2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2011, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
15 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
16 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
17 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
18 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
19 #include "crypto/random.h"
20 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
21 #include "ap_config.h"
22 #include "ieee802_11.h"
24 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
25 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
26 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
28 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
29 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
30 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
33 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
34 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
35 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
, size_t data_len
);
36 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
37 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
38 struct wpa_group
*group
);
39 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
40 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
41 struct wpa_group
*group
);
42 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
43 struct wpa_group
*group
);
45 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
= 4;
46 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
= 4;
47 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
48 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
49 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
51 /* TODO: make these configurable */
52 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
53 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
54 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
57 static inline void wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
58 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
60 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report
)
61 wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
65 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
66 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
69 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol
)
70 wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
74 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
75 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
77 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol
== NULL
)
79 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
);
83 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
84 const u8
*addr
, const u8
*prev_psk
)
86 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk
== NULL
)
88 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, prev_psk
);
92 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
93 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
95 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk
== NULL
)
97 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
101 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
103 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
104 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
106 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key
== NULL
)
108 return wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
113 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
114 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
116 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum
== NULL
)
118 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
123 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
124 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
126 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol
== NULL
)
128 return wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
133 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
134 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
137 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta
== NULL
)
139 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
143 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
144 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
147 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth
== NULL
)
149 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
153 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
154 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
156 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
158 wpa_auth
->cb
.logger(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
162 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
163 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
169 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
172 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
173 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
178 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
181 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
187 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
190 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect
== NULL
)
192 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(addr
));
193 wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
,
194 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
198 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
201 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
202 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
204 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
205 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
206 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
208 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
213 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
215 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
217 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
218 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
221 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
222 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
223 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
226 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
227 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
228 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
233 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
235 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
236 struct wpa_group
*group
;
238 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
239 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
) {
240 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
242 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
243 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
244 } while (group
->changed
);
247 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
248 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
249 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
254 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
256 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
257 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
259 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
260 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
265 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
267 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
273 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
276 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
277 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
281 static void wpa_group_set_key_len(struct wpa_group
*group
, int cipher
)
284 case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
:
287 case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
:
290 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104
:
293 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40
:
300 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
301 struct wpa_group
*group
)
303 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(group
)];
306 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
308 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
311 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
312 * Local MAC Address || Time)
314 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
315 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
316 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &group
, sizeof(group
));
317 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
320 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
321 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
323 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
324 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
330 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
331 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
333 struct wpa_group
*group
;
335 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
339 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
340 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
342 wpa_group_set_key_len(group
, wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
344 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
345 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
346 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
347 "the first station connects");
351 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
352 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
353 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
354 * on embedded devices.
356 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
357 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
365 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
366 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
367 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
369 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
370 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
371 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
379 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
380 * @addr: Authenticator address
381 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
382 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
383 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
385 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
386 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
387 struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
)
389 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
391 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
392 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
394 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
395 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
396 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->cb
, cb
, sizeof(*cb
));
398 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
399 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
404 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
405 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
406 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
411 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
413 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
414 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
415 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
420 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
421 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
422 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
423 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
424 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
425 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
429 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
431 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
432 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
433 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
436 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
437 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
438 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
445 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
447 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
449 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
451 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
452 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
453 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
459 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
460 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
462 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
464 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
466 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
467 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
469 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
470 while (wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
)
471 wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
);
472 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
474 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
476 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
477 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
478 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
479 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
481 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
483 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
495 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
496 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
497 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
499 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
500 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
502 struct wpa_group
*group
;
503 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
506 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
507 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
508 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
513 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
516 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
517 wpa_group_set_key_len(group
, wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
519 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
520 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
521 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
527 struct wpa_state_machine
*
528 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
530 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
532 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
535 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
537 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
538 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
544 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
545 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
547 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
550 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
551 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
552 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
553 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
554 "start 4-way handshake");
557 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
560 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
561 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
562 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
565 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
566 "start authentication");
570 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
571 return 1; /* should not really happen */
573 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
574 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
578 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
580 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
581 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
582 * STA has not yet been removed. */
586 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
590 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
592 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
593 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
594 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
596 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
597 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
598 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
599 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
605 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
610 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
611 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
612 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
614 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
);
615 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
619 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
620 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
621 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
622 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
623 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
624 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
625 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
