2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include "crypto/ctype.h"
18 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
19 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
20 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
21 #include <openssl/evp.h>
22 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
23 #include <openssl/x509.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
25 #include <openssl/objects.h>
26 #include "internal/dane.h"
27 #include "crypto/x509.h"
28 #include "x509_local.h"
30 /* CRL score values */
32 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
34 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
36 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
38 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
42 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
44 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
46 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
48 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
50 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
52 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
54 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
56 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
58 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
60 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
62 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
64 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
66 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
68 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
69 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
70 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
71 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
72 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
73 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
74 static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
75 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
76 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
77 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
);
78 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
79 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
80 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
81 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
82 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
);
83 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
84 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
85 static int check_curve(X509
*cert
);
87 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
88 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
89 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
90 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
91 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
92 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
93 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
94 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
96 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
97 unsigned int *preasons
);
98 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
99 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
100 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
101 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
103 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
105 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
111 * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not, or -1 on error.
112 * This actually verifies self-signedness only if requested.
113 * It calls X509v3_cache_extensions()
114 * to match issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any
115 * present authority key identifier to match the subject key identifier, etc.
117 int X509_self_signed(X509
*cert
, int verify_signature
)
121 if ((pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(cert
)) == NULL
) { /* handles cert == NULL */
122 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
125 if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert
))
127 if ((cert
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
) == 0)
129 if (!verify_signature
)
131 return X509_verify(cert
, pkey
);
134 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
135 static X509
*lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
137 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
140 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
142 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
146 /* Look for exact match */
147 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
148 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
149 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
))
153 if (xtmp
!= NULL
&& !X509_up_ref(xtmp
))
155 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
160 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
161 * If 'x' is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
163 * If 'err' is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
164 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
166 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
168 static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
, int err
)
170 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
171 ctx
->current_cert
= (x
!= NULL
) ? x
: sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
172 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
)
174 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
177 #define CB_FAIL_IF(cond, ctx, cert, depth, err) \
178 if ((cond) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, depth, err) == 0) \
182 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
183 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
186 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
188 static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
191 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
194 static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
197 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
199 if (ctx
->param
->auth_level
<= 0)
202 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; ++i
) {
203 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
206 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
207 * check the security of issuer keys.
209 CB_FAIL_IF(i
> 0 && !check_key_level(ctx
, cert
),
210 ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
212 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
213 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
215 CB_FAIL_IF(i
< num
- 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx
, cert
),
216 ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
221 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
227 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
228 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
230 if ((ok
= build_chain(ctx
)) == 0 ||
231 (ok
= check_chain(ctx
)) == 0 ||
232 (ok
= check_auth_level(ctx
)) == 0 ||
233 (ok
= check_id(ctx
)) == 0 || 1)
234 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
235 if (ok
== 0 || (ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
)) == 0)
238 err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
240 CB_FAIL_IF(err
!= X509_V_OK
, ctx
, NULL
, ctx
->error_depth
, err
);
242 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
243 ok
= (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
) ? ctx
->verify(ctx
) : internal_verify(ctx
);
247 if ((ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
)) == 0)
250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
251 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
252 if ((ok
= X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
254 if ((ok
= X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
258 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
259 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
)
260 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
264 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
266 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
269 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
270 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
271 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
275 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
277 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
278 * cannot do another one.
280 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
281 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
285 if (!X509_add_cert_new(&ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
)) {
286 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
289 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 1;
291 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
292 CB_FAIL_IF(!check_key_level(ctx
, ctx
->cert
),
293 ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
295 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
296 ret
= dane_verify(ctx
);
298 ret
= verify_chain(ctx
);
301 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
302 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
303 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
305 if (ret
<= 0 && ctx
->error
== X509_V_OK
)
306 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
310 static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*cert
)
312 int i
, n
= sk_X509_num(sk
);
314 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
315 if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk
, i
), cert
) == 0)
321 * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) |sk| an issuer cert (if any) of given cert |x|.
322 * The issuer must not yet be in |ctx->chain|, yet allowing the exception that
323 * |x| is self-issued and |ctx->chain| has just one element.
324 * Prefer the first non-expired one, else take the most recently expired one.
326 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
329 X509
*issuer
, *rv
= NULL
;
331 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
332 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
333 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
)
334 && (((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
335 || !sk_X509_contains(ctx
->chain
, issuer
))) {
336 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, issuer
, -1))
338 if (rv
== NULL
|| ASN1_TIME_compare(X509_get0_notAfter(issuer
),
339 X509_get0_notAfter(rv
)) > 0)
346 /* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */
347 static int check_issued(ossl_unused X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
349 return x509_likely_issued(issuer
, x
) == X509_V_OK
;
352 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
353 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
355 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
357 if (*issuer
== NULL
|| !X509_up_ref(*issuer
))
367 static STACK_OF(X509
) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
370 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
374 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->other_ctx
); i
++) {
375 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->other_ctx
, i
);
376 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0) {
377 if (!X509_add_cert_new(&sk
, x
, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
)) {
378 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
379 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
388 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
389 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
391 static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int purpose
, int depth
,
394 int tr_ok
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
397 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
398 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
400 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
401 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
402 * ctx->param->purpose!
