2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "crypto/aes.h"
17 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
18 #include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
19 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
20 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
21 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
22 #include "crypto/random.h"
23 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
24 #include "ap_config.h"
25 #include "ieee802_11.h"
27 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
28 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
29 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
31 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
32 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
33 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
36 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
37 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
38 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
41 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
42 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
);
43 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
44 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
45 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
46 struct wpa_group
*group
);
47 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
48 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
49 struct wpa_group
*group
);
50 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
51 struct wpa_group
*group
);
52 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
53 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
55 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
56 struct wpa_group
*group
);
57 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
58 struct wpa_group
*group
);
59 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
60 struct wpa_group
*group
);
61 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
);
63 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
= 4;
64 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
= 4;
65 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
66 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
67 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
69 /* TODO: make these configurable */
70 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
71 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
72 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
75 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
76 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
78 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report
)
79 return wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
84 static inline void wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(
85 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
87 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report
)
88 wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
92 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
93 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
96 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol
)
97 wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
101 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
102 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
104 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol
== NULL
)
106 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
);
110 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
112 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
,
115 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk
== NULL
)
117 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, p2p_dev_addr
,
122 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
123 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
125 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
== NULL
)
127 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
131 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
133 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
134 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
136 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key
== NULL
)
138 return wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
143 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
144 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
146 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum
== NULL
)
148 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
153 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
154 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
156 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol
== NULL
)
158 return wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
164 static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
167 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe
== NULL
)
169 return wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
171 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
174 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
175 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
178 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta
== NULL
)
180 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
184 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
185 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
188 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth
== NULL
)
190 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
194 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
195 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
197 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
199 wpa_auth
->cb
->logger(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
203 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
204 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
210 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
213 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
214 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
219 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
222 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
228 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
231 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect
== NULL
)
233 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(addr
));
234 wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
,
235 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
239 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
242 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
243 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
245 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
246 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
247 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
249 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
250 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
)
256 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
258 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
260 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
261 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
264 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
265 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
266 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
269 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
270 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
271 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
276 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
278 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
279 struct wpa_group
*group
, *next
;
281 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
282 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
284 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
286 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
288 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
289 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
290 } while (group
->changed
);
293 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
297 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
298 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
299 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
304 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
306 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
307 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
309 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
310 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
315 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
317 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
323 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
326 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
327 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
331 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
332 struct wpa_group
*group
)
334 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
338 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
340 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
343 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
344 * Local MAC Address || Time)
346 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
347 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
348 ptr
= (unsigned long) group
;
349 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &ptr
, sizeof(ptr
));
350 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
353 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
354 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
356 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
357 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
363 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
364 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
366 struct wpa_group
*group
;
368 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
372 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
373 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
374 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
376 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
377 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
378 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
379 "the first station connects");
383 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
384 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
385 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
386 * on embedded devices.
388 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
389 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
397 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
398 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
399 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
401 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
402 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
403 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
411 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
412 * @addr: Authenticator address
413 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
414 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
415 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
417 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
418 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
419 const struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
,
422 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
424 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
425 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
427 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
428 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
430 wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
= cb_ctx
;
432 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
433 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
438 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
439 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
440 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
445 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
447 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
448 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
449 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
450 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
455 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
456 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
457 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
458 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
459 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
460 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
461 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
465 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
467 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
468 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
469 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
472 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
473 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
474 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
478 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
)) {
479 int count
= WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_end
) -
480 WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
) + 1;
484 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
= bitfield_alloc(count
);
486 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
492 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
494 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
496 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
498 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
499 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
500 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
501 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
508 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
509 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
511 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
513 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
515 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
516 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
518 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
519 while (wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
)
520 wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
);
521 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
523 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
525 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
526 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
527 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
528 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
531 bitfield_free(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
532 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
535 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
537 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
549 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
550 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
551 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
553 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
554 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
556 struct wpa_group
*group
;
557 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
560 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
561 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
562 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
567 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
570 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
571 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
573 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
574 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
575 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
581 struct wpa_state_machine
*
582 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
583 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
)
585 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
587 if (wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
590 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
593 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
595 os_memcpy(sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, p2p_dev_addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
597 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
598 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
599 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
605 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
606 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
608 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
611 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
612 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
613 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
614 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
615 "start 4-way handshake");
616 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
617 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
620 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
623 if (sm
->fils_completed
) {
624 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
625 "FILS authentication already completed - do not start 4-way handshake");
626 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
627 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
630 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
633 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
634 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
635 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
638 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
639 "start authentication");
643 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
644 return 1; /* should not really happen */
646 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
647 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
651 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
653 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
654 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
655 * STA has not yet been removed. */
659 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
663 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
666 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
)) {
668 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
669 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR
,
670 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
671 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
673 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
674 bitfield_clear(sm
->wpa_auth
->ip_pool
,
675 WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) - start
);
677 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
678 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
679 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
680 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
682 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
683 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
684 wpabuf_free(sm
->ft_pending_req_ies
);
685 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
686 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
688 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
693 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
698 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
699 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
700 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
702 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
);
703 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
707 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
708 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
709 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
710 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
711 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
712 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
713 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
