2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2013, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
17 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
18 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
19 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
20 #include "crypto/random.h"
21 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
22 #include "ap_config.h"
23 #include "ieee802_11.h"
25 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
26 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
27 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
29 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
30 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
31 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
34 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
35 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
36 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
, size_t data_len
);
37 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
38 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
39 struct wpa_group
*group
);
40 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
41 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
42 struct wpa_group
*group
);
43 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
44 struct wpa_group
*group
);
46 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
= 4;
47 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
= 4;
48 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
49 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
50 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
52 /* TODO: make these configurable */
53 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
54 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
55 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
58 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
59 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
61 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report
)
62 return wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
67 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
68 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
71 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol
)
72 wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
76 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
77 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
79 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol
== NULL
)
81 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
);
85 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
87 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
,
90 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk
== NULL
)
92 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, p2p_dev_addr
,
97 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
98 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
100 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk
== NULL
)
102 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
106 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
108 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
109 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
111 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key
== NULL
)
113 return wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
118 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
119 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
121 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum
== NULL
)
123 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
128 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
129 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
131 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol
== NULL
)
133 return wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
138 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
139 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
142 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta
== NULL
)
144 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
148 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
149 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
152 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth
== NULL
)
154 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
158 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
159 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
161 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
163 wpa_auth
->cb
.logger(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
167 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
168 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
174 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
177 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
178 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
183 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
186 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
192 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
195 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect
== NULL
)
197 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(addr
));
198 wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
,
199 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
203 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
206 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
207 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
209 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
210 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
211 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
213 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
218 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
220 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
222 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
223 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
226 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
227 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
228 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
231 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
232 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
233 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
238 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
240 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
241 struct wpa_group
*group
;
243 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
244 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
) {
245 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
247 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
248 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
249 } while (group
->changed
);
252 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
253 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
254 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
259 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
261 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
262 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
264 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
265 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
270 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
272 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
278 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
281 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
282 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
286 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
287 struct wpa_group
*group
)
289 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
293 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
295 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
298 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
299 * Local MAC Address || Time)
301 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
302 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
303 ptr
= (unsigned long) group
;
304 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &ptr
, sizeof(ptr
));
305 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
308 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
309 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
311 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
312 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
318 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
319 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
321 struct wpa_group
*group
;
323 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
327 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
328 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
329 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
331 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
332 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
333 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
334 "the first station connects");
338 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
339 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
340 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
341 * on embedded devices.
343 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
344 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
352 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
353 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
354 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
356 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
357 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
358 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
366 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
367 * @addr: Authenticator address
368 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
369 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
370 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
372 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
373 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
374 struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
)
376 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
378 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
379 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
381 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
382 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
383 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->cb
, cb
, sizeof(*cb
));
385 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
386 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
391 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
392 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
393 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
398 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
400 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
401 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
402 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
407 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
408 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
409 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
410 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
411 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
412 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
416 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
418 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
419 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
420 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
423 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
424 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
425 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
429 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
)) {
430 int count
= WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_end
) -
431 WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
) + 1;
435 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
= bitfield_alloc(count
);
437 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
443 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
445 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
447 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
449 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
450 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
451 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
452 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
459 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
460 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
462 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
464 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
466 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
467 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
469 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
470 while (wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
)
471 wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
);
472 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
474 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
476 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
477 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
478 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
479 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
482 bitfield_free(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
483 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
486 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
488 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
500 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
501 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
502 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
504 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
505 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
507 struct wpa_group
*group
;
508 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
511 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
512 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
513 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
518 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
521 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
522 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
524 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
525 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
526 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
532 struct wpa_state_machine
*
533 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
534 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
)
536 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
538 if (wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
541 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
544 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
546 os_memcpy(sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, p2p_dev_addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
548 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
549 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
555 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
556 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
558 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
561 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
562 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
563 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
564 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
