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PROV: Avoid MDC2 in the RSA signature implementation in the FIPS module
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / providers / implementations / signature / rsa.c
CommitLineData
6f4b7663
RL		 1/*
2 * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10/*
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
12 * internal use.
13 */
14#include "internal/deprecated.h"
15
16#include <string.h>
17#include <openssl/crypto.h>
18#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
19#include <openssl/core_names.h>
20#include <openssl/err.h>
21#include <openssl/rsa.h>
22#include <openssl/params.h>
23#include <openssl/evp.h>
24#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
25#include "internal/nelem.h"
26#include "internal/sizes.h"
27#include "crypto/rsa.h"
28#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
29#include "prov/implementations.h"
30#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
31
32static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
33static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
34static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
35static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
36static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
37static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
38static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
39static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
40static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
41static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
42static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
43static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
44static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
45static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
46static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
47static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
48static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
49static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
50static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
51static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
52static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
53static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
54static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
55
56static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
57 { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
58 { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
59 { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
60 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
61 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
62 { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
63 { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
64 { 0, NULL }
65};
66
67/*
68 * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
69 * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
70 * we use that here too.
71 */
72
73typedef struct {
74 OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
75 RSA *rsa;
76
77 /*
78 * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
79 * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
80 * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
81 * by their Final function.
82 */
83 unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
84
85 /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
86 unsigned char aid[128];
87 size_t aid_len;
88
89 /* main digest */
90 EVP_MD *md;
91 EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
92 int mdnid;
93 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
94
95 /* RSA padding mode */
96 int pad_mode;
97 /* message digest for MGF1 */
98 EVP_MD *mgf1_md;
99 char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
100 /* PSS salt length */
101 int saltlen;
102 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
103 int min_saltlen;
104
105 /* Temp buffer */
106 unsigned char *tbuf;
107
108} PROV_RSA_CTX;
109
110static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
111{
112 if (prsactx->md != NULL)
113 return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
114 return 0;
115}
116
117static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
118{
119 /*
120 * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
121 * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
122 * map.
123 */
124 static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
125 { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
126 { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
127 { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
128 { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
129 { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
130 { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
131 { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
132 { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
133 { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
134 { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
135 { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
136 { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
137 { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
138 { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
139 { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
140 };
141 size_t i;
142 int mdnid = NID_undef;
143
144 if (md == NULL)
145 goto end;
146
147 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
148 if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
149 mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
150 break;
151 }
152 }
153
154 if (mdnid == NID_undef)
155 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
156
157 end:
158 return mdnid;
159}
160
161static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
162{
163 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
164 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
165 return 0;
166 }
167
168 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
169 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
170 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
171 return 0;
172 }
173 }
174
175 return 1;
176}
177
178static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
179{
180 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX));
181
182 if (prsactx == NULL)
183 return NULL;
184
185 prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
186 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
187 return prsactx;
188}
189
190/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
191#define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
192
193static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
194{
195 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
196
197 if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
198 return 0;
199
200 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
201 prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
202 if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL)
203 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
204 else
205 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
206 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
207 prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
208 prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
209
210 return 1;
211}
212
213static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
214 const char *mdprops)
215{
216 if (mdname != NULL) {
217 EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
218 int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
219 size_t algorithmidentifier_len = 0;
220 const unsigned char *algorithmidentifier = NULL;
221
222 if (md == NULL)
223 return 0;
224
225 if (!rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)) {
226 EVP_MD_free(md);
227 return 0;
228 }
229
230 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
231 EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
232 ctx->md = NULL;
233 ctx->mdctx = NULL;
234 ctx->mdname[0] = '\0';
235 ctx->aid[0] = '\0';
236 ctx->aid_len = 0;
237
238 algorithmidentifier =
239 rsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(md_nid, &algorithmidentifier_len);
240
241 ctx->md = md;
242 ctx->mdnid = md_nid;
243 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
244 if (algorithmidentifier != NULL) {
245 memcpy(ctx->aid, algorithmidentifier, algorithmidentifier_len);
246 ctx->aid_len = algorithmidentifier_len;
247 }
248 }
249
250 return 1;
251}
252
253static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
254 const char *props)
255{
256 if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
257 EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
258
259 if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, props)) == NULL)
260 return 0;
261 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