714 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
715 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
716 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
722 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
727 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
732 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
733 const u8
*replay_counter
)
736 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
739 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
740 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
747 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
748 const u8
*replay_counter
)
751 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
753 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
754 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
755 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
756 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
761 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
762 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
763 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
764 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
766 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
767 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
769 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
770 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
771 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
772 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
776 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
777 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
778 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
780 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
781 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
782 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
786 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
787 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
788 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
789 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
790 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
794 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
795 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
796 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
797 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
798 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
799 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
800 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
801 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
802 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
808 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
811 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
812 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
814 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
815 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
816 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
817 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
820 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
821 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
822 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
823 "group cipher is not TKIP");
824 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
825 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
826 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
827 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
829 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
) > 0)
830 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
831 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
832 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
836 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
837 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
839 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
844 static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*data
,
849 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
850 unsigned int pmk_len
;
852 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
854 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
855 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
856 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
862 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
865 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
);
867 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
, data
, data_len
)
873 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
878 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
879 "WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
883 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
884 "WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
885 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= 0;
886 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
887 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
888 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
894 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
895 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
896 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
898 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
899 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
900 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
901 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
,
902 SMK_M1
, SMK_M3
, SMK_ERROR
} msg
;
904 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
906 size_t keyhdrlen
, mic_len
;
909 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
911 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: RX EAPOL data", data
, data_len
);
913 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
914 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
916 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + keyhdrlen
) {
917 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Ignore too short EAPOL-Key frame");
921 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
922 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
923 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
924 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
925 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
926 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
927 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
928 " key_info=0x%x type=%u mic_len=%u key_data_length=%u",
929 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
,
930 (unsigned int) mic_len
, key_data_length
);
931 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
,
932 "WPA: EAPOL-Key header (ending before Key MIC)",
934 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key Key MIC",
936 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - keyhdrlen
) {
937 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
938 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
940 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
945 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
946 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
948 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
949 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
951 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
952 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
953 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
954 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
955 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
960 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
961 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
962 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
968 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
970 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
971 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
973 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
976 if ((key_info
& (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) ==
977 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) {
978 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
980 msgtxt
= "SMK Error";
985 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
988 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
991 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
993 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
994 } else if (key_data_length
== 0 ||
995 (mic_len
== 0 && (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
) &&
996 key_data_length
== AES_BLOCK_SIZE
)) {
998 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
1001 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
1004 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
1005 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
1007 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
1008 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
1009 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
1010 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
1011 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
&&
1012 !wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1013 !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1014 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1015 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1017 "advertised support for "
1018 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
1023 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
1024 !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1025 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
1026 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1028 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
1034 if ((wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1035 wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) &&
1036 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
) {
1037 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1038 "did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
1043 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1044 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
1045 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
1046 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
1047 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1048 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1049 "replayed counter");
1054 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
1055 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
1058 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1059 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1060 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1061 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1062 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
1065 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
1066 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
1067 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
1068 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
1069 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
1071 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1072 "Process SNonce update from STA "
1073 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
1075 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
1076 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_SNonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1077 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= TRUE
;
1078 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1079 sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1080 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1081 goto continue_processing
;
1084 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_4
&& sm
->alt_snonce_valid
&&
1085 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1086 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1087 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0) {
1089 * Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
1090 * there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
1091 * different SNonce values.
1093 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1094 "Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
1095 goto continue_processing
;
1098 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1099 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1100 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1101 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
1102 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1103 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
1104 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
1106 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1107 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
1108 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
1110 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
1111 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
1113 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
1114 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1115 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1117 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
1118 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1122 continue_processing
:
1124 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& mic_len
== 0 &&
1125 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
)) {
1126 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1127 "WPA: Encr Key Data bit not set even though AEAD cipher is supposed to be used - drop frame");
1130 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1134 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
1135 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
1136 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
1137 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
1138 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1139 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
1140 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1144 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1145 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
1147 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
1148 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
1149 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
1150 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
1151 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
1152 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
1155 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
1156 "collect more entropy for random number "
1158 random_mark_pool_ready();
1159 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1164 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
1166 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1167 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1168 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1174 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1175 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1176 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1177 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1178 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1179 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1183 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1187 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.peerkey
) {
1188 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1189 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1192 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1193 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1194 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1195 "invalid state - dropped");
1199 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1203 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1204 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1209 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1210 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1212 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1213 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1214 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1218 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1219 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1220 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1221 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1226 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1227 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1228 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1229 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC set");
1232 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1234 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1235 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1237 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &sm
->PTK
, data
,
1239 (msg
!= PAIRWISE_4
|| !sm
->alt_snonce_valid
||
1240 wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm
, data
, data_len
))) {
1241 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1242 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1247 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &sm
->PTK
, data
, data_len
,
1248 &key_data_length
) < 0) {
1249 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1250 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1253 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1254 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1255 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1256 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1259 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1260 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1261 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1262 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1263 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1265 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1266 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1272 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1273 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1274 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1276 if (msg
== SMK_ERROR
) {
1277 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1278 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1279 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1281 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1282 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1284 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) > 0)
1285 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1286 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1287 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1288 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1290 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1291 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1292 } else if (msg
== SMK_M1
) {
1293 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
,
1295 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1296 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1297 wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
,
1301 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1302 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1304 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1305 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1308 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1309 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1310 key
->replay_counter
);
1312 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1314 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1315 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1316 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1317 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1318 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1320 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1321 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1323 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1324 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1328 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1329 * do not get copied again.