565 "start 4-way handshake");
568 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
571 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
572 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
573 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
576 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
577 "start authentication");
581 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
582 return 1; /* should not really happen */
584 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
585 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
589 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
591 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
592 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
593 * STA has not yet been removed. */
597 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
601 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
604 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
)) {
606 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
607 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR
,
608 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
609 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
611 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
612 bitfield_clear(sm
->wpa_auth
->ip_pool
,
613 WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) - start
);
615 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
616 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
617 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
618 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
620 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
621 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
622 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
623 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
629 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
634 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
635 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
636 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
638 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
);
639 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
643 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
644 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
645 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
646 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
647 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
648 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
649 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
650 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
651 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
652 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
658 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
663 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
668 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
669 const u8
*replay_counter
)
672 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
675 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
676 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
683 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
684 const u8
*replay_counter
)
687 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
689 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
690 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
691 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
692 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
697 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
698 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
699 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
700 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
702 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
703 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
705 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
706 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
707 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
708 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
712 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
713 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
714 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
716 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
717 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
718 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
722 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
723 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
724 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
725 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
726 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
730 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
731 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
732 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
733 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
734 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
735 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
736 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
737 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
738 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
744 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
747 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
748 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
750 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
751 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
752 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
753 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
756 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
757 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
758 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
759 "group cipher is not TKIP");
760 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
761 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
762 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
763 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
765 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
) > 0)
766 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
767 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
768 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
772 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
773 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
775 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
780 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
781 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
782 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
784 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
785 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
786 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
787 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
,
788 SMK_M1
, SMK_M3
, SMK_ERROR
} msg
;
790 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
792 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
;
793 size_t eapol_key_ie_len
;
795 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
798 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
801 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
802 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
803 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
804 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_data_length
);
805 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
806 " key_info=0x%x type=%u key_data_length=%u",
807 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
, key_data_length
);
808 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - sizeof(*key
)) {
809 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
810 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
812 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
817 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
818 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
820 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
821 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
823 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
824 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
825 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
826 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
827 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
832 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
833 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
834 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
840 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
842 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
843 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
845 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
848 if ((key_info
& (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) ==
849 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) {
850 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
852 msgtxt
= "SMK Error";
857 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
860 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
863 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
865 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
866 } else if (key_data_length
== 0) {
868 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
871 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
874 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
875 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
877 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
878 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
879 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
880 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
881 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
882 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
884 "advertised support for "
885 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
890 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
891 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
892 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
894 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
901 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
902 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
903 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
904 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
905 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
906 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
912 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
913 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
916 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
917 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
918 key
->replay_counter
) &&
919 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
920 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
923 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
924 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
925 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
926 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
927 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
929 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
930 "Process SNonce update from STA "
931 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
933 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
934 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
935 key
->replay_counter
);
936 goto continue_processing
;
939 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
940 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
941 key
->replay_counter
) &&
942 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
943 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
944 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
945 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
947 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
948 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
949 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
951 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
952 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
954 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
955 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
956 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
958 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
959 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
966 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
967 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
968 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
969 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
970 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
971 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
972 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
976 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
977 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
979 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
980 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
981 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
982 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
983 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
984 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
987 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
988 "collect more entropy for random number "
990 random_mark_pool_ready();
991 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
994 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies((u8
*) (key
+ 1), key_data_length
,
996 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
997 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with "
998 "invalid Key Data contents");
1002 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
1003 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
1005 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
1006 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
1008 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
1009 wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
1010 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
1011 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
,
1012 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
1013 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
1014 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1015 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not "
1016 "match with msg 2/4");
1018 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
1019 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
1021 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
1022 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
1023 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
1024 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1027 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1028 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
1029 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1032 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1034 if (kde
.ip_addr_req
&& kde
.ip_addr_req
[0] &&
1035 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
&& WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0) {
1037 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: IP address requested in "
1038 "EAPOL-Key exchange");
1039 idx
= bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
1041 u32 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth
->conf
.
