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2039c421 1/*
b6461792 2 * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
d02b48c6 3 *
2a7b6f39 4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
2039c421
RS
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
d02b48c6
RE
8 */
9
c5f87134
P
10/*
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
12 * internal use.
13 */
14#include "internal/deprecated.h"
15
ec577822 16#include <openssl/crypto.h>
89abd1b6 17#include <openssl/core_names.h>
3f773c91
TM
18#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
19# include <openssl/engine.h>
20#endif
89abd1b6 21#include <openssl/evp.h>
da9988e0 22#include <openssl/param_build.h>
b39fc560 23#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
cd420b0b 24#include "internal/refcount.h"
25f2138b 25#include "crypto/bn.h"
25f2138b 26#include "crypto/evp.h"
c3a4fa4c 27#include "crypto/rsa.h"
902568bb 28#include "crypto/sparse_array.h"
55f02cb6 29#include "crypto/security_bits.h"
706457b7 30#include "rsa_local.h"
d02b48c6 31
b4250010 32static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
afb638f1 33
f844f9eb 34#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
6b691a5c 35RSA *RSA_new(void)
0f113f3e 36{
afb638f1 37 return rsa_new_intern(NULL, NULL);
0f113f3e 38}
ce8b2574 39
29c1f061 40const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa)
0f113f3e
MC
41{
42 return rsa->meth;
43}
cb78486d
GT
44
45int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth)
0f113f3e
MC
46{
47 /*
48 * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us
49 * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from.
50 */
51 const RSA_METHOD *mtmp;
52 mtmp = rsa->meth;
53 if (mtmp->finish)
54 mtmp->finish(rsa);
0b13e9f0 55#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
7c96dbcd
RS
56 ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine);
57 rsa->engine = NULL;
0b13e9f0 58#endif
0f113f3e
MC
59 rsa->meth = meth;
60 if (meth->init)
61 meth->init(rsa);
62 return 1;
63}
ce8b2574 64
5270e702 65RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
afb638f1
MC
66{
67 return rsa_new_intern(engine, NULL);
68}
69#endif
70
b4250010 71RSA *ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
afb638f1
MC
72{
73 return rsa_new_intern(NULL, libctx);
74}
75
b4250010 76static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
0f113f3e 77{
11ed851d 78 RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
d02b48c6 79
e077455e 80 if (ret == NULL)
0f113f3e 81 return NULL;
d02b48c6 82
11ed851d
F
83 ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
84 if (ret->lock == NULL) {
e077455e 85 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
11ed851d
F
86 OPENSSL_free(ret);
87 return NULL;
88 }
89
97beb77f
P
90 if (!CRYPTO_NEW_REF(&ret->references, 1)) {
91 CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ret->lock);
92 OPENSSL_free(ret);
93 return NULL;
94 }
97937cfc 95
902568bb
NH
96 ret->blindings_sa = ossl_rsa_alloc_blinding();
97 if (ret->blindings_sa == NULL)
98 goto err;
99
afb638f1 100 ret->libctx = libctx;
0f113f3e 101 ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method();
f844f9eb 102#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
11ed851d 103 ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
0f113f3e
MC
104 if (engine) {
105 if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
9311d0c4 106 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
11ed851d 107 goto err;
0f113f3e
MC
108 }
109 ret->engine = engine;
90862ab4 110 } else {
0f113f3e 111 ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA();
90862ab4 112 }
0f113f3e
MC
113 if (ret->engine) {
114 ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine);
7c96dbcd 115 if (ret->meth == NULL) {
9311d0c4 116 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
11ed851d 117 goto err;
0f113f3e
MC
118 }
119 }
0b13e9f0 120#endif
0c9de428 121
0f113f3e 122 ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
f844f9eb 123#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
0f113f3e 124 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
11ed851d 125 goto err;
d188a536 126 }
a3327784 127#endif
d188a536
AG
128
129 if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
9311d0c4 130 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
11ed851d 131 goto err;
0f113f3e 132 }
d188a536
AG
133
134 return ret;
11ed851d 135
544648a8 136 err:
11ed851d
F
137 RSA_free(ret);
138 return NULL;
0f113f3e 139}
d02b48c6 140
6b691a5c 141void RSA_free(RSA *r)
0f113f3e
MC
142{
143 int i;
d02b48c6 144
0f113f3e
MC
145 if (r == NULL)
146 return;
d02b48c6 147
97937cfc 148 CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i);
dc10ffc2 149 REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", i, r);
0f113f3e
MC
150 if (i > 0)
151 return;
f3f1cf84 152 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
d02b48c6 153
0c5d725e 154 if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
0f113f3e 155 r->meth->finish(r);