404 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
405 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
406 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
407 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
408 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
410 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
411 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
414 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
&& purpose
== ctx
->param
->purpose
)
415 tr_ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT
);
418 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
420 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
423 switch (X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0)) {
429 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) == 0)
435 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
);
438 /* Check extensions of a cert chain for consistency with the supplied purpose */
439 static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
441 int i
, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
443 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
445 int allow_proxy_certs
;
446 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
449 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
450 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
451 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
452 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
453 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
454 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
455 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
459 /* CRL path validation */
461 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
462 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
465 ! !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
466 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
469 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
472 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
473 CB_FAIL_IF((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
) == 0
474 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
) != 0,
475 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
);
476 CB_FAIL_IF(!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
),
477 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
);
478 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
479 switch (must_be_ca
) {
481 CB_FAIL_IF((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) != 0
482 && ret
!= 1 && ret
!= 0,
483 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
);
486 CB_FAIL_IF(ret
!= 0, ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
);
489 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
492 || ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
493 && ret
!= 1), ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
);
497 /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
498 ret
= check_curve(x
);
499 CB_FAIL_IF(ret
< 0, ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
);
500 CB_FAIL_IF(ret
== 0, ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS
);
503 * Do the following set of checks only if strict checking is requested
504 * and not for self-issued (including self-signed) EE (non-CA) certs
505 * because RFC 5280 does not apply to them according RFC 6818 section 2.
507 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) != 0
510 * !(i == 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
511 * && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0)
513 /* Check Basic Constraints according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.9 */
514 if (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1) {
515 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) == 0,
516 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA
);
517 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_kusage
& KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
) == 0, ctx
,
518 x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
);
520 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0
521 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_BCONS
) != 0
522 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL
) == 0,
523 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL
);
524 /* Check Key Usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */
525 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0) {
526 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) == 0,
527 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE
);
529 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_kusage
& KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
) != 0, ctx
, x
, i
,
530 X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA
);
532 /* Check issuer is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.4 */
533 CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_issuer_name(x
)) == 0,
534 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY
);
535 /* Check subject is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6 */
536 CB_FAIL_IF(((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0
537 || (x
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
) != 0
538 || x
->altname
== NULL
)
539 && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0,
540 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY
);
541 CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0
542 && x
->altname
!= NULL
543 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL
) == 0,
544 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL
);
545 /* Check SAN is non-empty according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 */
546 CB_FAIL_IF(x
->altname
!= NULL
547 && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x
->altname
) <= 0,
548 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
);
549 /* TODO add more checks on SAN entries */
550 /* Check sig alg consistency acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.1.2 */
551 CB_FAIL_IF(X509_ALGOR_cmp(&x
->sig_alg
, &x
->cert_info
.signature
) != 0,
552 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY
);
553 CB_FAIL_IF(x
->akid
!= NULL
554 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL
) != 0,
555 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL
);
556 CB_FAIL_IF(x
->skid
!= NULL
557 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL
) != 0,
558 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL
);
559 if (X509_get_version(x
) >= 2) { /* at least X.509v3 */
560 /* Check AKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.1 */
561 CB_FAIL_IF(i
+ 1 < num
/*
562 * this means not last cert in chain,
563 * taken as "generated by conforming CAs"
565 && (x
->akid
== NULL
|| x
->akid
->keyid
== NULL
), ctx
,
566 x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER
);
567 /* Check SKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.2 */
568 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0 && x
->skid
== NULL
,
569 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER
);
571 CB_FAIL_IF(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(X509_get0_extensions(x
)) > 0,
572 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3
);
576 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
577 if (purpose
> 0 && !check_purpose(ctx
, x
, purpose
, i
, must_be_ca
))
579 /* Check path length */
580 CB_FAIL_IF(i
> 1 && x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1
581 && plen
> x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
,
582 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
);
583 /* Increment path length if not a self-issued intermediate CA */
584 if (i
> 0 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
) == 0)
587 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
588 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
589 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
591 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
593 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
594 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
595 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
596 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
598 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
599 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
600 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
601 * increment proxy_path_length.