1043 bitfield_set(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
, idx
);
1044 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
, start
+ idx
);
1045 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Assigned IP "
1046 "address %u.%u.%u.%u to " MACSTR
,
1047 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
1048 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
1052 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
1055 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
1057 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1058 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1059 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1065 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1066 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1067 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1068 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1069 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1070 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1074 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1078 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.peerkey
) {
1079 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1080 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1083 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1084 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1085 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1086 "invalid state - dropped");
1090 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1094 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1095 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1100 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1101 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1103 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1104 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1105 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1109 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1110 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1111 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1115 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1116 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1117 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&sm
->PTK
, data
, data_len
)) {
1118 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1119 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1122 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1123 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1124 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1127 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1128 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1129 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1130 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1131 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1133 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1134 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1140 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1141 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1142 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1144 if (msg
== SMK_ERROR
) {
1145 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1146 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
);
1147 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1149 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1150 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1152 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) > 0)
1153 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1154 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1155 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1156 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1158 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1159 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1160 } else if (msg
== SMK_M1
) {
1161 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
);
1162 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1163 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1164 wpa_parse_kde_ies((const u8
*) (key
+ 1),
1165 key_data_length
, &kde
) == 0 &&
1168 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1169 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1171 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1172 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1175 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1176 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1177 key
->replay_counter
);
1179 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1181 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1182 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1183 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1184 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1185 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1187 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1188 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1190 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1191 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1195 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1196 * do not get copied again.
1198 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1201 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1202 if (msg
== SMK_M3
) {
1203 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
);
1206 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1208 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1209 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_malloc(data_len
);
1210 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1212 os_memcpy(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
, data
, data_len
);
1213 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1215 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1216 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1217 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1218 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1219 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1224 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1225 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1227 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + 16];
1231 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1232 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1233 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1234 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1235 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1238 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1239 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1240 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1241 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1243 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, 16) < 0)
1246 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1247 sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
);
1248 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1249 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
)
1252 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1258 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1260 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1261 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1263 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1264 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1265 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1270 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1271 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1272 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1273 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1274 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1276 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1277 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1280 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1282 int version
, pairwise
;
1285 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + sizeof(struct wpa_eapol_key
);
1288 version
= force_version
;
1289 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
))
1290 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1291 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1292 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1294 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1296 pairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1298 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1299 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1302 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1303 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1304 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1305 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1306 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1308 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1310 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1311 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1312 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1314 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1315 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1318 len
+= key_data_len
;
1320 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1323 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1324 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1325 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1326 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1328 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1329 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1330 key_info
|= version
;
1331 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1332 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1333 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1334 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1335 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1337 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1338 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1339 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
)
1340 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1342 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1343 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1344 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1345 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1346 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1347 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1349 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1350 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1351 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1352 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1355 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1358 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1361 os_memcpy(key
+ 1, kde
, kde_len
);
1362 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
, kde_len
);
1363 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1364 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1370 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1376 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1378 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1379 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1380 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
,
1381 (u8
*) (key
+ 1))) {
1386 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
, key_data_len
);
1389 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1390 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1391 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1392 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1393 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, 16);
1394 os_memcpy(key
+ 1, buf
, key_data_len
);
1395 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, (u8
*) (key
+ 1), key_data_len
);
1396 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
, key_data_len
);
1401 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1402 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1403 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1404 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1409 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, version
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1411 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1413 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
> 0.0d
&&
1415 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
) {
1416 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1417 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1420 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1423 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1425 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1431 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1432 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1433 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1434 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1435 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1438 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1444 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1447 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1448 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1449 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1450 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1452 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1453 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1454 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1455 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1456 "counter %d)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1457 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1458 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1462 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
1464 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1465 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1470 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1473 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1474 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1475 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1476 os_memcpy(mic
, key
->key_mic
, 16);
1477 os_memset(key
->key_mic
, 0, 16);
1478 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1479 data
, data_len
, key
->key_mic
) ||
1480 os_memcmp(mic
, key
->key_mic
, 16) != 0)
1482 os_memcpy(key
->key_mic
, mic
, 16);
1487 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1489 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1490 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1491 wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
, 0);
1492 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1493 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1497 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, wpa_event event
)
1504 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1505 "event %d notification", event
);
1513 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1516 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1519 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1520 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1521 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1522 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1523 * properly at this point.
1525 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1526 "started - initialize now");
1529 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1530 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1532 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1535 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1537 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1538 * update for this STA.