f844f9eb 156#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
412bafdc 157 ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
0b13e9f0 158#endif
d02b48c6 159
f844f9eb 160#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
0f113f3e 161 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data);
a3327784 162#endif
7abe8305 163
d188a536 164 CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
97937cfc 165 CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&r->references);
d188a536 166
e73c1faa 167#ifdef OPENSSL_PEDANTIC_ZEROIZATION
fa338aa7
DJL
168 BN_clear_free(r->n);
169 BN_clear_free(r->e);
170#else
c033101d
MB
171 BN_free(r->n);
172 BN_free(r->e);
fa338aa7 173#endif
23a1d5e9
RS
174 BN_clear_free(r->d);
175 BN_clear_free(r->p);
176 BN_clear_free(r->q);
177 BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
178 BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
179 BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
4f2271d5
SL
180
181#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
4158b0dc 182 ossl_rsa_acvp_test_free(r->acvp_test);
4f2271d5
SL
183#endif
184
f844f9eb 185#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
d771441d 186 RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
4158b0dc 187 sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
afb638f1 188#endif
902568bb 189 ossl_rsa_free_blinding(r);
0f113f3e
MC
190 OPENSSL_free(r);
191}
d02b48c6 192
6ac4e8bd 193int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r)
0f113f3e 194{
d188a536
AG
195 int i;
196
97937cfc 197 if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i) <= 0)
d188a536 198 return 0;
f3f1cf84 199
dc10ffc2 200 REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", i, r);
f3f1cf84 201 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
8686c474 202 return i > 1 ? 1 : 0;
0f113f3e 203}
5cbc2e8b 204
b4250010 205OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_rsa_get0_libctx(RSA *r)
8a758e96
RL
206{
207 return r->libctx;
208}
209
6963979f
RL
210void ossl_rsa_set0_libctx(RSA *r, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
211{
212 r->libctx = libctx;
213}
214
f844f9eb 215#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
dd9d233e 216int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg)
0f113f3e 217{
8686c474 218 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg);
0f113f3e 219}
58964a49 220
29c1f061 221void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx)
0f113f3e 222{
8686c474 223 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx);
0f113f3e 224}
a3327784 225#endif
58964a49 226
97b0b713
P
227/*
228 * Define a scaling constant for our fixed point arithmetic.
229 * This value must be a power of two because the base two logarithm code
230 * makes this assumption. The exponent must also be a multiple of three so
231 * that the scale factor has an exact cube root. Finally, the scale factor
232 * should not be so large that a multiplication of two scaled numbers
233 * overflows a 64 bit unsigned integer.
234 */
235static const unsigned int scale = 1 << 18;
236static const unsigned int cbrt_scale = 1 << (2 * 18 / 3);
237
238/* Define some constants, none exceed 32 bits */
239static const unsigned int log_2 = 0x02c5c8; /* scale * log(2) */
240static const unsigned int log_e = 0x05c551; /* scale * log2(M_E) */
241static const unsigned int c1_923 = 0x07b126; /* scale * 1.923 */
242static const unsigned int c4_690 = 0x12c28f; /* scale * 4.690 */
243
244/*
2beb004b 245 * Multiply two scaled integers together and rescale the result.
97b0b713
P
246 */
247static ossl_inline uint64_t mul2(uint64_t a, uint64_t b)
248{
249 return a * b / scale;
250}
251
252/*
253 * Calculate the cube root of a 64 bit scaled integer.
254 * Although the cube root of a 64 bit number does fit into a 32 bit unsigned
255 * integer, this is not guaranteed after scaling, so this function has a
256 * 64 bit return. This uses the shifting nth root algorithm with some
257 * algebraic simplifications.
258 */
259static uint64_t icbrt64(uint64_t x)
260{
261 uint64_t r = 0;
262 uint64_t b;
263 int s;
264
265 for (s = 63; s >= 0; s -= 3) {
266 r <<= 1;
267 b = 3 * r * (r + 1) + 1;
268 if ((x >> s) >= b) {
269 x -= b << s;
270 r++;
271 }
272 }
273 return r * cbrt_scale;
274}
275
276/*
277 * Calculate the natural logarithm of a 64 bit scaled integer.
278 * This is done by calculating a base two logarithm and scaling.
279 * The maximum logarithm (base 2) is 64 and this reduces base e, so
280 * a 32 bit result should not overflow. The argument passed must be
281 * greater than unity so we don't need to handle negative results.
282 */
283static uint32_t ilog_e(uint64_t v)
284{
285 uint32_t i, r = 0;
286
287 /*
288 * Scale down the value into the range 1 .. 2.
289 *
290 * If fractional numbers need to be processed, another loop needs
291 * to go here that checks v < scale and if so multiplies it by 2 and
292 * reduces r by scale. This also means making r signed.
