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PROV: add RSA signature implementation
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / providers / implementations / signature / rsa.c
CommitLineData
6f4b7663
RL		 1/*
2 * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10/*
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
12 * internal use.
13 */
14#include "internal/deprecated.h"
15
16#include <string.h>
17#include <openssl/crypto.h>
18#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
19#include <openssl/core_names.h>
20#include <openssl/err.h>
21#include <openssl/rsa.h>
22#include <openssl/params.h>
23#include <openssl/evp.h>
24#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
25#include "internal/nelem.h"
26#include "internal/sizes.h"
27#include "crypto/rsa.h"
28#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
29#include "prov/implementations.h"
30#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
31
32static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
33static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
34static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
35static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
36static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
37static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
38static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
39static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
40static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
41static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
42static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
43static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
44static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
45static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
46static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
47static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
48static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
49static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
50static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
51static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
52static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
53static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
54static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
55
56static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
57 { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
58 { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
59 { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
60 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
61 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
62 { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
63 { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
64 { 0, NULL }
65};
66
67/*
68 * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
69 * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
70 * we use that here too.
71 */
72
73typedef struct {
74 OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
75 RSA *rsa;
76
77 /*
78 * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
79 * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
80 * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
81 * by their Final function.
82 */
83 unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
84
85 /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
86 unsigned char aid[128];
87 size_t aid_len;
88
89 /* main digest */
90 EVP_MD *md;
91 EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
92 int mdnid;
93 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
94
95 /* RSA padding mode */
96 int pad_mode;
97 /* message digest for MGF1 */
98 EVP_MD *mgf1_md;
99 char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
100 /* PSS salt length */
101 int saltlen;
102 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
103 int min_saltlen;
104
105 /* Temp buffer */
106 unsigned char *tbuf;
107
108} PROV_RSA_CTX;
109
110static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
111{
112 if (prsactx->md != NULL)
113 return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
114 return 0;
115}
116
117static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
118{
119 /*
120 * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
121 * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
122 * map.
123 */
124 static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
125 { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
126 { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
127 { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
128 { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
129 { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
130 { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
131 { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
132 { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
133 { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
134 { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
135 { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
136 { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
137 { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
138 { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
139 { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
140 };
141 size_t i;
142 int mdnid = NID_undef;
143
144 if (md == NULL)
145 goto end;
146
147 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
148 if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
149 mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
150 break;
151 }
152 }
153
154 if (mdnid == NID_undef)
155 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
156
157 end:
158 return mdnid;
159}
160
161static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
162{
163 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
164 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
165 return 0;
166 }
167
168 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
169 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
170 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
171 return 0;
172 }
173 }
174
175 return 1;
176}
177
178static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
179{
180 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX));
181
182 if (prsactx == NULL)
183 return NULL;
184
185 prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
186 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
187 return prsactx;
188}
189
190/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
191#define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
192
193static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
194{
195 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
196
197 if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
198 return 0;
199
200 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
201 prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
202 if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL)
203 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
204 else
205 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
206 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
207 prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
208 prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
209
210 return 1;
211}
212
213static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
214 const char *mdprops)
215{
216 if (mdname != NULL) {
217 EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
218 int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
219 size_t algorithmidentifier_len = 0;
220 const unsigned char *algorithmidentifier = NULL;
221
222 if (md == NULL)
223 return 0;
224
225 if (!rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)) {
226 EVP_MD_free(md);
227 return 0;
228 }
229
230 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
231 EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
232 ctx->md = NULL;
233 ctx->mdctx = NULL;
234 ctx->mdname[0] = '\0';
235 ctx->aid[0] = '\0';
236 ctx->aid_len = 0;
237
238 algorithmidentifier =
239 rsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(md_nid, &algorithmidentifier_len);
240
241 ctx->md = md;
242 ctx->mdnid = md_nid;
243 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
244 if (algorithmidentifier != NULL) {
245 memcpy(ctx->aid, algorithmidentifier, algorithmidentifier_len);
246 ctx->aid_len = algorithmidentifier_len;
247 }
248 }
249
250 return 1;
251}
252
253static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
254 const char *props)
255{
256 if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
257 EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
258
259 if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, props)) == NULL)
260 return 0;
261 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