262
263 return 1;
264}
265
266static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
267{
268 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
269 return 1;
270 if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
271 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
272 return 0;
273 }
274 return 1;
275}
276
277static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
278{
279 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
280 OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
281}
282
283static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
284{
285 OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
286 ctx->tbuf = NULL;
287}
288
289static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
290 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
291{
292 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
293 int ret;
294 size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
295 size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
296
297 if (sig == NULL) {
298 *siglen = rsasize;
299 return 1;
300 }
301
302 if (sigsize < (size_t)rsasize)
303 return 0;
304
305 if (mdsize != 0) {
306 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
307 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
308 return 0;
309 }
310
1b6ea308 311#ifndef FIPS_MODE
6f4b7663
RL		 312 if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
313 unsigned int sltmp;
314
315 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
316 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
317 "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
318 return 0;
319 }
320 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
321 prsactx->rsa);
322
323 if (ret <= 0) {
324 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
325 return 0;
326 }
327 ret = sltmp;
328 goto end;
329 }
1b6ea308 330#endif
6f4b7663
RL		 331
332 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
333 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
334 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
335 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
336 return 0;
337 }
338 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
339 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
340 return 0;
341 }
342 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
343 prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
344 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
345 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
346 clean_tbuf(prsactx);
347 break;
348
349 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
350 {
351 unsigned int sltmp;
352
353 ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
354 prsactx->rsa);
355 if (ret <= 0) {
356 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
357 return 0;
358 }
359 ret = sltmp;
360 }
361 break;
362
363 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
364 /* Check PSS restrictions */
365 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
366 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
367 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
368 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
369 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
370 return 0;
371 }
372 /* FALLTHRU */
373 default:
374 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
375 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
376 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
377 return 0;
378 }
379 break;
380 }
381 }
382 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
383 return 0;
384 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
385 prsactx->tbuf, tbs,
386 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
387 prsactx->saltlen)) {
388 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
389 return 0;
390 }
391 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
392 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
393 clean_tbuf(prsactx);
394 break;
395
396 default:
397 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
398 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
399 return 0;
400 }
401 } else {
402 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
403 prsactx->pad_mode);
404 }
405
1b6ea308 406#ifndef FIPS_MODE
6f4b7663
RL		 407 end:
408#endif
409 if (ret <= 0) {
410 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
411 return 0;
412 }
413
414 *siglen = ret;
415 return 1;
416}
417
418static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
419 unsigned char *rout,
420 size_t *routlen,
421 size_t routsize,
422 const unsigned char *sig,
423 size_t siglen)
424{
425 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
426 int ret;
427
428 if (rout == NULL) {
429 *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
430 return 1;
431 }
432
433 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
434 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
435 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
436 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
437 return 0;
438 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
439 RSA_X931_PADDING);
440 if (ret < 1) {
441 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
442 return 0;
443 }
444 ret--;
445 if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
446 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
447 return 0;
448 }
449 if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
450 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
451 "Should be %d, but got %d",
452 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
453 return 0;
454 }
455
456 *routlen = ret;
457 if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
458 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
459 return 0;
460 }
461 memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
462 break;
463
464 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
465 {
466 size_t sltmp;
467
468 ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
469 sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
470 if (ret <= 0) {
471 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
472 return 0;
473 }
474 ret = sltmp;
475 }
476 break;
477
478 default:
479 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
480 "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
481 return 0;
482 }
483 } else {
484 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
485 prsactx->pad_mode);
486 if (ret < 0) {
487 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
488 return 0;
489 }
490 }
491 *routlen = ret;
492 return 1;
493}
494
495static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
496 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
497{
498 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
499 size_t rslen;
500
501 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
502 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
503 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
504 if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
505 prsactx->rsa)) {
506 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
507 return 0;
508 }
509 return 1;
510 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
511 if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
512 return 0;
513 break;
514 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
515 {
516 int ret;
517 size_t mdsize;
518
519 /* Check PSS restrictions */
520 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
521 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
522 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
523 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
524 return 0;
525 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
526 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
527 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
528 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
529 return 0;
530 }
531 /* FALLTHRU */
532 default:
533 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
534 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
535 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
536 return 0;
537 }
538 break;
539 }
540 }
541
542 /*
543 * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
544 * call
545 */
546 mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
547 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
548 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
549 "Should be %d, but got %d",
550 mdsize, tbslen);
551 return 0;
552 }
553
554 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
555 return 0;
556 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
557 prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
558 if (ret <= 0) {
559 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
560 return 0;
561 }
562 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
563 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
564 prsactx->tbuf,
565 prsactx->saltlen);
566 if (ret <= 0) {