1331 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1334 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1335 if (msg
== SMK_M3
) {
1336 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1339 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1341 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1342 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_malloc(data_len
);
1343 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1345 os_memcpy(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
, data
, data_len
);
1346 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1348 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1349 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1350 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1351 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1352 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1357 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1358 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1360 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + 16];
1364 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1365 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1366 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1367 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1368 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1371 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1372 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1373 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1374 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1376 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, 16) < 0)
1379 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1380 sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
);
1381 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1382 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
)
1385 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1391 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1393 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1394 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1396 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1397 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1398 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1403 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1404 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1405 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1406 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1407 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1409 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1410 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1411 size_t len
, mic_len
, keyhdrlen
;
1413 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1415 int version
, pairwise
;
1417 u8
*key_mic
, *key_data
;
1419 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
1420 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
1422 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + keyhdrlen
;
1425 version
= force_version
;
1426 else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1427 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1428 wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1429 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
;
1430 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
))
1431 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1432 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1433 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1435 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1437 pairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1439 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1440 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1443 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1444 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1445 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1446 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1447 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1449 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1451 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1452 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1453 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1454 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1455 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1457 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1458 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1461 len
+= key_data_len
;
1462 if (!mic_len
&& encr
)
1463 len
+= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
1465 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1468 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1469 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1470 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1471 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1472 key_mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1473 key_data
= ((u8
*) (hdr
+ 1)) + keyhdrlen
;
1475 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1476 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1477 key_info
|= version
;
1478 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1479 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1480 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1481 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1482 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1484 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1485 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1486 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
)
1487 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1489 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1490 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1491 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1492 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1493 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1494 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1496 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1497 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1498 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1499 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Replay Counter",
1500 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1501 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1504 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1507 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1510 os_memcpy(key_data
, kde
, kde_len
);
1511 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, kde_len
);
1513 } else if (!mic_len
) {
1517 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1518 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1521 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: KEK",
1522 sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1523 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
1524 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
1525 aad
[0] = (u8
*) hdr
;
1526 aad_len
[0] = key_mic
+ 2 - (u8
*) hdr
;
1527 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, kde
, kde_len
,
1528 1, aad
, aad_len
, key_mic
+ 2) < 0) {
1529 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: AES-SIV encryption failed");
1533 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Encrypted Key Data from SIV",
1534 key_mic
+ 2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1535 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1536 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1537 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1543 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1549 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1551 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1552 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1553 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1554 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1555 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
1556 (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
, key_data
)) {
1561 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1562 #ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
1563 } else if (sm
->PTK
.kek_len
== 16) {
1565 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1566 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1567 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1568 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1569 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1570 os_memcpy(key_data
, buf
, key_data_len
);
1571 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, key_data
, key_data_len
);
1572 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1573 #endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
1582 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1583 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
|| !mic_len
) {
1584 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1585 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1591 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
1592 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, version
,
1593 (u8
*) hdr
, len
, key_mic
);
1594 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1596 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
> 0.0 &&
1598 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
) {
1599 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1600 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1603 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1606 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1608 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1614 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1615 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1616 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1617 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1618 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1621 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1627 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1630 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1631 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1632 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1633 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1635 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1636 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1637 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1638 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1639 "counter %d)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1640 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1641 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1645 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
1648 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1649 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1652 u8 mic
[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN
], *mic_pos
;
1653 size_t mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(akmp
);
1655 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1658 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1659 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1660 mic_pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1661 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1662 os_memcpy(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
);
1663 os_memset(mic_pos
, 0, mic_len
);
1664 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, PTK
->kck_len
, akmp
,
1665 key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1666 data
, data_len
, mic_pos
) ||
1667 os_memcmp_const(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
) != 0)
1669 os_memcpy(mic_pos
, mic
, mic_len
);
1674 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1676 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1677 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1678 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
,
1680 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1681 "RSN: PTK removal from the driver failed");
1682 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1683 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1687 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, enum wpa_event event
)
1694 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1695 "event %d notification", event
);
1700 /* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
1701 if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
)) {
1706 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
1711 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1714 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1717 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1718 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1719 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1720 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1721 * properly at this point.
1723 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1724 "started - initialize now");
1727 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1728 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1730 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1733 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1735 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1736 * update for this STA.
1738 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1739 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1740 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1742 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1745 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1746 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1747 "after association");
1748 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1750 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1751 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1753 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1755 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1758 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1759 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1760 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1762 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1763 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1765 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1767 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1768 (event
== WPA_AUTH
|| event
== WPA_ASSOC
))
1770 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1773 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1774 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1776 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1780 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
1782 * wpa_sm_step() is already running - avoid recursive call to
1783 * it by making the existing loop process the new update.