262
263 return 1;
264}
265
266static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
267{
268 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
269 return 1;
270 if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
271 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
272 return 0;
273 }
274 return 1;
275}
276
277static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
278{
279 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
280 OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
281}
282
283static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
284{
285 OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
286 ctx->tbuf = NULL;
287}
288
289static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
290 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
291{
292 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
293 int ret;
294 size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
295 size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
296
297 if (sig == NULL) {
298 *siglen = rsasize;
299 return 1;
300 }
301
302 if (sigsize < (size_t)rsasize)
303 return 0;
304
305 if (mdsize != 0) {
306 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
307 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
308 return 0;
309 }
310
311 if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
312 unsigned int sltmp;
313
314 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
315 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
316 "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
317 return 0;
318 }
319 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
320 prsactx->rsa);
321
322 if (ret <= 0) {
323 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
324 return 0;
325 }
326 ret = sltmp;
327 goto end;
328 }
329
330 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
331 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
332 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
333 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
334 return 0;
335 }
336 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
337 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
338 return 0;
339 }
340 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
341 prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
342 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
343 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
344 clean_tbuf(prsactx);
345 break;
346
347 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
348 {
349 unsigned int sltmp;
350
351 ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
352 prsactx->rsa);
353 if (ret <= 0) {
354 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
355 return 0;
356 }
357 ret = sltmp;
358 }
359 break;
360
361 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
362 /* Check PSS restrictions */
363 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
364 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
365 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
366 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
367 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
368 return 0;
369 }
370 /* FALLTHRU */
371 default:
372 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
373 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
374 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
375 return 0;
376 }
377 break;
378 }
379 }
380 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
381 return 0;
382 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
383 prsactx->tbuf, tbs,
384 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
385 prsactx->saltlen)) {
386 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
387 return 0;
388 }
389 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
390 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
391 clean_tbuf(prsactx);
392 break;
393
394 default:
395 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
396 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
397 return 0;
398 }
399 } else {
400 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
401 prsactx->pad_mode);
402 }
403
404#ifdef LEGACY_MODE
405 end:
406#endif
407 if (ret <= 0) {
408 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
409 return 0;
410 }
411
412 *siglen = ret;
413 return 1;
414}
415
416static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
417 unsigned char *rout,
418 size_t *routlen,
419 size_t routsize,
420 const unsigned char *sig,
421 size_t siglen)
422{
423 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
424 int ret;
425
426 if (rout == NULL) {
427 *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
428 return 1;
429 }
430
431 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
432 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
433 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
434 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
435 return 0;
436 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
437 RSA_X931_PADDING);
438 if (ret < 1) {
439 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
440 return 0;
441 }
442 ret--;
443 if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
444 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
445 return 0;
446 }
447 if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
448 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
449 "Should be %d, but got %d",
450 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
451 return 0;
452 }
453
454 *routlen = ret;
455 if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
456 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
457 return 0;
458 }
459 memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
460 break;
461
462 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
463 {
464 size_t sltmp;
465
466 ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
467 sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
468 if (ret <= 0) {
469 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
470 return 0;
471 }
472 ret = sltmp;
473 }
474 break;
475
476 default:
477 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
478 "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
479 return 0;
480 }
481 } else {
482 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
483 prsactx->pad_mode);
484 if (ret < 0) {
485 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
486 return 0;
487 }
488 }
489 *routlen = ret;
490 return 1;
491}
492
493static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
494 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
495{
496 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
497 size_t rslen;
498
499 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
500 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
501 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
502 if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
503 prsactx->rsa)) {
504 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
505 return 0;
506 }
507 return 1;
508 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
509 if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
510 return 0;
511 break;
512 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
513 {
514 int ret;
515 size_t mdsize;
516
517 /* Check PSS restrictions */
518 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
519 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
520 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
521 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
522 return 0;
523 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
524 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
525 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
526 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
527 return 0;
528 }
529 /* FALLTHRU */
530 default:
531 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
532 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
533 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
534 return 0;
535 }
536 break;
537 }
538 }
539
540 /*
541 * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
542 * call
543 */
544 mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
545 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
546 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
547 "Should be %d, but got %d",
548 mdsize, tbslen);
549 return 0;
550 }
551
552 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
553 return 0;
554 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
555 prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
556 if (ret <= 0) {
557 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
558 return 0;
559 }
560 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
561 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
562 prsactx->tbuf,
563 prsactx->saltlen);
564 if (ret <= 0) {
565 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
