++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++ active_list[i] = NULL;
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
++ {
++ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
++ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
-+ *rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ rollback = TRUE;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
+ }
++#endif
+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ return (1);
+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
++err:
++ return (0);
++ }
+
-+ return (h_key);
++/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
++ {
++ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
++ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
++ if (pk11_pin) {
++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
++ }
++ pk11_pin = NULL;
++ return (1);
+ }
+
+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
-+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
++ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
++ * library.
+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
-+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &false, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
+
-+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
-+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ goto set;
++ if (pk11_pin) {
++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
+ }
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
++ pk11_pin = NULL;
+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
++ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
++ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
+ goto err;
-+ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
++ /* free all active lists */
++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++ pk11_free_active_list(i);
++
++ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
++ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ /*
++ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
++ * may have side-effects.
++ */
++#if 0
++ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
++#endif
++
++ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
++ pk11_dso = NULL;
++ pFuncList = NULL;
++ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
++ pk11_pid = 0;
++ /*
++ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
++ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
++ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
++ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
++ * the engine before calling fork().
++ */
++ pk11_free_all_locks();
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++ return (1);
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++err:
++ return (0);
++ }
+
-+ if (found == 0)
++/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
++ {
++ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
++
++ switch (cmd)
+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
++ if (p == NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
++ return (0);
+ }
-+ }
+
-+set:
-+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
-+ *rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ else if ((*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
++ if (initialized)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
++ return (0);
+ }
-+ }
+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = rsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0 &&
-+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
++ case PK11_CMD_PIN:
++ if (pk11_pin) {
++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
+ }
++ pk11_pin = NULL;
+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ if (p == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
++ return (0);
++ }
+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
++ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
++ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ return (0);
+ }
++ return (1);
++ case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
++ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif
++ return (1);
++ default:
++ break;
+ }
+
-+ return (h_key);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
++
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
++
++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
++static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
-+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
++ return;
+ }
+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
+ {
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
++ return;
++
+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing private exponent of RSA
-+ * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should
-+ * be sufficient.
++ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
++ * the calling functions do not care anyway
+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, rsa->d) != 0) ||
-+ ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0))
++ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
++
++ return;
++ }
++
++static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
++ {
++ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
++ }
++
++static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
++ {
++ CK_RV rv;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
++ return (0);
++
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+ return (0);
+ }
++
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+ return (1);
+ }
-+#endif
+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* The DSA function implementation */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
++static int pk11_rand_status(void)
+ {
+ return (1);
+ }
+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
++/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
++static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+ {
-+ return (1);
++ switch (optype)
++ {
++ case OP_RSA:
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++ }
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++ }
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++ }
++ break;
++ default:
++ break;
++ }
+ }
+
-+
-+static DSA_SIG *
-+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
++/*
++ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
++ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
++ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
++ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
++ */
++PK11_SESSION *
++pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+ {
-+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
-+ int i;
-+ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
-+
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
++#endif
+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
++
++ switch (optype)
++ {
++ case OP_RSA:
++ case OP_DSA:
++ case OP_DH:
++ case OP_RAND:
++ case OP_DIGEST:
++ case OP_CIPHER:
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++#endif
++ break;
++ default:
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++ return (NULL);
++ }
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++ sp = freelist;
+
+ /*
-+ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
-+ * each is 20 bytes long
++ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
++ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
++ * structure from the freelist.
+ */
-+ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
-+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
-+ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
-+
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+
-+ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
++ if (sp == NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
-+ goto ret;
++ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
++ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
+ }
-+
-+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
-+ if (dlen > i)
++ else
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
-+ goto ret;
++ freelist = sp->next;
+ }
+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto ret;
++ if (sp->pid != 0 && sp->pid != getpid())
++ {
++ /*
++ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
++ * PK11_SESSION objects.
++ */
++ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
++ {
++ freelist = sp1->next;
++ /*
++ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
++ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
++ * sessions and destroy all objects.
