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Add option to fipsinstall to disable fips security checks at run time.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / providers / implementations / signature / rsa.c
CommitLineData
6f4b7663 1/*
33388b44 2 * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
6f4b7663
RL		 3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10/*
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
12 * internal use.
13 */
14#include "internal/deprecated.h"
15
16#include <string.h>
17#include <openssl/crypto.h>
23c48d94 18#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
6f4b7663
RL		 19#include <openssl/core_names.h>
20#include <openssl/err.h>
21#include <openssl/rsa.h>
22#include <openssl/params.h>
23#include <openssl/evp.h>
24#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
25#include "internal/nelem.h"
26#include "internal/sizes.h"
27#include "crypto/rsa.h"
f590a5ea 28#include "prov/providercommon.h"
6f4b7663
RL		 29#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
30#include "prov/implementations.h"
31#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
6f5837dc 32#include "prov/der_rsa.h"
7a810fac 33#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
3f699197
SL		 34
35#define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
6f4b7663 36
363b1e5d
DMSP		 37static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
38static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
39static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
40static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
41static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
42static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
43static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
44static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
45static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
46static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
47static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
48static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
49static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
50static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
51static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
52static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
53static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
54static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
55static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
56static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
57static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
58static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
59static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
6f4b7663
RL		 60
61static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
b8086652
SL		 62 { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 },
63 { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 },
64 { RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE },
65 { RSA_X931_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 },
66 { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS },
6f4b7663
RL		 67 { 0, NULL }
68};
69
70/*
71 * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
72 * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
73 * we use that here too.
74 */
75
76typedef struct {
77 OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
2c6094ba 78 char *propq;
6f4b7663 79 RSA *rsa;
0ec36bf1 80 int operation;
6f4b7663
RL		 81
82 /*
83 * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
84 * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
85 * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
86 * by their Final function.
87 */
88 unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
89
3f699197 90 /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
6f5837dc
RL		 91 unsigned char aid_buf[128];
92 unsigned char *aid;
6f4b7663
RL		 93 size_t aid_len;
94
95 /* main digest */
96 EVP_MD *md;
97 EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
98 int mdnid;
99 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
100
101 /* RSA padding mode */
102 int pad_mode;
103 /* message digest for MGF1 */
104 EVP_MD *mgf1_md;
105 char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
106 /* PSS salt length */
107 int saltlen;
108 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
109 int min_saltlen;
110
111 /* Temp buffer */
112 unsigned char *tbuf;
113
114} PROV_RSA_CTX;
115
116static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
117{
118 if (prsactx->md != NULL)
119 return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
120 return 0;
121}
122
6f4b7663
RL		 123static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
124{
125 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
126 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
127 return 0;
128 }
129
130 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
131 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
132 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
133 return 0;
134 }
135 }
136
137 return 1;
138}
139
6ce6ad39 140static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
2d553660
RL		 141{
142 if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
143 int max_saltlen;
144
145 /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
6ce6ad39 146 max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
2d553660
RL		 147 if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
148 max_saltlen--;
6ce6ad39 149 if (prsactx->min_saltlen < 0 || prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
2d553660
RL		 150 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
151 return 0;
152 }
153 }
154 return 1;
155}
156
2c6094ba 157static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
6f4b7663 158{
2d553660
RL		 159 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
160 char *propq_copy = NULL;
6f4b7663 161
f590a5ea
P		 162 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
163 return NULL;
164
2d553660
RL		 165 if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL
166 || (propq != NULL
167 && (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) {
168 OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
169 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
6f4b7663 170 return NULL;
2d553660 171 }
6f4b7663
RL		 172
173 prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
174 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
2d553660 175 prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
6f4b7663
RL		 176 return prsactx;
177}
178
179/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
180#define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
181
6f4b7663
RL		 182static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
183 const char *mdprops)
184{
2c6094ba
RL		 185 if (mdprops == NULL)
186 mdprops = ctx->propq;
187
6f4b7663 188 if (mdname != NULL) {
6f5837dc 189 WPACKET pkt;
3f699197 190 EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
49ed5ba8
SL		 191 int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
192 int md_nid = digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, sha1_allowed);
2de64666 193 size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
