From b01e594fbe754a960212f908d047294e880b52fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Miss Islington (bot)" <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2026 21:55:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] [3.14] gh-146581: Fix vulnerability in shutil.unpack_archive() for ZIP files on Windows (GH-146591) (GH-149064) Use ZipFile.extractall() to sanitize file names and extract files. Files with invalid names (e.g. absolute paths) are now skipped. Files containing ".." in the name are no longer skipped. (cherry picked from commit fc829e88753858c8ac669594bf0093f44948c0f4) Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka --- Lib/shutil.py | 24 +------ Lib/test/test_shutil.py | 67 ++++++++++++++++++- Lib/zipfile/__init__.py | 21 ++++-- ...-03-29-12-51-33.gh-issue-146581.4vZfB0.rst | 5 ++ 4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-29-12-51-33.gh-issue-146581.4vZfB0.rst diff --git a/Lib/shutil.py b/Lib/shutil.py index 8d8fe1455678..b7608f7edfc9 100644 --- a/Lib/shutil.py +++ b/Lib/shutil.py @@ -1314,27 +1314,9 @@ def _unpack_zipfile(filename, extract_dir): if not zipfile.is_zipfile(filename): raise ReadError("%s is not a zip file" % filename) - zip = zipfile.ZipFile(filename) - try: - for info in zip.infolist(): - name = info.filename - - # don't extract absolute paths or ones with .. in them - if name.startswith('/') or '..' in name: - continue - - targetpath = os.path.join(extract_dir, *name.split('/')) - if not targetpath: - continue - - _ensure_directory(targetpath) - if not name.endswith('/'): - # file - with zip.open(name, 'r') as source, \ - open(targetpath, 'wb') as target: - copyfileobj(source, target) - finally: - zip.close() + with zipfile.ZipFile(filename) as zip: + zip._ignore_invalid_names = True + zip.extractall(extract_dir) def _unpack_tarfile(filename, extract_dir, *, filter=None): """Unpack tar/tar.gz/tar.bz2/tar.xz/tar.zst `filename` to `extract_dir` diff --git a/Lib/test/test_shutil.py b/Lib/test/test_shutil.py index 62c80aab4b33..fb1a7d876a61 100644 --- a/Lib/test/test_shutil.py +++ b/Lib/test/test_shutil.py @@ -2110,8 +2110,6 @@ class TestArchives(BaseTest, unittest.TestCase): def check_unpack_archive(self, format, **kwargs): self.check_unpack_archive_with_converter( format, lambda path: path, **kwargs) - self.check_unpack_archive_with_converter( - format, FakePath, **kwargs) self.check_unpack_archive_with_converter(format, FakePath, **kwargs) def check_unpack_archive_with_converter(self, format, converter, **kwargs): @@ -2168,6 +2166,71 @@ class TestArchives(BaseTest, unittest.TestCase): with self.assertRaises(TypeError): self.check_unpack_archive('zip', filter='data') + def test_unpack_archive_zip_badpaths(self): + srcdir = self.mkdtemp() + zipname = os.path.join(srcdir, 'test.zip') + abspath = os.path.join(srcdir, 'abspath') + with zipfile.ZipFile(zipname, 'w') as zf: + zf.writestr(abspath, 'badfile') + zf.writestr(os.sep + abspath, 'badfile') + zf.writestr('/abspath', 'badfile') + zf.writestr('C:/abspath', 'badfile') + zf.writestr('D:\\abspath', 'badfile') + zf.writestr('E:abspath', 'badfile') + zf.writestr('F:/G:/abspath', 'badfile') + zf.writestr('//server/share/abspath', 'badfile') + zf.writestr('\\\\server2\\share\\abspath', 'badfile') + zf.writestr('../relpath', 'badfile') + zf.writestr(os.pardir + os.sep + 'relpath2', 'badfile') + zf.writestr('good/file', 'goodfile') + zf.writestr('good..file', 'goodfile') + + dstdir = os.path.join(self.mkdtemp(), 'dst') + unpack_archive(zipname, dstdir) + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, 'good', 'file'))) + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, 'good..file'))) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(abspath)) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, 'abspath'))) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, 'G_'))) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, 'server'))) + if os.name != 'nt': + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, 'C:', 'abspath'))) + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, 'D:\\abspath'))) + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, 'E:abspath'))) + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, 'F:', 'G:', 'abspath'))) + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, '\\\\server2\\share\\abspath'))) + if os.pardir == '..': + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, '..', 