Make ANSWER TTL capping checks stricter

For checks querying a named instance with "dnssec-accept-expired yes;"
set, authoritative responses have a TTL of 300 seconds.  Assuming empty
resolver cache, TTLs of RRsets in the ANSWER section of the first
response to a given query will always match their authoritative
counterparts.  Also note that for a DNSSEC-validating named resolver,
validated RRsets replace any existing non-validated RRsets with the same
owner name and type, e.g. cached from responses received while resolving
CD=1 queries.  Since TTL capping happens before a validated RRset is
inserted into the cache and RRSIG expiry time does not impose an upper
TTL bound when "dnssec-accept-expired yes;" is set and, as pointed out
above, the original TTLs of the relevant RRsets equal 300 seconds, the
RRsets in the ANSWER section of the responses to expiring.example/SOA
and expired.example/SOA queries sent with CD=0 should always be exactly
120 seconds, never a lower value.  Make the relevant TTL checks stricter
to reflect that.

(cherry picked from commit a85cc41486d94d6c5e5116c63fa7ef1c9fd58925)

diff --git a/bin/tests/system/dnssec/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/dnssec/tests.sh
index 117fc0ca68ce7da77bb6f398ff149012abaea76b..dda755f9a15abae0e3f9f78f6d67bb1c830543d8 100644 (file)
--- a/bin/tests/system/dnssec/tests.sh
+++ b/bin/tests/system/dnssec/tests.sh
@@ -2855,7 +2855,7 @@ for ttl in ${ttls:-0}; do
     [ "$ttl" -eq 300 ] || ret=1
 done
 for ttl in ${ttls2:-0}; do
-    [ "$ttl" -le 120 ] && [ "$ttl" -gt 60 ] || ret=1
+    [ "$ttl" -eq 120 ] || ret=1
 done
 n=$((n+1))
 test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
@@ -2871,7 +2871,7 @@ for ttl in ${ttls:-0}; do
     [ "$ttl" -eq 300 ] || ret=1
 done
 for ttl in ${ttls2:-0}; do
-    [ "$ttl" -le 120 ] && [ "$ttl" -gt 60 ] || ret=1
+    [ "$ttl" -eq 120 ] || ret=1
 done
 n=$((n+1))
 test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"