6f4b7663 194
6f5837dc
RL		 195 if (md == NULL
196 || md_nid == NID_undef
2d553660 197 || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
2de64666 198 || mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) {
2d553660
RL		 199 if (md == NULL)
200 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
201 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
202 if (md_nid == NID_undef)
203 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
204 "digest=%s", mdname);
2de64666
NT		 205 if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname))
206 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
207 "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
6f4b7663
RL		 208 EVP_MD_free(md);
209 return 0;
210 }
211
212 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
213 EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
6f4b7663 214
6f5837dc
RL		 215 /*
216 * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
217 * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
218 * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
219 * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
220 * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
221 */
222 ctx->aid_len = 0;
223 if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
a30027b6
RL		 224 && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa,
225 md_nid)
6f5837dc
RL		 226 && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
227 WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
228 ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
229 }
230 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
6f4b7663 231
6f5837dc 232 ctx->mdctx = NULL;
6f4b7663
RL		 233 ctx->md = md;
234 ctx->mdnid = md_nid;
235 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
6f4b7663
RL		 236 }
237
238 return 1;
239}
240
241static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
2c6094ba 242 const char *mdprops)
6f4b7663 243{
2de64666 244 size_t len;
3f699197 245 EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2de64666 246
2c6094ba
RL		 247 if (mdprops == NULL)
248 mdprops = ctx->propq;
249
6f4b7663
RL		 250 if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
251 EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
252
3f699197 253 if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
2d553660
RL		 254 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
255 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
6f4b7663 256 return 0;
2d553660 257 }
49ed5ba8
SL		 258 /* The default for mgf1 is SHA1 - so allow SHA1 */
259 if (digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, 1) == NID_undef) {
3f699197
SL		 260 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
261 "digest=%s", mdname);
262 EVP_MD_free(md);
263 return 0;
264 }
265 ctx->mgf1_md = md;
2de64666
NT		 266 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
267 if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) {
268 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
269 "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
270 return 0;
271 }
6f4b7663
RL		 272
273 return 1;
274}
275
3f699197 276static int rsa_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
2d553660
RL		 277{
278 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
279
f590a5ea
P		 280 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
281 return 0;
282
2d553660
RL		 283 if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
284 return 0;
285
286 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
287 prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
288 prsactx->operation = operation;
289
49ed5ba8 290 if (!rsa_check_key(vrsa, operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN)) {
3f699197
SL		 291 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
292 return 0;
293 }
294
2d553660
RL		 295 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
296 prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
297 prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
298
299 switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
300 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
301 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
302 break;
303 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
304 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
305
306 {
307 const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss =
308 rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
309
310 if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
311 int md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
312 int mgf1md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
313 int min_saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
314 const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname;
2de64666 315 size_t len;
2d553660
RL		 316
317 mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
318 mgf1mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
319 prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
320
321 if (mdname == NULL) {
322 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
323 "PSS restrictions lack hash algorithm");
324 return 0;
325 }
326 if (mgf1mdname == NULL) {
327 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
328 "PSS restrictions lack MGF1 hash algorithm");
329 return 0;
330 }
331
2de64666
NT		 332 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname,
333 sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
334 if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mdname)) {
335 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
336 "hash algorithm name too long");
337 return 0;
338 }
339 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
340 sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
341 if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) {
342 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
343 "MGF1 hash algorithm name too long");
344 return 0;
345 }
2d553660
RL		 346 prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
347
348 return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
6ce6ad39
RL		 349 && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq)
350 && rsa_check_parameters(prsactx);
2d553660
RL		 351 }
352 }
353
354 break;
355 default:
356 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
357 return 0;
358 }
359
360 return 1;
361}
362
6f4b7663
RL		 363static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
364{
365 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
366 return 1;
367 if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
368 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
369 return 0;
370 }
371 return 1;
372}
373
374static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
375{
376 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
377 OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
378}
379
380static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
381{
2d553660
RL		 382 clean_tbuf(ctx);
383 OPENSSL_free(ctx->tbuf);
6f4b7663
RL		 384 ctx->tbuf = NULL;
385}
386
0ec36bf1
RL		 387static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
388{
f590a5ea
P		 389 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
390 return 0;
3f699197 391 return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
