4.4-stable patches

added patches:
	x86-kasan-write-protect-kasan-zero-shadow.patch

diff --git a/queue-4.4/series b/queue-4.4/series
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..305698b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-4.4/series
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+x86-kasan-write-protect-kasan-zero-shadow.patch

diff --git a/queue-4.4/x86-kasan-write-protect-kasan-zero-shadow.patch b/queue-4.4/x86-kasan-write-protect-kasan-zero-shadow.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..6bba77c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-4.4/x86-kasan-write-protect-kasan-zero-shadow.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 063fb3e56f6dd29b2633b678b837e1d904200e6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 15:51:19 +0300
+Subject: x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadow
+
+From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
+
+commit 063fb3e56f6dd29b2633b678b837e1d904200e6f upstream.
+
+After kasan_init() executed, no one is allowed to write to kasan_zero_page,
+so write protect it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
+Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
+Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
+Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
+Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
+Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
+Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
+Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
+Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
+Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452516679-32040-3-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
+Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
+Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c |   10 ++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+@@ -126,10 +126,16 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
+ 
+       /*
+        * kasan_zero_page has been used as early shadow memory, thus it may
+-       * contain some garbage. Now we can clear it, since after the TLB flush
+-       * no one should write to it.
++       * contain some garbage. Now we can clear and write protect it, since
++       * after the TLB flush no one should write to it.
+        */
+       memset(kasan_zero_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++      for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
++              pte_t pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
++              set_pte(&kasan_zero_pte[i], pte);
++      }
++      /* Flush TLBs again to be sure that write protection applied. */
++      __flush_tlb_all();
+ 
+       init_task.kasan_depth = 0;
+       pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");