293 */
294 while (v >= 2 * scale) {
295 v >>= 1;
296 r += scale;
297 }
298 for (i = scale / 2; i != 0; i /= 2) {
299 v = mul2(v, v);
300 if (v >= 2 * scale) {
301 v >>= 1;
302 r += i;
303 }
304 }
305 r = (r * (uint64_t)scale) / log_e;
306 return r;
307}
308
309/*
310 * NIST SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D: Maximum Security Strength Estimates for IFC
311 * Modulus Lengths.
312 *
55f02cb6
SL
313 * Note that this formula is also referred to in SP800-56A rev3 Appendix D:
314 * for FFC safe prime groups for modp and ffdhe.
315 * After Table 25 and Table 26 it refers to
316 * "The maximum security strength estimates were calculated using the formula in
317 * Section 7.5 of the FIPS 140 IG and rounded to the nearest multiple of eight
318 * bits".
319 *
320 * The formula is:
321 *
97b0b713
P
322 * E = \frac{1.923 \sqrt[3]{nBits \cdot log_e(2)}
323 * \cdot(log_e(nBits \cdot log_e(2))^{2/3} - 4.69}{log_e(2)}
324 * The two cube roots are merged together here.
325 */
9500c823 326uint16_t ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(int n)
97b0b713
P
327{
328 uint64_t x;
329 uint32_t lx;
1cf520e9 330 uint16_t y, cap;
97b0b713 331
1cf520e9
P
332 /*
333 * Look for common values as listed in standards.
f7e2e513 334 * These values are not exactly equal to the results from the formulae in
1cf520e9
P
335 * the standards but are defined to be canonical.
336 */
97b0b713 337 switch (n) {
1cf520e9 338 case 2048: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D and FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
97b0b713 339 return 112;
1cf520e9 340 case 3072: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D and FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
97b0b713 341 return 128;
1cf520e9 342 case 4096: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
97b0b713 343 return 152;
1cf520e9 344 case 6144: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
97b0b713 345 return 176;
1cf520e9
P
346 case 7680: /* FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
347 return 192;
348 case 8192: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
97b0b713 349 return 200;
1cf520e9
P
350 case 15360: /* FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
351 return 256;
97b0b713 352 }
1cf520e9 353
97b0b713
P
354 /*
355 * The first incorrect result (i.e. not accurate or off by one low) occurs
356 * for n = 699668. The true value here is 1200. Instead of using this n
357 * as the check threshold, the smallest n such that the correct result is
358 * 1200 is used instead.
359 */
360 if (n >= 687737)
361 return 1200;
362 if (n < 8)
363 return 0;
364
1cf520e9
P
365 /*
366 * To ensure that the output is non-decreasing with respect to n,
367 * a cap needs to be applied to the two values where the function over
368 * estimates the strength (according to the above fast path).
369 */
370 if (n <= 7680)
371 cap = 192;
372 else if (n <= 15360)
373 cap = 256;
374 else
375 cap = 1200;
376
97b0b713
P
377 x = n * (uint64_t)log_2;
378 lx = ilog_e(x);
379 y = (uint16_t)((mul2(c1_923, icbrt64(mul2(mul2(x, lx), lx))) - c4_690)
380 / log_2);
1cf520e9
P
381 y = (y + 4) & ~7;
382 if (y > cap)
383 y = cap;
384 return y;
97b0b713
P
385}
386
55f02cb6
SL
387
388
2514fa79 389int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa)
0f113f3e 390{
0122add6
AP
391 int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
392
f844f9eb 393#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
0122add6
AP
394 if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
395 /* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */
396 int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos);
397
4158b0dc 398 if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > ossl_rsa_multip_cap(bits))
0122add6
AP
399 return 0;
400 }
afb638f1 401#endif
9500c823 402 return ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(bits);
0f113f3e 403}
9862e9aa
RL
404
405int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
406{
fd809cfd 407 /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
1da12e34
RL
408 * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be
409 * left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
1da12e34 410 */
b84e1226
MC
411 if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
412 || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
9862e9aa
RL
413 return 0;
414
1da12e34
RL
415 if (n != NULL) {
416 BN_free(r->n);
417 r->n = n;
418 }
419 if (e != NULL) {
420 BN_free(r->e);
421 r->e = e;
422 }
423 if (d != NULL) {
c033101d 424 BN_clear_free(r->d);
1da12e34 425 r->d = d;
311e903d 426 BN_set_flags(r->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
1da12e34 427 }
29be6023 428 r->dirty_cnt++;
9862e9aa
RL
429
430 return 1;
431}
432
433int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
434{
fd809cfd 435 /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
1da12e34 436 * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
1da12e34 437 */
b84e1226
MC
438 if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
439 || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
9862e9aa
RL
440 return 0;
441
1da12e34 442 if (p != NULL) {
c033101d 443 BN_clear_free(r->p);
1da12e34 444 r->p = p;
311e903d 445 BN_set_flags(r->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
1da12e34
RL
446 }
447 if (q != NULL) {
c033101d 448 BN_clear_free(r->q);
1da12e34 449 r->q = q;
311e903d 450 BN_set_flags(r->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
1da12e34 451 }
29be6023 452 r->dirty_cnt++;
9862e9aa
RL
453
454 return 1;
455}
456
457int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
458{
fd809cfd 459 /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
1da12e34 460 * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
1da12e34 461 */
b84e1226
MC
462 if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
463 || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
464 || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
9862e9aa
RL
465 return 0;
466
1da12e34 467 if (dmp1 != NULL) {
c033101d 468 BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
1da12e34 469 r->dmp1 = dmp1;
311e903d 470 BN_set_flags(r->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
1da12e34
RL
471 }
472 if (dmq1 != NULL) {
c033101d 473 BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
1da12e34 474 r->dmq1 = dmq1;
311e903d 475 BN_set_flags(r->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
1da12e34
RL
476 }
477 if (iqmp != NULL) {
c033101d 478 BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
1da12e34 479 r->iqmp = iqmp;
311e903d 480 BN_set_flags(r->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
1da12e34 481 }
29be6023 482 r->dirty_cnt++;
9862e9aa
RL
483
484 return 1;
485}
486
f844f9eb 487#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
665d899f
PY
488/*
489 * Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure
490 * and related functions to let user pass a triplet?