0ec36bf1
RL		 392}
393
6f4b7663
RL		 394static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
395 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
396{
397 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
398 int ret;
399 size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
400 size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
401
f590a5ea
P		 402 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
403 return 0;
404
6f4b7663
RL		 405 if (sig == NULL) {
406 *siglen = rsasize;
407 return 1;
408 }
409
2d553660
RL		 410 if (sigsize < rsasize) {
411 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_SIZE,
412 "is %zu, should be at least %zu", sigsize, rsasize);
6f4b7663 413 return 0;
2d553660 414 }
6f4b7663
RL		 415
416 if (mdsize != 0) {
417 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
418 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
419 return 0;
420 }
421
f844f9eb 422#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
6f4b7663
RL		 423 if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
424 unsigned int sltmp;
425
426 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
427 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
428 "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
429 return 0;
430 }
431 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
432 prsactx->rsa);
433
434 if (ret <= 0) {
435 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
436 return 0;
437 }
438 ret = sltmp;
439 goto end;
440 }
1b6ea308 441#endif
6f4b7663
RL		 442 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
443 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
444 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
2d553660
RL		 445 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL,
446 "RSA key size = %d, expected minimum = %d",
447 RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), tbslen + 1);
6f4b7663
RL		 448 return 0;
449 }
450 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
451 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
452 return 0;
453 }
454 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
455 prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
456 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
457 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
458 clean_tbuf(prsactx);
459 break;
460
461 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
462 {
463 unsigned int sltmp;
464
465 ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
466 prsactx->rsa);
467 if (ret <= 0) {
468 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
469 return 0;
470 }
471 ret = sltmp;
472 }
473 break;
474
475 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
476 /* Check PSS restrictions */
477 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
478 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
479 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
480 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
2d553660
RL		 481 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
482 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
483 "minimum salt length set to %d, "
484 "but the digest only gives %d",
485 prsactx->min_saltlen,
486 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
6f4b7663
RL		 487 return 0;
488 }
489 /* FALLTHRU */
490 default:
491 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
492 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
2d553660
RL		 493 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
494 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
495 "minimum salt length set to %d, but the"
496 "actual salt length is only set to %d",
497 prsactx->min_saltlen,
498 prsactx->saltlen);
6f4b7663
RL		 499 return 0;
500 }
501 break;
502 }
503 }
504 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
505 return 0;
506 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
507 prsactx->tbuf, tbs,
508 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
509 prsactx->saltlen)) {
510 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
511 return 0;
512 }
513 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
514 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
515 clean_tbuf(prsactx);
516 break;
517
518 default:
519 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
520 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
521 return 0;
522 }
523 } else {
524 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
525 prsactx->pad_mode);
526 }
527
f844f9eb 528#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
6f4b7663
RL		 529 end:
530#endif
531 if (ret <= 0) {
532 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
533 return 0;
534 }
535
536 *siglen = ret;
537 return 1;
538}
539
0ec36bf1
RL		 540static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
541{
f590a5ea
P		 542 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
543 return 0;
3f699197 544 return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
0ec36bf1
RL		 545}
546
6f4b7663
RL		 547static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
548 unsigned char *rout,
549 size_t *routlen,
550 size_t routsize,
551 const unsigned char *sig,
552 size_t siglen)
553{
554 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
555 int ret;
556
f590a5ea
P		 557 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
558 return 0;
559
6f4b7663
RL		 560 if (rout == NULL) {
561 *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
562 return 1;
563 }
564
565 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
566 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
567 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
568 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
569 return 0;
570 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
571 RSA_X931_PADDING);
572 if (ret < 1) {
573 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
574 return 0;
575 }
576 ret--;
577 if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
578 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
579 return 0;
580 }
581 if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
582 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
583 "Should be %d, but got %d",
584 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
585 return 0;
586 }
587
588 *routlen = ret;
4f2271d5
SL		 589 if (rout != prsactx->tbuf) {
590 if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
591 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
592 "buffer size is %d, should be %d",
593 routsize, ret);
594 return 0;
595 }
596 memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
6f4b7663 597 }
6f4b7663
RL		 598 break;
599
600 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
601 {
602 size_t sltmp;
603
604 ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
605 sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
606 if (ret <= 0) {
607 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
608 return 0;
609 }
610 ret = sltmp;
611 }
612 break;
613
614 default:
615 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
616 "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
617 return 0;
618 }
619 } else {
620 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
621 prsactx->pad_mode);
622 if (ret < 0) {
