__hfsplus_ext_write_extent() writes the cached extent record back into a
B-tree node using fd->entrylength as the length, and fd->entrylength is
derived in __hfs_brec_find() from two on-disk values:
fd->entrylength = len - keylen;
A crafted image can keep both len and keylen valid but make fd->entrylength
negative (keylen > len). __hfsplus_ext_write_extent() doesn't check
fd->entrylength before consuming it, and hfs_bnode_write() takes the length
as u32, so the negative value turns into a huge one. The copy then reads
data past the end of hip->cached_extents, which is only
sizeof(hfsplus_extent_rec) bytes long, and leaks kernel memory into the
image.
Reject an fd->entrylength that does not match sizeof(hfsplus_extent_rec) in
__hfsplus_ext_write_extent(), mirroring the check already performed in
__hfsplus_ext_read_extent().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cbd7003314c530d4f910eacf019ff80adad6687e.camel@dubeyko.com/
Signed-off-by: Jiaming Zhang <r772577952@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260810092422.1691377-1-r772577952@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
} else {
if (res)
return res;
+ if (fd->entrylength != sizeof(hfsplus_extent_rec))
+ return -EIO;
hfs_bnode_write(fd->bnode, hip->cached_extents,
fd->entryoffset, fd->entrylength);
hip->extent_state &= ~HFSPLUS_EXT_DIRTY;