++ */
++ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
++ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
++ }
+
-+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
++ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
++ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
+
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
-+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
-+ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
++ /* Initialize the process */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
++ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
++ rv);
++ OPENSSL_free(sp);
++ sp = NULL;
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
++ /*
++ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
++ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
++ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
++ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
++ * information.
++ */
++ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
++ goto err;
+
++ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
-+ goto ret;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
++ rv);
++ OPENSSL_free(sp);
++ sp = NULL;
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret,
-+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ /* It is an inherited session and needs re-initialization. */
++ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
-+ goto ret;
++ OPENSSL_free(sp);
++ sp = NULL;
+ }
+ }
-+
-+
-+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ if (sp->pid == 0)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
++ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
++ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
++ {
++ OPENSSL_free(sp);
++ sp = NULL;
++ }
+ }
+
-+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
++ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
++
++err:
++ if (sp != NULL)
++ sp->next = NULL;
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++
++ return (sp);
++ }
++
++
++void
++pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++ {
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
++#endif
++ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
++
++ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
++ return;
++
++ switch (optype)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
++ case OP_RSA:
++ case OP_DSA:
++ case OP_DH:
++ case OP_RAND:
++ case OP_DIGEST:
++ case OP_CIPHER:
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++#endif
++ break;
++ default:
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++ return;
+ }
+
-+ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++ sp->next = freelist;
++ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ }
++
++
++/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
++static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
++ {
++ int ret = 1;
++ int type;
++
++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
++
++ /*
++ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
++ * return 0 on exit.
++ */
++ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
++ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
++ ret = 0;
+ }
+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
-+ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
++ return (ret);
++ }
++
++/*
++ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
++ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
++ * return an error on return.
++ */
++static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++ {
++ CK_RV rv;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
++ pid_t mypid = getpid();
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
++#endif
++ int ret = 1;
++
++ switch (optype)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto ret;
++ case OP_RSA:
++ case OP_DSA:
++ case OP_DH:
++ case OP_RAND:
++ case OP_DIGEST:
++ case OP_CIPHER:
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++#endif
++ break;
++ default:
++ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ dsa_sig->r = r;
-+ dsa_sig->s = s;
-+
-+ret:
-+ if (dsa_sig == NULL)
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
+ {
-+ if (r != NULL)
-+ BN_free(r);
-+ if (s != NULL)
-+ BN_free(s);
++ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
++ {
++ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
++ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
++ ret = 0;
++ }
++ }
++ freelist = sp->next;
++ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
++ OPENSSL_free(sp);
+ }
+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
-+ return (dsa_sig);
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ return (ret);
+ }
+
-+static int
-+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
-+ DSA *dsa)
++
++static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+ {
-+ int i;
+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int retval = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
-+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
-+
-+ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
-+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
-+ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
-+
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
+
-+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
++ switch (optype)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
-+ goto ret;
++ case OP_RSA:
++ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
++ break;
++ case OP_RAND:
++ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
++ break;
++ default:
++ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
++ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
++ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
-+ goto ret;
++ /*
++ * We are probably a child process so force the
++ * reinitialize of the session
++ */
++ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
++ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
++ return (0);
++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
++ }
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
++ sp->pid = getpid();
+
-+ if (dlen > i)
++ if (optype == OP_RSA)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
-+ goto ret;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+ }
+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
-+ goto ret;
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
++ return (1);
++ }
+
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
-+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
-+ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
-+ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
++/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++ {
++ int ret = 0;
+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
-+ h_pub_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
++ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto ret;
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
-+ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
-+ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
-+ */
-+ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
-+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
-+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
-+ BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
-+ goto ret;
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
-+ retval = 1;
-+ret:
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
-+ return (retval);
++ return (ret);
+ }
+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
-+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
-+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ int i;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
-+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */
-+ };
-+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
++ int ret = 0;
+
-+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
++ TRY_OBJ_DELETE(sp->session,
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
++ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
++ {
++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++ }
+ }
+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ return (ret);
++ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
++/*
++ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
++ * objects in the free list.