603 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1) {
604 CB_FAIL_IF(proxy_path_length
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
,
605 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
);
606 proxy_path_length
= x
->ex_pcpathlen
;
616 static int has_san_id(X509
*x
, int gtype
)
620 GENERAL_NAMES
*gs
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_subject_alt_name
, NULL
, NULL
);
625 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs
); i
++) {
626 GENERAL_NAME
*g
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs
, i
);
628 if (g
->type
== gtype
) {
633 GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs
);
637 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
641 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
642 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
643 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
646 /* Ignore self-issued certs unless last in chain */
647 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
651 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
652 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
654 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
656 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
657 X509_NAME
*tmpsubject
= X509_get_subject_name(x
);
658 X509_NAME
*tmpissuer
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
659 X509_NAME_ENTRY
*tmpentry
= NULL
;
660 int last_object_nid
= 0;
662 int last_object_loc
= X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
) - 1;
664 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
665 if (last_object_loc
< 1) {
666 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
667 goto proxy_name_done
;
671 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
672 * there is in issuer.
674 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
)
675 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer
) + 1) {
676 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
677 goto proxy_name_done
;
681 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
684 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
,
686 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
,
687 last_object_loc
- 1))) {
688 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
689 goto proxy_name_done
;
693 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
694 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
696 tmpsubject
= X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject
);
697 if (tmpsubject
== NULL
) {
698 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
699 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
704 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject
, last_object_loc
);
706 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry
));
708 if (last_object_nid
!= NID_commonName
709 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject
, tmpissuer
) != 0) {
710 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
713 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry
);
714 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject
);
717 CB_FAIL_IF(err
!= X509_V_OK
, ctx
, x
, i
, err
);
721 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
722 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
723 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
726 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
727 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
730 int rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
732 /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
733 if (rv
== X509_V_OK
&& i
== 0
734 && (ctx
->param
->hostflags
735 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT
) == 0
736 && ((ctx
->param
->hostflags
737 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT
) != 0
738 || !has_san_id(x
, GEN_DNS
)))
739 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x
, nc
);
744 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
747 CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx
, x
, i
, rv
);
756 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
758 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, errcode
);
761 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
)
764 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm
->hosts
);
767 if (vpm
->peername
!= NULL
) {
768 OPENSSL_free(vpm
->peername
);
769 vpm
->peername
= NULL
;
771 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
772 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm
->hosts
, i
);
773 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, vpm
->hostflags
, &vpm
->peername
) > 0)
779 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
781 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
783 if (vpm
->hosts
&& check_hosts(x
, vpm
) <= 0) {
784 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
787 if (vpm
->email
&& X509_check_email(x
, vpm
->email
, vpm
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
788 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
791 if (vpm
->ip
&& X509_check_ip(x
, vpm
->ip
, vpm
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
792 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
798 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
)
803 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
804 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
808 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
809 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
811 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && num_untrusted
> 0 && num_untrusted
< num
) {
812 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, num_untrusted
)) {
813 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
814 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
820 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
821 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
822 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
823 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
825 for (i
= num_untrusted
; i
< num
; i
++) {
826 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
827 trust
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
828 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
829 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
831 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
836 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
837 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
839 if (num_untrusted
< num
) {
840 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
)
842 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
845 if (num_untrusted
== num
&& ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
847 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
848 * for a direct trust store match.
851 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
852 mx
= lookup_cert_match(ctx
, x
);
854 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
857 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
858 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
860 trust
= X509_check_trust(mx
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
861 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
866 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
867 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
869 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
874 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
875 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
877 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
880 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
) == 0
881 ? X509_TRUST_REJECTED
: X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
884 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
885 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
887 dane
->pdpth
= num_untrusted
;
888 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
889 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
890 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
891 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
894 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
896 int i
= 0, last
= 0, ok
= 0;
897 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
899 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
900 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
902 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
907 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
908 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
909 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
916 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
918 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
920 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
921 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
923 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
924 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
925 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
926 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
928 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)
931 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
932 unsigned int last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
934 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
936 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
938 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
939 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */
941 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
944 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
945 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
950 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
953 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
959 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
961 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
971 * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
974 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
975 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
983 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
987 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
988 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
994 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
995 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
996 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
997 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
1002 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
1006 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
))
1013 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
))
1017 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
1018 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
1023 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
))
1026 /* Ignore expiration of base CRL is delta is valid */
1027 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
)) {
1030 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
))
1036 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
1041 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
1042 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
1043 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1045 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
1046 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
1047 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
1048 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
1049 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1051 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1052 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1053 reasons
= *preasons
;
1054 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
1055 if (crl_score
< best_score
|| crl_score
== 0)
1057 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1058 if (crl_score
== best_score
&& best_crl
!= NULL
) {
1060 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day
, &sec
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl
),
1061 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
)) == 0)
1064 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1067 if (day
<= 0 && sec
<= 0)
1071 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
1072 best_score
= crl_score
;
1073 best_reasons
= reasons
;
1077 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
1079 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
1080 *pscore
= best_score
;
1081 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
1082 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl
);
1083 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
1085 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
1088 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
1095 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1096 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1098 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
1100 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
1102 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
1104 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1105 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1107 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
1111 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
1115 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1117 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
1127 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
1133 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1134 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
1136 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1137 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
1139 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1140 if (!base
->crl_number
)
1142 /* Issuer names must match */
1143 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
1145 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1146 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
1148 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
1150 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1151 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1153 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1154 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1160 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1161 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1163 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
1164 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1168 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
1170 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
1172 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1173 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1174 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1175 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1176 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1177 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta
);
1186 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1187 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1188 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1189 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1190 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1192 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1193 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1197 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1199 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1201 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1202 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1204 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1205 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
)) {
1206 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1208 } else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) {
1209 /* If no new reasons reject */
1210 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1213 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1214 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1216 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1217 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
))) {
1218 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1221 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1223 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1224 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1226 /* Check expiration */
1227 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1228 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1230 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1231 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1233 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1234 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1237 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1239 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1240 /* If no new reasons reject */
1241 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1243 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1244 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1247 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1253 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1254 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1256 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1257 const X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1258 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1261 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1264 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1266 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1267 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1268 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1269 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1274 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1275 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1276 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1278 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1279 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1280 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1285 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1286 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1290 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1291 * untrusted certificates.