491 */
492int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
493 BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum)
494{
495 STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL;
496 RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
497 int i;
498
499 if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0)
500 return 0;
501
502 prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
503 if (prime_infos == NULL)
504 return 0;
505
506 if (r->prime_infos != NULL)
507 old = r->prime_infos;
508
509 for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
4158b0dc 510 pinfo = ossl_rsa_multip_info_new();
665d899f
PY
511 if (pinfo == NULL)
512 goto err;
513 if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) {
d2baf88c
CPG
514 BN_clear_free(pinfo->r);
515 BN_clear_free(pinfo->d);
516 BN_clear_free(pinfo->t);
665d899f
PY
517 pinfo->r = primes[i];
518 pinfo->d = exps[i];
519 pinfo->t = coeffs[i];
d2baf88c
CPG
520 BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
521 BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
522 BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
665d899f 523 } else {
4158b0dc 524 ossl_rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo);
665d899f
PY
525 goto err;
526 }
527 (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
528 }
529
530 r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
531
4158b0dc 532 if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
665d899f
PY
533 r->prime_infos = old;
534 goto err;
535 }
536
537 if (old != NULL) {
538 /*
539 * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
540 * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not
541 * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
542 * with other *set0* functions: just free it...
543 */
4158b0dc 544 sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
665d899f
PY
545 }
546
547 r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
29be6023 548 r->dirty_cnt++;
665d899f
PY
549
550 return 1;
551 err:
552 /* r, d, t should not be freed */
4158b0dc 553 sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
665d899f
PY
554 return 0;
555}
afb638f1 556#endif
665d899f 557
fd809cfd
RL
558void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
559 const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
9862e9aa
RL
560{
561 if (n != NULL)
562 *n = r->n;
563 if (e != NULL)
564 *e = r->e;
565 if (d != NULL)
566 *d = r->d;
567}
568
fd809cfd 569void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
9862e9aa
RL
570{
571 if (p != NULL)
572 *p = r->p;
573 if (q != NULL)
574 *q = r->q;
575}
576
f844f9eb 577#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
665d899f
PY
578int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r)
579{
580 int pnum;
581
582 pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos);
583 if (pnum <= 0)
584 pnum = 0;
585 return pnum;
586}
587
588int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[])
589{
590 int pnum, i;
591 RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
592
593 if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
594 return 0;
595
596 /*
597 * return other primes
598 * it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum]
599 */
600 for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
601 pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
602 primes[i] = pinfo->r;
603 }
604
605 return 1;
606}
afb638f1 607#endif
665d899f 608
9862e9aa 609void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
fd809cfd
RL
610 const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
611 const BIGNUM **iqmp)
9862e9aa
RL
612{
613 if (dmp1 != NULL)
614 *dmp1 = r->dmp1;
615 if (dmq1 != NULL)
616 *dmq1 = r->dmq1;
617 if (iqmp != NULL)
618 *iqmp = r->iqmp;
619}
620
f844f9eb 621#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
665d899f
PY
622int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[],
623 const BIGNUM *coeffs[])
624{
625 int pnum;
626
627 if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
628 return 0;
629
630 /* return other primes */
631 if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) {
632 RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
633 int i;
634
635 /* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */
636 for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
637 pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
638 if (exps != NULL)
639 exps[i] = pinfo->d;
640 if (coeffs != NULL)
641 coeffs[i] = pinfo->t;
642 }
643 }
644
645 return 1;
646}
afb638f1 647#endif
665d899f 648
6692ff77
DMSP
649const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r)
650{
651 return r->n;
652}
653
654const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *r)
655{
656 return r->e;
657}
658
659const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *r)
660{
661 return r->d;
662}
663
664const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *r)
665{
666 return r->p;
667}
668
669const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *r)
670{
671 return r->q;
672}
673
674const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *r)
675{
676 return r->dmp1;
677}
678
679const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *r)
680{
681 return r->dmq1;
682}
683
684const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *r)
685{
686 return r->iqmp;
687}
688
677add38
RL
689const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *r)
690{
15671090
RL
691#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
692 return NULL;
693#else
677add38 694 return r->pss;
15671090
RL
695#endif
696}
697
cf333799
RL
698/* Internal */