626 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
627 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
628 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
634 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
639 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
644 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
645 const u8
*replay_counter
)
648 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
651 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
652 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
659 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
660 const u8
*replay_counter
)
663 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
665 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
666 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
667 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
668 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
673 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
674 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
675 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
676 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
678 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
679 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
681 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
682 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
683 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
684 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
688 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
689 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
690 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
692 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
693 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
694 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
698 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
699 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
700 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
701 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
702 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
706 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
707 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
708 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
709 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
710 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
711 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
712 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
713 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
714 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
720 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
723 static void wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
724 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
726 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
727 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
728 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
729 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
732 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
733 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
734 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
735 "group cipher is not TKIP");
736 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
737 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
738 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
739 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
741 wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
742 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
743 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
747 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
748 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
750 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
754 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
755 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
756 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
758 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
759 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
760 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
761 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
,
762 SMK_M1
, SMK_M3
, SMK_ERROR
} msg
;
764 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
766 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
;
767 size_t eapol_key_ie_len
;
769 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
772 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
775 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
776 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
777 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
778 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_data_length
);
779 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
780 " key_info=0x%x type=%u key_data_length=%u",
781 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
, key_data_length
);
782 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - sizeof(*key
)) {
783 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
784 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
786 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
791 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
792 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
794 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
795 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
797 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
798 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
799 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
800 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
801 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
806 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
807 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
808 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
814 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
816 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
817 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
819 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
822 if ((key_info
& (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) ==
823 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) {
824 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
826 msgtxt
= "SMK Error";
831 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
834 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
837 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
839 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
840 } else if (key_data_length
== 0) {
842 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
845 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
848 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
849 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
851 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
852 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
) {
853 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
854 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
855 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
857 "advertised support for "
858 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
863 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
864 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
865 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
867 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
874 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
875 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
876 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
877 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
878 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
879 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
885 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
886 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
889 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
890 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
891 key
->replay_counter
) &&
892 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
893 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
896 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
897 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
898 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
899 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
900 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
902 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
903 "Process SNonce update from STA "
904 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
906 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
907 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
908 key
->replay_counter
);
909 goto continue_processing
;
912 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
913 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
914 key
->replay_counter
) &&
915 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
916 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
917 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
918 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
920 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
921 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
922 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
924 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
925 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
927 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
928 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
929 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
931 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
932 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
939 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
940 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
941 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
942 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
943 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
944 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
945 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
949 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
950 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
952 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
953 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
954 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
955 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
956 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
957 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
960 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
961 "collect more entropy for random number "
963 random_mark_pool_ready();
964 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
967 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies((u8
*) (key
+ 1), key_data_length
,
969 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
970 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with "
971 "invalid Key Data contents");
975 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
976 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
978 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
979 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
981 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
982 wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
983 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
984 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
,
985 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
986 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
987 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
988 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not "
989 "match with msg 2/4");
991 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
992 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
994 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
995 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
996 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
997 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1000 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1001 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
1002 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1005 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1008 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
1010 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1011 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1012 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1018 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1019 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1020 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1021 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1022 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1023 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1027 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1031 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.peerkey
) {
1032 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1033 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1036 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1037 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1038 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1039 "invalid state - dropped");
1043 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1047 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1048 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1053 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1054 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1056 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1057 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1058 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1062 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1063 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1064 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1068 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1069 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1070 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&sm
->PTK
, data
, data_len
)) {
1071 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1072 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1075 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1076 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1077 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1080 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1081 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1082 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1083 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1084 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1086 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1087 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1093 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1094 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1095 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1097 if (msg
== SMK_ERROR
) {
1098 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1099 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
);
1100 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1102 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1103 wpa_receive_error_report(
1105 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
));
1106 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1107 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1108 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1110 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1111 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1112 } else if (msg
== SMK_M1
) {
1113 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
);
1114 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1115 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1116 wpa_parse_kde_ies((const u8
*) (key
+ 1),
1117 key_data_length
, &kde
) == 0 &&
1120 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1121 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1123 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1124 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1127 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1128 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1129 key
->replay_counter
);
1131 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1133 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1134 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1135 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1136 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1137 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1139 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1140 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1142 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1143 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1147 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1148 * do not get copied again.