1293 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1294 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1295 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1297 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1298 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1299 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1306 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1307 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1308 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1309 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1311 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1313 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1316 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1319 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->store
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1322 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1323 /* Copy verify params across */
1324 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1326 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1327 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1329 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1330 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1334 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1335 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1337 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1342 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1343 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1344 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorized to do so. RFC5280 is more
1345 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1346 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1349 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1350 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1351 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1353 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1354 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1355 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1356 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1362 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1363 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1364 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1365 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1366 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1368 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1370 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1371 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1372 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1379 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1383 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1388 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1390 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1391 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1394 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1395 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1399 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1401 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1402 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1403 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1405 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1411 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1413 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1414 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1415 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1416 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1417 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1426 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1429 const X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1430 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1432 return ! !(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1433 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1434 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1435 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1437 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1443 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1444 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1445 unsigned int *preasons
)
1448 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1450 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) {
1451 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1454 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1457 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1458 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1459 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1460 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1461 if (!crl
->idp
|| idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1462 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1467 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
)
1468 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1474 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1475 * to find a delta CRL too
1477 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1478 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1481 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1483 unsigned int reasons
;
1484 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1485 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1486 const X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1488 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1489 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1490 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1494 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1495 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1497 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1501 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1503 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1506 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1508 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1509 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1510 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1518 /* Check CRL validity */
1519 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1521 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1522 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1523 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1524 int chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1526 /* If we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1527 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1528 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1530 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1531 * certificate in chain.
1533 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1534 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1536 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1537 /* If not self-issued, can't check signature */
1538 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
) &&
1539 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
))
1547 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1549 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
) {
1550 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1551 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1552 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
) &&
1553 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
))
1556 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
) &&
1557 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
))
1560 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
) &&
1561 check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0 &&
1562 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
))
1565 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) &&
1566 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
))
1570 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
) &&
1571 !check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1))
1574 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1575 ikey
= X509_get0_pubkey(issuer
);
1578 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
))
1582 int rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1584 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
&& !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, rv
))
1586 /* Verify CRL signature */
1587 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0 &&
1588 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
))
1594 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1595 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1600 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1601 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1602 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1603 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1605 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1606 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
) &&
1607 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
))
1610 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1611 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1613 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1614 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1616 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
))
1623 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1630 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1631 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1632 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1633 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1634 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1635 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1636 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1637 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1638 * X509_policy_check() call.
1640 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
&& !sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, NULL
)) {
1641 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1642 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
1645 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1646 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1647 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
)
1648 (void)sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
1650 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL
) {
1651 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1652 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
1655 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1656 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID
) {
1659 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1660 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1661 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1663 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
) != 0,
1664 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
);
1668 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE
) {
1669 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1670 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1671 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1673 if (ret
!= X509_PCY_TREE_VALID
) {
1674 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1678 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) {
1679 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1681 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1682 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1683 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1684 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1686 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1694 * Check certificate validity times.
1695 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1696 * the validation status.
1698 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1700 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
)
1705 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1706 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1707 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
1712 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1713 if (i
>= 0 && depth
< 0)
1715 CB_FAIL_IF(i
== 0, ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
);
1716 CB_FAIL_IF(i
> 0, ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
);
1718 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1719 if (i
<= 0 && depth
< 0)
1721 CB_FAIL_IF(i
== 0, ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
);
1722 CB_FAIL_IF(i
< 0, ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
);
1726 /* verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain */
1727 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1729 int n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1730 X509
*xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1734 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1735 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1736 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1738 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
) {
1741 goto check_cert_time
;
1744 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1745 xs
= xi
; /* The typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */
1747 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
1749 goto check_cert_time
;
1752 CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx
, xi
, 0, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
);
1755 goto check_cert_time
;
1759 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1760 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1764 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1765 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1769 * For each iteration of this loop:
1770 * n is the subject depth
1771 * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked
1772 * xi is the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use
1773 * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued.
