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2039c421 | 1 | /* |
83cf7abf | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
d02b48c6 | 3 | * |
2a7b6f39 | 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
2039c421 RS |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
d02b48c6 RE |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
10 | #include <stdio.h> | |
ec577822 | 11 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
b39fc560 | 12 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
cd420b0b | 13 | #include "internal/refcount.h" |
18125f7f | 14 | #include "internal/bn_int.h" |
3c27208f | 15 | #include <openssl/engine.h> |
e5e04ee3 DSH |
16 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
17 | #include "internal/evp_int.h" | |
9862e9aa | 18 | #include "rsa_locl.h" |
d02b48c6 | 19 | |
6b691a5c | 20 | RSA *RSA_new(void) |
0f113f3e | 21 | { |
076fc555 | 22 | return RSA_new_method(NULL); |
0f113f3e | 23 | } |
ce8b2574 | 24 | |
29c1f061 | 25 | const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa) |
0f113f3e MC |
26 | { |
27 | return rsa->meth; | |
28 | } | |
cb78486d GT |
29 | |
30 | int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth) | |
0f113f3e MC |
31 | { |
32 | /* | |
33 | * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us | |
34 | * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from. | |
35 | */ | |
36 | const RSA_METHOD *mtmp; | |
37 | mtmp = rsa->meth; | |
38 | if (mtmp->finish) | |
39 | mtmp->finish(rsa); | |
0b13e9f0 | 40 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
7c96dbcd RS |
41 | ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine); |
42 | rsa->engine = NULL; | |
0b13e9f0 | 43 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
44 | rsa->meth = meth; |
45 | if (meth->init) | |
46 | meth->init(rsa); | |
47 | return 1; | |
48 | } | |
ce8b2574 | 49 | |
5270e702 | 50 | RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine) |
0f113f3e | 51 | { |
11ed851d | 52 | RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); |
d02b48c6 | 53 | |
0f113f3e MC |
54 | if (ret == NULL) { |
55 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
56 | return NULL; | |
57 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 58 | |
11ed851d F |
59 | ret->references = 1; |
60 | ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); | |
61 | if (ret->lock == NULL) { | |
62 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
63 | OPENSSL_free(ret); | |
64 | return NULL; | |
65 | } | |
66 | ||
0f113f3e | 67 | ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method(); |
0b13e9f0 | 68 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
11ed851d | 69 | ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; |
0f113f3e MC |
70 | if (engine) { |
71 | if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) { | |
72 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); | |
11ed851d | 73 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
74 | } |
75 | ret->engine = engine; | |
90862ab4 | 76 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 77 | ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA(); |
90862ab4 | 78 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
79 | if (ret->engine) { |
80 | ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine); | |
7c96dbcd | 81 | if (ret->meth == NULL) { |
0f113f3e | 82 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); |
11ed851d | 83 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
84 | } |
85 | } | |
0b13e9f0 | 86 | #endif |
0c9de428 | 87 | |
0f113f3e MC |
88 | ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; |
89 | if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { | |
11ed851d | 90 | goto err; |
d188a536 AG |
91 | } |
92 | ||
93 | if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) { | |
11ed851d F |
94 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); |
95 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 96 | } |
d188a536 AG |
97 | |
98 | return ret; | |
11ed851d | 99 | |
544648a8 | 100 | err: |
11ed851d F |
101 | RSA_free(ret); |
102 | return NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 103 | } |
d02b48c6 | 104 | |
6b691a5c | 105 | void RSA_free(RSA *r) |
0f113f3e MC |
106 | { |
107 | int i; | |
d02b48c6 | 108 | |
0f113f3e MC |
109 | if (r == NULL) |
110 | return; | |
d02b48c6 | 111 | |
2f545ae4 | 112 | CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock); |
f3f1cf84 | 113 | REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r); |