1788 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1792 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1794 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1796 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1797 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1798 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1802 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1803 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1804 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1805 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1806 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1807 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1808 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1811 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1813 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1815 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1816 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1817 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1822 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1824 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1825 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1826 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1830 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1832 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1833 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1837 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1839 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1840 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1841 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1842 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1844 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1845 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1849 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1850 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1852 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1855 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1856 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1857 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1858 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1859 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1861 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1863 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1864 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1865 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1866 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1868 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1869 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1872 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1873 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1874 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
1875 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
1876 group
->first_sta_seen
= FALSE
;
1877 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1882 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1884 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1886 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1887 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1890 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1891 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1892 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1893 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1894 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1895 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1896 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1898 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1899 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1901 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1904 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1906 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1907 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1908 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1914 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1916 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1917 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1919 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1920 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1922 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1924 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1925 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
1926 sm
->pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
1927 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
1928 unsigned int pmk_len
;
1930 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
& WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192
)
1931 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
1934 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1935 "(MSK len=%lu PMK len=%u)", (unsigned long) len
,
1937 if (len
< pmk_len
) {
1938 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1939 "WPA: MSK not long enough (%u) to create PMK (%u)",
1940 (unsigned int) len
, (unsigned int) pmk_len
);
1941 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1944 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, pmk_len
);
1945 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
1946 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1947 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
1948 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
1949 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1951 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1953 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
1954 sm
->wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
);
1955 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1958 os_memset(msk
, 0, sizeof(msk
));
1960 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1961 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1962 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1963 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1964 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1965 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1966 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1967 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1968 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1969 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
1973 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
1976 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
1977 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, NULL
);
1979 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1980 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1981 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1982 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1983 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1984 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1986 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1990 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
1992 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
1993 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
1995 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
1996 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
1997 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1998 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= FALSE
;
2001 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2002 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2003 * immediately following this. */
2007 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2008 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2010 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
2011 * one possible PSK for this STA.
2013 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
2014 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2015 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
2017 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2018 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
2019 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2020 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
2022 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2023 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2024 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2025 /* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
2029 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
2030 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
2032 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmk_len
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2033 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2034 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
2037 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2038 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
2039 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
2043 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
2044 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
2045 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
2047 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2048 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2049 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, pmk
, ptk
);
2050 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2052 return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, "Pairwise key expansion",
2053 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, snonce
,
2054 ptk
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
);
2060 int fils_auth_pmk_to_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
2061 size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*snonce
, const u8
*anonce
)
2063 u8 ick
[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN
];
2067 res
= fils_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2068 snonce
, anonce
, &sm
->PTK
