Correct some formatting errors in tls1_meth.c

Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18132)

diff --git a/ssl/record/methods/tls1_meth.c b/ssl/record/methods/tls1_meth.c
index 698ebdc00818b3bde19cba1f5c459113c03ae5d0..ae162e69a42942586c164f9e4500406e0852eb69 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/record/methods/tls1_meth.c
+++ b/ssl/record/methods/tls1_meth.c
@@ -148,7 +148,6 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
         return 0;
     }
 
-
     if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->md_ctx)) {
         int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(rl->md_ctx);
         if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
@@ -176,10 +175,6 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
         if (ivlen > 1) {
             for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
                 if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
-                    /*
-                        * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
-                        * happen?? (steve)
-                        */
                     RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                     return 0;
                 } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(rl->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
@@ -203,9 +198,9 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
         if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
                 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0) {
             /*
-                * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
-                * cipher doesn't support pipelining
-                */
+             * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
+             * cipher doesn't support pipelining
+             */
             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
             return 0;
         }
@@ -253,9 +248,9 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
 
         } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
             /*
-                * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
-                * padding on the provider side.
-                */
+             * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
+             * padding on the provider side.
+             */
             padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
 
             /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
@@ -309,10 +304,10 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
         int decrement_seq = 0;
 
         /*
-            * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
-            * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
-            * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
-            */
+         * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
+         * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
+         * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
+         */
         if (sending && !rl->use_etm)
             decrement_seq = 1;
 
@@ -338,10 +333,10 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
         recs[0].length = outlen;
 
         /*
-            * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
-            * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
-            * any explicit IV
-            */
+         * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
+         * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
+         * any explicit IV
+         */
         if (!sending) {
             if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
                     recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
@@ -409,9 +404,9 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
                 }
 
                 /*
-                    * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
-                    * with a random MAC if padding is invalid
-                    */
+                 * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
+                 * with a random MAC if padding is invalid
+                 */
                 if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
                                         recs[ctr].orig_len,
                                         recs[ctr].data,