1540 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1541 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1542 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1544 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1547 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1548 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1549 "after association");
1550 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1552 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1553 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1555 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1557 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1560 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1561 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1562 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1564 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1565 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1567 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1570 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1571 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1573 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1577 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1581 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1583 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1585 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1586 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1587 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1591 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1592 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1593 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1594 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1595 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1596 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1597 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1600 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1602 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1604 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1605 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1606 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1611 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1613 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1614 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1615 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1619 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1621 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1622 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1626 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1628 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1629 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1630 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1631 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1633 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1634 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1638 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1639 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1641 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1644 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1645 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1646 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1647 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1648 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1650 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1652 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1653 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1654 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1655 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1657 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1658 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1661 wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
);
1662 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
1663 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
1667 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1669 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1671 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1672 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1675 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1676 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1677 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1678 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1679 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1680 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1681 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1683 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1684 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1686 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1689 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1691 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1692 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1693 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1699 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1701 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1702 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1704 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1705 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1707 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1709 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1710 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
1711 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
1712 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1713 "(len=%lu)", (unsigned long) len
);
1714 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, PMK_LEN
);
1715 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1716 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
1717 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
1718 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1720 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1722 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK");
1725 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1726 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1727 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1728 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1729 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1730 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1731 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1732 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1733 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1734 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
1738 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
1741 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
1742 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, NULL
);
1744 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1745 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1746 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1747 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1748 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1750 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1754 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
1756 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
1757 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
1759 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
1760 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
1761 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1764 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
1765 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1766 * immediately following this. */
1770 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1771 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1773 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
1774 * one possible PSK for this STA.
1776 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
1777 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1779 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1780 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
1781 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1782 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
1784 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
1785 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
1788 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
1789 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
1791 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, PMK_LEN
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
1792 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
1793 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
1796 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
1797 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
1798 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
1802 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
1803 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
1805 size_t ptk_len
= sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
? 48 : 64;
1806 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1807 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1808 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, pmk
, ptk
, ptk_len
);
1809 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1811 wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, PMK_LEN
, "Pairwise key expansion",
1812 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, sm
->SNonce
,
1813 (u8
*) ptk
, ptk_len
,
1814 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
1820 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
1824 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
1826 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
1827 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
1828 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
1830 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
1831 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
1834 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1835 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1836 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
1842 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, pmk
, &PTK
);
1844 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&PTK
, sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
1845 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
1850 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1855 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1856 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
1860 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1861 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1863 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
1864 * with the value we derived.
1866 if (os_memcmp(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
1867 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
1868 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1869 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
1871 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
1873 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
1874 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
1875 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
1879 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1881 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1882 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1884 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1885 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
1886 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
1888 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
1891 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1893 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
1894 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
1898 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
1900 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
1905 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1907 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1909 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
1910 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ sizeof(struct wpa_igtk_kde
);
1917 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
1919 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
1920 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
1921 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
1923 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
1926 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
1928 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
1929 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, rsc
) < 0)
1930 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
1932 os_memcpy(igtk
.pn
, rsc
, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
1933 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN
);
1934 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
1936 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
1939 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, WPA_IGTK_LEN
) < 0)
1942 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
1943 (const u8
*) &igtk
, sizeof(igtk
), NULL
, 0);
1948 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1950 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1956 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
1961 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1964 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
1966 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
1967 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
1968 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
1970 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
1972 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
1973 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1976 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
1977 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1978 * immediately following this. */
1982 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
1983 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
1985 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1986 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
1987 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
1988 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
1989 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
1990 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
1991 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
1992 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
1993 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE */
1994 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
1995 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
1997 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1998 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1999 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2000 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
2002 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2003 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2004 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2006 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2007 * of GTK in the BSS.