++ */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
++ {
++ int ret = 1;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ if (session != NULL)
++ local_free_session = session;
++ else
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
++#else
++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
++ uselock = FALSE;
+ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ /*
++ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
++ */
++ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ local_free_session = sp->next;
+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ /*
++ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
++ * destroy operations fails.
++ */
++ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
++ ret = 0;
++ continue;
+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
++ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
++ ret = 0;
++ continue;
+ }
-+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ }
+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++ if (session == NULL)
++ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
++#else
++ if (session == NULL)
++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
++ return (ret);
++ }
++
++static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh)
++ {
++ CK_RV rv;
++ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
++ rv);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ return (h_key);
++ return (1);
+ }
+
++
+/*
-+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
-+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
++ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
++ *
++ * CKM_RSA_X_509
++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
++ *
++ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
++ * public key slot.
++ *
++ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
++ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
++ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
++ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
++ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
-+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++static int
++pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
+ {
++ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
++ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
++ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
++ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
++ unsigned int i;
+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
++ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
++ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
+
-+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &false, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
-+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */
-+ };
++ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
++ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
++ *any_slot_found = 0;
+
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
++ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
+
-+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
-+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
-+ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
-+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
++ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
++ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
++
++ if (pSlotList == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ return (0);
++ }
+
++ /* Get the slot list for processing */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
++ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
-+ goto err;
++ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
++
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ /* Check if slot has random support. */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ continue;
++
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
++ {
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
++ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
++ break;
++ }
+ }
+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
++ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
++ {
++ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
++ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
++
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ continue;
++
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++ /*
++ * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
++ */
++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
++ &mech_info);
++
++ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN)))
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
-+ goto err;
++ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
+ }
-+ }
+
-+ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
++ if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
-+ goto err;
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
++ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
++ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
++ PK11_DBG);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
++ best_slot_sofar);
+ }
++ else
++ {
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG);
++ }
++#else
++ } /* if */
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++ } /* for */
+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dsa;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
++ if (found_candidate_slot)
+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
+ }
+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++ /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/
+
-+malloc_err:
-+ /*
-+ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
-+ * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
-+ {
-+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
-+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
-+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
++ if (pSlotList != NULL)
++ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+
-+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
-+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
++ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
++ *any_slot_found = 1;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.2
+--- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 13:17:24 2009
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h Mon Oct 5 13:17:03 2009
+@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
++/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */
++
++#define find_lock pk11so_find_lock
++#define active_list pk11so_active_list
++#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11so_error
++#define PK11err_add_data PK11SOerr_add_data
++#define pk11_get_session pk11so_get_session
++#define pk11_return_session pk11so_return_session
++#define pk11_active_add pk11so_active_add
++#define pk11_active_delete pk11so_active_delete
++#define pk11_active_remove pk11so_active_remove
++#define pk11_free_active_list pk11so_free_active_list
++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects
++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub
++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv
++#define pk11_load_privkey pk11so_load_privkey
++#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11so_load_pubkey
++#define PK11_RSA PK11SO_RSA
++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects
++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub
++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv
++#define PK11_DSA PK11SO_DSA
++#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects
++#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11so_destroy_dh_object
++#define PK11_DH PK11SO_DH
++#define pFuncList pk11so_pFuncList
++#define pk11_pin pk11so_pin
++#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11so
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.2
+--- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 13:17:24 2009
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c Mon Oct 5 13:17:03 2009
+@@ -0,0 +1,899 @@
+/*
-+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
-+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
++ * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ */
-+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
-+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
-+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
-+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
-+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
-+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
-+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/* The DH function implementation */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
+
++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
+/*
-+ * Generate DH key-pair.
++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
++ *
++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
++ * Afchine Madjlessi.
++ */
++/*
++ * ====================================================================
++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ *
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
++ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
++ * distribution.