699int ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(RSA *r, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss)
700{
701#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
702 return 0;
703#else
704 RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
705 r->pss = pss;
706 return 1;
707#endif
708}
709
15671090 710/* Internal */
23b2fc0b 711RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(RSA *r)
15671090
RL
712{
713 return &r->pss_params;
677add38
RL
714}
715
9862e9aa
RL
716void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
717{
718 r->flags &= ~flags;
719}
720
721int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags)
722{
723 return r->flags & flags;
724}
725
726void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
727{
728 r->flags |= flags;
729}
730
665d899f
PY
731int RSA_get_version(RSA *r)
732{
733 /* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */
734 return r->version;
735}
736
f844f9eb 737#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
e0685d24 738ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r)
9862e9aa
RL
739{
740 return r->engine;
741}
e5e04ee3
DSH
742
743int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
744{
745 /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
746 if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL
747 && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
748 && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
749 return -1;
750 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2);
751}
afb638f1 752#endif
c3a4fa4c
RL
753
754DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)
755
f3be5366
NH
756/*
757 * Note: This function deletes values from the parameter
758 * stack values as they are consumed and set in the RSA key.
759 */
760int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
761 STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
762 STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs)
c3a4fa4c 763{
f844f9eb 764#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
c3a4fa4c 765 STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old_infos = NULL;
afb638f1 766#endif
c3a4fa4c
RL
767 int pnum;
768
769 if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL)
770 return 0;
771
772 pnum = sk_BIGNUM_num(primes);
f3be5366
NH
773
774 /* we need at least 2 primes */
2647726b 775 if (pnum < 2)
c3a4fa4c
RL
776 return 0;
777
778 if (!RSA_set0_factors(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 0),
2647726b 779 sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 1)))
c3a4fa4c
RL
780 return 0;
781
f3be5366
NH
782 /*
783 * if we managed to set everything above, remove those elements from the
784 * stack
785 * Note, we do this after the above all to ensure that we have taken
786 * ownership of all the elements in the RSA key to avoid memory leaks
787 * we also use delete 0 here as we are grabbing items from the end of the
788 * stack rather than the start, otherwise we could use pop
789 */
790 sk_BIGNUM_delete(primes, 0);
791 sk_BIGNUM_delete(primes, 0);
792
2647726b
NH
793 if (pnum == sk_BIGNUM_num(exps)
794 && pnum == sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) + 1) {
795
796 if (!RSA_set0_crt_params(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 0),
797 sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 1),
798 sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, 0)))
799 return 0;
f3be5366
NH
800
801 /* as above, once we consume the above params, delete them from the list */
802 sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
803 sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
804 sk_BIGNUM_delete(coeffs, 0);
2647726b
NH
805 }
806
f844f9eb 807#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
c3a4fa4c 808 old_infos = r->prime_infos;
afb638f1 809#endif
c3a4fa4c
RL
810
811 if (pnum > 2) {
f844f9eb 812#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
c3a4fa4c
RL
813 int i;
814
815 prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
816 if (prime_infos == NULL)
817 return 0;
818
819 for (i = 2; i < pnum; i++) {
f3be5366
NH
820 BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_pop(primes);
821 BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_pop(exps);
822 BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_pop(coeffs);
c3a4fa4c
RL
823 RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
824
825 if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL))
826 goto err;
827
4158b0dc 828 /* Using ossl_rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */
e077455e 829 if ((pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pinfo))) == NULL)
c3a4fa4c 830 goto err;
c3a4fa4c
RL
831
832 pinfo->r = prime;
833 pinfo->d = exp;
834 pinfo->t = coeff;
835 BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
836 BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
837 BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
838 (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
839 }
840
841 r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
842
4158b0dc 843 if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
c3a4fa4c
RL
844 r->prime_infos = old_infos;
845 goto err;
846 }
afb638f1
MC
847#else
848 return 0;
849#endif
c3a4fa4c
RL
850 }
851
f844f9eb 852#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
c3a4fa4c
RL
853 if (old_infos != NULL) {
854 /*
855 * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
856 * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not
857 * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
858 * with other *set0* functions: just free it...