1775 * Skip signature check for self-signed certificates unless explicitly
1776 * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time.
1778 if (xs
!= xi
|| ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
)
1779 && (xi
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)) {
1782 * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage
1783 * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer
1784 * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject).
1786 int issuer_depth
= n
+ (xs
== xi
? 0 : 1);
1788 * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4
1789 * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert
1790 * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it.
1791 * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
1792 * we must not verify a certificate signature if the key usage of
1793 * the CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing.
1794 * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is
1795 * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e.,
1796 * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply
1797 * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus
1798 * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs.
1800 int ret
= xs
== xi
&& (xi
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) == 0
1801 ? X509_V_OK
: x509_signing_allowed(xi
, xs
);
1803 CB_FAIL_IF(ret
!= X509_V_OK
, ctx
, xi
, issuer_depth
, ret
);
1804 if ((pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1805 CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx
, xi
, issuer_depth
,
1806 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1808 CB_FAIL_IF(X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0,
1809 ctx
, xs
, n
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
);
1813 check_cert_time
: /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */
1814 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1815 if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
, n
))
1819 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1822 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1823 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1824 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1825 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
))
1830 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1836 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1838 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1841 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1843 static const size_t utctime_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1844 static const size_t generalizedtime_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1845 ASN1_TIME
*asn1_cmp_time
= NULL
;
1846 int i
, day
, sec
, ret
= 0;
1847 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
1848 const char upper_z
= 0x5A;
1850 const char upper_z
= 'Z';
1853 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1854 * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1855 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1856 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1858 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1859 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1860 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1861 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1863 switch (ctm
->type
) {
1864 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME
:
1865 if (ctm
->length
!= (int)(utctime_length
))
1868 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
:
1869 if (ctm
->length
!= (int)(generalizedtime_length
))
1877 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1878 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1879 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1881 for (i
= 0; i
< ctm
->length
- 1; i
++) {
1882 if (!ascii_isdigit(ctm
->data
[i
]))
1885 if (ctm
->data
[ctm
->length
- 1] != upper_z
)
1889 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1890 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1891 * so we go through ASN.1
1893 asn1_cmp_time
= X509_time_adj(NULL
, 0, cmp_time
);
1894 if (asn1_cmp_time
== NULL
)
1896 if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day
, &sec
, ctm
, asn1_cmp_time
))
1900 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1901 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1903 ret
= (day
>= 0 && sec
>= 0) ? -1 : 1;
1906 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time
);
1911 * Return 0 if time should not be checked or reference time is in range,
1912 * or else 1 if it is past the end, or -1 if it is before the start
1914 int X509_cmp_timeframe(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
,
1915 const ASN1_TIME
*start
, const ASN1_TIME
*end
)
1918 time_t *time
= NULL
;
1919 unsigned long flags
= vpm
== NULL
? 0 : X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(vpm
);
1921 if ((flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
) != 0) {
1922 ref_time
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(vpm
);
1924 } else if ((flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
) != 0) {
1925 return 0; /* this means ok */
1926 } /* else reference time is the current time */
1928 if (end
!= NULL
&& X509_cmp_time(end
, time
) < 0)
1930 if (start
!= NULL
&& X509_cmp_time(start
, time
) > 0)
1935 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1937 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1940 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1942 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1945 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1946 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1955 if (s
&& !(s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
)) {
1956 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1957 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1958 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1959 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1961 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1964 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1966 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
1969 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
1972 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1973 ktmp
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
1975 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1978 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1982 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1986 /* first, populate the other certs */
1987 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
1988 ktmp2
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
1989 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
);
1993 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
1997 /* Make a delta CRL as the difference between two full CRLs */
1998 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
1999 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
2001 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
2003 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
2004 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2005 if (base
->base_crl_number
|| newer
->base_crl_number
) {
2006 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
2009 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2010 if (!base
->crl_number
|| !newer
->crl_number
) {
2011 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
2014 /* Issuer names must match */
2015 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
2016 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
2019 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2020 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
2021 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
2024 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
2025 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
2028 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2029 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
2030 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
2033 /* CRLs must verify */
2034 if (skey
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
2035 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
2036 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
2039 /* Create new CRL */
2040 crl
= X509_CRL_new();
2041 if (crl
== NULL
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, 1))
2043 /* Set issuer name */
2044 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
2047 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer
)))
2049 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer
)))
2052 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2053 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
2057 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2058 * number to correct value too.
