From: Sean Christopherson Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 18:35:40 +0000 (+0200) Subject: KVM: SEV: Move sev_free_vcpu() down below sev_es_unmap_ghcb() X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/gitweb/index.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=08385c5e1814edee829ffe475d559ed730354335;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Flinux.git KVM: SEV: Move sev_free_vcpu() down below sev_es_unmap_ghcb() Relocate sev_free_vcpu() down in sev.c so that it's definition comes after sev_es_unmap_ghcb(). This will allow sharing unmap functionality between the two functions without needing a forward declaration (or weird placement of the common code). No functional change intended. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky Reviewed-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Message-ID: <20260501202250.2115252-16-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Message-ID: <20260529183549.1104619-16-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 4ebe0d449789..437282f0ea94 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -3313,37 +3313,6 @@ void sev_guest_memory_reclaimed(struct kvm *kvm) sev_writeback_caches(kvm); } -void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ - struct vcpu_svm *svm; - - if (!is_sev_es_guest(vcpu)) - return; - - svm = to_svm(vcpu); - - /* - * If it's an SNP guest, then the VMSA was marked in the RMP table as - * a guest-owned page. Transition the page to hypervisor state before - * releasing it back to the system. - */ - if (is_sev_snp_guest(vcpu)) { - u64 pfn = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa) >> PAGE_SHIFT; - - if (kvm_rmp_make_shared(vcpu->kvm, pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K)) - goto skip_vmsa_free; - } - - if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected) - sev_flush_encrypted_page(vcpu, svm->sev_es.vmsa); - - __free_page(virt_to_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa)); - -skip_vmsa_free: - if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free) - kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa); -} - static void dump_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) { struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control; @@ -3618,6 +3587,37 @@ void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) svm->sev_es.ghcb = NULL; } +void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_svm *svm; + + if (!is_sev_es_guest(vcpu)) + return; + + svm = to_svm(vcpu); + + /* + * If it's an SNP guest, then the VMSA was marked in the RMP table as + * a guest-owned page. Transition the page to hypervisor state before + * releasing it back to the system. + */ + if (is_sev_snp_guest(vcpu)) { + u64 pfn = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + if (kvm_rmp_make_shared(vcpu->kvm, pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K)) + goto skip_vmsa_free; + } + + if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected) + sev_flush_encrypted_page(vcpu, svm->sev_es.vmsa); + + __free_page(virt_to_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa)); + +skip_vmsa_free: + if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free) + kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa); +} + int pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu) { struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);