0f113f3e MC |
114 | if (i > 0) |
115 | return; | |
f3f1cf84 | 116 | REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); |
d02b48c6 | 117 | |
0c5d725e | 118 | if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL) |
0f113f3e | 119 | r->meth->finish(r); |
0b13e9f0 | 120 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
412bafdc | 121 | ENGINE_finish(r->engine); |
0b13e9f0 | 122 | #endif |
d02b48c6 | 123 | |
0f113f3e | 124 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data); |
7abe8305 | 125 | |
d188a536 AG |
126 | CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); |
127 | ||
c033101d MB |
128 | BN_free(r->n); |
129 | BN_free(r->e); | |
23a1d5e9 RS |
130 | BN_clear_free(r->d); |
131 | BN_clear_free(r->p); | |
132 | BN_clear_free(r->q); | |
133 | BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); | |
134 | BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); | |
135 | BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); | |
d771441d | 136 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss); |
665d899f | 137 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); |
23a1d5e9 RS |
138 | BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding); |
139 | BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding); | |
4c42ebd2 | 140 | OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data); |
0f113f3e MC |
141 | OPENSSL_free(r); |
142 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 143 | |
6ac4e8bd | 144 | int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r) |
0f113f3e | 145 | { |
d188a536 AG |
146 | int i; |
147 | ||
2f545ae4 | 148 | if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0) |
d188a536 | 149 | return 0; |
f3f1cf84 RS |
150 | |
151 | REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r); | |
152 | REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); | |
8686c474 | 153 | return i > 1 ? 1 : 0; |
0f113f3e | 154 | } |
5cbc2e8b | 155 | |
dd9d233e | 156 | int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg) |
0f113f3e | 157 | { |
8686c474 | 158 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg); |
0f113f3e | 159 | } |
58964a49 | 160 | |
29c1f061 | 161 | void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx) |
0f113f3e | 162 | { |
8686c474 | 163 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx); |
0f113f3e | 164 | } |
58964a49 | 165 | |
97b0b713 P |
166 | /* |
167 | * Define a scaling constant for our fixed point arithmetic. | |
168 | * This value must be a power of two because the base two logarithm code | |
169 | * makes this assumption. The exponent must also be a multiple of three so | |
170 | * that the scale factor has an exact cube root. Finally, the scale factor | |
171 | * should not be so large that a multiplication of two scaled numbers | |
172 | * overflows a 64 bit unsigned integer. | |
173 | */ | |
174 | static const unsigned int scale = 1 << 18; | |
175 | static const unsigned int cbrt_scale = 1 << (2 * 18 / 3); | |
176 | ||
177 | /* Define some constants, none exceed 32 bits */ | |
178 | static const unsigned int log_2 = 0x02c5c8; /* scale * log(2) */ | |
179 | static const unsigned int log_e = 0x05c551; /* scale * log2(M_E) */ | |
180 | static const unsigned int c1_923 = 0x07b126; /* scale * 1.923 */ | |
181 | static const unsigned int c4_690 = 0x12c28f; /* scale * 4.690 */ | |
182 | ||
183 | /* | |
2beb004b | 184 | * Multiply two scaled integers together and rescale the result. |
97b0b713 P |
185 | */ |
186 | static ossl_inline uint64_t mul2(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) | |
187 | { | |
188 | return a * b / scale; | |
189 | } | |
190 | ||
191 | /* | |
192 | * Calculate the cube root of a 64 bit scaled integer. | |
193 | * Although the cube root of a 64 bit number does fit into a 32 bit unsigned | |
194 | * integer, this is not guaranteed after scaling, so this function has a | |
195 | * 64 bit return. This uses the shifting nth root algorithm with some | |
196 | * algebraic simplifications. | |
197 | */ | |
198 | static uint64_t icbrt64(uint64_t x) | |
199 | { | |
200 | uint64_t r = 0; | |
201 | uint64_t b; | |
202 | int s; | |
203 | ||
204 | for (s = 63; s >= 0; s -= 3) { | |
205 | r <<= 1; | |
206 | b = 3 * r * (r + 1) + 1; | |
207 | if ((x >> s) >= b) { | |
208 | x -= b << s; | |
209 | r++; | |
210 | } | |
211 | } | |
212 | return r * cbrt_scale; | |
213 | } | |
214 | ||
215 | /* | |
216 | * Calculate the natural logarithm of a 64 bit scaled integer. | |