859 */
4158b0dc 860 sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
c3a4fa4c 861 }
afb638f1 862#endif
c3a4fa4c
RL
863
864 r->version = pnum > 2 ? RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI : RSA_ASN1_VERSION_DEFAULT;
865 r->dirty_cnt++;
866
867 return 1;
f844f9eb 868#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
c3a4fa4c
RL
869 err:
870 /* r, d, t should not be freed */
4158b0dc 871 sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
c3a4fa4c 872 return 0;
afb638f1 873#endif
c3a4fa4c
RL
874}
875
876DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM)
877
23b2fc0b
P
878int ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes,
879 STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps,
880 STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs)
c3a4fa4c 881{
f844f9eb 882#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
c3a4fa4c
RL
883 RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
884 int i, pnum;
afb638f1 885#endif
c3a4fa4c
RL
886
887 if (r == NULL)
888 return 0;
889
a9127c1d
RL
890 /* If |p| is NULL, there are no CRT parameters */
891 if (RSA_get0_p(r) == NULL)
892 return 1;
893
c3a4fa4c
RL
894 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_p(r));
895 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_q(r));
896 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmp1(r));
897 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmq1(r));
898 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, RSA_get0_iqmp(r));
afb638f1 899
f844f9eb 900#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
afb638f1 901 pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r);
c3a4fa4c
RL
902 for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
903 pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
904 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, pinfo->r);
905 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, pinfo->d);
906 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, pinfo->t);
907 }
afb638f1 908#endif
c3a4fa4c
RL
909
910 return 1;
911}
89abd1b6 912
6dacee48 913#define safe_BN_num_bits(_k_) (((_k_) == NULL) ? 0 : BN_num_bits((_k_)))
914int ossl_rsa_check_factors(RSA *r)
915{
916 int valid = 0;
917 int n, i, bits;
918 STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *factors = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
919 STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
920 STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
921
922 if (factors == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL)
923 goto done;
924
925 /*
926 * Simple sanity check for RSA key. All RSA key parameters
927 * must be less-than/equal-to RSA parameter n.
928 */
929 ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(r, factors, exps, coeffs);
930 n = safe_BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(r));
931
932 if (safe_BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_d(r)) > n)
933 goto done;
934
935 for (i = 0; i < sk_BIGNUM_const_num(exps); i++) {
936 bits = safe_BN_num_bits(sk_BIGNUM_const_value(exps, i));
937 if (bits > n)
938 goto done;
939 }
940
941 for (i = 0; i < sk_BIGNUM_const_num(factors); i++) {
942 bits = safe_BN_num_bits(sk_BIGNUM_const_value(factors, i));
943 if (bits > n)
944 goto done;
945 }
946
947 for (i = 0; i < sk_BIGNUM_const_num(coeffs); i++) {
948 bits = safe_BN_num_bits(sk_BIGNUM_const_value(coeffs, i));
949 if (bits > n)
950 goto done;
951 }
952
953 valid = 1;
954
955done:
956 sk_BIGNUM_const_free(factors);
957 sk_BIGNUM_const_free(exps);
958 sk_BIGNUM_const_free(coeffs);
959
960 return valid;
961}
962
f844f9eb 963#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
13f91a72
RL
964/* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */
965static int int_set_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
966 /* For checks */
967 int keytype, int optype,
968 /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params() */
969 const char *mdkey, const char *mdname,
970 const char *propkey, const char *mdprops)
89abd1b6 971{
13f91a72 972 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
89abd1b6 973
13f91a72 974 if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) {
89abd1b6
MC
975 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
976 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
977 return -2;
978 }
979
13f91a72
RL
980 /* If key type not RSA return error */
981 switch (keytype) {
982 case -1:
983 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
984 && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
985 return -1;
986 break;
987 default:
988 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype)))
989 return -1;
990 break;
991 }
89abd1b6 992
13f91a72
RL
993 /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
994 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, 0);
995 if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx) && mdprops != NULL) {
996 /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
997 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(propkey, (char *)mdprops, 0);
998 }
89abd1b6
MC
999 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1000
13f91a72 1001 return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
89abd1b6
MC
1002}
1003
13f91a72
RL
1004/* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */
1005static int int_get_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
1006 /* For checks */
1007 int keytype, int optype,
1008 /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params() */
1009 const char *mdkey,
1010 char *mdname, size_t mdnamesize)
89abd1b6 1011{
13f91a72 1012 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
89abd1b6 1013
13f91a72 1014 if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) {
89abd1b6
MC
1015 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
1016 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
1017 return -2;
1018 }
1019
13f91a72
RL
1020 /* If key type not RSA return error */
1021 switch (keytype) {
1022 case -1:
1023 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
1024 && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
1025 return -1;
1026 break;
1027 default:
1028 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype)))
1029 return -1;
1030 break;
1031 }
89abd1b6 1032
13f91a72
RL
1033 /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
1034 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, mdnamesize);
89abd1b6
MC
1035 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1036
13f91a72
RL
1037 return evp_pkey_ctx_get_params_strict(ctx, params);
1038}
89abd1b6 1039
13f91a72
RL
1040/*
1041 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1042 * simply because that's easier.