, ick
, &ick_len
,
2069 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
);
2072 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2074 res
= fils_key_auth_sk(ick
, ick_len
, snonce
, anonce
,
2075 sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2076 NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, /* TODO: SK+PFS */
2077 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2078 sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
,
2079 &sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2080 os_memset(ick
, 0, sizeof(ick
));
2082 /* Store nonces for (Re)Association Request/Response frame processing */
2083 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, snonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2084 os_memcpy(sm
->ANonce
, anonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2090 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
2091 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
)
2093 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2094 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2101 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) buf
;
2102 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2103 pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2104 key_data_len
= WPA_GET_BE16(pos
);
2105 if (key_data_len
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
||
2106 key_data_len
> buf_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - sizeof(*key
) - 2) {
2107 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2108 "No room for AES-SIV data in the frame");
2111 pos
+= 2; /* Pointing at the Encrypted Key Data field */
2113 tmp
= os_malloc(key_data_len
);
2117 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
2118 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
2120 aad_len
[0] = pos
- buf
;
2121 if (aes_siv_decrypt(ptk
->kek
, ptk
->kek_len
, pos
, key_data_len
,
2122 1, aad
, aad_len
, tmp
) < 0) {
2123 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2124 "Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2125 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2129 /* AEAD decryption and validation completed successfully */
2130 key_data_len
-= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2131 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Decrypted Key Data",
2134 /* Replace Key Data field with the decrypted version */
2135 os_memcpy(pos
, tmp
, key_data_len
);
2136 pos
-= 2; /* Key Data Length field */
2137 WPA_PUT_BE16(pos
, key_data_len
);
2138 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2140 *_key_data_len
= key_data_len
;
2145 int fils_decrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*fils_session
,
2146 const struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
, size_t frame_len
,
2147 u8
*pos
, size_t left
)
2150 const u8
*end
, *ie_start
, *ie
, *session
, *crypt
;
2151 struct ieee802_11_elems elems
;
2155 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
2156 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2157 "FILS: No KEK to decrypt Assocication Request frame");
2161 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2162 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2163 "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
2167 end
= ((const u8
*) mgmt
) + frame_len
;
2168 fc
= le_to_host16(mgmt
->frame_control
);
2169 stype
= WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc
);
2170 if (stype
== WLAN_FC_STYPE_REASSOC_REQ
)
2171 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.reassoc_req
.variable
;
2173 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.variable
;
2177 * Find FILS Session element which is the last unencrypted element in
2181 while (ie
+ 1 < end
) {
2182 if (ie
+ 2 + ie
[1] > end
)
2184 if (ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
&&
2185 ie
[1] >= 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN
&&
2186 ie
[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION
) {
2194 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2195 "FILS: Could not find FILS Session element in Association Request frame - reject");
2198 if (os_memcmp(fils_session
, session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
) != 0) {
2199 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Session mismatch");
2200 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected FILS Session",
2201 fils_session
, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2202 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received FILS Session",
2203 session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2206 crypt
= session
+ 2 + session
[1];
2208 if (end
- crypt
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
) {
2209 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2210 "FILS: Too short frame to include AES-SIV data");
2214 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2216 /* The STA's MAC address */
2218 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2219 /* The AP's BSSID */
2221 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2222 /* The STA's nonce */
2223 aad
[2] = sm
->SNonce
;
2224 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2225 /* The AP's nonce */
2226 aad
[3] = sm
->ANonce
;
2227 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2229 * The (Re)Association Request frame from the Capability Information
2230 * field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2232 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.capab_info
;
2233 aad_len
[4] = crypt
- aad
[4];
2235 if (aes_siv_decrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, crypt
, end
- crypt
,
2236 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
+ (crypt
- ie_start
)) < 0) {
2237 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2238 "FILS: Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2241 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Decrypted Association Request elements",
2242 pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
);
2244 if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
, &elems
, 1) ==
2246 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2247 "FILS: Failed to parse decrypted elements");
2250 if (!elems
.fils_key_confirm
) {
2251 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No FILS Key Confirm element");
2254 if (elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
!= sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) {
2255 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2256 "FILS: Unexpected Key-Auth length %d (expected %d)",
2257 elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
,
2258 (int) sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2261 if (os_memcmp(elems
.fils_key_confirm
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2262 sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) != 0) {
2263 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Key-Auth mismatch");
2264 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received Key-Auth",
2265 elems
.fils_key_confirm
,
2266 elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
);
2267 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected Key-Auth",
2268 sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2272 return left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2276 int fils_encrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*buf
,
2277 size_t current_len
, size_t max_len
,
2278 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2280 u8
*end
= buf
+ max_len
;
2281 u8
*pos
= buf
+ current_len
;
2282 struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
;
2283 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2284 u8
*len
, *tmp
, *tmp2
;
2286 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2288 struct wpa_group
*gsm
;
2292 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
)
2295 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2296 "FILS: Association Response frame before FILS processing",
2299 mgmt
= (struct ieee80211_mgmt
*) buf
;
2301 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2303 /* The AP's BSSID */
2305 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2306 /* The STA's MAC address */
2308 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2309 /* The AP's nonce */
2310 aad
[2] = sm
->ANonce
;
2311 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2312 /* The STA's nonce */
2313 aad
[3] = sm
->SNonce
;
2314 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2316 * The (Re)Association Response frame from the Capability Information
2317 * field (the same offset in both Association and Reassociation
2318 * Response frames) to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2320 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_resp
.capab_info
;
2321 aad_len
[4] = pos
- aad
[4];
2323 /* The following elements will be encrypted with AES-SIV */
2325 plain
= wpabuf_alloc(1000);
2329 /* TODO: FILS Public Key */
2331 /* FILS Key Confirmation */
2332 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2333 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, 1 + sm
->fils_key_auth_len
); /* Length */
2334 /* Element ID Extension */
2335 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM
);
2336 wpabuf_put_data(plain
, sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2338 /* FILS HLP Container */
2340 wpabuf_put_buf(plain
, hlp
);
2342 /* TODO: FILS IP Address Assignment */
2346 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2347 len
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 1);
2348 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_KEY_DELIVERY
);
2349 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
,
2350 wpabuf_put(plain
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
));
2352 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2353 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2354 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2356 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2357 * of GTK in the BSS.