'relpath'))) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, 'relpath'))) + else: + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, '..', 'relpath'))) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, os.pardir, 'relpath2'))) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, 'relpath2'))) + + dstdir2 = os.path.join(self.mkdtemp(), 'dst') + os.mkdir(dstdir2) + with os_helper.change_cwd(dstdir2): + unpack_archive(zipname, '') + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join('good', 'file'))) + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile('good..file')) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(abspath)) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists('abspath')) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists('C_')) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists('server')) + if os.name != 'nt': + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join('C:', 'abspath'))) + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile('D:\\abspath')) + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile('E:abspath')) + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join('F:', 'G:', 'abspath'))) + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile('\\\\server2\\share\\abspath')) + if os.pardir == '..': + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join('..', 'relpath'))) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists('relpath')) + else: + self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join('..', 'relpath'))) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(os.pardir, 'relpath2'))) + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists('relpath2')) + def test_unpack_registry(self): formats = get_unpack_formats() diff --git a/Lib/zipfile/__init__.py b/Lib/zipfile/__init__.py index 19aea290b585..c8d8d3a2c0a5 100644 --- a/Lib/zipfile/__init__.py +++ b/Lib/zipfile/__init__.py @@ -1410,6 +1410,7 @@ class ZipFile: fp = None # Set here since __del__ checks it _windows_illegal_name_trans_table = None + _ignore_invalid_names = False def __init__(self, file, mode="r", compression=ZIP_STORED, allowZip64=True, compresslevel=None, *, strict_timestamps=True, metadata_encoding=None): @@ -1890,21 +1891,31 @@ class ZipFile: # build the destination pathname, replacing # forward slashes to platform specific separators. - arcname = member.filename.replace('/', os.path.sep) - - if os.path.altsep: + arcname = member.filename + if os.path.sep != '/': + arcname = arcname.replace('/', os.path.sep) + if os.path.altsep and os.path.altsep != '/': arcname = arcname.replace(os.path.altsep, os.path.sep) # interpret absolute pathname as relative, remove drive letter or # UNC path, redundant separators, "." and ".." components. - arcname = os.path.splitdrive(arcname)[1] + drive, root, arcname = os.path.splitroot(arcname) + if self._ignore_invalid_names and (drive or root): + return None + if self._ignore_invalid_names and os.path.pardir in arcname.split(os.path.sep): + return None invalid_path_parts = ('', os.path.curdir, os.path.pardir) arcname = os.path.sep.join(x for x in arcname.split(os.path.sep) if x not in invalid_path_parts) if os.path.sep == '\\': # filter illegal characters on Windows - arcname = self._sanitize_windows_name(arcname, os.path.sep) + arcname2 = self._sanitize_windows_name(arcname, os.path.sep) + if self._ignore_invalid_names and arcname2 != arcname: + return None + arcname = arcname2 if not arcname and not member.is_dir(): + if self._ignore_invalid_names: + return None raise ValueError("Empty filename.") targetpath = os.path.join(targetpath, arcname) diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-29-12-51-33.gh-issue-146581.4vZfB0.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-29-12-51-33.gh-issue-146581.4vZfB0.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..98e65549d790 --- /dev/null +++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-29-12-51-33.gh-issue-146581.4vZfB0.rst @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +Fix vulnerability in :func:`shutil.unpack_archive` for ZIP files on Windows +which allowed to write files outside of the destination tree if the patch in +the archive contains a Windows drive prefix. Now such invalid paths will be +skipped. Files containing ".." in the name (like "foo..bar") are no longer +skipped. -- 2.47.3