13f91a72
RL
1043 */
1044int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad_mode)
1045{
1046 return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING,
1047 pad_mode, NULL);
1048}
89abd1b6 1049
13f91a72
RL
1050/*
1051 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1052 * simply because that's easier.
13f91a72
RL
1053 */
1054int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad_mode)
1055{
1056 return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING,
1057 0, pad_mode);
89abd1b6
MC
1058}
1059
13f91a72
RL
1060/*
1061 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1062 * simply because that's easier.
13f91a72 1063 */
e947a064
DB
1064int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
1065{
13f91a72
RL
1066 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
1067 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
e947a064
DB
1068}
1069
1070int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
1071 const char *mdname,
1072 const char *mdprops)
1073{
13f91a72
RL
1074 return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
1075 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST, mdname,
1076 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops);
e947a064
DB
1077}
1078
13f91a72
RL
1079/*
1080 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1081 * simply because that's easier.
13f91a72 1082 */
89abd1b6
MC
1083int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
1084{
0c3eb31b 1085 /* If key type not RSA return error */
1086 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA"))
1087 return -1;
1088
13f91a72
RL
1089 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
1090 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
89abd1b6
MC
1091}
1092
1093int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
1094 const char *mdprops)
1095{
13f91a72
RL
1096 return
1097 int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
1098 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, mdname,
1099 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops);
89abd1b6
MC
1100}
1101
1102int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name,
13f91a72 1103 size_t namesize)
89abd1b6 1104{
13f91a72
RL
1105 return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
1106 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST,
1107 name, namesize);
89abd1b6
MC
1108}
1109
13f91a72
RL
1110/*
1111 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1112 * simply because that's easier.
13f91a72 1113 */
89abd1b6
MC
1114int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md)
1115{
0c3eb31b 1116 /* If key type not RSA return error */
1117 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA"))
1118 return -1;
1119
13f91a72
RL
1120 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
1121 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md);
89abd1b6
MC
1122}
1123
13f91a72
RL
1124/*
1125 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1126 * simply because that's easier.
13f91a72
RL
1127 */
1128int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
89abd1b6 1129{
13f91a72
RL
1130 return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
1131 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
89abd1b6
MC
1132}
1133
13f91a72
RL
1134int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
1135 const char *mdprops)
e25761b1 1136{
13f91a72 1137 return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1,
e25761b1 1138 EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
13f91a72
RL
1139 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname,
1140 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, mdprops);
e25761b1
RL
1141}
1142
13f91a72
RL
1143int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name,
1144 size_t namesize)
e25761b1 1145{
13f91a72 1146 return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1,
e25761b1 1147 EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
13f91a72 1148 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, name, namesize);
e25761b1
RL
1149}
1150
13f91a72
RL
1151/*
1152 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1153 * simply because that's easier.
13f91a72 1154 */
e25761b1
RL
1155int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
1156{
13f91a72
RL
1157 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
1158 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
e25761b1
RL
1159}
1160
1161int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
1162 const char *mdname)
1163{
13f91a72
RL
1164 return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
1165 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname,
1166 NULL, NULL);
89abd1b6
MC
1167}
1168
13f91a72
RL
1169/*
1170 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1171 * simply because that's easier.
13f91a72 1172 */
89abd1b6
MC
1173int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md)
1174{
13f91a72
RL
1175 return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
1176 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
89abd1b6
MC
1177}
1178
1179int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *label, int llen)
1180{
1181 OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params;
21b98da9
DU
1182 const char *empty = "";
1183 /*
1184 * Needed as we swap label with empty if it is NULL, and label is
1185 * freed at the end of this function.
