When a listening SCTP server processes a COOKIE_ECHO chunk, the cached
peer INIT chunk embedded after the cookie is parsed and its parameters
are later walked by sctp_process_init() using sctp_walk_params().
However, the chunk header length of this cached INIT chunk was not
validated against the remaining buffer in the COOKIE_ECHO payload. If
the length field is inflated, the parameter walk can run beyond the
actual received data, leading to out-of-bounds reads and potential
memory corruption during later parameter handling (e.g. STATE_COOKIE
processing and kmemdup() copies).
Add a bounds check in sctp_unpack_cookie() to ensure the cached INIT
chunk length does not exceed the available data in the COOKIE_ECHO
buffer before it is used.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/eb60825fa22d6f9e663c7d4dbb69f397b5d34d42.1780362366.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
struct sctp_signed_cookie *cookie;
struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;
struct sctp_cookie *bear_cookie;
+ struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch;
enum sctp_scope scope;
unsigned int len;
ktime_t kt;
cookie = chunk->subh.cookie_hdr;
bear_cookie = &cookie->c;
+ ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)(bear_cookie + 1);
+ if (ntohs(ch->length) > len - fixed_size)
+ goto malformed;
+
/* Verify the cookie's MAC, if cookie authentication is enabled. */
if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->cookie_auth_enable) {
u8 mac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];