217 | * This is done by calculating a base two logarithm and scaling. | |
218 | * The maximum logarithm (base 2) is 64 and this reduces base e, so | |
219 | * a 32 bit result should not overflow. The argument passed must be | |
220 | * greater than unity so we don't need to handle negative results. | |
221 | */ | |
222 | static uint32_t ilog_e(uint64_t v) | |
223 | { | |
224 | uint32_t i, r = 0; | |
225 | ||
226 | /* | |
227 | * Scale down the value into the range 1 .. 2. | |
228 | * | |
229 | * If fractional numbers need to be processed, another loop needs | |
230 | * to go here that checks v < scale and if so multiplies it by 2 and | |
231 | * reduces r by scale. This also means making r signed. | |
232 | */ | |
233 | while (v >= 2 * scale) { | |
234 | v >>= 1; | |
235 | r += scale; | |
236 | } | |
237 | for (i = scale / 2; i != 0; i /= 2) { | |
238 | v = mul2(v, v); | |
239 | if (v >= 2 * scale) { | |
240 | v >>= 1; | |
241 | r += i; | |
242 | } | |
243 | } | |
244 | r = (r * (uint64_t)scale) / log_e; | |
245 | return r; | |
246 | } | |
247 | ||
248 | /* | |
249 | * NIST SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D: Maximum Security Strength Estimates for IFC | |
250 | * Modulus Lengths. | |
251 | * | |
252 | * E = \frac{1.923 \sqrt[3]{nBits \cdot log_e(2)} | |
253 | * \cdot(log_e(nBits \cdot log_e(2))^{2/3} - 4.69}{log_e(2)} | |
254 | * The two cube roots are merged together here. | |
255 | */ | |
8240d5fa | 256 | uint16_t rsa_compute_security_bits(int n) |
97b0b713 P |
257 | { |
258 | uint64_t x; | |
259 | uint32_t lx; | |
260 | uint16_t y; | |
261 | ||
262 | /* Look for common values as listed in SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */ | |
263 | switch (n) { | |
264 | case 2048: | |
265 | return 112; | |
266 | case 3072: | |
267 | return 128; | |
268 | case 4096: | |
269 | return 152; | |
270 | case 6144: | |
271 | return 176; | |
272 | case 8192: | |
273 | return 200; | |
274 | } | |
275 | /* | |
276 | * The first incorrect result (i.e. not accurate or off by one low) occurs | |
277 | * for n = 699668. The true value here is 1200. Instead of using this n | |
278 | * as the check threshold, the smallest n such that the correct result is | |
279 | * 1200 is used instead. | |
280 | */ | |
281 | if (n >= 687737) | |
282 | return 1200; | |
283 | if (n < 8) | |
284 | return 0; | |
285 | ||
286 | x = n * (uint64_t)log_2; | |
287 | lx = ilog_e(x); | |
288 | y = (uint16_t)((mul2(c1_923, icbrt64(mul2(mul2(x, lx), lx))) - c4_690) | |
289 | / log_2); | |
290 | return (y + 4) & ~7; | |
291 | } | |
292 | ||
2514fa79 | 293 | int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa) |
0f113f3e | 294 | { |
0122add6 AP |
295 | int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n); |
296 | ||
297 | if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) { | |
298 | /* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */ | |
299 | int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos); | |
300 | ||
301 | if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) | |
302 | return 0; | |
303 | } | |
97b0b713 | 304 | return rsa_compute_security_bits(bits); |
0f113f3e | 305 | } |
9862e9aa RL |
306 | |
307 | int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) | |
308 | { | |
fd809cfd | 309 | /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
1da12e34 RL |
310 | * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be |
311 | * left NULL (in case only the public key is used). | |
1da12e34 | 312 | */ |
b84e1226 MC |
313 | if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) |
314 | || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) | |
9862e9aa RL |
315 | return 0; |
316 | ||
1da12e34 RL |
317 | if (n != NULL) { |
318 | BN_free(r->n); | |
319 | r->n = n; | |
320 | } | |
321 | if (e != NULL) { | |
322 | BN_free(r->e); | |
323 | r->e = e; | |
324 | } | |
325 | if (d != NULL) { | |
c033101d | 326 | BN_clear_free(r->d); |
1da12e34 | 327 | r->d = d; |
311e903d | 328 | BN_set_flags(r->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 | 329 | } |
9862e9aa RL |
330 | |
331 | return 1; | |
332 | } | |
333 | ||
334 | int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) | |
335 | { | |
fd809cfd | 336 | /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
1da12e34 | 337 | * parameters MUST be non-NULL. |
1da12e34 | 338 | */ |
b84e1226 MC |
339 | if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) |
340 | || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL)) | |
