projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blame
| Commit | Line | Data |
|---|---|---|
| fe36a698 SM |
1 | A "wish list" of changes we'd like to make to the FIPS module if we could. |
| 2 | Note the CMVP requires retesting of all previously tested platforms | |
| 3 | ("Operational Environments") to implement any changes considered "cryptographically | |
| 4 | significant". Since the OpenSSL FIPS module v2.0 has some 250 such formally | |
| 5 | tested platforms (and counting), retesting just isn't logistically or economically | |
| 6 | feasible. | |
| 7 | ||
| 8 | -------- | |
| 9 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4157 | |
| 10 | From 2017-08-14, Fix GCM MAC computation for AES-GCM by srahul123 | |
| 11 | cryptographically significant, not fixable | |
| 12 | ||
| 13 | -------- | |
| 14 | Andy Polyakov: harmonize with __thumb__ clause in FIPS_ref_point() (#3354), | |
| 15 | https://patch-diff.githubusercontent.com/raw/openssl/openssl/pull/3354.patch | |
| 16 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3354#pullrequestreview-36086406 | |
| 17 | May be possible to introduce in future change letter | |
| 18 | ||
| 19 | -------- | |
| 20 | CVE-2016-0701 | |
| 21 | cryptographically significant, not fixable | |
| 22 | ||
| 23 | -------- | |
| 24 | CVE-2014-0076 | |
| 25 | cryptographically significant, not fixable | |
| 26 | ||
| 27 | -------- | |
| 28 | "Lucky 13", CVE-2013-0169 | |
| 29 | cryptographically significant, not fixable | |
| 30 | ||
| 31 | -------- |