From: Tristan Madani Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 13:50:18 +0000 (+0000) Subject: wifi: wcn36xx: fix OOB read from short trigger BA firmware response X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=b5e6f21923ca89d90256e7346301056f6502691e;p=thirdparty%2Flinux.git wifi: wcn36xx: fix OOB read from short trigger BA firmware response The firmware response length is only checked against sizeof(*rsp) (20 bytes), but when candidate_cnt >= 1, a 22-byte candidate struct is read at buf + 20 without verifying the response contains it. This causes an out-of-bounds read of stale heap data, corrupting the BA session state. Add validation that the response includes the candidate data. Fixes: 16be1ac55944 ("wcn36xx: Parse trigger_ba response properly") Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260421135018.352774-4-tristmd@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson --- diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/wcn36xx/smd.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/wcn36xx/smd.c index 2a0c946d8109..c0b477345832 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/wcn36xx/smd.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/wcn36xx/smd.c @@ -2599,6 +2599,9 @@ static int wcn36xx_smd_trigger_ba_rsp(void *buf, int len, struct add_ba_info *ba if (rsp->candidate_cnt < 1) return rsp->status ? rsp->status : -EINVAL; + if (len < sizeof(*rsp) + sizeof(*candidate)) + return -EINVAL; + candidate = (struct wcn36xx_hal_trigger_ba_rsp_candidate *)(buf + sizeof(*rsp)); for (i = 0; i < STACFG_MAX_TC; i++) {