1150 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1153 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1154 if (msg
== SMK_M3
) {
1155 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
);
1158 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1160 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1161 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_malloc(data_len
);
1162 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1164 os_memcpy(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
, data
, data_len
);
1165 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1167 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1168 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1169 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1170 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1171 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1176 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1177 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1179 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + 16];
1183 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1184 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1185 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1186 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1187 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1190 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1191 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1192 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1193 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1195 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, 16) < 0)
1198 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1199 sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
);
1200 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1201 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
)
1204 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1210 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1212 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1213 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1215 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1216 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1217 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1222 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1223 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1224 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1225 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1226 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1228 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1229 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1232 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1234 int version
, pairwise
;
1237 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + sizeof(struct wpa_eapol_key
);
1240 version
= force_version
;
1241 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
))
1242 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1243 else if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
)
1244 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1246 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1248 pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1250 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1251 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1254 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1255 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1256 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1257 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1258 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1260 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1262 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1263 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1264 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1266 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1267 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1270 len
+= key_data_len
;
1272 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1275 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1276 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1277 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1278 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1280 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1281 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1282 key_info
|= version
;
1283 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1284 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1285 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1286 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1287 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1289 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1291 case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
:
1292 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 16);
1294 case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
:
1295 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 32);
1297 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40
:
1298 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 5);
1300 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104
:
1301 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 13);
1304 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
)
1305 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1307 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1308 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1309 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1310 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1311 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1312 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1314 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1315 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1316 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1317 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1320 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1323 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1326 os_memcpy(key
+ 1, kde
, kde_len
);
1327 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
, kde_len
);
1328 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1329 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1335 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1341 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1343 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1344 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1345 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
,
1346 (u8
*) (key
+ 1))) {
1351 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
, key_data_len
);
1354 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1355 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1356 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1357 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1358 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, 16);
1359 os_memcpy(key
+ 1, buf
, key_data_len
);
1360 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, (u8
*) (key
+ 1), key_data_len
);
1361 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
, key_data_len
);
1366 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1367 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1368 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1369 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1374 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, version
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1378 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1380 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1386 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1387 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1388 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1389 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1390 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1393 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1399 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1402 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1403 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1404 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1405 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1407 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1408 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1409 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1410 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1411 "counter %d)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1412 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1413 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1417 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
1419 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1420 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1425 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1428 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1429 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1430 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1431 os_memcpy(mic
, key
->key_mic
, 16);
1432 os_memset(key
->key_mic
, 0, 16);
1433 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1434 data
, data_len
, key
->key_mic
) ||
1435 os_memcmp(mic
, key
->key_mic
, 16) != 0)
1437 os_memcpy(key
->key_mic
, mic
, 16);
1442 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1444 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1445 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1446 wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
, 0);
1447 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1448 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1452 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, wpa_event event
)
1459 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1460 "event %d notification", event
);
1468 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1471 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1474 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1475 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1476 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1477 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1478 * properly at this point.
1480 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1481 "started - initialize now");
1484 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1485 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1487 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1490 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1492 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1493 * update for this STA.
1495 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1496 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1497 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1499 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1502 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1503 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1504 "after association");
1505 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1507 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1508 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1510 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1512 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1515 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1516 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1517 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1519 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1520 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1522 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1525 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1526 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1528 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1532 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1536 static enum wpa_alg
wpa_alg_enum(int alg
)
1539 case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
:
1540 return WPA_ALG_CCMP
;
1541 case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
:
1542 return WPA_ALG_TKIP
;
1543 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104
:
1544 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40
:
1547 return WPA_ALG_NONE
;
1552 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1554 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1556 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1557 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1558 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1562 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1563 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1564 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1565 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1566 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1567 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1568 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1571 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1573 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1575 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1576 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1577 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1582 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1584 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1585 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1586 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1590 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1592 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1593 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1597 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1599 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1600 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1601 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1602 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1604 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1605 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1609 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1610 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1612 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1615 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1616 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1617 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1618 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1619 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1621 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1623 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1624 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1625 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1626 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1628 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1629 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1632 wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
);
1633 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
1634 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
1638 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1640 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1642 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1645 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1646 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1647 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1648 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1649 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1650 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1651 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1653 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1654 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1656 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1659 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1661 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1662 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1663 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1664 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1670 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1672 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1673 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1675 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1676 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1678 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1680 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1681 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
1682 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
1683 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1684 "(len=%lu)", (unsigned long) len
);
1685 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, PMK_LEN
);
1686 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1687 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
1688 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
1689 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1691 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1693 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK");
1696 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1697 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1698 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1699 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1700 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1701 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1702 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1703 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1704 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1705 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
1709 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
1712 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
1713 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, NULL
);
1715 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1716 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1717 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1718 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1719 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1721 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1725 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
1727 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
1728 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
1730 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
1731 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
1732 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1735 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
1736 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1737 * immediately following this. */
1741 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1742 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1744 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
1745 * one possible PSK for this STA.