566 return 0;
567 }
568 return 1;
569 }
570 default:
571 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
572 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
573 return 0;
574 }
575 } else {
576 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
577 return 0;
578 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
579 prsactx->pad_mode);
580 if (rslen == 0) {
581 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
582 return 0;
583 }
584 }
585
586 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
587 return 0;
588
589 return 1;
590}
591
592static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
593 const char *props, void *vrsa)
594{
595 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
596
597 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
598 if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa)
599 || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, props))
600 return 0;
601
602 prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
603 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
604 goto error;
605
606 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
607 goto error;
608
609 return 1;
610
611 error:
612 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
613 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
614 prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
615 prsactx->md = NULL;
616 return 0;
617}
618
619int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *data,
620 size_t datalen)
621{
622 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
623
624 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
625 return 0;
626
627 return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
628}
629
630int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
631 size_t sigsize)
632{
633 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
634 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
635 unsigned int dlen = 0;
636
637 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
638 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
639 return 0;
640
641 /*
642 * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
643 * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
644 */
645 if (sig != NULL) {
646 /*
647 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
648 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
649 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
650 */
651 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
652 return 0;
653 }
654
655 return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
656}
657
658
659int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
660 size_t siglen)
661{
662 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
663 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
664 unsigned int dlen = 0;
665
666 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
667 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
668 return 0;
669
670 /*
671 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
672 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
673 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
674 */
675 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
676 return 0;
677
678 return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
679}
680
681static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
682{
683 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
684
685 if (prsactx == NULL)
686 return;
687
688 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
689 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
690 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
691 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
692 free_tbuf(prsactx);
693
694 OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
695}
696
697static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
698{
699 PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
700 PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
701
702 dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
703 if (dstctx == NULL)
704 return NULL;
705
706 *dstctx = *srcctx;
707 dstctx->rsa = NULL;
708 dstctx->md = NULL;
709 dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
710 dstctx->tbuf = NULL;
711
712 if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
713 goto err;
714 dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
715
716 if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
717 goto err;
718 dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
719
720 if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
721 goto err;
722 dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
723
724 if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
725 dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
726 if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
727 || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
728 goto err;
729 }
730
731 return dstctx;
732 err:
733 rsa_freectx(dstctx);
734 return NULL;
735}
736
737static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
738{
739 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
740 OSSL_PARAM *p;
741
742 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
743 return 0;
744
745 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
746 if (p != NULL
747 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
748 return 0;
749
750 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
751 if (p != NULL)
752 switch (p->data_type) {
753 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
754 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
755 return 0;
756 break;
757 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
758 {
759 int i;
760 const char *word = NULL;
761
762 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
763 if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
764 word = padding_item[i].ptr;
765 break;
766 }
767 }
768
769 if (word != NULL) {
770 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
771 return 0;
772 } else {
773 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
774 }
775 }
776 break;
777 default:
778 return 0;
779 }
780
781 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
782 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
783 return 0;
784
785 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
786 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
787 return 0;
788
789 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
790 if (p != NULL) {
791 if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
792 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
793 return 0;
794 } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
795 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
796 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
797 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
798 return 0;
799 break;
800 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
801 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
802 return 0;
803 break;
804 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
805 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
806 return 0;
807 break;
808 default:
809 if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
810 <= 0)
811 return 0;
812 break;
813 }
814 }
815 }
816
817 return 1;
818}
819
820static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
821 OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
822 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
823 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
824 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
825 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
826 OSSL_PARAM_END
827};
828
829static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
830{
831 return known_gettable_ctx_params;
832}
833
834static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
835{
836 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
837 const OSSL_PARAM *p;
838
839 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
840 return 0;
841
842 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
843 /* Not allowed during certain operations */
844 if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
845 return 0;
846 if (p != NULL) {
847 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
848 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
849 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
850 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
851 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
852
853 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
854 return 0;
855 if (propsp != NULL
856 && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
857 return 0;
858
859 /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
860 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
861 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
862 if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
