NTFS3 uses $LXUID, $LXGID, $LXMOD and $LXDEV as internal WSL
permission metadata and reloads them into i_uid, i_gid and i_mode
from ntfs_get_wsl_perm().
Because the empty-prefix xattr handler also lets file owners call
setxattr() on these names directly, an unprivileged writer on a
writable ntfs3 mount can plant root ownership and S_ISUID on their own
file and gain euid 0 after inode reload.
Reject direct userspace writes to the reserved $LX* names. Internal
ntfs3 metadata updates are unchanged because ntfs_save_wsl_perm()
writes them via ntfs_set_ea() directly.
Signed-off-by: Zhen Yan <sdjasjbuaa@gmail.com>
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: added an additional check for non privileged users]
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
return err;
}
+static bool ntfs_is_reserved_lxattr(const char *name)
+{
+ return !strcmp(name, "$LXUID") || !strcmp(name, "$LXGID") ||
+ !strcmp(name, "$LXMOD") || !strcmp(name, "$LXDEV");
+}
+
/*
* ntfs_setxattr - inode_operations::setxattr
*/
goto out;
}
+ /* Do not allow non privileged users to change $LXUID/$LXGID... */
+ if (ntfs_is_reserved_lxattr(name) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ err = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* Deal with NTFS extended attribute. */
err = ntfs_set_ea(inode, name, strlen(name), value, size, flags, 0,
NULL);