++ *
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
++ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
++ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
++ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
++ *
++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
++ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
++ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
++ *
++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
++ * acknowledgment:
++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ * ====================================================================
++ *
++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
-+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
-+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
-+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
-+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
-+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
+ */
-+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
-+ {
-+ CK_ULONG i;
-+ CK_RV rv, rv1;
-+ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
+
-+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++#error RSA is disabled
++#endif
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
++#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <cryptlib.h>
++#include <openssl/engine.h>
++#include <openssl/dso.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++#include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/rsa.h>
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/objects.h>
++#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof (false)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++#define NOPTHREADS
++typedef int pid_t;
++#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
++static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
++#ifndef NULL_PTR
++#define NULL_PTR NULL
++#endif
++#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
++#else
++#include <unistd.h>
++#endif
+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof (false)},
-+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &false, sizeof (false)},
-+ {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof (true)}
-+ };
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++#include <pthread.h>
++#endif
+
-+ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
+
-+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++#define OPENSSL_NO_DH
++#endif
+
-+ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
-+ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
-+ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
-+ */
-+ pub_key_template[1].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
-+ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
++#else
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#endif
++#include "hw_pk11so.h"
++#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
+
-+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
++#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
++#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x)
++#endif
+
-+ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
-+ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
-+ {
-+ pub_key_template[2].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
-+ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
-+ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++/* RSA stuff */
++static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
++ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+
-+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ goto err;
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
++ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
-+ /*
-+ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
-+ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are
-+ * destroyed before return and thus not cached.
-+ */
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
++static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
++static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
-+ &mechanism,
-+ pub_key_template,
-+ ul_pub_key_attr_count,
-+ priv_key_template,
-+ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
-+ &h_pub_key,
-+ &h_priv_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
+
-+ /*
-+ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
-+ * should be sufficient for reuse.
-+ */
-+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
-+ {
-+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
-+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
-+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
-+ }
++/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
++#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
++static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
++#else
++static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
++#endif
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
-+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
-+ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
++/*
++ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
++ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
++ * variable and jump to the specified label.
++ */
++#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
++ { \
++ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
++ { \
++ var = TRUE; \
++ if (unlock) \
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
++ goto label; \
++ } \
++ }
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++/*
++ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
++ * entry otherwise return NULL.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++ {
++ PK11_active *entry;
+
-+ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
-+ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
++ if (entry->h == h)
++ return (entry);
+
-+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
-+ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
-+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
++ return (NULL);
++ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
-+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
++/*
++ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
++ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
++ * failure.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++int
++pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++ {
++ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
++ return (-1);
+ }
+
-+ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
++ /* search for entry in the active list */
++ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
++ entry->refcnt++;
++ else
+ {
-+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
-+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
-+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
-+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
++ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
++ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
++ if (entry == NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++ entry->h = h;
++ entry->refcnt = 1;
++ entry->prev = NULL;
++ entry->next = NULL;
++ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
++ if (active_list[type] == NULL)
++ active_list[type] = entry;
++ else /* make the entry first in the list */
++ {
++ entry->next = active_list[type];
++ active_list[type]->prev = entry;
++ active_list[type] = entry;
+ }
+ }
+
-+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
++ return (entry->refcnt);
++ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
++/*
++ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++void
++pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++ {
++ PK11_active *prev_entry;
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
++ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
-+ goto err;
++ prev_entry->next = entry->next;
++ if (entry->next != NULL)
++ entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
+ }
-+
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
++ else
+ {
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ active_list[type] = entry->next;
++ /* we were the first but not the only one */
++ if (entry->next != NULL)
++ entry->next->prev = NULL;
+ }
+
-+ ret = 1;
++ /* sanitization */
++ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ entry->prev = NULL;
++ entry->next = NULL;
++ OPENSSL_free(entry);
++ }
+
-+err:
++/* Free all entries from the active list. */
++void
++pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
++ {
++ PK11_active *entry;
+
-+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
++ switch (type)
+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
++ case OP_RSA:
++ break;
++ default:
++ return;
+ }
+
-+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
++ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
++ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
++ }
++
++/*
++ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
++ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