863 return 1;
864 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
865 return 0;
866 }
867
868 /* non-PSS code follows */
869 if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
870 return 0;
871 }
872
873 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
874 if (p != NULL) {
875 int pad_mode = 0;
876
877 switch (p->data_type) {
878 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
879 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
880 return 0;
881 break;
882 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
883 {
884 int i;
885
886 if (p->data == NULL)
887 return 0;
888
889 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
890 if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
891 pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
892 break;
893 }
894 }
895 }
896 break;
897 default:
898 return 0;
899 }
900
901 switch (pad_mode) {
902 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
903 /*
904 * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
905 * with signature use.
906 */
907 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
908 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
909 "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying");
910 return 0;
911 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
912 if (prsactx->mdname[0] == '\0')
913 rsa_setup_md(prsactx, "SHA1", "");
914 goto cont;
915 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
916 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
917 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
918 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
919 if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL) {
920 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
921 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
922 "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS");
923 return 0;
924 }
925 cont:
926 if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
927 return 0;
928 break;
929 default:
930 return 0;
931 }
932 prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
933 }
934
935 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
936 if (p != NULL) {
937 int saltlen;
938
939 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
940 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
941 "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
942 "PSS padding has been specified first");
943 return 0;
944 }
945
946 switch (p->data_type) {
947 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
948 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
949 return 0;
950 break;
951 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
952 if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
953 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
954 else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
955 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
956 else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
957 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
958 else
959 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
960 break;
961 default:
962 return 0;
963 }
964
965 /*
966 * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
967 * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
968 * lowest saltlen number possible.
969 */
970 if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
971 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
972 return 0;
973 }
974
975 prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
976 }
977
978 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
979 if (p != NULL) {
980 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
981 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
982 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
983 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
984 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
985
986 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
987 return 0;
988 if (propsp != NULL
989 && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
990 return 0;
991
992 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
993 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
994 return 0;
995 }
996
997 /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
998 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
999 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
1000 if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
1001 || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
1002 return 1;
1003 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1004 return 0;
1005 }
1006
1007 /* non-PSS code follows */
1008 if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
1009 return 0;
1010 }
1011
1012 return 1;
1013}
1014
1015static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
1016 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1017 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1018 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1019 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1020 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1021 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1022 OSSL_PARAM_END
1023};
1024
1025static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
1026{
1027 /*
1028 * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
1029 * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
1030 * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
1031 * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
1032 */
1033 return known_settable_ctx_params;
1034}
1035
1036static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
1037{
1038 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1039
1040 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1041 return 0;
1042
1043 return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1044}
1045
1046static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1047{
1048 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1049
1050 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1051 return 0;
1052
1053 return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1054}
1055
1056static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1057{
1058 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1059
1060 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1061 return 0;
1062
1063 return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1064}
1065
1066static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1067{
1068 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1069
1070 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1071 return 0;
1072
1073 return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1074}
1075
1076const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
1077 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
1078 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
1079 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
1080 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
1081 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
1082 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
1083 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
1084 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
1085 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
1086 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
1087 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1088 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
1089 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
1090 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
1091 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
1092 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
1093 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1094 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
1095 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
1096 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
1097 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
1098 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
1099 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1100 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
1101 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
1102 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1103 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
1104 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1105 (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
1106 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1107 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
1108 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1109 (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
1110 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1111 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },
1112 { 0, NULL }
1113};
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