2009 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
2017 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
2023 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
2025 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
2026 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
2027 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
2028 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
2029 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
2030 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
2032 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2033 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2034 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2039 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2041 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
2042 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2043 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2044 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2045 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2047 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2049 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0)
2050 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 3 * 4;
2051 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2052 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2057 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
2059 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2060 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2061 int res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, pos
- kde
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
2063 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
2064 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2070 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2073 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
2075 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2078 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2080 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2081 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2083 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
2085 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
2086 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2087 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2088 NULL
, NULL
, pos
, kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
2091 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2092 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2098 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2099 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2101 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
2102 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
2105 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2106 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2108 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
2109 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
* 60);
2112 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2114 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0) {
2116 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
2117 os_memcpy(addr
+ 4, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_mask
, 4);
2118 os_memcpy(addr
+ 8, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_go
, 4);
2119 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC
,
2120 addr
, sizeof(addr
), NULL
, 0);
2122 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2124 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2125 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2126 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
2127 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
2128 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
2133 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
2135 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
2136 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2138 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2139 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2140 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2141 sm
->PTK
.tk1
, klen
)) {
2142 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2145 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2146 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
2148 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
2149 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2150 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.
2151 wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk
,
2155 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2156 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2157 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
2161 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2163 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
2164 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2165 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
2168 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
2171 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
2172 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
2173 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2174 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
2177 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2178 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2179 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2181 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2182 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2183 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2189 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2192 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2193 else if (sm
->Disconnect
2194 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2195 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2196 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2197 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2199 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
2200 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2201 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
2202 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
2203 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
2204 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2205 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
)
2206 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2207 else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
2208 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
2210 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
2211 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2213 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
2214 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2216 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
2217 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2219 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
2220 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2221 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2222 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
2223 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
2224 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)
2225 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2226 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
2228 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
2229 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2230 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0)
2231 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2233 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2234 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2235 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2236 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2239 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
2240 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
,
2242 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2244 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2245 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2246 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2247 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2250 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
2251 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2252 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2253 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2254 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2255 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2256 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2257 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2258 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
2259 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2260 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2261 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2262 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2264 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
2265 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
2266 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
2267 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2268 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2269 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2270 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2271 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2273 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
2274 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2276 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
2277 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
2278 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2279 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2280 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2281 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
2282 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2283 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2284 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2285 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2286 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
2288 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2289 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2290 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2291 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2293 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
2299 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
2301 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2303 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
2304 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
2305 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2307 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2311 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
2313 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2314 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2315 u8
*kde
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
2317 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2319 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2322 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
) {
2323 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2324 * immediately following this. */
2328 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2329 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
2330 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2331 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
2332 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2333 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
2334 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2335 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2336 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
2338 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2339 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2341 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2342 * of GTK in the BSS.
2344 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2348 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2349 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
2350 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2351 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2356 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2358 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2360 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2363 pos
= kde
+ gsm
->GTK_len
;
2366 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2367 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2369 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
2370 rsc
, gsm
->GNonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
2371 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
2376 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
2378 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2379 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2380 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2381 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2382 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2383 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2384 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2385 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2386 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
2387 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2392 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
2394 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2395 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2396 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2397 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2398 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2402 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
2404 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
2405 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2406 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
2407 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
2408 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
2409 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
2410 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
2411 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2413 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
2414 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2415 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2416 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
2417 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
2418 (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
)
2419 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
2420 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2421 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2423 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
2424 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2426 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
2427 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2433 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2434 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2438 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2439 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2440 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
2441 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2442 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2444 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
2445 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
2447 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2448 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
2449 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2450 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2451 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
2452 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2453 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4],
2456 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
2457 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN
);
2459 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2465 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2466 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2468 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2469 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2470 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
2471 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
2474 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
2477 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2480 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2481 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
2482 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2486 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
2488 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
2491 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
2492 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2493 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
2494 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2497 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
2499 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
2500 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
2501 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
2503 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2504 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
2505 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
2508 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
2509 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2512 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
2513 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
2521 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
2522 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2524 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2527 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
2531 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
2534 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
2538 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2540 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2545 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
2548 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