1747 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
1748 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1750 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1751 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
1752 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1753 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
1755 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
1756 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
1759 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
1760 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
1762 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, PMK_LEN
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
1763 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
1764 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
1767 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
1768 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
1769 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
1773 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
1774 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
1776 size_t ptk_len
= sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
? 48 : 64;
1777 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1778 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1779 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, pmk
, ptk
, ptk_len
);
1780 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1782 wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, PMK_LEN
, "Pairwise key expansion",
1783 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, sm
->SNonce
,
1784 (u8
*) ptk
, ptk_len
,
1785 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
1791 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
1795 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
1797 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
1798 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
1799 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
1801 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
1802 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
1805 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1806 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, pmk
);
1812 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, pmk
, &PTK
);
1814 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&PTK
, sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
1815 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
1820 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1825 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1826 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
1830 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1831 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1833 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
1834 * with the value we derived.
1836 if (os_memcmp(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
1837 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
1838 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1839 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
1841 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
1843 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
1844 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
1845 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
1849 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1851 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1852 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1854 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1855 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
1856 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
1858 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
1861 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1863 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
1864 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
1868 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
1870 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
1875 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1877 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1879 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
1880 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ sizeof(struct wpa_igtk_kde
);
1887 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
1889 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
1890 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
1892 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
1895 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
1897 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
1898 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, igtk
.pn
) < 0)
1899 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
1900 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN
);
1901 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
1903 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
1906 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, WPA_IGTK_LEN
) < 0)
1909 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
1910 (const u8
*) &igtk
, sizeof(igtk
), NULL
, 0);
1915 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1917 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1923 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
1928 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1931 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
1933 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
1934 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
1935 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
1937 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
1939 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
1940 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1943 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
1944 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1945 * immediately following this. */
1949 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
1950 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
1952 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1953 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
1954 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
1955 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
1956 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
1957 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
1958 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
1959 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
1960 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE */
1961 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
1962 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
1964 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1965 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1966 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
1967 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
1969 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
1970 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
1971 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
1973 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
1974 * of GTK in the BSS.
1976 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
1984 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
1990 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
1992 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
1993 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
1994 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
1995 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
1996 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
1997 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
1999 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2000 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2001 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2006 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2008 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
2009 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2010 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2011 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2012 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2014 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2015 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2020 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
2022 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2023 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2024 int res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, pos
- kde
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
2026 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
2027 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2033 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2036 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
2038 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2041 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2043 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2044 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2046 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
2048 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
2049 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2050 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2051 NULL
, NULL
, pos
, kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
2054 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2055 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2061 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2062 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2064 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
2065 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
2068 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2069 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2071 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
2072 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
* 60);
2075 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2077 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2078 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2079 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
2080 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
2081 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
2086 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
2088 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
2089 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2093 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
2100 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2101 sm
->PTK
.tk1
, klen
)) {
2102 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2105 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2106 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
2108 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
2109 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2110 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.