2060 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
2061 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
;
2062 ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
2063 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
2067 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2068 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
2070 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
2071 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
2072 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
2074 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2075 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2077 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, &rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
2078 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
2081 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
2082 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
2087 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2089 if (skey
&& md
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
2095 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2100 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2102 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2105 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2107 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2110 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2115 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2120 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2122 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2125 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2127 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
2130 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2132 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2135 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2137 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
2140 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2145 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2149 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2152 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2154 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2157 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2159 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2162 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2167 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2172 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2177 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2180 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2181 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2182 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2184 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2187 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2190 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2191 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2193 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2197 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2198 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2199 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2200 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2201 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2202 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2203 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2207 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2208 int purpose
, int trust
)
2211 /* If purpose not set use default */
2213 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2214 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2217 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2219 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2222 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2223 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2224 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2226 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2227 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2228 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2231 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2234 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2236 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2238 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2241 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2243 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2248 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
)
2249 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2250 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
)
2251 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2255 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX
*libctx
, const char *propq
)
2257 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx
));
2260 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2264 ctx
->libctx
= libctx
;
2265 if (propq
!= NULL
) {
2266 ctx
->propq
= OPENSSL_strdup(propq
);
2267 if (ctx
->propq
== NULL
) {
2269 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2277 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2279 return X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(NULL
, NULL
);
2283 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2288 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2290 /* libctx and propq survive X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() */
2291 OPENSSL_free(ctx
->propq
);
2296 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2297 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2303 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2305 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
2306 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2310 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2311 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2312 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2313 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2314 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2315 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2316 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2320 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 0;
2321 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2322 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2324 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2326 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2330 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2331 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2333 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2335 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2336 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2338 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2340 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2341 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2343 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2345 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2346 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2348 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2350 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2351 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2353 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2355 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2356 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2358 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2360 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2361 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2363 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2365 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2366 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2368 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2370 if (store
&& store
->check_policy
)
2371 ctx
->check_policy
= store
->check_policy
;
2373 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2375 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2376 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2378 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs
;
2380 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2381 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2383 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls
;
2385 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2386 if (ctx
->param
== NULL
) {
2387 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2391 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */
2393 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2395 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2398 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2399 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2402 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2407 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2408 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2410 if (ctx
->param
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2411 int idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx
->param
->purpose
);
2412 X509_PURPOSE
*xp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2415 ctx
->param
->trust
= X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp
);
2418 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2421 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2425 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2426 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2428 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2433 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2434 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2436 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2438 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2439 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2440 ctx
->lookup_certs
= lookup_certs_sk
;
2443 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2446 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2447 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2448 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2449 * pointers below after they're freed!
2451 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2452 if (ctx
->cleanup
!= NULL
) {
2454 ctx
->cleanup
= NULL
;
2456 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2457 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2458 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2461 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2463 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2465 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2466 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2469 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2471 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2474 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2476 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2479 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2482 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2485 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2490 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2492 return ctx
->untrusted
;
2495 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2497 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2500 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2502 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2506 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2507 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb
)
2509 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2512 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2514 return ctx
->verify_cb
;
2517 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2518 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify
)
2520 ctx
->verify
= verify
;
2523 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2528 X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2530 return ctx
->get_issuer
;
2533 X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn
2534 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2536 return ctx
->check_issued
;
2539 X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn
2540 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2542 return ctx
->check_revocation
;
2545 X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2547 return ctx
->get_crl
;
2550 X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2552 return ctx
->check_crl
;
2555 X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2557 return ctx
->cert_crl
;
2560 X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn
2561 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2563 return ctx
->check_policy
;
2566 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn
2567 X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2569 return ctx
->lookup_certs
;
2572 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn
2573 X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2575 return ctx
->lookup_crls
;
2578 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2580 return ctx
->cleanup
;
2583 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2588 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2590 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2593 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2595 return ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2598 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2600 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2602 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2605 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2608 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2613 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2615 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2619 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, SSL_DANE
*dane
)
2624 static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2627 unsigned int *i2dlen
)
2629 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
2633 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2636 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT
:
2637 len
= i2d_X509(cert
, &buf
);
2639 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
:
2640 len
= i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert
), &buf
);
2643 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR
);
2647 if (len
< 0 || buf
== NULL
) {
2648 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2652 *i2dlen
= (unsigned int)len
;
2656 #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2658 static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
, int depth
)
2660 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2661 unsigned usage
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2662 unsigned selector
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2663 unsigned ordinal
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2664 unsigned mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2665 unsigned char *i2dbuf
= NULL
;
2666 unsigned int i2dlen
= 0;
2667 unsigned char mdbuf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2668 unsigned char *cmpbuf
= NULL
;
2669 unsigned int cmplen
= 0;
2673 danetls_record
*t
= NULL
;
2676 mask
= (depth
== 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK
: DANETLS_TA_MASK
;
2678 /* The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) */
2679 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
2680 mask
&= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2683 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2684 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2685 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2687 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
2688 mask
&= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2691 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2692 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2693 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2694 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2696 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2697 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2698 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2699 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2701 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2702 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2703 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2705 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2706 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2707 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2708 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2709 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2710 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2711 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2713 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2714 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2715 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2716 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2718 recnum
= (dane
->umask
& mask
) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
) : 0;
2719 for (i
= 0; matched
== 0 && i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2720 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2721 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t
->usage
) & mask
) == 0)
2723 if (t
->usage
!= usage
) {
2726 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2727 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2728 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2730 if (t
->selector
!= selector
) {
2731 selector
= t
->selector
;
2733 /* Update per-selector state */
2734 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2735 i2dbuf
= dane_i2d(cert
, selector
, &i2dlen
);
2739 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2740 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2741 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2742 } else if (t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
) {
2746 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2748 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2749 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2750 * other than "Full".