9862e9aa RL |
341 | return 0; |
342 | ||
1da12e34 | 343 | if (p != NULL) { |
c033101d | 344 | BN_clear_free(r->p); |
1da12e34 | 345 | r->p = p; |
311e903d | 346 | BN_set_flags(r->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 RL |
347 | } |
348 | if (q != NULL) { | |
c033101d | 349 | BN_clear_free(r->q); |
1da12e34 | 350 | r->q = q; |
311e903d | 351 | BN_set_flags(r->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 | 352 | } |
9862e9aa RL |
353 | |
354 | return 1; | |
355 | } | |
356 | ||
357 | int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) | |
358 | { | |
fd809cfd | 359 | /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
1da12e34 | 360 | * parameters MUST be non-NULL. |
1da12e34 | 361 | */ |
b84e1226 MC |
362 | if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) |
363 | || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) | |
364 | || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) | |
9862e9aa RL |
365 | return 0; |
366 | ||
1da12e34 | 367 | if (dmp1 != NULL) { |
c033101d | 368 | BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); |
1da12e34 | 369 | r->dmp1 = dmp1; |
311e903d | 370 | BN_set_flags(r->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 RL |
371 | } |
372 | if (dmq1 != NULL) { | |
c033101d | 373 | BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); |
1da12e34 | 374 | r->dmq1 = dmq1; |
311e903d | 375 | BN_set_flags(r->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 RL |
376 | } |
377 | if (iqmp != NULL) { | |
c033101d | 378 | BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); |
1da12e34 | 379 | r->iqmp = iqmp; |
311e903d | 380 | BN_set_flags(r->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 | 381 | } |
9862e9aa RL |
382 | |
383 | return 1; | |
384 | } | |
385 | ||
665d899f PY |
386 | /* |
387 | * Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure | |
388 | * and related functions to let user pass a triplet? | |
389 | */ | |
390 | int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[], | |
391 | BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum) | |
392 | { | |
393 | STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL; | |
394 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; | |
395 | int i; | |
396 | ||
397 | if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0) | |
398 | return 0; | |
399 | ||
400 | prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); | |
401 | if (prime_infos == NULL) | |
402 | return 0; | |
403 | ||
404 | if (r->prime_infos != NULL) | |
405 | old = r->prime_infos; | |
406 | ||
407 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { | |
408 | pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new(); | |
409 | if (pinfo == NULL) | |
410 | goto err; | |
411 | if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) { | |
412 | BN_free(pinfo->r); | |
413 | BN_free(pinfo->d); | |
414 | BN_free(pinfo->t); | |
415 | pinfo->r = primes[i]; | |
416 | pinfo->d = exps[i]; | |
417 | pinfo->t = coeffs[i]; | |
418 | } else { | |
419 | rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo); | |
420 | goto err; | |
421 | } | |
422 | (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); | |
423 | } | |
424 | ||
425 | r->prime_infos = prime_infos; | |
426 | ||
427 | if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { | |
428 | r->prime_infos = old; | |
429 | goto err; | |
430 | } | |
431 | ||
432 | if (old != NULL) { | |
433 | /* | |
434 | * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could | |
435 | * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not | |
436 | * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent | |
437 | * with other *set0* functions: just free it... | |
438 | */ | |
439 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free); | |
440 | } | |
441 | ||
442 | r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI; | |
443 | ||
444 | return 1; | |
445 | err: | |
446 | /* r, d, t should not be freed */ | |
447 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex); | |
448 | return 0; | |
449 | } | |
450 | ||
fd809cfd RL |
451 | void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, |
452 | const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d) | |
9862e9aa RL |
453 | { |
454 | if (n != NULL) | |
455 | *n = r->n; | |
456 | if (e != NULL) | |
457 | *e = r->e; | |
458 | if (d != NULL) | |
459 | *d = r->d; | |
460 | } | |
461 | ||
fd809cfd | 462 | void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q) |