2111 wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk
,
2115 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2116 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2117 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
2121 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2123 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
2124 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2125 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
2128 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
2131 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
2132 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
2133 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2134 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
2137 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2138 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2139 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2141 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2142 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2143 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2149 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2152 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2153 else if (sm
->Disconnect
2154 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2155 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2156 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2157 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2159 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
2160 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2161 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
2162 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
2163 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
2164 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2165 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
)
2166 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2167 else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
2168 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
2170 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
2171 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2173 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
2174 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2176 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
2177 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2179 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
2180 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2181 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2182 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
2183 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
2184 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)
2185 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2186 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
2188 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
2189 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2190 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0)
2191 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2193 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2194 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2195 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2196 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2199 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
2200 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, NULL
))
2201 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2203 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2204 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2205 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2206 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2209 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
2210 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2211 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2212 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2213 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2214 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2215 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2216 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2217 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
2218 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2219 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2220 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2221 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2223 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
2224 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
2225 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
2226 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2227 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2228 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2229 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2230 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2232 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
2233 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2235 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
2236 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
2237 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2238 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2239 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2240 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
2241 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2242 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2243 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2244 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2245 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
2247 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2248 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2249 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2250 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2252 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
2258 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
2260 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2262 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
2263 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
2264 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2266 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2270 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
2272 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2273 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2274 u8
*kde
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
2276 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2278 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2281 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
) {
2282 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2283 * immediately following this. */
2287 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2288 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
2289 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2290 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
2291 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2292 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
2293 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2294 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2295 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
2297 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2298 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2300 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2301 * of GTK in the BSS.
2303 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2307 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2308 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
2309 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2310 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2315 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2317 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2319 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2322 pos
= kde
+ gsm
->GTK_len
;
2325 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2326 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2328 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
2329 rsc
, gsm
->GNonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
2330 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
2335 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
2337 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2338 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2339 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2340 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2341 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2342 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2343 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2344 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2345 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
2346 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2351 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
2353 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2354 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2355 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2356 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2357 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2361 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
2363 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
2364 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2365 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
2366 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
2367 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
2368 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
2369 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
2370 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2372 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
2373 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2374 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2375 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
2376 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
2377 (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
)
2378 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
2379 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2380 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2382 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
2383 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2385 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
2386 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2392 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2393 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2397 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2398 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2399 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
2400 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2401 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2403 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
2404 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
2406 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2407 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
2408 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2409 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2410 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
2411 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2412 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4],
2415 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
2416 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN
);
2418 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2424 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2425 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2427 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2428 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2429 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
2430 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
2433 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
2436 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2439 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2440 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
2441 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2445 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
2447 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
2448 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2449 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
2450 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2453 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
2455 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
2456 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
2457 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
2459 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2460 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
2461 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
2464 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211V
2465 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in wnmsleep */
2466 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2468 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211V */
2470 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
2471 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
2478 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211V
2479 /* update GTK when exiting wnmsleep mode */
2480 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2482 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2485 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
2489 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
2491 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
2495 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2498 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2499 size_t subelem_len
, pad_len
;
2504 /* GTK subslement */
2505 key_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2506 if (key_len
> sizeof(keybuf
))
2510 * Pad key for AES Key Wrap if it is not multiple of 8 bytes or is less
2513 pad_len
= key_len
% 8;
2515 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
2516 if (key_len
+ pad_len
< 16)
2519 os_memcpy(keybuf
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], key_len
);
2520 os_memset(keybuf
+ key_len
, 0, pad_len
);
2521 keybuf
[key_len
] = 0xdd;
2525 key
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2528 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
2529 * Key[5..32] | 8 padding.
2531 subelem_len
= 13 + key_len
+ 8;
2532 subelem
= os_zalloc(subelem_len
);
2533 if (subelem
== NULL
)
2536 subelem
[0] = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
2537 subelem
[1] = 11 + key_len
+ 8;
2538 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
2539 WPA_PUT_LE16(&subelem
[2], gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
2540 subelem
[4] = gsm
->GTK_len
;
2541 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, subelem
+ 5) != 0)
2546 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, key_len
/ 8, key
, subelem
+ 13)) {
2551 os_memcpy(pos
, subelem
, subelem_len
);
2553 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext GTK",
2554 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
2561 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2562 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2565 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2569 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] |
2570 * Key[16] | 8 padding */
2571 subelem_len
= 1 + 1 + 2 + 6 + WPA_IGTK_LEN
+ 8;
2572 subelem
= os_zalloc(subelem_len
);
2573 if (subelem
== NULL
)
2577 *ptr
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
2578 *ptr
++ = subelem_len
- 2;
2579 WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
2581 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, ptr
) != 0) {
2586 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, WPA_IGTK_LEN
/ 8,
2587 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], ptr
)) {
2592 os_memcpy(pos
, subelem
, subelem_len
);
2594 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext IGTK",
2595 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN
);
2600 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2601 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211V */
2604 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2605 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2609 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2610 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2611 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2612 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