2359 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0) {
2365 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2367 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2368 tmp2
= wpa_add_kde(tmp
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2370 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2373 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2374 tmp2
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, tmp
);
2375 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2377 *len
= (u8
*) wpabuf_put(plain
, 0) - len
- 1;
2379 if (pos
+ wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
> end
) {
2380 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2381 "FILS: Not enough room for FILS elements");
2386 wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Association Response plaintext",
2389 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
2390 wpabuf_head(plain
), wpabuf_len(plain
),
2391 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
) < 0) {
2396 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2397 "FILS: Encrypted Association Response elements",
2398 pos
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ wpabuf_len(plain
));
2399 current_len
+= wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2402 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
2408 int fils_set_tk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2413 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
)
2416 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2417 klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2419 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Configure TK to the driver");
2420 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2421 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2422 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Failed to set TK to the driver");
2429 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2432 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
2434 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2436 int ok
= 0, psk_found
= 0;
2437 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
2438 unsigned int pmk_len
;
2440 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
, *key_data
, *mic
;
2441 u16 key_data_length
;
2442 size_t mic_len
, eapol_key_ie_len
;
2443 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2444 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2445 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
2447 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2448 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2449 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
2450 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
2452 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2454 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
2455 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
2458 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2459 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2460 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
2467 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
2470 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
);
2473 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
,
2474 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2475 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
2482 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &PTK
, sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2483 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
, NULL
) == 0) {
2487 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2489 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2494 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2495 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
2497 wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2502 * Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
2505 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
;
2506 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2507 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2508 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
2509 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
2510 if (key_data_length
> sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
2511 sizeof(*key
) - mic_len
- 2)
2514 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
, &kde
) < 0) {
2515 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2516 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with invalid Key Data contents");
2520 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
2521 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
2522 } else if (kde
.osen
) {
2523 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.osen
;
2524 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.osen_len
;
2526 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
2527 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
2529 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2530 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
2531 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
, sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
2532 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
2533 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2534 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not match with msg 2/4");
2536 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
2537 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
2539 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
2540 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
2541 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
2542 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2545 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2546 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
2547 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2550 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2552 if (kde
.ip_addr_req
&& kde
.ip_addr_req
[0] &&
2553 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
&& WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0) {
2555 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2556 "P2P: IP address requested in EAPOL-Key exchange");
2557 idx
= bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
2559 u32 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
2560 bitfield_set(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
, idx
);
2561 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
, start
+ idx
);
2562 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2563 "P2P: Assigned IP address %u.%u.%u.%u to "
2564 MACSTR
, sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
2565 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
2569 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2571 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2572 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2574 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
2575 * with the value we derived.
2577 if (os_memcmp_const(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2578 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
2579 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2580 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
2582 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
2584 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2585 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
2586 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2590 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2592 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
2593 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2595 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2596 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
2597 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
2599 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
2600 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2603 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
2605 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
2606 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2610 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
2612 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
2617 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2619 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2621 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
2623 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2624 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
;
2631 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2633 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
2634 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2635 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2636 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2638 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
2641 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
2643 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
2644 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, rsc
) < 0)
2645 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2647 os_memcpy(igtk
.pn
, rsc
, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2648 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2649 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2651 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
2654 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, len
) < 0)
2657 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
2658 (const u8
*) &igtk
, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
,
2664 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2666 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2672 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2677 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2680 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
2682 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2683 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
2684 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2686 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
2688 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2689 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2692 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2693 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2694 * immediately following this. */
2698 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
2699 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
2701 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2702 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2703 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
2704 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
2705 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
2706 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
2707 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
2708 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
2709 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
2710 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2711 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
2712 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2713 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2715 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2716 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2717 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2718 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
2720 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2721 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2722 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2724 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2725 * of GTK in the BSS.
2727 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
2735 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
2741 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
2743 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
2744 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
2745 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
2746 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
2747 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
2748 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
2750 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2751 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2752 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2757 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2759 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
2760 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2761 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2762 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2763 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2765 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2767 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0)
2768 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 3 * 4;
2769 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2770 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2775 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
2777 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2778 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2783 res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, &elen
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
2785 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
2786 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2793 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2796 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
2798 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2801 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2803 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2804 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2806 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
2808 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
2809 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
2810 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
>= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) {
2811 os_memcpy(pos
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
2812 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
2813 res
= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1];
2815 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2816 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2818 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
2822 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2823 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2829 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2830 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2832 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
2833 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
2836 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2837 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2839 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
2840 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
* 60);
2843 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2845 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0) {
2847 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
2848 os_memcpy(addr
+ 4, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_mask
, 4);
2849 os_memcpy(addr
+ 8, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_go
, 4);
2850 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC
,
2851 addr
, sizeof(addr
), NULL
, 0);
2853 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2855 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2856 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) |
2857 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ? WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
2858 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
2859 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
2860 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
2865 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
2867 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
2868 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2870 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2871 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2872 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2873 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2874 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2877 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2878 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
2880 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
2881 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2882 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.
2883 wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk
,
2887 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2888 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2889 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
2893 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2895 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
2896 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2897 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
2900 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
2903 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
2904 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
2905 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2906 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
2909 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2910 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2911 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2913 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2914 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2915 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2921 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2924 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2925 else if (sm
->Disconnect
2926 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2927 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2928 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2929 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2931 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
2932 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2933 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
2934 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
2935 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
2936 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2937 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
)
2938 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2939 else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
2940 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
2942 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
2943 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2945 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
2946 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2948 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
2949 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2951 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
2952 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2953 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2954 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
2955 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
2956 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)
2957 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2958 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
2960 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
2961 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2962 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0)
2963 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2965 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2966 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2967 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2968 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2971 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
2972 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
,
2974 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2976 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2977 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2978 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2979 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2982 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
2983 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2984 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2985 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2986 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2987 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2988 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2989 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2990 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
2991 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2992 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2993 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2994 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2996 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
2997 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
2998 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
2999 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3000 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
3001 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3002 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3003 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3005 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
3006 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3008 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
3009 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
3010 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3011 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3012 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3013 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
3014 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
3015 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
3016 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3017 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3018 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
3020 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
3021 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3022 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3023 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3025 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
3031 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
3033 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3035 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
3036 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
3037 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3039 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3043 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
3045 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
3046 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3048 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
3050 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
3052 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3055 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
) {
3056 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
3057 * immediately following this. */
3061 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
3062 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
3063 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
3064 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
3065 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
3066 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
3067 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
3068 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3069 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
3071 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
3072 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
3074 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
3075 * of GTK in the BSS.