623 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
624 return 0;
625 }
626 }
627 *routlen = ret;
628 return 1;
629}
630
0ec36bf1
RL		 631static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
632{
f590a5ea
P		 633 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
634 return 0;
3f699197 635 return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
0ec36bf1
RL		 636}
637
6f4b7663
RL		 638static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
639 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
640{
641 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
642 size_t rslen;
643
f590a5ea
P		 644 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
645 return 0;
6f4b7663
RL		 646 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
647 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
648 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
649 if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
650 prsactx->rsa)) {
651 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
652 return 0;
653 }
654 return 1;
655 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
4f2271d5
SL		 656 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
657 return 0;
658 if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, prsactx->tbuf, &rslen, 0,
659 sig, siglen) <= 0)
6f4b7663
RL		 660 return 0;
661 break;
662 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
663 {
664 int ret;
665 size_t mdsize;
666
6f4b7663
RL		 667 /*
668 * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
669 * call
670 */
671 mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
672 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
673 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
674 "Should be %d, but got %d",
675 mdsize, tbslen);
676 return 0;
677 }
678
679 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
680 return 0;
681 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
682 prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
683 if (ret <= 0) {
684 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
685 return 0;
686 }
687 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
688 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
689 prsactx->tbuf,
690 prsactx->saltlen);
691 if (ret <= 0) {
692 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
693 return 0;
694 }
695 return 1;
696 }
697 default:
698 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
699 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
700 return 0;
701 }
702 } else {
703 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
704 return 0;
705 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
706 prsactx->pad_mode);
707 if (rslen == 0) {
708 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
709 return 0;
710 }
711 }
712
713 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
714 return 0;
715
716 return 1;
717}
718
719static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
2c6094ba 720 void *vrsa, int operation)
6f4b7663
RL		 721{
722 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
723
f590a5ea
P		 724 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
725 return 0;
726
db1319b7
SL		 727 if (prsactx != NULL)
728 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
3f699197 729 if (!rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
2d553660 730 || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */
6f4b7663
RL		 731 return 0;
732
733 prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2d553660
RL		 734 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) {
735 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
6f4b7663 736 goto error;
2d553660 737 }
6f4b7663
RL		 738
739 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
740 goto error;
741
742 return 1;
743
744 error:
745 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
746 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
747 prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
748 prsactx->md = NULL;
749 return 0;
750}
751
0ec36bf1
RL		 752static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx,
753 const unsigned char *data,
754 size_t datalen)
6f4b7663
RL		 755{
756 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
757
758 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
759 return 0;
760
761 return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
762}
763
0ec36bf1 764static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
2d553660 765 void *vrsa)
0ec36bf1 766{
f590a5ea
P		 767 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
768 return 0;
2d553660 769 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
0ec36bf1
RL		 770 EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
771}
772
773static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig,
774 size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize)
6f4b7663
RL		 775{
776 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
777 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
778 unsigned int dlen = 0;
779
f590a5ea 780 if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || prsactx == NULL)
51bba73e 781 return 0;
6f4b7663 782 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
51bba73e 783 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
6f4b7663 784 return 0;
6f4b7663
RL		 785 /*
786 * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
787 * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
788 */
789 if (sig != NULL) {
790 /*
3f699197
SL		 791 * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
792 * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
6f4b7663
RL		 793 */
794 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
795 return 0;
796 }
797
798 return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
799}
800
0ec36bf1 801static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
2d553660 802 void *vrsa)
0ec36bf1 803{
f590a5ea
P		 804 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
805 return 0;
2d553660 806 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
0ec36bf1
RL		 807 EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
808}
6f4b7663
RL		 809
810int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
811 size_t siglen)
812{
813 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
814 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
815 unsigned int dlen = 0;
816
f590a5ea
P		 817 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
818 return 0;
819
db1319b7
SL		 820 if (prsactx == NULL)
821 return 0;
6f4b7663 822 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
db1319b7 823 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
6f4b7663
RL		 824 return 0;
825
826 /*
3f699197
SL		 827 * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
828 * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
6f4b7663
RL		 829 */
830 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
831 return 0;
832
833 return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
834}
835
836static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
837{
838 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
839
840 if (prsactx == NULL)
841 return;
842
6f4b7663
RL		 843 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
844 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