2752 if (dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
] < ordinal
)
2757 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2758 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2760 if (t
->mtype
!= mtype
) {
2761 const EVP_MD
*md
= dane
->dctx
->mdevp
[mtype
= t
->mtype
];
2767 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf
, i2dlen
, cmpbuf
, &cmplen
, md
, 0)) {
2775 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2776 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2779 if (cmplen
== t
->dlen
&&
2780 memcmp(cmpbuf
, t
->data
, cmplen
) == 0) {
2781 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage
) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK
)
2783 if (matched
|| dane
->mdpth
< 0) {
2784 dane
->mdpth
= depth
;
2786 OPENSSL_free(dane
->mcert
);
2794 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2795 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2799 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2801 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2805 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) || depth
== 0)
2806 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2809 * Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2810 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2811 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2813 cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
2814 if (cert
!= NULL
&& (matched
= dane_match(ctx
, cert
, depth
)) < 0)
2815 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2817 ctx
->num_untrusted
= depth
- 1;
2818 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2821 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2824 static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2826 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2828 int num
= ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2829 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2830 int recnum
= sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
);
2833 for (i
= 0; i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2834 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2835 if (t
->usage
!= DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA
||
2836 t
->selector
!= DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
||
2837 t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
||
2838 X509_verify(cert
, t
->spki
) <= 0)
2841 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2842 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2845 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2846 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 1;
2847 dane
->mdpth
= num
- 1;
2850 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2851 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2852 for (; num
> ctx
->num_untrusted
; --num
)
2853 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
2855 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2858 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2861 static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE
*dane
)
2863 /* Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. */
2864 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2871 static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
2873 int err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, cert
, NULL
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
2875 CB_FAIL_IF(err
!= X509_V_OK
, ctx
, cert
, 0, err
);
2879 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2881 X509
*cert
= ctx
->cert
;
2882 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2889 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2890 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2891 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2892 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust anchor.
2893 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2895 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2896 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2897 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2898 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2900 matched
= dane_match(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0);
2901 done
= matched
!= 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && dane
->mdpth
< 0);
2904 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
2907 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2908 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2910 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2911 if ((dane
->flags
& DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS
) == 0 &&
2914 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2915 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2916 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2917 return ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
);
2921 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2922 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2923 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2928 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2929 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2931 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
2935 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2936 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2938 return verify_chain(ctx
);
2941 /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
2942 static int get_issuer(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
2944 STACK_OF(X509
) *saved_chain
= ctx
->chain
;
2948 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(issuer
, ctx
, cert
);
2949 ctx
->chain
= saved_chain
;
2954 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2956 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2957 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2958 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2960 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
= NULL
;
2961 unsigned int search
;
2962 int may_trusted
= 0;
2963 int may_alternate
= 0;
2964 int trust
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2965 int alt_untrusted
= 0;
2970 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2971 if (!ossl_assert(num
== 1 && ctx
->num_untrusted
== num
)) {
2972 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2973 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
2977 self_signed
= X509_self_signed(cert
, 0);
2978 if (self_signed
< 0) {
2979 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
2983 #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2984 #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2985 #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2987 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2988 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2989 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2990 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2991 * if no luck with untrusted first.
2993 search
= (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED
: 0;
2994 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane
)) {
2995 if (search
== 0 || ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
)
2996 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
2997 else if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
))
3003 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
3004 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
3005 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
3007 if (ctx
->untrusted
&& (sktmp
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
) {
3008 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3009 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3014 * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust anchors from DNS, add
3015 * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
3016 * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
3017 * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
3018 * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
3019 * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
3020 * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
3023 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) && dane
->certs
!= NULL
) {
3024 if (sktmp
== NULL
&& (sktmp
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3025 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3026 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3029 if (!X509_add_certs(sktmp
, dane
->certs
, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT
)) {
3030 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
3031 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3037 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
3038 * might be reasonable.