2613 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
2615 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
2617 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2618 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
2619 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
2620 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
2621 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2622 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
2623 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
2624 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
2625 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2627 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
2628 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
2629 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
2630 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2631 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
2633 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, NULL
);
2634 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
2635 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2639 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2640 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2644 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
2645 wpa_alg_enum(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
2646 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
2647 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2650 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2651 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
&&
2652 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, WPA_ALG_IGTK
,
2653 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
2654 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4],
2657 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2663 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2664 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2666 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2667 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2668 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2669 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
2671 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0)
2678 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2679 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2682 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
2683 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
2684 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
2685 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2686 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
2688 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2689 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
2690 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
2691 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2692 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
2693 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2698 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2703 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
2704 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
2705 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
2706 * recursive call. */
2707 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
2711 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
2713 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2716 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2717 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
2719 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
2720 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2722 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
2723 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2725 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
2726 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
2727 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
2729 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
2730 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
2731 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
2732 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
2739 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
2741 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
2746 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2750 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
2754 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
2757 struct wpa_group
*group
;
2759 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
2762 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
2764 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
2766 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
2768 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2769 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
2770 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
2771 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
2772 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2773 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2774 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2779 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int bool)
2781 return bool ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
2785 static int wpa_cipher_bits(int cipher
)
2788 case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
:
2790 case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
:
2792 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104
:
2794 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40
:
2802 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
2803 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
2804 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
2806 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
2809 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
2810 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
2811 const int preauth
= 1;
2812 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
2813 const int preauth
= 0;
2814 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
2816 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
2819 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2820 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
2821 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
2822 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
2823 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
2824 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
2825 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
2826 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
2827 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2831 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
2832 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
2835 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2836 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
2837 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
2838 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
2839 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
2840 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
2841 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
2842 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
2843 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
2844 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
2845 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
2846 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
2847 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
2848 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
2849 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
2850 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2851 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2852 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2853 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
2854 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2855 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2856 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2857 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
2858 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
2859 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
2861 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
2862 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
,
2863 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
,
2864 wpa_cipher_bits(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
2865 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
2866 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
2867 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
2868 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
2869 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
2870 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
2872 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
2873 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
2874 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
2875 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
2876 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
2877 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2881 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
2882 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
2885 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
2886 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
2887 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2895 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
2903 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
2905 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
2907 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
) {
2908 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
)
2909 pairwise
= WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP
;
2910 else if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
2911 pairwise
= WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP
;
2912 else if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_WEP104
)
2913 pairwise
= WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104
;
2914 else if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_WEP40
)
2915 pairwise
= WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40
;
2916 else if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_NONE
)
2917 pairwise
= WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE
;
2918 } else if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2919 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
)
2920 pairwise
= RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP
;
2921 else if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
2922 pairwise
= RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP
;
2923 else if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_WEP104
)
2924 pairwise
= RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104
;
2925 else if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_WEP40
)
2926 pairwise
= RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40
;
2927 else if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_NONE
)
2928 pairwise
= RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE
;
2933 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2934 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
2935 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
2936 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
2937 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2938 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
2939 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
2940 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
2941 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
2942 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
2943 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
2945 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
2946 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
2947 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
2948 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2953 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2954 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
2955 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
2957 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
2958 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2966 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
2969 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
2973 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2975 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
2979 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2981 return sm
->pairwise
;
2985 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2989 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
2993 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3001 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3002 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
3004 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
3011 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3012 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3014 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
3018 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3021 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
3025 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
3027 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3029 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
3030 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
3034 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
3035 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3037 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
3038 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3041 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
,
3042 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
3043 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
3050 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3051 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3052 int session_timeout
,
3053 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3055 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3058 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, wpa_auth
->addr
,
3059 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
3060 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
3067 static struct wpa_group
*
3068 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
3070 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3072 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
3075 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3077 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
3081 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
3082 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
3088 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
3090 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3092 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3095 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
3097 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
3099 group
= group
->next
;
3102 if (group
== NULL
) {
3103 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
3108 if (sm
->group
== group
)
3111 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
3112 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
3119 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3120 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
3122 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
3124 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
3125 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
3126 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
3128 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
3129 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
3130 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
3131 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
3132 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
3133 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
3134 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
3135 * the station has received the frame.
3137 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
3138 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
3139 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
3141 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
3142 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
3143 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
3144 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);