]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/linux.git/commitdiff
sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()
authorMichael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Mon, 8 Jun 2026 12:22:34 +0000 (08:22 -0400)
committerJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Wed, 10 Jun 2026 01:12:30 +0000 (18:12 -0700)
__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF
chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls
af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6)
trusting the parameter's declared length.

An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that
declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter
header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then
reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.

Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16
bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.

The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with
sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound.
Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before
from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43
("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop").

Fixes: df2185771439 ("[SCTP]: Update association lookup to look at ASCONF chunks as well")
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260608122234.459098-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
net/sctp/input.c

index e119e460ccde0b8ac68e10ca2cb1f1c2c5e9cccf..864741fae4187e3645474b97e47ba154591b30b2 100644 (file)
@@ -1204,6 +1204,14 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(
        /* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */
        param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf + 1);
 
+       /* The whole address parameter must lie within the chunk before
+        * af->from_addr_param() reads the variable-length address; otherwise a
+        * truncated trailing ASCONF chunk lets it read uninitialized bytes past
+        * the parameter.
+        */
+       if (sizeof(*asconf) + ntohs(param->p.length) > ntohs(ch->length))
+               return NULL;
+
        af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param->p.type));
        if (unlikely(!af))
                return NULL;