3040 if (ctx
->param
->depth
> INT_MAX
/2)
3041 ctx
->param
->depth
= INT_MAX
/2;
3044 * Try to extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
3045 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
3046 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
3048 depth
= ctx
->param
->depth
+ 1;
3050 while (search
!= 0) {
3055 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
3056 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
3057 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
3058 * we've not found a trust anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
3060 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
3061 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
3062 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
3063 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
3064 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
3065 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
3066 * would be a-priori too long.
3068 if ((search
& S_DOTRUSTED
) != 0) {
3069 i
= num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3070 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
3072 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
3073 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
3074 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
3075 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
3076 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
3077 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
3078 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
3079 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
3080 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
3081 * ctx->num_untrusted.
3083 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
3084 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
3088 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
-1);
3090 ok
= (depth
< num
) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
3093 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3094 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
;
3101 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
3102 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
3103 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
3104 * that despite the current trust store match we might still
3105 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust anchor, in which
3106 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
3107 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
3108 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
3110 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
3111 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
3112 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
3114 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
3115 if (!ossl_assert(num
> i
&& i
> 0 && !self_signed
)) {
3116 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3118 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3119 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3123 search
&= ~S_DOALTERNATE
;
3124 for (; num
> i
; --num
)
3125 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
3126 ctx
->num_untrusted
= num
;
3128 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3129 dane
->mdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
3131 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
3134 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3135 dane
->pdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3140 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
3141 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
3144 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
= xtmp
)) {
3146 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3147 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3148 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3152 self_signed
= X509_self_signed(x
, 0);
3153 if (self_signed
< 0) {
3154 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
3155 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3158 } else if (num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
3160 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
3161 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3162 * a trust anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
3163 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3165 if (X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
) != 0) {
3166 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3171 ctx
->num_untrusted
= --num
;
3172 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, num
, x
= xtmp
);
3177 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, re-check
3178 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3179 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3180 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3182 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3183 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3184 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3185 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3186 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3187 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3190 if (!ossl_assert(ctx
->num_untrusted
<= num
)) {
3191 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3192 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3193 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3197 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3198 switch (trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
)) {
3199 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3200 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3210 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3211 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3212 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3213 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3215 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) == 0) {
3216 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3217 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 && --alt_untrusted
> 0)
3219 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3220 if (!may_alternate
|| (search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 ||
3221 ctx
->num_untrusted
< 2)
3223 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3224 search
|= S_DOALTERNATE
;
3225 alt_untrusted
= ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1;
3231 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
3233 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) != 0) {
3234 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3235 if (!ossl_assert(num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
)) {
3236 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3237 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3238 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3242 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
-1);
3245 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
3246 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3248 xtmp
= (self_signed
|| depth
< num
) ? NULL
3249 : find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
, x
);
3251 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3253 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
3257 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3258 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
, xtmp
);
3260 if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp
)) {
3261 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3262 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3263 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3268 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, xtmp
)) {
3270 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3271 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3272 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3278 ++ctx
->num_untrusted
;
3279 self_signed
= X509_self_signed(x
, 0);
3280 if (self_signed
< 0) {
3281 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
3282 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3286 /* Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. */
3287 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1)) {
3288 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3289 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3295 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
3298 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3299 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3301 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3303 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane
))
3304 trust
= check_dane_pkeys(ctx
);
3305 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3306 trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
);
3310 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3312 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3313 /* Callback already issued */
3315 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
:
3317 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3318 CB_FAIL_IF(num
> depth
,
3319 ctx
, NULL
, num
-1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
);
3320 CB_FAIL_IF(DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
)
3321 && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || dane
->pdpth
>= 0),
3322 ctx
, NULL
, num
-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
3324 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3325 sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1
3326 ? X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
3327 : X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
);
3328 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3329 ctx
->num_untrusted
< num
3330 ? X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
3331 : X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
);
3335 static const int minbits_table
[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3336 static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
= OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table
);
3339 * Check whether the public key of `cert` meets the security level of `ctx`.
3340 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3342 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3344 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(cert
);
3345 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3348 * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public
3349 * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the
3350 * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security
3356 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3360 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3361 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3363 return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
) >= minbits_table
[level
- 1];
3367 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params
3368 * for an elliptic curve.
3370 * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors.
3372 static int check_curve(X509
*cert
)
3374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3375 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(cert
);
3377 /* Unsupported or malformed key */
3381 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3384 ret
= EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
));
3385 return ret
< 0 ? ret
: !ret
;
3393 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3394 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3395 * self-signed or otherwise).
3397 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3399 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3402 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3406 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3407 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3409 if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert
, NULL
, NULL
, &secbits
, NULL
))
3412 return secbits
>= minbits_table
[level
- 1];