++ *
++ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
++ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++int
++pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++ {
++ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
++
++ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
-+ }
++ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
++ return (-1);
+ }
+
-+ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
++ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
++ entry->refcnt--;
++ if (entry->refcnt == 0)
+ {
-+ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
-+ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
-+ }
++ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
++ return (1);
+ }
+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
-+ return (ret);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
-+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
-+ DH *dh)
++/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
++static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa;
++
++RSA_METHOD *
++PK11_RSA(void)
+ {
-+ unsigned int i;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ const RSA_METHOD *rsa;
+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
++ if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL)
+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
-+ };
++ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
++ memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa));
++ pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method";
++ pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign;
++ }
++ return (&pk11_rsa);
++ }
+
-+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
-+ };
++/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
++#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
+
++/*
++ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
++ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
++ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
++ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
++ {
++ X509_SIG sig;
++ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
++ int i, j = 0;
++ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
++ X509_ALGOR algor;
++ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int ret = -1;
++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++ int ret = 0;
++ unsigned long ulsiglen;
+
-+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
-+ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
-+ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
-+ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
++ /* Encode the digest */
++ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
++ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
++ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
++ s = (unsigned char *)m;
+ }
-+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
-+
-+ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
-+
-+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
-+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
-+ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
-+ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
-+
-+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ else
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ sig.algor = &algor;
++ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
++ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
++ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
++ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
++ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
++ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
-+ &mechanism,
-+ h_key,
-+ priv_key_template,
-+ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
-+ &h_derived_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ sig.digest = &digest;
++ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
++ sig.digest->length = m_len;
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
++ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
++ }
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
-+ rv);
++ j = RSA_size(rsa);
++ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
++ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
-+ goto err;
++ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
++ if (s == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ p = s;
++ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+ }
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
-+ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
-+ }
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
-+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
++ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
++ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
++ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
++ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, sp->session);
+
-+ /*
-+ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
-+ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
-+ */
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
++ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
-+ /*
-+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
-+ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
-+ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
-+ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
-+ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
-+ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
-+ * pre-master secret.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
++ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
++
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
-+ break;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
++ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
-+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
-+ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
-+ }
-+
-+err:
++ ulsiglen = j;
++ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
++ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
++ *siglen = ulsiglen;
+
-+ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
-+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
++ goto err;
+ }
-+ }
-+ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
-+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
++ ret = 1;
+ }
+
-+ if (mechanism.pParameter)
++err:
++ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
-+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
++ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
++ OPENSSL_free(s);
+ }
+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
++static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
+
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
-+ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++/* load RSA private key from a file */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+ {
++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++ FILE *privkey;
++ RSA *rsa;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++ /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
-+ CK_ULONG found;
-+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
-+ int i;
++ CK_ULONG objcnt = 0;
++ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
++ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][1024];
++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
++ extern char *pk11_pin;
+
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
++ /* we look for private keys only */
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
-+ {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof (true)},
-+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof (false)},
-+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
++ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
++ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
++ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
+ };
+
-+ key_template[0].pValue = &class;
-+ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
++ /* these attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA structure */
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
++ {
++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], 1024}, /* n */
++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], 1024}, /* e */
++ };
+
-+ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
-+ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
++ /*
++ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
++ */
++ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ }
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++ return (NULL);
+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
++ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
++ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+
-+ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
-+ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
++ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++ {
++ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "));