567 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
568 return 0;
569 }
570 return 1;
571 }
572 default:
573 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
574 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
575 return 0;
576 }
577 } else {
578 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
579 return 0;
580 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
581 prsactx->pad_mode);
582 if (rslen == 0) {
583 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
584 return 0;
585 }
586 }
587
588 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
589 return 0;
590
591 return 1;
592}
593
594static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
595 const char *props, void *vrsa)
596{
597 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
598
599 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
600 if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa)
601 || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, props))
602 return 0;
603
604 prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
605 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
606 goto error;
607
608 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
609 goto error;
610
611 return 1;
612
613 error:
614 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
615 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
616 prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
617 prsactx->md = NULL;
618 return 0;
619}
620
621int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *data,
622 size_t datalen)
623{
624 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
625
626 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
627 return 0;
628
629 return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
630}
631
632int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
633 size_t sigsize)
634{
635 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
636 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
637 unsigned int dlen = 0;
638
639 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
640 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
641 return 0;
642
643 /*
644 * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
645 * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
646 */
647 if (sig != NULL) {
648 /*
649 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
650 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
651 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
652 */
653 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
654 return 0;
655 }
656
657 return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
658}
659
660
661int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
662 size_t siglen)
663{
664 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
665 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
666 unsigned int dlen = 0;
667
668 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
669 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
670 return 0;
671
672 /*
673 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
674 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
675 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
676 */
677 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
678 return 0;
679
680 return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
681}
682
683static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
684{
685 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
686
687 if (prsactx == NULL)
688 return;
689
690 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
691 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
692 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
693 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
694 free_tbuf(prsactx);
695
696 OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
697}
698
699static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
700{
701 PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
702 PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
703
704 dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
705 if (dstctx == NULL)
706 return NULL;
707
708 *dstctx = *srcctx;
709 dstctx->rsa = NULL;
710 dstctx->md = NULL;
711 dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
712 dstctx->tbuf = NULL;
713
714 if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
715 goto err;
716 dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
717
718 if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
719 goto err;
720 dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
721
722 if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
723 goto err;
724 dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
725
726 if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
727 dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
728 if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
729 || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
730 goto err;
731 }
732
733 return dstctx;
734 err:
735 rsa_freectx(dstctx);
736 return NULL;
737}
738
739static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
740{
741 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
742 OSSL_PARAM *p;
743
744 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
745 return 0;
746
747 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
748 if (p != NULL
749 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
750 return 0;
751
752 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
753 if (p != NULL)
754 switch (p->data_type) {
755 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
756 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
757 return 0;
758 break;
759 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
760 {
761 int i;
762 const char *word = NULL;
763
764 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
765 if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
766 word = padding_item[i].ptr;
767 break;
768 }
769 }
770
771 if (word != NULL) {
772 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
773 return 0;
774 } else {
775 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
776 }
777 }
778 break;
779 default:
780 return 0;
781 }
782
783 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
784 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
785 return 0;
786
787 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
788 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
789 return 0;
790
791 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
792 if (p != NULL) {
793 if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
794 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
795 return 0;
796 } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
797 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
798 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
799 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
800 return 0;
801 break;
802 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
803 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
804 return 0;
805 break;
806 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
807 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
808 return 0;
809 break;
810 default:
811 if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
812 <= 0)
813 return 0;
814 break;
815 }
816 }
817 }
818
819 return 1;
820}
821
822static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
823 OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
824 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
825 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
826 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
827 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
828 OSSL_PARAM_END
829};
830
831static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
832{
833 return known_gettable_ctx_params;
834}
835
836static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
837{
838 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
839 const OSSL_PARAM *p;
840
841 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
842 return 0;
843
844 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
845 /* Not allowed during certain operations */
846 if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
847 return 0;
848 if (p != NULL) {
849 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
850 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
851 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
852 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
853 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
854
855 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
856 return 0;
857 if (propsp != NULL
858 && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
859 return 0;
860
861 /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
862 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
863 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