2549 *pos
++ = 11 + gsm
->GTK_len
;
2550 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
2551 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
2553 *pos
++ = gsm
->GTK_len
;
2554 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, pos
) != 0)
2557 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
2558 pos
+= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2560 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2562 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2563 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
2569 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2570 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2572 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2577 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
2579 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
2580 *pos
++ = 2 + 6 + WPA_IGTK_LEN
;
2581 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
2583 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, pos
) != 0)
2587 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN
);
2588 pos
+= WPA_IGTK_LEN
;
2590 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2592 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2593 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN
);
2597 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2598 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM */
2601 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2602 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2606 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2607 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2608 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2609 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
2610 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
2612 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
2614 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2615 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
2616 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
2617 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
2618 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2619 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
2620 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
2621 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
2622 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2624 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
2625 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
2626 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
2627 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2628 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
2630 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
2631 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
2632 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2636 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2637 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2641 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
2642 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
2643 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
2644 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2647 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2648 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
&&
2649 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, WPA_ALG_IGTK
,
2650 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
2651 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4],
2654 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2660 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
2662 if (sm
->group
== ctx
) {
2663 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
2664 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
2666 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2673 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2674 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2676 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
2677 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2678 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
;
2679 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_disconnect_cb
, group
);
2683 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2684 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2686 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2687 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2688 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2689 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
2691 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
2692 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth
, group
);
2700 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2701 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2704 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
2705 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
) {
2706 /* Do not allow group operations */
2707 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
2708 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
2709 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2710 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
2712 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2713 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
2714 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
2715 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2716 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
2717 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2722 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2727 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
2728 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
2729 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
2730 * recursive call. */
2731 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
2735 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
2737 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2740 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2741 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
2743 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
2744 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2746 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
2747 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2749 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
2750 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
2751 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
2753 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
2754 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
2755 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
2756 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
2763 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
2765 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
2770 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2774 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
2778 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
2781 struct wpa_group
*group
;
2783 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
2786 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
2788 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
2790 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
2792 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2793 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
2794 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
2795 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
2796 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2797 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2798 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2803 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int bool)
2805 return bool ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
2809 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
2810 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
2811 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
2813 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
2816 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
2817 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
2818 const int preauth
= 1;
2819 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
2820 const int preauth
= 0;
2821 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
2823 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
2826 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2827 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
2828 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
2829 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
2830 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
2831 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
2832 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
2833 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
2834 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2838 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
2839 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
2842 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2843 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
2844 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
2845 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
2846 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
2847 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
2848 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
2849 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
2850 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
2851 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
2852 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
2853 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
2854 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
2855 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
2856 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
2857 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2858 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2859 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2860 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
2861 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2862 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2863 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2864 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
2865 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
2866 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
2868 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
2869 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
,
2870 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
,
2871 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
2872 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
2873 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
2874 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
2875 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
2876 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
2877 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
2879 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
2880 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
2881 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
2882 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
2883 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
2884 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2888 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
2889 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
2892 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
2893 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
2894 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2902 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
2910 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
2912 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
2914 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
2915 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
2921 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2922 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
2923 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
2924 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
2925 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2926 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
2927 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
2928 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
2929 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
2930 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
2931 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
2933 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
2934 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
2935 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
2936 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2941 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2942 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
2943 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
2945 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
2946 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2954 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
2957 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
2961 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2963 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
2967 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2969 return sm
->pairwise
;
2973 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2977 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
2981 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2989 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
2990 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
2992 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
2999 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3000 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3002 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
3006 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3009 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
3013 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
3015 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3017 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
3018 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
3022 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
3023 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3025 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
3026 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3029 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
,
3030 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
3031 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
3038 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3039 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3040 int session_timeout
,
3041 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3043 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3046 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, wpa_auth
->addr
,
3047 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
3048 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
3055 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3058 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
3060 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
)
3062 pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
3064 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
3065 MACSTR
" based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr
));
3066 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmksa
);
3071 static struct wpa_group
*
3072 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
3074 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3076 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
3079 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3081 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
3085 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
3086 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
3092 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
3094 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3096 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3099 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
3101 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
3103 group
= group
->next
;
3106 if (group
== NULL
) {
3107 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
3112 if (sm
->group
== group
)
3115 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
3118 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
3119 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
3126 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3127 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
3129 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
3131 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
3132 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
3133 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
3135 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
3136 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
3137 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
3138 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
3139 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
3140 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
3141 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
3142 * the station has received the frame.
3144 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
3145 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
3146 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
3148 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
3149 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
3150 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
3151 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
3156 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3160 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
3164 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3168 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE
;
3173 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*addr
)
3175 if (sm
== NULL
|| WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0)
3177 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
3180 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */