check_and_correct_requested_length() compares (off + len) against
node_size using u32 arithmetic. When the caller passes a large len
value (e.g. from an underflowed subtraction in hfs_brec_remove()),
off + len can wrap past 2^32 and produce a small result, causing the
bounds check to pass when it should fail.
For example, with off=14 and len=0xFFFFFFF2 (underflowed from
data_off - keyoffset - size in hfs_brec_remove), off + len wraps to 6,
which is less than a typical node_size of 512, so the check passes and
the subsequent memmove reads ~4GB past the node buffer.
Fix this by widening the addition to u64 before comparing against
node_size. This prevents the u32 wrap while keeping the logic
straightforward.
Reported-by: syzbot+6df204b70bf3261691c5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6df204b70bf3261691c5
Tested-by: syzbot+6df204b70bf3261691c5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+e76bf3d19b85350571ac@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e76bf3d19b85350571ac
Tested-by: syzbot+e76bf3d19b85350571ac@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: a431930c9bac ("hfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260505111300.3592757-2-tristmd@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
node_size = node->tree->node_size;
- if ((off + len) > node_size) {
+ if ((u64)off + len > node_size) {
u32 new_len = node_size - off;
pr_err("requested length has been corrected: "
node_size = node->tree->node_size;
- if ((off + len) > node_size) {
+ if ((u64)off + len > node_size) {
u32 new_len = node_size - off;
pr_err("requested length has been corrected: "