]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/linux.git/commitdiff
libceph: Fix multiplication overflow in decode_new_up_state_weight()
authorRaphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Wed, 27 May 2026 14:06:17 +0000 (16:06 +0200)
committerIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Thu, 23 Jul 2026 18:29:40 +0000 (20:29 +0200)
If a message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP contains a (maliciously) corrupted
osdmap, out-of-bounds memory accesses may occur in
decode_new_up_state_weight(). This happens because the bounds check for
the new_state part is based on calculating its length depending on a len
value read from the incoming message. This calculation may overflow
leading to an incorrect bounds check. Subsequently, out-of-bounds reads
may occur when decoding this part.

This patch switches the multiplication to use check_mul_overflow() to
abort processing the osdmap if an overflow occurred. Therefore,
osdmaps/messages containing large values for len that result in a
multiplication overflow are treated as invalid.

[ idryomov: rename new_state_len -> new_state_item_size, formatting ]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 930c53286977 ("libceph: apply new_state before new_up_client on incrementals")
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
net/ceph/osdmap.c

index 8b5b0587a0cfa2c437b76c8c87251199efe20291..8e77096718c4d3b91f1baa2dabff13a4ba15f95a 100644 (file)
@@ -1842,6 +1842,8 @@ static int decode_new_up_state_weight(void **p, void *end, u8 struct_v,
        void *new_up_client;
        void *new_state;
        void *new_weight_end;
+       const u32 new_state_item_size =
+           sizeof(u32) + (struct_v >= 5 ? sizeof(u32) : sizeof(u8));
        u32 len;
        int ret;
        int i;
@@ -1862,7 +1864,8 @@ static int decode_new_up_state_weight(void **p, void *end, u8 struct_v,
 
        new_state = *p;
        ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, e_inval);
-       len *= sizeof(u32) + (struct_v >= 5 ? sizeof(u32) : sizeof(u8));
+       if (check_mul_overflow(len, new_state_item_size, &len))
+               goto e_inval;
        ceph_decode_need(p, end, len, e_inval);
        *p += len;