1186 */
1187 void *plabel = label;
00d5193b 1188 int ret;
89abd1b6
MC
1189
1190 if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
1191 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
1192 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
1193 return -2;
1194 }
1195
1196 /* If key type not RSA return error */
13f91a72 1197 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA"))
89abd1b6
MC
1198 return -1;
1199
21b98da9
DU
1200 /* Accept NULL for backward compatibility */
1201 if (label == NULL && llen == 0)
1202 plabel = (void *)empty;
1203
13f91a72 1204 /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
89abd1b6 1205 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL,
21b98da9 1206 (void *)plabel, (size_t)llen);
89abd1b6
MC
1207 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1208
00d5193b
PH
1209 ret = evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, rsa_params);
1210 if (ret <= 0)
1211 return ret;
89abd1b6 1212
e304aa87 1213 /* Ownership is supposed to be transferred to the callee. */
89abd1b6
MC
1214 OPENSSL_free(label);
1215 return 1;
1216}
1217
1218int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label)
1219{
ba0a6d1d 1220 OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params;
89abd1b6
MC
1221 size_t labellen;
1222
1223 if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
1224 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
1225 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
1226 return -2;
1227 }
1228
1229 /* If key type not RSA return error */
13f91a72 1230 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA"))
89abd1b6
MC
1231 return -1;
1232
89abd1b6
MC
1233 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL,
1234 (void **)label, 0);
89abd1b6
MC
1235 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1236
1237 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params))
1238 return -1;
1239
ba0a6d1d 1240 labellen = rsa_params[0].return_size;
89abd1b6
MC
1241 if (labellen > INT_MAX)
1242 return -1;
1243
1244 return (int)labellen;
1245}
6f4b7663 1246
13f91a72
RL
1247/*
1248 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1249 * simply because that's easier.
1250 */
e25761b1
RL
1251int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen)
1252{
13f91a72
RL
1253 /*
1254 * For some reason, the optype was set to this:
1255 *
1256 * EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY
1257 *
1258 * However, we do use RSA-PSS with the whole gamut of diverse signature
1259 * and verification operations, so the optype gets upgraded to this:
1260 *
1261 * EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG
1262 */
1263 return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
1264 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, saltlen, NULL);
e25761b1
RL
1265}
1266
13f91a72
RL
1267/*
1268 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1269 * simply because that's easier.
1270 */
1271int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *saltlen)
e25761b1 1272{
13f91a72
RL
1273 /*
1274 * Because of circumstances, the optype is updated from:
1275 *
1276 * EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY
1277 *
1278 * to:
1279 *
1280 * EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG
1281 */
1282 return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
1283 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, 0, saltlen);
e25761b1
RL
1284}
1285
13f91a72 1286int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen)
6f4b7663
RL
1287{
1288 OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params;
1289
13f91a72 1290 if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
6f4b7663
RL
1291 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
1292 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
1293 return -2;
1294 }
1295
13f91a72 1296 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
6f4b7663
RL
1297 return -1;
1298
13f91a72
RL
1299 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN,
1300 &saltlen);
6f4b7663
RL
1301 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1302
13f91a72 1303 return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, pad_params);
6f4b7663 1304}
2972af10
RL
1305
1306int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int bits)
1307{
1308 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
1309 size_t bits2 = bits;
1310
1311 if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
1312 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
1313 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
1314 return -2;
1315 }
1316
1317 /* If key type not RSA return error */
13f91a72
RL
1318 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
1319 && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
2972af10
RL
1320 return -1;
1321
2972af10
RL
1322 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_BITS, &bits2);
1323 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1324
13f91a72 1325 return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
2972af10
RL
1326}
1327
13f91a72 1328int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp)
2972af10 1329{
13f91a72 1330 int ret = RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
3786d748 1331 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp);
3786d748 1332
1333 /*
1334 * Satisfy memory semantics for pre-3.0 callers of
1335 * EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(): their expectation is that input
1336 * pubexp BIGNUM becomes managed by the EVP_PKEY_CTX on success.
1337 */
13f91a72
RL
1338 if (ret > 0 && evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx)) {
1339 BN_free(ctx->rsa_pubexp);
3786d748 1340 ctx->rsa_pubexp = pubexp;
13f91a72 1341 }
3786d748 1342
2972af10
RL
1343 return ret;
1344}
1345
3786d748 1346int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp)
1347{
13f91a72
RL
1348 int ret = 0;
1349
1350 /*
1351 * When we're dealing with a provider, there's no need to duplicate
1352 * pubexp, as it gets copied when transforming to an OSSL_PARAM anyway.
1353 */
9d1a2705 1354 if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx)) {
13f91a72 1355 pubexp = BN_dup(pubexp);
9d1a2705 1356 if (pubexp == NULL)
1357 return 0;
1358 }
13f91a72
RL
1359 ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
1360 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp);
1361 if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx) && ret <= 0)
1362 BN_free(pubexp);
1363 return ret;
3786d748 1364}
1365
2972af10
RL
1366int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int primes)
1367{
1368 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
1369 size_t primes2 = primes;
1370
1371 if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
1372 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
1373 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
1374 return -2;
1375 }
1376
1377 /* If key type not RSA return error */
13f91a72
RL
1378 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
1379 && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
2972af10
RL
1380 return -1;
1381
2972af10
RL
1382 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PRIMES, &primes2);
1383 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1384
13f91a72 1385 return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
2972af10 1386}
902568bb 1387
afb638f1 1388#endif