3077 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3081 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
3082 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
3083 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
3084 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
3085 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
3088 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
3089 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
3091 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
3093 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
3094 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
3097 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3100 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
3101 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
|
3102 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ? WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
3104 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
3105 rsc
, gsm
->GNonce
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
3111 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
3113 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3114 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
3115 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3116 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3117 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3118 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3119 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
3120 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3121 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
3122 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
3127 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
3129 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3130 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3131 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3132 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3133 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3137 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
3139 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
3140 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3141 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
3142 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
3143 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
3144 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
3145 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
3146 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3148 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
3149 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3150 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3151 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
3152 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
3153 (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
)
3154 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
3155 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3156 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3158 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
3159 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3161 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
3162 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3168 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3169 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3173 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3174 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3175 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
3176 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3177 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3179 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
3180 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
3182 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3183 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3185 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3186 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3187 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3188 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
3189 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3190 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3192 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
3193 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3195 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3201 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3202 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3204 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3205 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3206 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
3207 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
3210 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
3213 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3216 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3217 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
3218 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3222 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3224 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
3227 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
3228 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3229 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
3230 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3233 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
3235 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
3236 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
3237 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
3239 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3240 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
3241 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
3244 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
3245 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3248 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
3249 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
3257 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
3258 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3260 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3263 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
3267 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
3270 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
3274 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3276 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3281 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
3284 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
3285 *pos
++ = 11 + gsm
->GTK_len
;
3286 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
3287 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
3289 *pos
++ = gsm
->GTK_len
;
3290 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, pos
) != 0)
3293 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3294 pos
+= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3296 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3298 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3299 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3305 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3306 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3308 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3310 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3314 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
3316 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
3317 *pos
++ = 2 + 6 + len
;
3318 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
3320 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, pos
) != 0)
3324 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3327 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3329 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3330 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3334 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3335 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM */
3338 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3339 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3343 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3344 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3345 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3346 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
3347 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
3349 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3351 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3352 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3353 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3354 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3355 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3356 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
3357 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
3358 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
3359 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3361 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
3362 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
3363 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
3364 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3365 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
3367 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
3368 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
3369 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3373 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3374 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3378 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
3379 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
3380 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
3381 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3384 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3385 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3389 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3390 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3393 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, alg
,
3394 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
3395 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3398 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3404 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3406 if (sm
->group
== ctx
) {
3407 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
3408 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
3410 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3417 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3418 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3420 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
3421 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3422 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
;
3423 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_disconnect_cb
, group
);
3427 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3428 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3430 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3431 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3432 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3433 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
3435 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
3436 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth
, group
);
3444 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3445 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3448 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
3449 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
) {
3450 /* Do not allow group operations */
3451 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
3452 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
3453 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
3454 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
3456 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3457 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
3458 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
3459 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
3460 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
3461 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3466 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3471 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
3472 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
3473 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
3474 * recursive call. */
3475 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
3479 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
3481 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3484 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3485 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
3487 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
3488 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3490 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
3491 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3493 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
3494 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
3495 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
3497 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
3498 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
3499 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
3500 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
3507 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
3509 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
3514 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3518 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
3522 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3525 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3527 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3530 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3532 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
3534 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3536 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3537 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3538 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3539 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3540 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3541 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3542 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3547 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
)
3549 return val
? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
3553 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
3554 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
3555 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
3557 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3560 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
3561 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
3562 const int preauth
= 1;
3563 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3564 const int preauth
= 0;
3565 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3567 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3570 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3571 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
3572 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
3573 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
3574 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
3575 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
3576 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
3577 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
3578 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3582 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
3583 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
3586 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3587 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
3588 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
3589 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
3590 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
3591 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
3592 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
3593 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