864 if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
865 return 1;
866 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
867 return 0;
868 }
869
870 /* non-PSS code follows */
871 if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
872 return 0;
873 }
874
875 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
876 if (p != NULL) {
877 int pad_mode = 0;
878
879 switch (p->data_type) {
880 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
881 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
882 return 0;
883 break;
884 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
885 {
886 int i;
887
888 if (p->data == NULL)
889 return 0;
890
891 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
892 if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
893 pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
894 break;
895 }
896 }
897 }
898 break;
899 default:
900 return 0;
901 }
902
903 switch (pad_mode) {
904 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
905 /*
906 * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
907 * with signature use.
908 */
909 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
910 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
911 "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying");
912 return 0;
913 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
914 if (prsactx->mdname[0] == '\0')
915 rsa_setup_md(prsactx, "SHA1", "");
916 goto cont;
917 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
918 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
919 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
920 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
921 if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL) {
922 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
923 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
924 "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS");
925 return 0;
926 }
927 cont:
928 if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
929 return 0;
930 break;
931 default:
932 return 0;
933 }
934 prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
935 }
936
937 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
938 if (p != NULL) {
939 int saltlen;
940
941 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
942 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
943 "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
944 "PSS padding has been specified first");
945 return 0;
946 }
947
948 switch (p->data_type) {
949 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
950 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
951 return 0;
952 break;
953 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
954 if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
955 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
956 else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
957 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
958 else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
959 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
960 else
961 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
962 break;
963 default:
964 return 0;
965 }
966
967 /*
968 * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
969 * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
970 * lowest saltlen number possible.
971 */
972 if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
973 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
974 return 0;
975 }
976
977 prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
978 }
979
980 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
981 if (p != NULL) {
982 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
983 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
984 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
985 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
986 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
987
988 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
989 return 0;
990 if (propsp != NULL
991 && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
992 return 0;
993
994 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
995 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
996 return 0;
997 }
998
999 /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
1000 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1001 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
1002 if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
1003 || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
1004 return 1;
1005 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1006 return 0;
1007 }
1008
1009 /* non-PSS code follows */
1010 if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
1011 return 0;
1012 }
1013
1014 return 1;
1015}
1016
1017static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
1018 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1019 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1020 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1021 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1022 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1023 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1024 OSSL_PARAM_END
1025};
1026
1027static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
1028{
1029 /*
1030 * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
1031 * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
1032 * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
1033 * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
1034 */
1035 return known_settable_ctx_params;
1036}
1037
1038static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
1039{
1040 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1041
1042 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1043 return 0;
1044
1045 return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1046}
1047
1048static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1049{
1050 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1051
1052 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1053 return 0;
1054
1055 return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1056}
1057
1058static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1059{
1060 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1061
1062 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1063 return 0;
1064
1065 return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1066}
1067
1068static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1069{
1070 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1071
1072 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1073 return 0;
1074
1075 return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1076}
1077
1078const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
1079 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
1080 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
1081 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
1082 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
1083 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
1084 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
1085 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
1086 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
1087 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
1088 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
1089 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1090 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
1091 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
1092 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
1093 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
1094 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
1095 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1096 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
1097 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
1098 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
1099 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
1100 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
1101 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1102 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
1103 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
1104 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1105 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
1106 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1107 (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
1108 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1109 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
1110 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1111 (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
1112 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1113 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },
1114 { 0, NULL }
1115};
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