++
++ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ }
++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(sp->session, CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
++ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_PIN, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session,
++ search_templ, 3)) != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &ks_key, 1, &objcnt);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ if (objcnt > 1)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_TOO_MANY_OBJECTS);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ if (objcnt != 1)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++ if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
++ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
++ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
++ NULL, NULL, NULL);
++
++ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
++ if (pkey == NULL)
++ goto err;
++
++ rsa = RSA_new_method(e);
++ if (rsa == NULL) {
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++ pkey = NULL;
++ goto err;
+ }
++ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
++ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++ pkey = NULL;
++ goto err;
++ }
+
-+ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
-+ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
-+ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
-+ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
++ /* Note: these flags are critical! */
++ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
++ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
++
++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
++ }
++ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto malloc_err;
++ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ (void) fclose(privkey);
+ }
+
-+ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
++err:
++ if (sp != NULL)
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (pkey);
++ }
+
-+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
-+ ul_key_attr_count);
++/* load RSA public key from a file */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
++ {
++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++ FILE *pubkey;
++ RSA *rsa;
++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++ /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
++ CK_RV rv;
++ CK_ULONG objcnt = 0;
++ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
++ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][1024];
++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
++ extern char *pk11_pin;
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ /* we look for public keys only */
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
++ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
++ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
++ };
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
++ /* these attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA structure */
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
++ {
++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], 1024}, /* n */
++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], 1024}, /* e */
++ };
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
++ /*
++ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
++ */
++ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++ return (NULL);
+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
++ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
++#define ALLWAYS_LOGIN
++#ifdef ALLWAYS_LOGIN
++ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++ {
++ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "));
+
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++ if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++ {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ }
++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(sp->session, CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
++ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
++ {
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
++ PK11_R_INVALID_PIN, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++#endif
++
++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ if (pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, search_templ, 3) != CKR_OK)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &ks_key, 1, &objcnt);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
-+ rv);
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ if (objcnt > 1)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, PK11_R_TOO_MANY_OBJECTS);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ if (objcnt != 1)
++ {
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, PK11_R_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND);
+ goto err;
+ }
++
++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
++ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
++ if (pkey == NULL)
++ goto err;
++
++ rsa = RSA_new_method(e);
++ if (rsa == NULL) {
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++ pkey = NULL;
++ goto err;
+ }
++ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+
-+ if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
++ if (pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
++ get_templ, 2) != CKR_OK)
+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ rollback = TRUE;
++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
-+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
-+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err);
-+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
-+ *key_ptr = dh;
++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
+
-+err:
-+ if (rollback)
++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
++ }
++ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
-+ * since we are doing rollback.
-+ */
-+ if (found == 0)
-+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
-+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ (void) fclose(pubkey);
+ }
+
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++err:
++ if (sp != NULL)
++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++ return (pkey);
++ }
+
-+malloc_err:
-+ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
++/*
++ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
++ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
++ */
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
++ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++ {
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++
++ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) {
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY);
++ return (h_key);
++ }
++
++ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
++ (void) pk11_active_add(h_key, OP_RSA);
++ if (key_ptr != NULL)
++ *key_ptr = rsa;
++ if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
+ {
-+ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
++ if (rsa->d == NULL)
++ *rsa_d_num = NULL;
++ else if ((*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
-+ key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ return (h_key);
+ }
+ }
-+
+ return (h_key);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
-+ *
-+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
-+ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
+ */
-+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
++static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ /*
-+ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
-+ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
-+ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
-+ * in PK11_SESSION structure.
++ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
++ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
++ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
++ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+ */
-+ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
-+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
++ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0))
+ {
+ /*
+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+ */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE);
++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+ }
-+#endif
+
+/*
-+ * Local function to simplify key template population
-+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
-+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
-+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
++static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+ {
-+ CK_ULONG len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-+ if (len == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ *ul_value_len = len;
-+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
-+ if (*p_value == NULL)
++ /*
++ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
++ * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing private exponent of RSA
++ * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should
++ * be sufficient.