845 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
2c6094ba 846 OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq);
6f4b7663 847 free_tbuf(prsactx);
fdf6118b 848 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
6f4b7663 849
26c5ea8f 850 OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(*prsactx));
6f4b7663
RL		 851}
852
853static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
854{
855 PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
856 PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
857
f590a5ea
P		 858 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
859 return NULL;
860
6f4b7663 861 dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
2d553660
RL		 862 if (dstctx == NULL) {
863 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
6f4b7663 864 return NULL;
2d553660 865 }
6f4b7663
RL		 866
867 *dstctx = *srcctx;
868 dstctx->rsa = NULL;
869 dstctx->md = NULL;
870 dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
871 dstctx->tbuf = NULL;
872
873 if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
874 goto err;
875 dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
876
877 if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
878 goto err;
879 dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
880
881 if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
882 goto err;
883 dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
884
885 if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
886 dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
887 if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
888 || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
889 goto err;
890 }
891
892 return dstctx;
893 err:
894 rsa_freectx(dstctx);
895 return NULL;
896}
897
898static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
899{
900 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
901 OSSL_PARAM *p;
902
903 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
904 return 0;
905
906 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
907 if (p != NULL
908 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
909 return 0;
910
911 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
912 if (p != NULL)
913 switch (p->data_type) {
914 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
915 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
916 return 0;
917 break;
918 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
919 {
920 int i;
921 const char *word = NULL;
922
923 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
924 if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
925 word = padding_item[i].ptr;
926 break;
927 }
928 }
929
930 if (word != NULL) {
931 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
932 return 0;
933 } else {
934 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
935 }
936 }
937 break;
938 default:
939 return 0;
940 }
941
942 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
943 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
944 return 0;
945
946 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
947 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
948 return 0;
949
950 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
951 if (p != NULL) {
952 if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
953 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
954 return 0;
955 } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
b8086652
SL		 956 const char *value = NULL;
957
6f4b7663
RL		 958 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
959 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
b8086652 960 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST;
6f4b7663
RL		 961 break;
962 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
b8086652 963 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX;
6f4b7663
RL		 964 break;
965 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
b8086652 966 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO;
6f4b7663
RL		 967 break;
968 default:
b8086652
SL		 969 {
970 int len = BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d",
971 prsactx->saltlen);
972
973 if (len <= 0)
974 return 0;
975 p->return_size = len;
976 break;
977 }
6f4b7663 978 }
b8086652
SL		 979 if (value != NULL
980 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, value))
981 return 0;
6f4b7663
RL		 982 }
983 }
984
985 return 1;
986}
987
988static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
989 OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
990 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
991 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
992 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
993 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
994 OSSL_PARAM_END
995};
996
3f699197 997static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx)
6f4b7663
RL		 998{
999 return known_gettable_ctx_params;
1000}
1001
1002static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1003{
1004 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1005 const OSSL_PARAM *p;
1006
1007 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
1008 return 0;
1009
1010 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
1011 /* Not allowed during certain operations */
1012 if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
1013 return 0;
1014 if (p != NULL) {
1015 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
1016 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
1017 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
1018 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
1019 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
1020
1021 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1022 return 0;
2c6094ba
RL		 1023
1024 if (propsp == NULL)
1025 pmdprops = NULL;
1026 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
1027 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
6f4b7663
RL		 1028 return 0;
1029
6f4b7663
RL		 1030 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1031 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
1032 if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
1033 return 1;
1034 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1035 return 0;
1036 }
1037
1038 /* non-PSS code follows */
2c6094ba 1039 if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
6f4b7663
RL		 1040 return 0;
1041 }
1042
1043 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
1044 if (p != NULL) {
1045 int pad_mode = 0;
0ec36bf1 1046 const char *err_extra_text = NULL;
6f4b7663
RL		 1047
1048 switch (p->data_type) {
1049 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1050 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
1051 return 0;
1052 break;
1053 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1054 {
1055 int i;
1056
1057 if (p->data == NULL)
1058 return 0;
1059
1060 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
1061 if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
1062 pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
1063 break;
1064 }
1065 }
1066 }
1067 break;
1068 default:
1069 return 0;
1070 }
1071
1072 switch (pad_mode) {
1073 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
1074 /*
1075 * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
1076 * with signature use.