9862e9aa RL |
463 | { |
464 | if (p != NULL) | |
465 | *p = r->p; | |
466 | if (q != NULL) | |
467 | *q = r->q; | |
468 | } | |
469 | ||
665d899f PY |
470 | int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r) |
471 | { | |
472 | int pnum; | |
473 | ||
474 | pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos); | |
475 | if (pnum <= 0) | |
476 | pnum = 0; | |
477 | return pnum; | |
478 | } | |
479 | ||
480 | int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[]) | |
481 | { | |
482 | int pnum, i; | |
483 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; | |
484 | ||
485 | if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0) | |
486 | return 0; | |
487 | ||
488 | /* | |
489 | * return other primes | |
490 | * it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum] | |
491 | */ | |
492 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { | |
493 | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); | |
494 | primes[i] = pinfo->r; | |
495 | } | |
496 | ||
497 | return 1; | |
498 | } | |
499 | ||
9862e9aa | 500 | void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, |
fd809cfd RL |
501 | const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, |
502 | const BIGNUM **iqmp) | |
9862e9aa RL |
503 | { |
504 | if (dmp1 != NULL) | |
505 | *dmp1 = r->dmp1; | |
506 | if (dmq1 != NULL) | |
507 | *dmq1 = r->dmq1; | |
508 | if (iqmp != NULL) | |
509 | *iqmp = r->iqmp; | |
510 | } | |
511 | ||
665d899f PY |
512 | int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[], |
513 | const BIGNUM *coeffs[]) | |
514 | { | |
515 | int pnum; | |
516 | ||
517 | if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0) | |
518 | return 0; | |
519 | ||
520 | /* return other primes */ | |
521 | if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) { | |
522 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; | |
523 | int i; | |
524 | ||
525 | /* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */ | |
526 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { | |
527 | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); | |
528 | if (exps != NULL) | |
529 | exps[i] = pinfo->d; | |
530 | if (coeffs != NULL) | |
531 | coeffs[i] = pinfo->t; | |
532 | } | |
533 | } | |
534 | ||
535 | return 1; | |
536 | } | |
537 | ||
6692ff77 DMSP |
538 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r) |
539 | { | |
540 | return r->n; | |
541 | } | |
542 | ||
543 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *r) | |
544 | { | |
545 | return r->e; | |
546 | } | |
547 | ||
548 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *r) | |
549 | { | |
550 | return r->d; | |
551 | } | |
552 | ||
553 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *r) | |
554 | { | |
555 | return r->p; | |
556 | } | |
557 | ||
558 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *r) | |
559 | { | |
560 | return r->q; | |
561 | } | |
562 | ||
563 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *r) | |
564 | { | |
565 | return r->dmp1; | |
566 | } | |
567 | ||
568 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *r) | |
569 | { | |
570 | return r->dmq1; | |
571 | } | |
572 | ||
573 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *r) | |
574 | { | |
575 | return r->iqmp; | |
576 | } | |
577 | ||
9862e9aa RL |
578 | void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags) |
579 | { | |
580 | r->flags &= ~flags; | |
581 | } | |
582 | ||
583 | int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags) | |
584 | { | |
585 | return r->flags & flags; | |
586 | } | |
587 | ||
588 | void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags) | |
589 | { | |
590 | r->flags |= flags; | |
591 | } | |
592 | ||
665d899f PY |
593 | int RSA_get_version(RSA *r) |
594 | { | |
595 | /* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */ | |
596 | return r->version; | |
597 | } | |
598 | ||
e0685d24 | 599 | ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r) |
9862e9aa RL |
600 | { |
601 | return r->engine; | |
602 | } | |
e5e04ee3 DSH |
603 | |
604 | int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2) | |
605 | { | |
606 | /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ | |
607 | if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL | |
608 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA | |
609 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | |
610 | return -1; | |
611 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2); | |
612 | } |