++ */
++ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, rsa->d) != 0) ||
++ ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0))
++ {
++ /*
++ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
++ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
++ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
++ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
++ */
++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
+ return (0);
-+
-+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
-+
++ }
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
+ }
+ }
++
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
+ {
+ return buf;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1
---- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 11:08:14 2009
+--- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 13:17:24 2009
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.1 $ */
++/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */
+
+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
+#endif
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1
---- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 11:08:14 2009
+--- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 13:17:24 2009
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@
+/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.1 $ */
++/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */
+
+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
+#endif
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2
---- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 11:08:14 2009
+--- /dev/null Mon Oct 5 13:17:24 2009
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008
@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@
+/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */
-+/* $Revision: 1.1 $ */
++/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */
+
+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
+
+#endif
Index: openssl/util/libeay.num
-diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.1.3.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.5
+diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.1.3.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.6
--- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.1.3.1 Mon Feb 2 00:27:56 2009
-+++ openssl/util/libeay.num Fri Sep 4 10:43:22 2009
-@@ -3725,3 +3725,4 @@
++++ openssl/util/libeay.num Mon Oct 5 13:17:03 2009
+@@ -3725,3 +3725,5 @@
JPAKE_STEP3A_init 4111 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE
ERR_load_JPAKE_strings 4112 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE
JPAKE_STEP2_init 4113 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE
-+ENGINE_load_pk11 4114 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
++ENGINE_load_pk11ca 4114 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE
++ENGINE_load_pk11so 4114 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE
Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl
-diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.1.3.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.6
+diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.1.3.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.7
--- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.1.3.1 Tue Dec 2 23:50:21 2008
-+++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Fri Sep 4 10:43:23 2009
-@@ -322,6 +322,9 @@
++++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Mon Oct 5 13:17:05 2009
+@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@
+ no-ecdh - No ECDH
+ no-engine - No engine
+ no-hw - No hw
++ no-hw-pkcs11ca - No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor
++ no-hw-pkcs11so - No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor
+ nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm
+ nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare
+ nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare
+@@ -242,6 +244,8 @@
+ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ECDH" if $no_ecdh;
+ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine;
+ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw;
++$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA" if $no_hw_pkcs11ca;
++$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO" if $no_hw_pkcs11so;
+ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips;
+ $cflags.= " -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt;
+ $cflags.= " -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2;
+@@ -322,6 +326,9 @@
if ($key eq "ZLIB_INCLUDE")
{ $cflags .= " $val" if $val ne "";}
if ($key eq "LIBZLIB")
{ $zlib_lib = "$val" if $val ne "";}
+@@ -1300,6 +1307,8 @@
+ "no-ecdh" => \$no_ecdh,
+ "no-engine" => \$no_engine,
+ "no-hw" => \$no_hw,
++ "no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca,
++ "no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so,
+ "just-ssl" =>
+ [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast,
+ \$no_md2, \$no_sha, \$no_mdc2, \$no_dsa, \$no_dh,
+Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl
+diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.1.3.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.5
+--- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.1.3.1 Mon Nov 24 16:14:15 2008
++++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl Mon Oct 5 13:17:05 2009
+@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
+ # External "algorithms"
+ "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM",
+ # Engines
+- "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP",
++ "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO",
+ # RFC3779 support
+ "RFC3779",
+ # TLS extension support
+@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
+ my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2;
+ my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5;
+ my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw; my $no_camellia;
++my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so;
+ my $no_seed;
+ my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated;
+ my $no_rfc3779; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng; my $no_jpake;
+@@ -214,6 +215,8 @@
+ elsif (/^no-cms$/) { $no_cms=1; }
+ elsif (/^no-capieng$/) { $no_capieng=1; }
+ elsif (/^no-jpake$/) { $no_jpake=1; }
++ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; }
++ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; }
+ }
+
+
+@@ -1138,6 +1141,8 @@
+ if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; }
+ if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; }
+ if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; }
++ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; }
++ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; }
+ if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; }
+ if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; }
+ if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; }
Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.1.3.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.5
--- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.1.3.1 Mon Mar 9 12:14:08 2009
projects / thirdparty / bind9.git / commitdiff