3594 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
3595 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
3596 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
3597 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
3598 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
3599 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
3600 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
3601 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3602 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3603 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3604 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
3605 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3606 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3607 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3608 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
3609 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
3610 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
3612 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
3613 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
,
3614 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
,
3615 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
3616 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
3617 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
3618 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
3619 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
3620 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
3621 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
3623 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
3624 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
3625 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
3626 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
3627 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
3628 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3632 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
3633 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
3636 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
3637 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
3638 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3646 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3654 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
3656 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
3658 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
3659 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
3665 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3666 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
3667 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
3668 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
3669 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3670 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
3671 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
3672 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
3673 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
3674 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
3675 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
3677 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
3678 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
3679 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
3680 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3685 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3686 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
3687 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
3689 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
3690 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3698 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3701 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
3705 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3707 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
3711 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3713 return sm
->pairwise
;
3717 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3721 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
3725 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3733 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3734 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
3736 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
3743 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3744 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3746 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
3750 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3753 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
3757 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
3759 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3761 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
3762 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
3766 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
3767 unsigned int pmk_len
,
3768 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3770 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
3771 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3774 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
& WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192
) {
3775 if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
)
3776 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
3777 } else if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN
) {
3781 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, NULL
,
3782 sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
3783 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
3784 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
3791 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3792 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3793 int session_timeout
,
3794 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3796 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3799 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, NULL
,
3802 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
3803 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
3810 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
3811 const u8
*pmk
, const u8
*pmkid
)
3813 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3816 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
,
3818 wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, 0, NULL
,
3826 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3829 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
3831 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
)
3833 pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
3835 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
3836 MACSTR
" based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr
));
3837 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmksa
);
3842 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
,
3845 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3847 return pmksa_cache_auth_list(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, buf
, len
);
3851 void wpa_auth_pmksa_flush(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3853 if (wpa_auth
&& wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3854 pmksa_cache_auth_flush(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
3858 #ifdef CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL
3861 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list_mesh(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
3862 char *buf
, size_t len
)
3864 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3867 return pmksa_cache_auth_list_mesh(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, addr
, buf
, len
);
3871 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3872 wpa_auth_pmksa_create_entry(const u8
*aa
, const u8
*spa
, const u8
*pmk
,
3873 const u8
*pmkid
, int expiration
)
3875 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
;
3876 struct os_reltime now
;
3878 entry
= pmksa_cache_auth_create_entry(pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
, NULL
, 0, aa
,
3879 spa
, 0, NULL
, WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE
);
3883 os_get_reltime(&now
);
3884 entry
->expiration
= now
.sec
+ expiration
;
3889 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_entry(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3890 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
3894 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3897 ret
= pmksa_cache_auth_add_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, entry
);
3899 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
3900 "RSN: Failed to store external PMKSA cache for "
3901 MACSTR
, MAC2STR(entry
->spa
));
3906 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
3907 #endif /* CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL */
3910 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3911 wpa_auth_pmksa_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3914 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3916 return pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, pmkid
);
3920 void wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
,
3921 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3922 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3929 os_memcpy(pmk
, pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
3930 os_memcpy(pmkid
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
3931 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
3936 * Remove and free the group from wpa_authenticator. This is triggered by a
3937 * callback to make sure nobody is currently iterating the group list while it
3940 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3941 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3943 struct wpa_group
*prev
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3945 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3949 if (prev
->next
== group
) {
3950 /* This never frees the special first group as needed */
3951 prev
->next
= group
->next
;
3961 /* Increase the reference counter for group */
3962 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3963 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3965 /* Skip the special first group */
3966 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
3969 group
->references
++;
3973 /* Decrease the reference counter and maybe free the group */
3974 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3975 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3977 /* Skip the special first group */
3978 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
3981 group
->references
--;
3982 if (group
->references
)
3984 wpa_group_free(wpa_auth
, group
);
3989 * Add a group that has its references counter set to zero. Caller needs to
3990 * call wpa_group_get() on the return value to mark the entry in use.
3992 static struct wpa_group
*
3993 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
3995 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3997 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
4000 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
4002 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
4006 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
4007 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
4014 * Enforce that the group state machine for the VLAN is running, increase
4015 * reference counter as interface is up. References might have been increased
4016 * even if a negative value is returned.
4017 * Returns: -1 on error (group missing, group already failed); otherwise, 0
4019 int wpa_auth_ensure_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4021 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4023 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4026 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4028 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4030 group
= group
->next
;
4033 if (group
== NULL
) {
4034 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4039 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4040 "WPA: Ensure group state machine running for VLAN ID %d",
4043 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
4044 group
->num_setup_iface
++;
4046 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4054 * Decrease reference counter, expected to be zero afterwards.
4055 * returns: -1 on error (group not found, group in fail state)
4056 * -2 if wpa_group is still referenced
4059 int wpa_auth_release_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4061 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4064 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4067 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4069 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4071 group
= group
->next
;
4077 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4078 "WPA: Try stopping group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
4081 if (group
->num_setup_iface
<= 0) {
4082 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
,
4083 "WPA: wpa_auth_release_group called more often than wpa_auth_ensure_group for VLAN ID %d, skipping.",
4087 group
->num_setup_iface
--;
4089 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4092 if (group
->references
> 1) {
4093 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4094 "WPA: Cannot stop group state machine for VLAN ID %d as references are still hold",
4099 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
4105 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
4107 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4109 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4112 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
4114 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4116 group
= group
->next
;
4119 if (group
== NULL
) {
4120 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4125 if (sm
->group
== group
)
4128 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4131 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
4132 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
4134 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, group
);
4135 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
4142 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4143 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
4145 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
4147 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
4148 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
4149 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
4151 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
4152 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
4153 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
4154 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
4155 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
4156 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
4157 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
4158 * the station has received the frame.
4160 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
4161 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
4162 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
4164 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4165 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
4166 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
4167 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4172 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4176 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
4180 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4184 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE
;
4189 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*addr
)
4191 if (sm
== NULL
|| WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0)
4193 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
4196 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
4199 int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4200 struct radius_das_attrs
*attr
)
4202 return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, attr
);
4206 void wpa_auth_reconfig_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4208 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4212 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
)
4213 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);