1077 */
0ec36bf1
RL		 1078 err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying";
1079 goto bad_pad;
6f4b7663 1080 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
0ec36bf1
RL		 1081 if ((prsactx->operation
1082 & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) {
1083 err_extra_text =
1084 "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations";
1085 goto bad_pad;
1086 }
1087 if (prsactx->md == NULL
3f699197 1088 && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME, NULL)) {
0ec36bf1
RL		 1089 return 0;
1090 }
1091 break;
6f4b7663 1092 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
0ec36bf1
RL		 1093 err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1094 goto cont;
6f4b7663 1095 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
0ec36bf1
RL		 1096 err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1097 goto cont;
6f4b7663 1098 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
0ec36bf1
RL		 1099 err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1100 goto cont;
6f4b7663 1101 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
0ec36bf1 1102 err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
6f4b7663 1103 cont:
2d553660
RL		 1104 if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
1105 RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
0ec36bf1
RL		 1106 break;
1107 /* FALLTHRU */
6f4b7663 1108 default:
0ec36bf1
RL		 1109 bad_pad:
1110 if (err_extra_text == NULL)
1111 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1112 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
1113 else
1114 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1115 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
1116 err_extra_text);
6f4b7663
RL		 1117 return 0;
1118 }
0ec36bf1
RL		 1119 if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
1120 return 0;
6f4b7663
RL		 1121 prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
1122 }
1123
1124 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
1125 if (p != NULL) {
1126 int saltlen;
1127
1128 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1129 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
1130 "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
1131 "PSS padding has been specified first");
1132 return 0;
1133 }
1134
1135 switch (p->data_type) {
1136 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1137 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
1138 return 0;
1139 break;
1140 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
b8086652 1141 if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST) == 0)
6f4b7663 1142 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
b8086652 1143 else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX) == 0)
6f4b7663 1144 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
b8086652 1145 else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO) == 0)
6f4b7663
RL		 1146 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
1147 else
1148 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
1149 break;
1150 default:
1151 return 0;
1152 }
1153
1154 /*
1155 * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
1156 * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
1157 * lowest saltlen number possible.
1158 */
1159 if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
1160 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1161 return 0;
1162 }
1163
0ec36bf1 1164 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
6ce6ad39 1165 switch (saltlen) {
0ec36bf1
RL		 1166 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
1167 if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
1168 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1169 return 0;
1170 }
1171 break;
1172 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
1173 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
1174 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1175 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1176 "Should be more than %d, but would be "
1177 "set to match digest size (%d)",
1178 prsactx->min_saltlen,
1179 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
1180 return 0;
1181 }
6ce6ad39 1182 break;
0ec36bf1
RL		 1183 default:
1184 if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
1185 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1186 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1187 "Should be more than %d, "
1188 "but would be set to %d",
1189 prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen);
1190 return 0;
1191 }
1192 }
1193 }
1194
6f4b7663
RL		 1195 prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
1196 }
1197
1198 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
1199 if (p != NULL) {
1200 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
1201 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
1202 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
1203 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
1204 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
1205
1206 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1207 return 0;
2c6094ba
RL		 1208
1209 if (propsp == NULL)
1210 pmdprops = NULL;
1211 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
1212 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
6f4b7663
RL		 1213 return 0;
1214
1215 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1216 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
1217 return 0;
1218 }
1219
6f4b7663 1220 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
0ec36bf1 1221 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */
6f4b7663
RL		 1222 if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
1223 || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
1224 return 1;
1225 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1226 return 0;
1227 }
1228
1229 /* non-PSS code follows */
2c6094ba 1230 if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
6f4b7663
RL		 1231 return 0;
1232 }
1233
1234 return 1;
1235}
1236
1237static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
1238 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1239 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1240 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1241 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1242 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1243 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1244 OSSL_PARAM_END
1245};
1246
991a6bb5 1247static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
6f4b7663
RL		 1248{
1249 /*
1250 * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
1251 * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
1252 * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
1253 * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
1254 */
1255 return known_settable_ctx_params;
1256}
1257
1258static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
1259{
1260 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1261
1262 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1263 return 0;
1264
1265 return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1266}
1267
1268static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1269{
1270 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1271
1272 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1273 return 0;
1274
1275 return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1276}
1277
1278static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1279{
1280 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1281
1282 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1283 return 0;
1284
1285 return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1286}
1287
1288static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1289{
1290 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1291
1292 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1293 return 0;
1294
1295 return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1296}
1297
1298const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
1299 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
0ec36bf1 1300 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
6f4b7663 1301 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
0ec36bf1 1302 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init },
6f4b7663 1303 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
0ec36bf1
RL		 1304 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT,
1305 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init },
1306 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER,
1307 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
6f4b7663 1308 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
0ec36bf1 1309 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init },
6f4b7663
RL		 1310 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
1311 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1312 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
1313 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
1314 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
0ec36bf1 1315 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init },
6f4b7663
RL		 1316 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
1317 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1318 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
1319 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
1320 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
1321 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
1322 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
1323 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1324 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
1325 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
1326 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1327 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
1328 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1329 (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
1330 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1331 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
1332 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1333 (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
1334 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1335 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },
1336 { 0, NULL }
1337};
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